Sorry that I didn’t cancel Bitarch’s scheduled post; it completely slipped my mind with everything going on, and the publication was somewhat out of place. Now, let’s get to the point.
In a recent post about mercantilism, I pointed out that today it is a tool not for achieving wealth, but for war. The market is a tool for peaceful people, and economic sanctions are the flip side of that tool. Specifically, if you, the reader, can find any way to make the Russian state poorer, I will be glad if you apply it. I will be even gladder if you can do this without danger to your life, and if it doesn’t hit your own wallet too hard—after all, the resources of a peaceful person and a state differ greatly, and it’s better to avoid clearly suicidal actions, unless, of course, you believe you can achieve some truly important goal for yourself this way.
If you go out onto Russian streets to protest the war, try not to get arrested. If you do get arrested, at least try not to pay the fines afterward. If there is an opportunity to emigrate immediately (for example, if you have remote work, you are not burdened by real estate, sick relatives, and so on), do it. Even if you continue to work remotely for some Russian enterprise, at least you won’t be paying consumption taxes to Russia. If you are burdened by things like clothes, cats, or studying political science, I hope you will soon rethink the priorities in your life, although you certainly know best.
Montenegro remains visa-free for Russians for now, so for some time it will still be possible to get here relatively freely. One of the MonteLibero participants has already issued a statement that they are ready to help free of charge in obtaining a residence permit for everyone who is forced to leave Ukraine for Montenegro and asks for help. I cannot formulate a similarly broad offer for everyone wishing to urgently ditch Russia on my part, but I will certainly help with advice on settling in.
Even if you are thrilled that Putin is finally cracking down on Ukrainian Nazis, I still hope that you leave Russia, but preferably far away from me.
In general, the best thing that could happen to Russians in the coming years is if they completely lose their own statehood and scatter across the world. Change my mind.
I reread what I wrote and see that it came out terribly dry. That’s why I love texts. You can write three paragraphs of emotion and pathos, exhale, and erase them.
About a month ago, the chapter-by-chapter publication of the translation of Jonathan Beer’s book Blocksize War ended on the Hype Coin News and Bitcoin Translated channels. I read the translation as it was being released, and when it finished, I decided to layout the book in epub, as I had previously done with the book Inventing Bitcoin published there. I started the work but forgot to upload it to the cloud, and then I left for Albania, resulting in a long technical break. Better late than never, so I laid out the book upon my return, and now I am posting it.
The book describes the inner workings of the bitcoin community in detail and provides an understanding of how decision-making occurs when everything is decentralized. Moreover, it is a successful case study where a very difficult and fundamental conflict eventually led to a good, balanced solution where everyone made some concessions. Thus, the book will be interesting not only to tech geeks (I am not one of them), but also to those interested in the mechanisms of self-governance in complex systems, which is extremely important for us ancaps.
Upd.: I added a section about patrons to the preface, as it felt impolite toward the people who funded the translation. Sorry for forgetting it at first.
Between different jurisdictions, there has always been the question of maintaining strategic parity—that is, an equality of chances of emerging victorious in the event of a military conflict. Without this, it is impossible to either deter a potential aggressive attack or repel it should it occur. But what strategic parity can there be in the case of an excessive difference in power potential? And the problem here consists not only in the quantitative and qualitative difference in weaponry, but also in the difference in violent tendencies among people. However, a solution exists even for absolutely pacifist societies, which we will now discuss.
Imagine Scandinavia, where although violence has not been completely eradicated, certain social factors have clearly reinforced low violent tendencies in the vast majority of the population over time. Even among state security agents, violent tendencies there are relatively low; at the very least, they are not even close to the violent tendencies of similar agents from other countries, such as Russia. If we assume that a military conflict arises between the Scandinavian states and Russia, the latter would be able to seize them almost without a fight. Even weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons or a class 4 pathogenic virus, would not help if they suddenly came into the possession of the Scandinavians, for because of their pacifism, they would hardly dare to actually use them. And given a similarly pacifist army and the lack of a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population), for security forces highly prone to violence—those who previously toured actively in Donbas and Syria—it would be no problem at all to march across the entire territory of Scandinavia and easily deal with any possible resistance in their path.
