Internal conflicts of volunteer organizations

Not long ago, I published a long post Internal Dynamics of Libertarian Communities. Among other things, it mentions the danger of “beastly seriousness” over trifles:

Subconsciously realizing the certain comicality of their position, the disputant, in a polemical frenzy, begins to accuse opponents of violating even the most basic value principles.

And just recently, I received a direct message:

I believe that the current Secretary has exceeded their authority. The Council is unable to resolve this crisis on its own, as some Council members support the Secretary’s actions, while others remain indifferent to what is happening. This is not an isolated case that is being questioned, but this particular case is already egregious.

What is this egregious case? It turns out a Telegram chat admin enabled slow mode in the chat. Why slow mode is needed in a chat of two dozen people, I have no idea, but this case perfectly illustrates how easily, in a purely voluntary organization, people take offense at the slightest manifestation of disrespect from those endowed with certain technical powers.

And here is another case, a public one—and also indignation directed at the secretary: one of the MTL-court judges removed the court secretary from handling a case because the secretary, in the judge’s view, handled correspondence with the parties incorrectly and also for some reason was present in the chat where the judges were discussing the case. And the secretary, instead of stepping down, stayed put; instead, the judge was removed.

This pattern repeats constantly. What is required for it to emerge?

  1. An organization consisting of volunteers
  2. The presence of a sole administrative position within it
  3. The administrator having technical capabilities to restrict the rights of other organization participants.

That’s it. Sooner or later, a situation will arise where the administrator begins to interpret their functions broadly and applies their technical capabilities in a way that restricts the rights of other organization participants, and some participants will view this action as an abuse of power.

If the organization had paid employees, the administration’s actions would be perceived more calmly (any whim for your money). If there were a whole board instead of one administrator, one could appeal to one member to roll back the actions of another (also a very rich class of conflicts, though far less acute). Finally, if the administrator lacked technical capabilities that could be abused, it would be much harder for them.

Let’s leave point 1 alone, because conflicts in hierarchical commercial organizations can be discussed by Bitarch and Voluntarist.

Point 2 is much easier to overcome. If the group is small and consists of formally equal participants, then everyone should be made an admin (if some participants have a sort of probation period, admin rights can be granted after its successful completion)—this serves as a visible confirmation of mutual trust within the organization. Alternatively, one could do without admins entirely.

As for point 3, it depends too much on the chosen communication tools. In Montelibero, Telegram is used almost exclusively for this. In it, the only way to disable technical administration capabilities for a group is to create it using a service account, add participants, and then remove the creator from the group. In principle, this is also a solution for a small, tight-knit group that wishes to communicate strictly on business and does not want to lose internal cohesion over someone’s wounded pride.

Of course, administrators are useful. But that is exactly the line of reasoning that etatists use to explain the utility of the state. No, the utility comes not from administrators, but from a tradition of respecting colleagues. Applied to working groups, this means self-restraint regarding off-topic posts and communication style. If such a tradition is established, an administrator is not needed. If it is not established, it cannot be implemented by the strength of one administrator alone. In any case, the goodwill of the other participants is required.

Network State — it’s over!

So, it has happened. The final, and key, chapter of The Network State has been translated. In it, Balaji explains in detail:

  • What a network state is (this is Montellibero, which received diplomatic recognition from El Salvador);
  • What happens if you remove one of the parts from the definition of a network state (in most cases it will break, but if you remove the point about the need for a dictatorship of the network state’s founder, it will be even better—roughly speaking, Bitcoin instead of Ethereum);
  • That digitalization is penetrating everything and it is impossible to fight, and a network state is precisely a way to lead the process, instead of fighting directly against the digital gulag of centralized nation-states;
  • That the startup community, if it aspires to develop, needs a high level of internal trust, and pleasant bonuses would be visible demonstrations of solidarity (for example, the MTL-fest) and the absence of public flame wars;
  • That tokenomics is cool (but Balaji focuses on the community’s internal currency, although having one’s own unit of account is a secondary matter; the principle of public recording of monetary and social obligations is far more important);
  • That it is extremely important to scrounge the first diplomatic recognition from anyone, even from Nauru, and then it will be easier;
  • And he throws in various technological ideas for connecting offline with online, through which you can feel that the person thinks based on a paradigm of abundance of capital goods—let’s be happy for him.

