Тег: Government

The development of plots about state stupidity

A week ago, I mentioned three events where the state took repressive actions and people responded to them in various ways. All three storylines have since had developments.

The second fork of the Libertarian Party of Russia has also been recognized as a foreign agent organization

Now no one feels slighted that the state notices his party while ignoring the rivals’ party; both got a taste of the medicine. In response, both parties announced a total freeze of their activities. This is more than logical, because writing “bullshit” in every headline is quite humiliating, and there is no point in enduring this humiliation, as a foreign agent organization is prohibited from engaging in educational activities and participating in politics—which is exactly what both LPRs have done throughout their history.

A side plot has also seen some development. Montelibero reminded us of the support program for repatriates to Montenegro, and the Montenegrin state, in turn, reminded us that it is actively striving for the EU, harmonizing its visa policy with the European Union, and therefore introducing a visa regime with the RF starting in November. Finita, a popular relocation destination is closing. What is the point of getting a Montenegrin visa if the requirements will be Schengen-like; wouldn’t it be better to just get a Schengen visa and at least have the opportunity to choose one of 27 countries for residence.

The popular Ukrainian Minister of Defense was not reinstated, but instead, the commander-in-chief was replaced by a more popular one

This is, of course, the strangest development of the plot, because it moves in complete contradiction to the official rhetoric. The President of Ukraine claimed that he had no complaints against the former Minister of Defense, but simply a conflict between him and the commander-in-chief. And so, the commander-in-chief was removed; it would seem the problem was solved. But no, in fact, the firing of the Minister of Defense was the goal of all the reshuffles. The retired minister is asserting his rights, the street continues to protest, and the democratic process—being by definition a euphemism for civil war—is working at full blast in exactly this, its primary capacity; if it worked like this for everyone, there would be significantly fewer complaints about democracy.

Balaji Srinivasan’s Network State has signed a partnership agreement with Kazakhstan, and he’s getting the hell out of Malaysia

Thus, the founder of the Network State not only carried out his threat to move capital out of a toxic jurisdiction but was also welcomed with open arms in another jurisdiction, and this is exactly what the concept of the network state was devised for: the possibility of obtaining diplomatic recognition from traditional territorial states.

The subject of the Network State’s conflict with Malaysia, if Twitter comments are to be believed, is quite ridiculous in itself. The Malaysian police literally stormed their campus not just for no reason, but were looking for Jews under the floor, which makes the plot completely Tarantino-esque.

General conclusions and forecasts

Traditional territorial states care less and less about their own systemic well-being and more and more about serving the momentary whims of top officials or long-neglected bureaucratic processes whose meaning has long been lost. The sanctity of state decisions has been lost almost everywhere; now legitimacy is being actively spent. When legitimacy drops sufficiently, the sabotage of state decisions will become a widespread and quite ordinary phenomenon. It seems, however, that the collapse of state management systems will remain fairly peaceful: where the state is aggressive, individuals and organizations avoid violent conflict with it, but the conflict still undermines the state’s strength.

Difference in reactions to state foolishness

I thought it would be interesting to compare the reactions of various targets of state attacks to the fact of the attack, especially since there have been several multi-level examples recently.

The Libertarian Party of Russia has been recognized as a foreign agent organization

Reaction:

  • LPR members are wondering which of the two LPRs specifically.
  • The LPR(s) posted an official statement: “we are patriots and condemn this decision.”
  • Those not in the LPR congratulate both LPRs on the state recognizing their existence.
  • Montelibero reminds about the assistance program for moving to Montenegro.

A popular Ukrainian defense minister has been dismissed

Reaction:

  • The dismissed official posted a report on the work done and held a
    press conference.
  • Like-minded people of the dismissed official in the troops publish public statements in his support.
  • Foreign officials express bewilderment.
  • The general public: protests in support of the dismissed official.

Balaji Srinivasan’s Network State was subjected to swatting

Reaction:

  • The founder politely asks on Twitter whether Malaysia would like capital flight from this toxic jurisdiction to more welcoming ones for such startups, such as Kazakhstan.
  • The founder’s like-minded associates specify exactly how much has been invested and how much will be withdrawn if Malaysian officials do not swear that it was a stupid mistake and that they will not dare do such a thing again.