This same problem can be transferred to a potential free stateless society in which different contractual jurisdictions exist. Imagine that in such a society there is a jurisdiction of pacifists, in which violence is completely eradicated, and any offenses are punished by non-violent methods (ostracism or financial sanctions). But alongside this, there exists a violent jurisdiction, in which all problems are solved by brute force and cruel physical punishments (such a jurisdiction might be created, for example, by some conservatives). Obviously, there is no strategic parity here either; the order of the second society will lead to the reinforcement of violent tendencies in its participants, whereas in the case of the first society, these tendencies will be maximally suppressed (reinforcing a strong version of Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism). I think it is easy to understand who would win in the event of a direct military conflict.
An excellent solution to the problem of maintaining strategic parity on the part of more pacifist jurisdictions and societies is the creation of gene therapy against violence. It could be implemented in the form of a drug delivered to attacking agents via a fired dart. In an extreme case, implementation as a pandemic virus is possible (we do not approve of this option). Of course, the latter faces many risks, including the fact that bystanders would be affected, some of whom might die (even with the highest quality vaccination, not everyone tolerates it). However, such a “non-violence virus” is not a traditional weapon of mass destruction in terms of the physical destruction of the attackers; it is intended only for the forced eradication of violence in the aggressor’s army and is therefore the best possible solution within the framework of the classical MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) that can be imagined if there is no chance of stopping the aggressor through immediate resistance.
Both darts with the drug and a pandemic “non-violence virus” (personally, I do not approve of this option, but the opinions of others regarding the admissibility of such a “weapon” may differ) could be used even by fierce pacifists, given that such a “weapon” does not initiate violence in the biological sense, and even a person with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism would be able to apply it. They would allow for the deterrence of potential aggressors, as they would fear losing their violent tendencies as a result of attacking pacifists. But if someone still decides to attack, then we will arrive at the following scenarios:
1) Security agents sent to the front by the aggressor will come under fire from darts with gene therapy. And these darts will reach their target far more often than bullets do now, because soldiers, for the most part, are not rapists or violent criminals; they most often try to simulate activity at the front, avoid shooting, and if they do shoot, it is not at people on the other side of the front, but into the air, again, merely to create the illusion of performing some activity. There are quite few actual violent criminals in war, and this is confirmed by research, which you can find here. But anyone can fire a dart. And if the darts accurately hit the soldiers on the other side of the front, including those actually prone to violence, then the aggressor will soon find themselves completely without people capable of pushing the war further.
2) It is impossible to stop the attack; even darts with gene therapy are not enough to deter the overwhelming forces of the aggressor. In such a case, a pandemic “non-violence virus” is deployed across the front. After this, a few weeks may be enough for the aggressor’s forces to be completely disorganized and the soldiers to turn into pacifists incapable of attack. The war ends quite quickly.
Do you see now what an effective means of deterrence and ending war gene therapy against violence is? In principle, this is the only possible salvation for peaceful and non-violent societies from attack by violent aggressors. Moreover, compared to the weapons of mass destruction that are currently suggested as means of deterring aggressive attacks, this solution is extremely humane.
By the way, this solution is an excellent answer to the question of how a free society can protect itself from aggression by surrounding states in the event of a local rather than global achievement. It is also very useful in the very process of achieving a free society—the same darts with gene therapy can be successfully launched at security agents who beat and arrest peaceful protesters. Ensuring a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population) to achieve a state of affairs where any aggressor can be eliminated upon immediate attack can be a quite difficult task, but it is not necessary to provide everyone with darts with gene therapy—a small number of activists ready to fire them upon seeing another security officer in case of need will suffice (this is especially effective if security officers are deanonymized, as is currently done in Belarus; then they can be caught even in everyday life). And activists will be able to do this even while being less violent people than the security officers, or even absolute pacifists, because, again, this is not a means of inflicting physical harm or killing another person, but merely a means of depriving them of their violent tendencies.