If anyone hasn’t picked up the book yet, now is the time. I don’t see much point in making an audiobook out of it—there are too many external links, many of which are quite interesting to browse. For the same reason, it’s unlikely that the text will be produced in epub format—such a book should be read while online, and preferably in a browser anyway. The author promises to update the book periodically. If anyone follows the updates, please send me links to new pieces of text, and I will update the translation.

And for now—thank you all for the long wait, the channel is now officially coming out of vacation. I’ll need to scour through to see if any interesting questions from readers have accumulated, write a new article for Hedgehog, and it’s about time to finish the translations of Mac and Molinyu, for goodness’ sake.

P.S. Readers quickly generated a pdf. It’s not without flaws—internal footnotes have become external links—but overall it’s perfectly suitable for reading.

Internal dynamics of libertarian communities

This will be a long-form text in three parts. It was written by request of Soz, for a donation of 50 EURMTL. The work took nearly a full month. For ordinary questions with attached donations, this is indecently long, but I recall that back when Bitarch didn’t yet publish on my channel himself but commissioned me to write long-reads, the pace was comparable. Unfortunately, I struggle to keep large concepts in my head, so as the volume of the task increases, the working time increases in a clearly non-linear proportion: a couple of days for a Telegram-format post, a month for a long-read, a year and a half for an 84-page book…

The task from the client was formulated not very clearly, but it amounted to creating and presenting a conciliatory narrative for the Montelibero community, which is currently experiencing internal friction due to differences in approaches to achieving the movement’s goals.

It seemed appropriate to me to expand the topic slightly, but not so much that the final recipes would be inapplicable to the specific community.

Part 1. Why don’t libertarians like contracts?

There is an opinion that libertarians adore contracts and almost pray to them. This is not true. Libertarians, for the most part, have a fairly ordinary system of values, and therefore they do not like contracts. What they love, like all normal people, is an atmosphere of openness and mutual trust. Anyone who claims otherwise most likely loved it once too, but their trust was betrayed.

What is trust? It is the conviction that the counterparty will sincerely defend your interests, and if they conflict with his own, he will still try to take yours into account as much as possible, and if necessary, occasionally compromise his own. Openness, on the other hand, means that the counterparties provide full and reliable information about their interests and other facts related to the subject of interaction. How could one not love this?

This is precisely why libertarians prefer to gather in communities. In a circle of people sharing common values, trust is usually higher, and if these values are libertarian, then—especially in business matters—mutual trust may, to an outsider, even border on naivety.

A contract, however, is a product of mutual distrust. Please state exactly what you will demand from me and what you are ready to give me in return, and what tools we have to compel each other to comply with what is written. And further clarify the meaning of the terms, so that it doesn’t emerge in court that you meant something completely different from what you hinted to me…

It’s not that libertarians completely neglect contracts when making deals among themselves, but usually it is just a brief summary of a chat conversation, purely so as not to forget: I borrow so much, for such a term, at such a rate, payments in equal monthly installments on the first of the month. The higher the trust, the more nuances are left out.

Trust in deals and the ability to rely on people to defend your interests is a huge treasure, as it reduces transaction costs to a negligible minimum, and thus ensures maximum market efficiency. But this treasure, unfortunately, is very fragile.

Trust can be destroyed by a fraudster. This is a very banal risk, and it is partially mitigated by simple tenure in the community. The longer a fraudster is forced to maintain an impeccable reputation to gain trust, the larger the deal he needs to scam the counterparty and ultimately still end up in profit.