Commonalities in all three reactions

  • No one expresses any doubt that the state is committing overt aggression against the interests of its citizens.
  • The targets of the attack officially express loyalty to the state, although they condemn its decision.
  • The targets of the attack try to convince the state to revoke its decision amicably.

The uniqueness of the reaction in one of the cases

Only the founder of the Network State communicates with the territorial state as an equal.

Conclusion

The state is effective in violence. The targets of state attacks prefer not to give it a forceful response in order not to provoke escalation. Nevertheless, they lean towards an asymmetric response. In the case of the LPR and the Network State, this is emigration, meaning the deprivation of the state of economic resources. In the case of the dismissed minister, it is the delegitimization of the decision through public pressure.
I have arranged the cases in increasing order of the probability that the toxic decision will be overturned. In the case of the LPR, the probability is vanishingly small. With Fedorov, I think the probability is about thirty percent. With Balaji, about seventy percent. I will follow the last two cases.

Why do we call the state a Stationary Bandit?

Many of our subscribers and libertarians in general are likely already well acquainted with the abbreviation “SB” or the term “stationary bandit.” But despite their familiarity to us, most people have still not really encountered them. This also applies to new participants of our resource, who often do not understand what this means. Perhaps some of you accidentally came across a repost, started reading, and are now wondering: “Why do they constantly call the state some kind of bandit? What conspiracy theory is this?”.

Let us first note that such a term is not just some fantasy of ancaps written on a knee in a basement. This is an absolutely mainstream, classical theory of the origin of the state by Mancur Olson, which is recognized and respected in official academic science. But what does this theory imply and how did it arise in the first place?

So, imagine the early Middle Ages. A dense forest, a small village, peasants peacefully plowing the land, raising children and piglets. Suddenly, a gang of armed thugs flies out of the forest. In academic works, they are also called roving bandits. They slaughter half the village, burn the houses, take 100% of the grain, steal the livestock, and disappear into the sunset. But there is a small problem. When this same gang returns a year later, there will be nothing left to rob! The peasants have either died of hunger or scattered. As a business model, it is a complete failure, since this provides no long-term profit.

And here, one of the bandit leaders, a guy with an entrepreneurial vein and a sufficient level of intelligence (let’s call him, say, Rurik or some Frankish chief), begins to think: “What if we don’t go anywhere? What if we settle here?”. Instead of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs, this genius of criminal thought offers the peasants a “deal.” He declares himself king (or a duke, prince, or someone else) and gives a speech: “From now on, you give me not everything, but only 20% of your grain. In exchange, I will simply not kill you. Moreover, if other roving bandits come from the forest, I will protect you from them. Because you are now my cow, and only I am allowed to milk it!”

It is at this moment that the Stationary Bandit is born on the historical stage.

Over time, he realizes: in order to be able to take more, the economy must grow. He begins to build roads (to make it more convenient to collect taxes and move his retinue), introduces courts (after all, a peasant who dies in a knife fight does not pay taxes), and, most importantly, invents an ideology (so that people think less about the situation they have found themselves in). And after a couple of generations, he is no longer a racketeer who seized power by force, but the “Lord’s anointed,” the “father of the nation,” or the “guarantor of the constitution.”

Why is this concept popular among libertarians? It brilliantly tears off all the romantic masks from the face of Leviathan! Since our school days, we have all been brainwashed with fairy tales about the “social contract.” Allegedly, one day wise people gathered in a square and voluntarily decided to establish a state. Yeah, sure, maybe you can show me where I personally signed up for this? And even less so did those subordinated by military means sign up for it (remember that state borders on the map were historically formed precisely by wars).

We call the state a stationary bandit because, in its essence, it is no different from a mafia “protection racket.” It attempts to impose its monopoly on violence over a certain territory. And taxes are just legalized tribute so that you are simply not thrown into a cage.