As we can see, for the sake of maintaining strategic parity on the part of pacifist societies and for the sake of ensuring an effective struggle of peaceful protesters against the security agents of the state, it is very advantageous to develop gene therapy against violence. What is very important for us is that this is advantageous even to many modern governments, for example, in Scandinavia, and it is quite likely that they will want to help us. This would be the best and most humane solution to these problems that could possibly be imagined.
Bitarch (this time in the role of the question author, not the answer author – note by Ancap-chan)
Essentially, this question pertains to the section of social norms concerning the laws and customs of war. The more fierce the conflict, the greater the probability of the deliberate destruction of non-combatants.
What determines the fierceness of a conflict?
I will give a slightly paradoxical answer. A conflict will be less fierce the more it is perceived by all sides as a kind of natural state of affairs. It is precisely the routine of war that makes people treat it sloppily, show zeal only in front of their superiors, and perceive rank-and-file soldiers on the opposite side of the front as fellow wretches who happened to end up in this shit.
One happened to be born German, another French; now they sit opposite each other in trenches. It’s boring, damn it, maybe play some football? One happened to be born in the USA, another in the USSR; now the first has a bunker in the backyard, and the second is next to the factory gates. Studying the effects of a nuclear explosion is deadly boring—why doesn’t the first read “Das Kapital,” and the second watch a Hollywood action flick? One happened to be born with a penis, another with a vagina, and now their entire life is a continuous minefield. So, they will fuck, feeling like spies in the enemy camp. One is from a conservative family, another from a liberal one, and now they are supposed to fight in social networks. And then it turns out that discussing baseball is more interesting, and why doesn’t this politics just go away.
The conflict didn’t disappear; it is part of everyday life. Just far from the most important part. In fact, this is exactly how it was in the USA for quite a long time, and Trump, with his sharp rhetoric and clumsy diplomacy, contributed to the escalation of the war. Now, for some time, the conflict will be very fierce, and news about disconnecting ventilators could very easily become a reality. For libertarians, this means a certain field of opportunities, which I mentioned in the previous post.
So, is it permissible from the perspective of libertarian ethics to use total war techniques during fierce conflicts? Yes, it is permissible. But not very smart.
Many reflections on the situation in the USA have already been written, from the banal to the very deep, authored by quite respected people. I will try to survey the state of affairs from a slightly different angle.
From my two previous posts, you know that a republic is a society of people who agree on questions of law. In the USA right now, there is nowhere near an agreement on questions of law, which means there can be no legal assessment of either the electoral procedures, the performance at the Capitol, or the subsequent purges in the information field. If the jurisdiction of a court is not recognized by both parties to a conflict, then the court does not perform the function of resolving conflicts; therefore, it is not a court at all, but a more or less ritualized execution. In short, I interpret the state of affairs in the USA as a civil war. In a war, elections are only capable of recording exactly which personalities end up at the helm as the leader of the dominant grouping. This is still a more legitimate procedure than the direct rule of military commanders, but in fact, at the federal level, the elections in the USA were not between Trump and Biden, but between Biden and Sanders (from the Republican side, there were no elections at all). And then, Biden, having won the election, simply led the troops during the forceful crushing of the Republican side of the conflict.
What position do ancaps find themselves in this situation? The position of the third party who rejoices. In the confrontation between the toad and the viper, the toad emerged victorious, and now the viper temporarily finds itself on our side. An alliance between agorists, who defend market freedom regardless of the desires of any power groups, and those who continue to chant the mantra about law and order is potentially a very powerful thing. Because now we will be talking about our law and our order.