But trust can also be destroyed by a pedant. Someone who, in a libertarian community, will demand as detailed a contract as possible, and then start insisting that it be followed to the letter—is a repulsive counterparty. He literally positions himself as an outsider, saying that you are all suspicious types ready to scam anyone at the first opportunity. Therefore, here are ten pages of fine print in tooth-grinding legal jargon, now let’s go get it notarized, and here we have a state court specified, and here is the penalty for delay, and so on and so forth.

Therefore, libertarian communities tend to reject both fraudsters and nitpickers, striving to preserve the innocent simplicity of trust-based relationships. But consistent rejection also requires conscious and unpleasant effort. A fraudster can be charming, and if he hasn’t personally scammed you, there is a temptation to continue being friendly with him. A pedant can be a strong professional, and this provides an incentive to tolerate him despite all the discomfort of communication.

Therefore, in real libertarian communities, complete ostracism is rare. Usually, a community member who causes repulsion is simply pushed to the periphery. There, he can either reshape his behavior and over time return closer to the core, or remain in the vague status of a partial outcast, or leave the community of his own volition. So, libertarian communities are quite resilient to problems with individual people, and these do not have a noticeable impact on the atmosphere of trust. However, another phenomenon is far more dangerous. A split.

Part 2. Why don’t libertarians like corporations?

There is an opinion that the world of victorious libertarianism is a war of corporations. Having read the first part, it is easy to conclude that this is also not true. But it is not that simple.

Communities whose members share libertarian values are capable of having a very high level of internal trust. However, libertarian communities usually have not only values but also goals. Their members do not like the outside world, where freedom is quite poor, and they strive to somehow combine the efforts of community members to influence the outside world and make it freer. This noble aspiration, alas, is capable of leading to rather sad results.

In order to turn a community into a movement—that is, to prompt community members to achieve a certain goal—this goal must be either quickly and verifiably achievable, even at the cost of serious effort (for example, a movement to abolish some repressive law), or easily broken down into stages that obviously bring one closer to the final goal (for example, a movement for EU accession, for which there is a checklist of requirements).

However, it may turn out that the goal looks tempting but suffers from a lack of specificity in implementation (for example, making Montenegro a free country). In this case, several movements may arise around the goal, differing in their ideas of exactly how this goal is achieved. For example, part of the community decides to focus on political transformations in Montenegro, and another part on building an economy independent of the state. And another part declares that it does not wish to adhere to the proposed goal and is satisfied simply living in accordance with its values (that is, remaining just a community).

The situation is exacerbated if certain activities of the movement appear from the outside not only as not bringing it closer to the declared goal, but as completely contradicting it. For example, if the goal is a free society, then any regulations of communications and business relations can easily be declared as contradicting the final goal, even if they perform an important tactical task of lowering the heat of conflict in a dispute or improving coordination in a working group.

Add to this the natural isolation of participants of one movement from participants of another movement—and soon we will inevitably see that the level of trust between several movements within one community has decreased, despite the continuing unity of basic values.

This isolation is further strengthened if a movement is formalized into a corporation. What was simply the coordination of people united by a goal has become management procedures, delegation of authority, setting tasks for working groups, accounting and control—in short, the methods familiar to all of us for making an activity more efficient.

Against the backdrop of such complication of the primary community, those who try to return to the happy past, criticizing the present, are perceived as gloomy retrogrades denying any movement toward the goal.

Thus, a relatively homogeneous community cannot move in a coordinated way toward any complex goal. But with the appearance of structures for achieving complex goals, it, firstly, still cannot move anywhere entirely in a coordinated manner, and secondly, it also loses the atmosphere of trust. What is to be done?

Part 3. How can libertarians maintain a balance of trust and efficiency?

It is quite easy to determine from the outside how great the internal unity of aspirations is in a community. If they argue about fundamental questions, then there is no unity. It is simply a discussion platform, a community united by the value of discussion as such, not its subject. If, however, disputes are over trifles, it means that agreement on basic things was reached long ago; it isn’t even discussed. This does not, however, make disputes over minor details less ridiculous and potentially less destructive.