Of course, for many, realizing this fact is like finding out as a child that Santa Claus doesn’t exist, only a hundred times more bitter. We are used to believing in the benevolence and caring nature of the state. But understanding the truth is necessary, because only by taking off the rose-colored glasses can one begin to ask the right questions. On what grounds does someone interfere in my private life? Why does a handful of bureaucrats decide what I can watch on the internet, who I can trade with, and how much of my money to take for “important projects” (i.e., replacing paving stones in a circle, palaces, or another bloody clash with a neighboring SB)?!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A little bit more about taxes and death

Sperry’s article about why there is no point in opposing taxes was actively discussed in the comments of the telegram channel, which was largely the goal of the publication. In short, the text is about how, one way or another, even in a free market, a sum comparable to government taxes will be squeezed out of you anyway and spent on roughly the same things the state would have spent it on; and since there is no difference, why be outraged?

The article shows two extremes. One extreme is the organization of an enterprise requiring a vast amount of unskilled labor in conditions where manpower is in huge abundance. Appealing to historical examples, Sperry reminds us that in such cases it is usually more profitable to pay workers mere pittance, and preferably not in money, but in food tokens, while suppressing discontent through organized violence. The other extreme is the organization of an enterprise requiring a handful of highly qualified specialists who are exhausting to find, and who must be kept from being poached by competitors. Here, the employer not only pays them a hefty salary but also provides substantial bonuses, from a simple coffee machine in the break room to fitness gyms, expensive health insurance for the employee’s entire family, flexible work schedules, and company stock options.

In both extreme cases, Sperry makes it clear that the worker is not free and is forced to eat whatever they are given. In one case, tokens for miserable food at the plantation store instead of a simple human wage. In the other, an unwanted fitness gym instead of a simple salary increase. But why, exactly, does this happen?

For it to be profitable to coerce labor through violence, that labor must be very monotonous, concentrated in space, and not involve active movement. Only in this case can one get by with mobile armed overseers, who must be very few in number relative to the workers; otherwise, the cost of the thug no longer pays off. Thus, tending bushes or mining raw materials are perfectly optimized for mass slave labor, but grazing livestock is not particularly so. But, one way or another, in a free market, if you put together a gang of thugs to organize forced labor, you will have to be the leader of those thugs. Relax for a moment, and tomorrow you will find that your foreman has taken your place, and you are already being driven to pick bananas.

Naturally, the planter is not interested in such an outcome; he wants his property rights protected and the workers, even if armed, to know their place. And here, the state comes to his aid. The state becomes the guarantor that the security foreman will moderately and diligently perform his job for hard cash rather than seizing the plantation for himself. In exchange, the state takes taxes, and with them maintains an army and police. From this moment on, the planter is doomed. Tomorrow the state will raise land taxes, introduce inheritance taxes, nationalize latifundia, or otherwise optimize the privileged class because it consumes too much, and its “dekulakization” will inevitably be popular among the people. It turns out that for a share of his profit, the planter receives the same tokens for protection, just as his workers receive tokens for food. And the quality of the tokens’ provision will arbitrarily decrease as the issuer’s appetite grows.

So, either you are a stern Spartan who personally arranges krypteia with colleagues so that the helots know their place and do not think of rebellion, or you degenerate into an effeminate sybarite who has outsourced his functions of coercion, and the question of your abolition becomes effectively decided.

And what about the second extreme case? Generally speaking, in a free market, mega-qualified specialists will not eat whatever they are given. The employer sets up a fitness gym in the office because the specialist specifically wants that. He is too lazy to go lift weights after work; he wants to have the option when the urge hits, and if the employer is not ready for that, there are competitors. And if the worker grows tired of the fitness gym, they will have no problem putting a bar next to it—just keep working, sweetheart. You don’t want anything extra, just more money? Here is more money, and work from home if you like. Of course, all these measures to increase loyalty benefit the employer only if the specialist genuinely enjoys their work, but it cannot be otherwise; otherwise, they would not have acquired their outstanding qualification.

However, even if a corporation’s main engine consists of a few mega-professionals, it still cannot do without a team of mid-level employees; someone must handle the routine. And these people are the ones who don’t get to choose between fitness, a bar, or cash in hand. Firstly, it is above their rank. Secondly, a benefits package reduces profit and therefore reduces the profit tax. Salary, on the other hand, requires payment of payroll tax. Therefore, it is often more profitable for a corporation to pay its rank-and-file employees less in cash, and instead provide benefits in kind, which, of course, evokes associations with food tokens in the plantation cafeteria.