Using the information field as an example, this will mean the following. We will get a serious solvent demand for free social networks, free hosting, free domain registrars, free operating systems that do not prevent us from managing user devices, free hardware without hardware backdoors, and free money to pay for all the above. The network effect is exactly what the tools of freedom are currently lacking.
Today, it is a matter of honor for every American Republican to sell all their Apple and Alphabet shares, not to mention shitty Twitter, invest the proceeds in bitcoins, and use them to support those free market tools that best satisfy their client demand for the free exchange of information, money, and goods, for self-defense, for building peace and order around themselves, for the destruction of the aggressors’ property, for provoking discord among them, and for tools that ensure the state’s blindness, whether through anonymizing network actions or paralyzing the will of the overseers. Gouging out the Cyclops’ eye is an important part of the strategy.
Friedman devoted two chapters of The Machinery of Freedom to the problem of territorial defense against an aggressor of the “nation-state” type, with an interval of forty years between them. In the first part, he estimated the chances of an anarcho-USA fending off nuclear aggression from the Soviet Union and concluded that for the sake of defense against such a serious aggressor, he was willing to accept the existence of a state. In the second part, once the USSR was reliably dead, he breathed a sigh of relief and began to fantasize about how territorial defense is ensured without a state.
In my view, Friedman pays excessively much attention to the territorial aspect of the problem. For example, when he dismisses the model of financing defense through insurance, he puts the cart before the horse and assumes that clients will be tried to be sold “national defense” specifically (and that they will hope to save money, counting on their neighbor buying it). But the client does not need national defense. They need assurance that if an insured event occurs personally to them, they will receive the money. Whether they are on territory near where they bought the policy or on the other side of the planet is unimportant to them. And exactly what means the company uses to reduce its own risks of having to pay out insurance does not concern them either, as long as the company does not commit fraud.
Thus, if the organization of territorial defense truly reduces the chances of an attack by an external “state”-type aggressor, insurance companies are capable of calculating how much to invest in it to keep it profitable, and how to interact with other insurance companies to share the costs, for example, proportionally to the client base.
Friedman also presents an interesting thesis that the absence of a single jurisdiction over a certain territory is not in itself a guarantee against an aggressor’s claims. And when a conditional USSR arrives in a region where ancap reigns, it is sufficient for them to smash one city with a nuclear bomb and declare something like: look, see, Alderaan was here, it is no more. If the residents of Yavin do not wish the same fate, they owe five hundred million credits by the day after tomorrow, and we don’t care that they have neither a single administration nor taxation; if they want to live, they’ll figure it out somehow.
Effectively, he suggests that when it is too costly for a stationary bandit to expand its territory, it retains the option to act toward that territory as a nomadic bandit. Further, as you understand, everything depends on how coordinated the response will be. If a community is capable of reaching a level of coordination sufficient to pay a large tribute, it is reasonable to assume that further resistance will be coordinated at a level at least no less. This means that the second Death Star will indeed be destroyed without firing a single shot, unlike the first, which managed three.
At the same time, let us note that it is the free market that contributes to the fastest scientific and technical progress. And if, at the initial stage of ancap, states will still be able to oppose network market structures due to the difference in scale, then by the end of the transition period, the technological backwardness of states will become too obvious, and they will have to focus rather on holding onto the remnants of power over their own subjects.
Perhaps by ancap’s foreign policy you did not mean defense. But since for ancap the state is nothing more than a bandit, relations with a bandit amount to nothing more than deterring it from banditry directed at oneself, and other diplomacy is reduced precisely to this aspect. Visa regimes? That is about ensuring the bandit does not attack travelers. Customs regimes? That is about ensuring the bandit does not rob caravans. Regulatory regimes? That is about ensuring the bandit does not interfere with contracts. All these negotiations will come down to the interested party spending money on a payoff. As long as this money is less than the money required to eliminate the bandit, the latter will have a chance to survive.