The devil begins with the foam on the lips of an angel who has entered the fight for a holy right cause. The best path to a community split is animal seriousness in trifles (recall the pedant from the first part). Subconsciously understanding the certain comicality of their position, the disputant in a polemical frenzy begins to accuse opponents of violating basic value principles. Thereby making it clear that they perceive opponents as strangers who somehow ended up in the community.

Therefore, the first rule for a libertarian community that does not want splits is: everyone here is a libertarian. That is, they agree among themselves regarding the basic principles of their ideology.

The second rule develops the first: do not demand ideological purity from others. One can call oneself not just a libertarian, but an agorist. One can gather a bunch of agorists around oneself. But claiming to other libertarians that, for instance, you are not agorists and therefore are latent etatists is a bad idea.

The third rule generalizes the second: excessive detailing is harmful. The more detailed some description, some contract, some charter, or some rules are worked out, the more likely it is that reality will not fit the description, rules will be violated, and the charter will be interpreted based on immediate benefit. A good document is brief, evocative, and strives to capture precisely the spirit of what one wanted to express.

The fourth rule develops the third: an alliance is better than a merger. If a certain group can exist autonomously—let it exist. If it faces a task that it cannot handle on its own, let it enter into an alliance with other groups. If, instead of solving the task, the groups start merging into a single organization to solve the task, all the momentum will be spent on arranging the merger process.

The fifth rule is an antithesis to the fourth: do not judge what is better for others. If, for example, some groups have already merged into something that seems unnaturally large, there is no need to panic and declare war on them. Either they are fine with it, or they will eventually split up on their own. It is better to contact individual members of that group, applying the fourth rule.

One could continue to fantasize, but five rules are already a lot, see the third rule. Therefore, I will limit myself to what has been stated, and in conclusion, I will briefly summarize all three parts of the text.

  1. Trust is what libertarians unite for in communities. Trust must not be destroyed, otherwise the community loses its meaning.
  2. Organization is what without which a community will not move toward a goal. But organization devours trust, and thus destroys the community.
  3. A balance between trust and efficiency is possible, but it is not achieved automatically. One can formulate several rules, the observance of which will help maintain the balance.

Do not be your own enemies; we already have enough enemies from the outside.

From Theory to Practice: Social Support Cases in the Montellibero Ancap Community

This is my second article from the first issue of Yozh magazine, which is distributed via a paid subscription model. The issue was dedicated to the libertarian view on social support.

I am writing this post in a libertarian club, sipping a suspended beer. Recently, I needed money, and I sold my promissory notes on the exchange. Several times, people helped me move my things to a new apartment for free. In the early stages of Montelibero’s existence, I received an unconditional basic income. And at the very dawn of the project, when I first arrived in Montenegro, I received a generous relocation allowance from one of the community’s ideologues—he appreciated that I was convincing people to participate in the movement by personal example. Finally, through one of the project participants, I managed to find stable remote work with a decent income that allows me to live and even save a little, without being an IT specialist.

These were only the cases of social support where I was the recipient. I can recall a few others. An acquaintance of mine received a loan from a private charitable foundation to develop her private kindergarten, and I am helping another person obtain investments to open her own jewelry workshop. And when one idiot borrowed a huge amount of money and was in no hurry to pay it back, he was helped to tokenize his debt, and now all his obligations are available for public viewing on the blockchain. Less patient creditors sell his promissory notes at a deep discount. And when someone buys enough of these debt obligations, it becomes market-justified for them to visit the debtor and very gently ask him to reconsider his priorities regarding spending on personal needs in order to buy back his notes at face value as quickly as possible.

The Montelibero ancap community is young. Therefore, major social support here usually boils down to loans or taking an equity stake in a business. Minor support takes the form of in-kind services or one-time gifts. We haven’t yet reached the point of thinking about what to replace (or if it’s necessary to replace) state pension payments for our participants. For now, it is far more relevant for us to help each other find ways to earn a living.