Well, why does the corporation need the state? For the same reason the planter does: to protect the corporation’s interests through brute force (mainly by limiting market entry for competitors, plus government contracts). Naturally, as a result, the corporation also ends up vulnerable if a certain high-ranking state official decides to “dekulakize” it. What could replace the state regulator? As in the case of the union of planters, it would have to be some situational alliance of industry representatives agreeing on voluntarily observed norms and standards. If the corporation’s business itself is not based on coercion, then living without a state is still somewhat easier for it than for latifundists.

Thus, the state, by its very existence, exerts a corrosive effect on large business: it reduces the costs of violence against workers or competitors, and as a result, business acquires state-like characteristics. It is much harder for small business to latch onto this mechanism, so even within an existing state, it remains a purer market agent and therefore will survive the abolition of the state with much greater ease. This leaves the ancaps with only one question: can a society without a state maintain a high level of structural complexity and a deep division of labor in the absence of large business? Or can large business remain so in the absence of a state? I will leave this question hanging for now.

How ancap courts work in territories occupied by states

The misconception that the state’s power is insurmountable for non-governmental communities in the sphere of court decision enforcement is extremely deeply rooted, despite regular practical refutations.

Nothing and no one can be strong in everything, and the state has plenty of weak points. On one hand, the state is a fairly centralized organization. On the other, it is a completely decentralized mental parasite. The weakness of centralization lies in the long transit of orders through the chain of hierarchy, multiplied by the distortion of the order at each stage. The weakness of decentralization lies in the possibility of a covert independent attack on any node.

The state is a tool of institutionalized violence. However, it is not the only possible one. Any bounty hunter, blood avenger, or duelist is exactly the same tool of institutionalized violence, just from a different lore. But if humanity has learned anything from postmodernism, it is the construction of lores and switching between them.

Now, imagine a clash of two lores: etatism, with its laws written by bureaucrats, adopted by politicians, and enforced by low-paid employees under the command of bureaucrats venturing into politics — and ancap, with its decentralized pluralistic legal system based on the right to restitution and enforced by any interested parties. In a well-functioning etatist system, the second lore resides somewhere in the back of the mind, where adventure novel characters dwell. But what about an etatist system at the stage of collapse?

Let’s leave the theorizing here and turn to a practical example.

There is the state of the RF, which is at war with the state of Ukraine. War is a deeply anti-legal endeavor. To wage it, the state crudely tramples upon the rights of its own subjects that it established itself. Subjects who, in a normal situation, obey simply out of habit (and this is the most energy-efficient way to command), in conditions where extraordinary demands are placed upon them, obey thanks to stronger incentives, for example, serious reward and/or strong fear. Both money and fear lose their value as an incentive with every dose, so to maintain controllability, the doses must be increased. People to whom such powerful incentives for obedience are applied master the skill of serial murder of people unknown to them.

Let’s consider a couple more factors. First, the accounting of weapons in war conditions inevitably becomes extremely negligent, and they flood the black market. Second, the opponent, a citizen of Ukraine, is culturally close, possesses perfect command of the Russian language, and communicates without problems with any subject of the RF. These factors lead to the fact that various military objects or high-ranking officials are constantly exploding on the territory of the RF. The perpetrator could be a Ukrainian saboteur, an ideological Russian dissident, or a simple Russian mercenary for whom this is a less dangerous and more reliable earning than rotting in a dugout waiting for a drone strike.

And it is against this background that ancap gets a serious chance to establish itself in minds not just as a theory detached from reality, but as a fully working practice.

A native of Chuvashia, Mishshi Oreshnikov, moves to Ukraine and arms himself with a lore according to which Chuvashia never voluntarily joined the RF but is an occupied territory; he states that until the state legal institutions of a future free Chuvashia are formed, the use of norms of customary law is quite appropriate — and simply begins to offer court services. Primarily — over those with whom it is most pointless to litigate in state courts, namely, state officials. Middle-management officials find themselves in the highest risk zone here — those who make some responsible decisions, but of whom there are too many for the state to provide each with even a moderately reliable protection.