Provide a quota for girls? Let me say right away that this nonsense—claiming “we will establish a proper system where selection will be unbiased”—doesn’t work, because at the moment “this selection is also unbiased,” yet they still predominantly take guys, and it is difficult for a girl to get in.
liberal
It is a time of anarchy, capitalism, heat, and summer. A young woman submits an application to an educational institution where they teach effective ways of killing people and destroying material assets as part of organized groups and using various specialized equipment. In essence, this is as ordinary an event as if a girl were applying to an educational institution where they would tell her the history of how people effectively killed people as part of armed groups and so on—that is, a faculty of history.
What interests guide the institution when accepting her application? It expects to make a profit. What ways does it have to profit from educating students in the absence of state funding (due to the absence of the state)? There are two main ways. First, trading in knowledge—that is, educating for money anyone who is willing to pay. Second, trading in prestige—that is, implementing a strict selection process, providing the most effective knowledge and skills, and hoping that graduates will be maximally successful in life and then, out of gratitude, contribute to the endowment fund of their beloved university. The education itself might even be free, because the university here effectively acts as a venture capital fund.
If the military university in question makes money by selling knowledge, the girl has no problems. She pays—she receives what she bought. But if the university considers itself prestigious, then the girl has a chance of encountering disproportionately serious difficulties right at the admission stage.
Let’s start with the fact that historically, the army is a male brotherhood, and the entry of women into it often dealt a blow to the prestige of the army (historian Martin van Creveld talks about this interestingly in his book Transformation of War, I highly recommend it). We do not know to what extent patriarchal snobs will form the core of organized armed formations under ancap conditions, and how fundamental it will be for them that women not only do not enter the army, but do not even study military science. I find this unlikely, simply because trends have changed, inclusivity is in fashion, and work in the army looks less and less like a brutal slugfest and more and more like working in a delivery service or other logistics businesses.
Secondly, the army still places significant physical fitness requirements on soldiers, including those related to lifting heavy weights and other disciplines in which women are relatively weak simply by virtue of their constitution. Theoretically, this should not become an obstacle to university admission, as it should, at worst, only narrow the range of available specializations. However, if physical training turns out to be one of the admission criteria at the university, then our hypothetical applicant faces obvious, though surmountable, difficulties.
So your fears are quite justified; it is unlikely that it will be much easier for girls to become specialists in the military sphere under ancap. Then again, this sphere itself does not look particularly promising, so it’s not like anyone really wanted it that much.
A post appeared in the “Life with Others” channel, in which the riots in the USA are examined from the perspective of the concentration of forces. I will briefly summarize its message.
The rioters gathered into a crowd, and they are opposed by individuals, each of whom is defending their own piece of property. As long as the individuals are armed, though not all of them, and the rioters only have improvised tools, a fragile possibility of defense remains; because, firstly, there is no need to loot a specifically protected point when there is an undefended one further down the street, and secondly, no one wants to be the unlucky person who catches a bullet before the crowd tears apart the person who fired it. But if the rioters are also armed, the defenders’ position will become hopeless; therefore, the fact that there is little weaponry in society is more likely to reduce mass violence. It is also pointed out that the attempt at a reciprocal concentration of forces by those defending their property is historically a key factor in the formation of states.
It seems to me that attempting to analyze the situation that has developed in a large state as if that state does not exist is a dubious idea. The riots mainly occur in cities and states covered by the Democratic Party. That is, precisely where the city government and state police are on the side of the rioters. If you stand with a gun guarding your property and they don’t come for you—consider yourself lucky. If you stand guard over your property and you are killed by rioters, they will try not to report it in the news, and mentions will be erased from Facebook, as we see in the example of David Dorn’s murder. But if you happen, for example, to organize a self-defense squad, it will be perceived as the creation of an extremist community of some white supremacists, and it may very well happen that the police, who tried to keep a low profile during the riots themselves, materialize out of nowhere. In this situation, the owners of the looted businesses can only be comforted by the fact that the Democratic Party opposes guns, and therefore rioters are unlikely to be waving firearms—in that case, the picture would cease to be pleasant for the state leadership.