Our task as a libertarian community is to acquire enough resources to transform the world around us to our liking, and at the same time, not allow the state to seize these resources. Additionally, it is very important to us that other communities borrow and replicate our experience, and that those who know about us but are not part of the community view us favorably.

Therefore, it is required, on the one hand, to be proud and self-sufficient, not begging for money from the state or obscure external NGOs, and on the other hand, not to acquire the image of caricatured ancaps who can help only for money.

As a result, we created a quite original internal tokenomics on the blockchain, where tokens are issued to denote any public obligations, which can then be traded freely. On the one hand, this allows for the easy attraction of the community’s free resources for private needs. On the other hand, for the state, especially one as archaic as Montenegro’s, all these blockchains are a dark forest. Quite serious value is stored in the tokenomics, but it is difficult for an outside observer to analyze, despite the full transparency of the blockchain.

In tokenomics, it is easy for a person to confirm their business reputation: they show a link to their contracts, and then to the transactions on the blockchain made according to those contracts. In tokenomics, it is easy to provide some low-liquidity property as collateral to obtain a loan denominated in high-liquidity euro-stablecoins. In tokenomics, finally, one can simply collect micro-donations. For example, when the path to the club began to be overgrown with blackberries, one of the activists organized a community cleanup. A dozen people showed up and worked with pruning shears for a couple of hours, while many others sent donations for this good cause to the activist’s wallet. Then she divided the collected money equally among the participants. Thus, literally in passing, public goods are created under ancap.

One cannot mention all the cases, but the general principle is this: ideological kinship creates trust, tokenomics tools consolidate it, and an entrepreneurial spirit allows it to be used to solve social tasks.

How stateless social support works

This is my article from the first issue of Yozh magazine, which is distributed via a paid subscription model. The issue was dedicated to the libertarian view on social support.

1. Why is it needed?

Although the free market promotes general enrichment, commerce alone will not make everyone wealthy. Some will be unable or fail to save enough to cover suddenly arising urgent needs. Some people’s needs may exceed their credit limit, so the possibility of a loan will not solve the problem.

Such people have a request for the mercy of those around them.

2. Can they count on it?

In a society of strangers, people show mercy more willingly the wealthier they are, the more secure their position seems to them, and the more undeserved the plight of the petitioner seems to them.

In close-knit communities, additional factors play an important role: the gratitude of the community, a further increase in its cohesion, and the fact that an example of mercy will encourage mercy from other members of the community.

3. Who can count on mercy?

3.1. First and foremost — their own. That is, family members, friends, and participants of a close-knit community.

3.2. Those who are merciful themselves. Helping them is also an opportunity to express one’s gratitude. This also includes everyone who is considered worthy of gratitude for other reasons. Usually, these are positive externalities associated with their activities. Thus, artists, service workers valued by those around them, etc., can confidently count on charity.

3.3. Those who know how to express gratitude. This is a currency that anyone at all is able to find.

3.4. And finally, those who tried to take care of themselves rather than living for the day. This is especially relevant if hard times come for many.

4. What effect does this system of incentives produce?

As is easy to guess, these incentives will encourage people to gather in communities, strive to be useful and grateful to others, but not forget to create a safety net for themselves. Serious deviations from the described socially responsible behavior can mostly be afforded by very proud and self-sufficient people who, in essence, refuse social support themselves, and who are we to impose it on them?

5. What forms will social support take under ancap?

Let us stipulate: market behavior cannot be planned, therefore, in describing the future of self-regulating systems, we can only make plausible assumptions.

5.1. Spontaneous support

A person suddenly needs help, they broadcast a request among their circle of communication, and those willing either satisfy the request without further communication or get in touch to clarify the optimal option for themselves and the object of help.