In an interview with Sota, Mishshi reveals the mechanisms of the court’s operation and his motivations in more detail, while the host demonstrates certain facets of his understanding of the phenomenon.

What other features of the anarcho-capitalist legal mechanism on state-occupied territory can be noted?

  1. There are several courts; entry into the market is formally open, but the mechanisms for admission into the association are informal. At the same time, the exact number of courts in the system is fundamentally unknown, and some of the publicly designated organizations participating in the movement are placeholders, false targets. The possibility of appealing a decision of one court of the association in another court of the association is declared. In fact, in the case of trials of state officials, this is unlikely to become a necessity.
  2. Fundraising for the execution of court decisions is carried out by non-public organizations via cryptocurrencies. Technically, the lion’s share of the budget could consist of funds from the state of Ukraine, but that is completely irrelevant.
  3. The executors of sentences are non-public organizations that formally have no connection to the courts. Technically, the executors could be professional Ukrainian saboteurs, but that is completely irrelevant.
  4. The initiator of the movement is out of reach of direct threats from the army and police of the RF, since the Ukrainian army stands between him and the RF security forces. Thus, he can be destroyed only accidentally during a raid or as a result of sabotage. It is unknown how many people are capable of picking up the banner in the event of his elimination. Technically, this could be handled by some professional Ukrainian officer, but that is completely irrelevant.
  5. Sentences against state officials and, more importantly, the execution of these sentences are primarily advertising. An official commits a crime as part of their job, and therefore is unlikely to seriously consider the possibility of paying compensation to victims from their own personal funds. Therefore, it is convenient to demonstrate on them what happens to those who refuse to pay compensation. After several such demonstrations, the court can be rolled out into production to resolve conflicts between private individuals. There, it is far more likely that the defendant will appear at the court hearing and provide a full defense, and therefore acquittals, court refusals regarding claims, actual compensation payments, and other riches of law enforcement are probable.
  6. However, even if this specific model of courts does not progress beyond ritualized retribution against members of the “State” organized crime group, it is still a significant step in bringing ancap ideas to life.

In several places, I state that for us it is completely irrelevant to what extent we have a confrontation between ancap and the state, and to what extent it is a confrontation between states. Since we are talking about a struggle of ideas regarding the world order, a state imitating ancap mechanisms works for ancap.

Durov

Due to Durov’s arrest, an active discussion continues online.

For us libertarians, the position is simple: states, by their very nature, exercise aggressive violence and therefore have no right to exist. (Private individuals who provide any conceivable services that the state provides or has ever provided, but do so on a voluntary basis, do have a right to exist)

The world, however, does not consist solely of libertarians. There are numerous representatives of ideologies claiming the right of collectives to violate any conceivable rights of individuals for the sake of the benefit of these or those collectives, including such abstract collectives as, for example, “future humanity.” With them, it is sometimes possible to have meaningful discussions on the topic of “exactly how will this specific violation of individual rights help achieve your wonderful collectivist goal, and isn’t it ridiculous for you to throw so many resources at tasks with such a tiny cost-efficiency ratio, when here are far more effective solutions to your own problem with a much lower need to violate individual rights.” As soon as the interlocutor begins to angrily reject such economic analysis, the conversation can be wound up, essentially saying: come back when you’ve grown wiser; until then, there is nothing to talk about.

Finally, there are the realists. They condescendingly explain that values are called such because they have a price. That anyone can be bought. That Durov has already repeatedly made compromises with quite repulsive political regimes. And if these regimes, through threats to the creators of Telegram, easily turn it into a weapon on the side of evil, then it is foolish to demand that less repulsive political regimes not use threats against the creators of Telegram to turn it into a weapon on the side of good (or, if you prefer, the lesser evil). This position was expressed very clearly and consistently by Michael Naki in his video.

He essentially claims that, firstly, even if Durov was indeed arrested and will be accused, in violation of any legal norms, of all the nonsense that is causing so much noise online, it is justified if the result is his active assistance to the anti-Putin coalition in the war on Ukraine’s side. And secondly—that the arrest looks like a staging, and it is far more likely that Durov himself asked for the protection of the West and effectively promised assistance in the war in exchange for protection from pressure by dictatorial regimes, primarily the Putin regime.

