Recently, the article by Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen has made waves, attempting to completely refute the concept of psychopathy and labeling it a “zombie idea.” The author concludes that psychopathy does not exist in principle, and that the scientific community’s interest in this idea is fueled only by the cultural popularity of the concept. But do such claims actually hold water, or is this just another attempt to ride the hype by denying the obvious? Let us examine everything in order.
First of all, the author refers to his own meta-analysis, in which he finds that, according to research data, psychopathic personalities perform no worse than ordinary people on empathy tests. However, it is extremely important to note that modern science does not claim an absolute inability of psychopaths to empathize. Often, the discussion concerns a deficit in affective empathy (the ability to feel the emotions of others while observing them) to varying degrees, while simultaneously, cognitive empathy (the mere ability to read others’ emotions without feeling them) is frequently fully intact. The author of the article primarily uses empathy as a monolithic construct, which is fundamentally incorrect.
Furthermore, such results may have a rather interesting explanation—psychopathy may consist not in the absence of empathy itself, but merely in the absence of its automatic activation. For instance, in one experiment, psychopaths were found to have the same level of mirror neuron activation (which is typically associated with empathy) as ordinary people. But this only occurred when they were given the task of manifesting it intentionally! As for spontaneous empathy, they demonstrated a clear deficit in neural activity in that case. Another experiment similarly proved the ability of psychopaths to take the perspective of others (to understand their state and thoughts), but only when it is an intentional task. At the same time, automatic (reflexive) perspective-taking occurs only in low-psychopathic personalities.
The author also uses psychopathy itself as a monolithic construct, without paying particular attention to its individual traits and the connections between them. This is also an extremely incorrect approach, as in modern research, results and conclusions are often presented within the framework of multi-factor models of psychopathy, which are perfectly functional.
There are also moments where the author has explicitly lied. He claims that frequently cited studies in favor of the psychopathy concept—for example, neurobiologist James Blair’s article on the mechanism of violence inhibition, which normally deters a person from harming others, the presence of moral-psychological impairments in psychopaths, as well as certain neurophysiological studies—are merely isolated pieces of evidence and therefore cannot be taken seriously. However, Blair’s core positions and his violence inhibitor model, such as the reduced ability of violent and psychopathic personalities to perceive distress signals (sadness, fear, etc.) from others, have been replicated by dozens of studies! Furthermore, there is already a great deal of evidence regarding the link between structural brain impairments and psychopathy.
Finally, the author decided not to mention the strongest argument in favor of the psychopathy concept at all: its extremely high predictive power regarding violent crime, and especially murder. This, for example, is supported by numerous studies and meta-analyses by criminologist Matt DeLisi. Moreover, so far there is not a single study that refutes such a link. As forensic psychologist John Marshall notes in one of his articles, psychopathy is the strongest indicator of violence, it is difficult to ignore in the matter of predicting such behavior, and the fact that the “average” criminal who commits a murder demonstrates moderate manifestations of psychopathy underscores that this is not just a rare subtype of murderers, but a general trend for all cases of lethal violence.