In states led by Republicans, everything is relatively quiet, and if there are cities there covered by the Democratic Party, the National Guard is sent in, and that is sufficient. In general, many have already concluded that the riots in the USA are rather a tool for showdowns between the dominant “roofs” (protection rackets). It just so happens that due to the economic shock caused by the lockdown (which was again stronger in states under the Democratic Party), these showdowns turned out to be particularly vivid this time.
Panarchy theorists suggest that the most peaceful way of resolving this hopeless conflict would be the formation of extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions, where Democrats would have their own government and Republicans their own, and citizens would simply live within the model closer to them. Naturally, in this case, the number of competing governments would quickly increase: currently, diverse forces are forced to unite under one flag for the sake of winning elections, but under panarchy, this factor promoting consolidation would become irrelevant.
Nevertheless, such an option remains highly unlikely. Rather, some California (or, conversely, Texas) will announce secession, and then citizens of both Americas will simply be able to effectively vote with their feet. Times have changed, and in the event of the country splitting, no one will have the drive for a new civil war for the sake of a unity that no one needs anymore.
Yesterday, after I finished editing the article on the inefficiency of violence, I sat down to watch the movie “Black Hawk Down,” which I came across while following links related to the article. The film focuses on the episode mentioned in the article: how the US was forced to leave Somalia after the failure of what they considered a peacekeeping operation—losing nearly two dozen special forces operators in a single day and killing around a thousand locals in a dense urban environment, without much regard for who was a combatant and who was not.
In 2001, when Black Hawk Down was released, I was more interested in things like The Lord of the Rings or Harry Potter, which came out around the same time, but I’m glad I finally got to it; the movie is excellent. However, I want to talk not about the plot in general or the visual quality, but about literally two moments that were key for me personally, and to which all other narrative serves, in my view, merely as illustration.
The first moment is around the eighteenth minute. The Rangers are discussing a fact from a thin brochure they were given titled “All About Somalia”: if one local kills another, his clan must pay the clan of the deceased a hundred camels. To this, one of the soldiers notes that he couldn’t even afford one camel, and the locals must all be in debt now. And now, let’s listen to a lecture by Vladimir Zolotorev:
I am providing a link exactly to the moment where he explains how the civil war in Somalia was effectively stopped by a court decision: the combatants were quieted by their own clans because the relatives of the killers were tired of paying giant sums for other people’s debts.
Thus, the film brilliantly shows how expensive and pointlessly cruel the UN intervention was, and how little importance the self-proclaimed peacekeepers attached to the mechanism that actually stopped the war.
The second important moment is closer to the end of the movie, around 1:45. A Somali man is talking to a captured American pilot and explains: you took our hostages, we took you. The pilot replies: my government will not negotiate. OK, the Somali replies, then let’s negotiate between you and me, soldier to soldier. To this, the American replies that he has no decision-making power. The Somali huffs in response: you, apparently, are granted the right to kill, but not to negotiate, while for us, war is just another form of negotiation. Therefore, you have nothing to gain here.
Many thanks to Ridley Scott, who didn’t film a propaganda piece, but truly managed to show the difference between a dull and meaningless state military machine and an anarchic society. I especially recommend the film to those who repeatedly ask the same questions about how “Ancapistan” would defend itself from a state invasion.
Of course, Somalia is not Ancapistan—things are doing well with anarchy there, but significantly worse with capitalism, especially at the time shown in the movie. Nevertheless, even a pre-capitalist stateless society managed to teach a good lesson to the strongest superpower on the planet. States risk a lot when they try to impose their rules on anarchic orders, and if these orders are backed by a truly strong economy, then the outcome of a direct military confrontation between a state and Ancapistan can be considered predetermined.