As for what this could lead to, Michael himself concludes quite soberly: that later, so he says, Telegram will start to be used against Trump. And he immediately answers this consideration: won’t there be downsides, then? In other words, what can be applied for extraordinary reasons will easily be applied for any reason. War is a continuation of politics, and if Telegram can be brought under control in a total war, why not bring it under control tomorrow to influence the election process—why hesitate, since Trump, in Michael’s opinion, is a fascist and is just as deserving of having a total war declared against him. And the day after tomorrow, the Chinese experience is adopted—and what’s the big deal, since an honest person has nothing to hide. There are so many terrible things in the world worthy of having a total war declared against them: drug trafficking, trafficking… the state, right, Michael? Oh, what, the state isn’t on this list? Strange, strange.

Realists perfectly understand that their position is logically vulnerable because it is inconsistent. They don’t care, because logical constructs are an ideal construction, not a real one. Some momentary desires are declared by them as the highest value, others as meaningless whims; some methods are adopted, while others are only sweetly dreamed of—and the only criterion for justifying such an approach turns out to be the result. It’s fine if the result is declared in advance, but that’s not necessarily the case, as the target can be drawn around the point where the bullet hit.

What can be opposed to the realists? Only a change in reality. We have lived too long in a world of centralized systems, and therefore we are easily captivated by heroes, seeking hope now in Durov, now in Musk. But real hope is brought by another type of hero—the anonymous Satoshi. One who opens a new technology and makes it public property. We have relied on centralized systems for too long because it is fast, cheap, and convenient. And also, they can be broken quickly, cheaply, and conveniently. It is time to realize that we are not rich enough to buy cheap things.

A small centralized system competing on a free market with a million similar systems—why not. But when it comes to the global exchange of values or opinions—let’s forget about centralization. Bitcoin and its extensions—as protocols for transferring value. Nostr or something along those lines—as a protocol for transmitting statements. Some entity that has not yet gained widespread use—as a protocol for legal transactions (this function of the Leviathan must also be replaced by something decentralized). In the new world, there will be fewer heroes, and therefore—fewer possible points of failure. A hell of a lot of responsibility will not hang on one specific person. And therefore, there will be no point in arresting Durov.

But for now—let’s create hype around our hero and demand his release. Why? A strange question. Let’s be realists; it’s so fashionable. States as a means of forced unification of people must be destroyed. What will contribute more to the death of this institution—if Durov is kept in detention until he agrees to the conditions imposed on him—or if, as a result of a pressure campaign, the French state is seriously discredited and forced to release its prisoner? Of course, the latter. But even if pressure does not help the goals of liberation—that is no reason not to press. It is much more pleasant to observe a morally degraded state than a proud and triumphant one.

An example of a truly libertarian reaction to state lawlessness

Not long ago, I told you about a major international terror attack carried out by the authorities of several countries against a small crypto exchange, Bitzlato. It seemed that everything in this story was already clear: the company was crushed, and the depositors’ money was lost.

However, the exchange team decided to preserve the service. Since the servers were seized and the bot’s code was compromised, they are currently rewriting the code; starting March 1, they promise to organize the possibility for every user to withdraw half of their deposit, and later gradually provide full access to the remaining funds.

I like the fighting spirit in the news published by the project team. No “bleh, meh, we are not to blame, force majeure, there’s nothing to be done, bye-bye.” Instead, the seize-ers are clearly called seize-ers, and they are almost openly sent away in the manner of the Russian warship—remember that ancient meme?

Yes, using centralized services is dangerous, but completely avoiding trust in certain intermediaries is a very costly endeavor. And that is why I especially value those centralized services that have, in one way or another, passed the “test of character.” Not every company can manage this. For instance, the Bitfinex exchange managed to reimburse depositors for losses from a major hack in its time, while the btc-e exchange could not survive a raid by bandits in uniform. I very much hope that the Bitzlato service will pass its test of character.

How do libertarian institutions regulate advertising?

Will market regulation of advertising be more effective than state regulation? For example, advertising for psychoactive substances, child pornography, or gambling.