The market is able to provide the necessary tools here: verification of need, convenience of money transfer, selection of providers of in-kind services — either on a gratuitous basis or at the expense of funds transferred by donors.

5.2. Regular support

A person requires constant help, or funds are needed to maintain some costly infrastructure that is not paid for by direct contributions from those who use it.

The market here provides a competitive environment in which the following operate: (a) funds that accumulate one-time and regular voluntary contributions and spend them on charitable projects; (b) contractors ready to implement these projects on a commercial basis.

6. Limitations of social support under ancap

Charity is an exchange of resources for moral satisfaction. In the absence of coercion, support will be received not by those who need it most, but by those whose support provides more moral satisfaction. This triggers competition among those in need of help, in which those who best satisfy the criteria in section 3 win.

Will everyone get help? It is impossible to say for sure, but the probability is higher the wealthier the society and the more developed the market, including the market for charity.

Will the volume of help be higher than under state distribution? It is quite possible that not, but it will certainly be spent more efficiently, and such a distribution will definitely be perceived as more fair.

Network State. Translation of chapters 5.1 and 5.2.

The translation of The Network State is steadily nearing completion. Chapter 5.1 (a short preamble to the fifth part of the book) and Chapter 5.2, where Balaji Srinivasan analyzes the phenomenon of the nation-state in detail: what a nation is, what a state is, how they differ, how they influence each other, what their combination represents, and much more along those lines, are ready.

From some fairly recent thoughts: various strategies of public administration are likened to various programming paradigms.

The next piece will definitely, certainly be the last, and I hope the most interesting—after all, we must finally figure out what the author proposes in a practical sense, after going on for so long and in such detail about the global situation and upcoming challenges!

My partners and I created the MEREXP investment fund and share some of our analytics in a Telegram channel. Could you evaluate the channel?

Lisoz Tech (the question is accompanied by a donation of 15 USDC)

Here is the link to the channel: https://t.me/merexp_analytics

It only started being populated recently, since May 2, and so far it has been doing so on a daily basis (at one point, my own channel had a similarly auspicious picture). The materials can be roughly divided into two categories: reviews of specific markets and articles explaining the advantages of Merexp Analytics.

As far as can be understood, the advantages lie in the fact that the company uses its own proprietary metrics. I particularly liked the breakdown of how these metrics work based on historical Bitcoin data. Admittedly, based on the channel’s materials, it remains unclear how the raw data for all these metrics is collected, but perhaps the company shares this information with its clients.

The fund views Bitcoin as simply another asset in the stock market, which gives the reviews their own charm, since the Bitcoin market is usually written about either in the context of cryptocurrency world news or in the context of technical analysis; here, however, the focus is mainly on the influence of fiat liquidity fluctuations and similar matters.

Strictly speaking, this is already at least the second attempt to launch the fund’s channel; the first happened in December 2023, and by February 2024, publications had already ceased. Back then, the publications were much less regular and concerned Bitcoin exclusively.

It was somewhat surprising that there is no link anywhere in the channel’s materials to the investment fund’s website or its analytical division. This is inconvenient both in terms of presenting materials (for example, the website could contain a convenient archive of review publications broken down into categories by individual markets), as well as a lack of information about the fund that is awkward to present in a Telegram channel format (for example, information about the volume of attracted investments and the fund’s portfolio). Instead of a website, it is suggested to contact the support bot for all questions. This model of presenting material and interacting with potential clients is not very clear to me, although perhaps it is simply a trend. After all, people even manage to do business on Instagram.

The feedback bot was tested by me at the most unfavorable time — on a Friday evening. The response time was 40 minutes, which is very good.

Or perhaps the website and other interactive tools are currently being actively finalized and will soon see the light of day. If so, I even appreciate such an approach: first fully develop one’s key know-how that provides an advantage over competitors, and only then pay attention to how to present them to the public. This is much more honest than first making a beautiful presentation and website, then attracting venture investment, and only then, possibly, spending that investment on the development of metrics and algorithms.