Anonymous question

The question of how libertarian institutions regulate something is, in essence, a question of how market institutions regulate something.

The person placing the advertisement does so to increase the return on their activity. In the limit, they would like to force everyone and anyone to buy their product for any amount of money by a simple act of will. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of consumption.

The person consuming the advertisement wants to receive information as a result about which goods are available on the market, how they satisfy their particular current or potential needs, and where these goods can be found. In the limit, they would like to force the producer by a simple act of will to do exactly what the consumer needs, right at the moment of the order, and deliver it right to where the consumer indicates. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of production.

Finally, there are those who produce the advertising and show it to the consumer. In the limit, they would like to force product manufacturers by a simple act of will to pay them the lion’s share of the product’s value for the right to sell this product to the consumer. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of sales.

How do market institutions regulate the relations between these listed groups? Through a multitude of spontaneously emerging feedback loops. Advertising is too expensive — producers try to minimize their purchases, and the consumer is forced to spend a huge amount of effort to find anything outside of their daily basket. There is too much advertising — the consumer develops banner blindness, and it becomes ineffective. As a result, the advertiser stops paying for impressions, preferring to pay for results — and the advertising market is forced to restructure in favor of more targeted advertising tools. This leaves both the advertisers satisfied — their ads give the maximum return per unit of funds invested — and the consumers — they receive information exactly about what they want, and unnecessary things do not clutter their eyes. For each of the stakeholder groups, the situation ultimately turns out to be imperfect, but it is a kind of dynamic compromise that more or less satisfies everyone. And as soon as it stops being satisfactory, a fairly rapid restructuring of the market occurs.

And what about state regulation? The state is a regulator of production, consumption, and sales. In the limit, it would like to determine every aspect of the life of each of its subjects by a simple act of will (by “desires of the state” I here mean a somewhat simplified reflection on the activities of its individual functionaries, as well as the persons who make up its support group — “statists”). The extent to which the state is successful in this pursuit is also determined by spontaneously emerging feedback loops. If it succeeded in selling the consumer the necessity of fighting child pornography, the consumer will tolerate difficulties in receiving the corresponding advertising, and the increasing cost of the corresponding services. If it failed to sell the necessity of fighting alcohol consumption, the consumer enjoys the fact that they are at least not imprisoned for consumption, even though advertising, for example, is restricted.

Now, your question essentially concerned whether market institutions can allow third parties to restrict the advertising of certain products in which both the producers of the product and its consumers are interested. How effectively these third parties can perform the role of the state in this case, without being the state and without resorting to direct violence.

Answer: they can, but not as effectively as state institutions. The task of an influence group is to make a certain consumer behavior reprehensible, to make the person feel ashamed of it and, conversely, proud of avoiding it. If your advertising campaign proves successful — congratulations, your opponent is marginalized. If it proves unsuccessful — well, then you yourself end up as the marginals. Everything is fair.

#freeLegkodymov

Yesterday, security forces from the USA, France, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus carried out a loud act of terror, destroying Bitzlato, a bitcoin-to-ruble exchange service that had been operating successfully since 2016 (the turnover of other crypto and fiat constituted a very modest part of the total turnover), and arresting its founder, Anatoly Legkodymov. These terrorists issued a boastful press release, promising to continue pursuing the cryptocurrency business worldwide, regardless of the formal boundaries of jurisdictions.

Anatoly is accused of neglecting the state-imposed identity verification of users, collaborating with darknet markets, and performing other actions that are completely legitimate for any libertarian, while consistently satisfying his clients. In other words, he was arrested for making our lives better. Now he faces five years of imprisonment, and, of course, his business will be destroyed, and our money, which was kept in the company’s wallets for operational needs, will be seized by the state.

I had to say goodbye to a certain amount of bitcoin, as well as remove all recommendations for using the destroyed service from my website. I hope the next generation of crypto exchangers will already be using Lightning, and there will be no question of storing funds in third-party accounts. For now, the most reliable way to exchange cryptocurrency for fiat was and remains exchange through trusted acquaintances.

The well-known statist Leonid Volkov, in his channel, approves of the actions of the American authorities, after which he finally ceases to exist as a personality and begins to exist as a faggot. His beloved Navalny, whom he so touchingly demands be released, personally went to surrender to the Russian authorities, ignoring the shouts of “don’t go in – it’ll kill you.” At the time, the man diligently distanced himself from the USA, indulging the whims of the local legislation as much as possible—but he had the imprudence to physically appear on the territory of this terrorist state, for which he paid the price.

What do I propose?

First, of course, no donations to the FBK—they are our enemies, even if they stand against Putin. Unsubscribe and ignore.

Second, if possible, avoid the USA (I realize this sounds something like “do not overindulge in black caviar”).

Third, we see that storing money in centralized services is fraught not only with scams from these very services, but, on the contrary, with the confiscation of your money by the state, if these services do their job truly well. So, no matter how attractive online wallets on various exchanges may be, let’s maintain hygiene and keep money only under our own direct control.

I am not well-versed in the intricacies of legal squabbles, so I will not undertake to call for any actions in this field in attempts to recover my pennies. But I hope that everyone who approves of this act of terror will thereby ruin their reputation in the eyes of the widest possible circle of people, and preferably specifically those they depend on.

How does ancap answer the question of unemployment that will arise as a result of the soon-to-be automation of intellectual labor by machines?

Not only will there be no need for ordinary taxi drivers and construction workers, but lawyers, doctors, artists, and others will also lose their jobs en masse.

Yes, some people will be social workers, jesters, and prostitutes, but why are all the others needed? And what will they live on? People who have a sufficient cushion of assets are the exception, even in developed countries. And why wouldn’t the state be able to use this crisis to build a totalitarian hell?

Vietnamese

I’ll start from the end. The state doesn’t need any special reasons to try and build a totalitarian hell; it tries to do so permanently, and is limited in this pursuit only by the willingness of its subjects to live in a totalitarian hell. All that remains is to understand whether the situation under consideration will create any preconditions for a huge number of people to willingly agree to a totalitarian hell.

So, a vast amount of intellectual labor, which is currently considered an exclusively human prerogative, has been automated. Let’s assume it’s an ancap world. This means a free market. After automation, productivity increases sharply—consequently, the supply of the produced good or service increases sharply. Therefore, with demand remaining unchanged, its price will inevitably fall. The technological revolution leads to a situation where maintaining a standard of living that was quite wealthy by the standards of the previous technological era requires mere pennies.

Those lucky few whose labor within the new technological order turns out to be necessary on a regular basis will earn an obscene amount of money. Those whom the new economy does not need as much will be able to provide themselves with an acceptable standard of living even with rare, sporadic earnings. Want to update the furniture in your house? Donate blood, participate as an extra in a movie, train a neural network. Don’t need any serious expenses? Well, check a box on the websites of a couple of charitable foundations, stating you wish to receive a basic income—and that will be enough.

Again, after every previous technological revolution, those who were no longer required in the former numbers eventually retrained themselves more or less, and for their children, the new reality was completely organic, and they no longer had problems finding an occupation in it. Peasants’ children became workers, and workers’ children became clerks. Clerks’ children will become, for example, motivators for those titans of thought whose labor proved impossible to automate, or enter other spheres that are difficult for us to even imagine now, just as it was once difficult to imagine professional esports.

And what changes if we encounter this new reality while still having modern-type states? It will be more regulated. Those who receive an obscene amount of money will not be those whose labor is necessary to maintain the new technological order, but those who rob them and redistribute the funds. A large class of government employees will remain. Many will consider the state of affairs, if not the best, then the only possible one. Will this be a totalitarian hell? Unlikely; rather a kingdom of apathy, not of artificial totalitarian enthusiasm—but that doesn’t make the picture any more pleasant.

What could allow such a scenario to be realized? Mass stupification and conformism. Do we see tendencies toward this? We certainly do! And what could make such a scenario stable? A high level of professionalism among managers, allowing them to maintain a high-tech society while leading a mass of fools and conformists. The scenario proves to be fundamentally unstable: current trends will inevitably force a transition to some other future. This could, of course, be new Dark Ages. Or it could turn out to be ancap. So let’s work toward making it ancap!

The new Dark Ages look something like this