In any case, I subscribed to the channel because the content provided there is quite original. Regarding Bitcoin, it will even be possible to track how the forecasts come true, and if they prove reliable, then perhaps I will start looking for entry points, rather than just buying coins blindly as soon as I receive income exceeding the subsistence minimum.

As a right-libertarian and legal individualist, can I support the Russian Volunteer Corps?

Max Stirner

From the proposed positions, it is strange in general to ask questions about whether one can do something. Of course, one can; the only question is the extent of responsibility.

If we are talking about sanctions from the Russian state, then solving the problem comes down to finding sufficiently safe ways of transferring money, publishing propaganda, delivering equipment, and so on.

However, I believe the question is more about whether other right-libertarians and right-individualists, upon learning of such activity, would feel obligated to obstruct you.

The RDK is a semi-autonomous armed formation within the AFU: in some ways it obeys the central command, it depends on it significantly for supplies, and it seems to be quite autonomous in matters of recruiting and the informational coverage of its activities. But there are other units within the AFU that independently conduct recruiting and crowdfunding. How is the RDK so different that the German Stirner asks about the permissibility of helping specifically the RDK, and not some Azov?

Azov was mentioned for a reason. Both this brigade and the Russian Volunteer Corps face numerous accusations that Nazis serve there. Economic theory tells us that values are subjective. Any person has every right to prefer one nation over all others; this in itself does not provide grounds to condemn them. Do the guys from Azov and RDK exterminate representatives of all other nations for the sake of the greatness of the nation they prefer over all others? No, they exterminate people according to a different criterion, and this criterion is no different from the one guided by other military formations within the AFU.

The only remaining difference between the RDK (and a couple of other smaller units) and other parts is that they physically, on foot, crossed the internationally recognized Russian-Ukrainian border to fight the Russian army on Russian territory. And what, does this make them aggressors? No, they are still participants in a defensive war. Just like the drone operators striking refineries deep in the Russian rear.

Ah, yes, they also have Russian passports, or at least they did at the start of the war. And what, does this somehow change their legal status? No, not even under Russian laws. They still remain AFU servicemen, toward whom all sorts of rights and restrictions associated with the laws and customs of war apply—laws which the RF pledged to observe (but does not). But even if there were a law in the RF according to which any RF citizen who joined the ranks of foreign armed forces was subject to execution without trial, what significance would this have for a legal individualist?

However, I assume that the reader with the nickname Max Stirner is a Russian citizen. Therefore, his question can be reformulated more sharply: does libertarian morality justify war against one’s own state? Actually, libertarian morality justifies war against any state. Even against states led by libertarians, such as Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele, or Hans-Adam II. Fighting against one’s own is even more meaningful, because that is where your main grievances lie, it is that state that causes you direct harm, whereas all others are just some predators roaming nearby, who, of course, should also have no place on earth. However, a successful war requires allies. Most of us do not have them. The RDK does. Let us be happy for them.

Network State. Translation of the fourth part is complete

To avoid bothering readers with news about every single sneeze, I present a large chunk of the translation of The Network State all at once.

Chapter 4.4. The Foreseeable Future: here the author simply had some fun with a couple of interesting technical predictions. They have a rather indirect relationship to the theme of the book.

Chapter 4.5. American Anarchy, Chinese Control, and International Centrism. A monstrously large text where the author mostly, of course, writes about the USA, analyzing step by step exactly how the degree of confrontation between supporters of the establishment and supporters of decentralization will increase in the States, and reports that this, generally speaking, is not funny or romantic at all (to be honest, while reading, it seemed to me that the author created a straw man out of Bitcoin maximalists, and they by no means propagate societies of total distrust, but who knows what kind of freaks actually hang out in these Americas of theirs). The alternative in the form of the Chinese recipe for a digital gulag obviously does not entice him either. As usual, he hopes that foreign countries will help him, and primarily bets on Israel and India. However, in his view, this is merely a base for building many startup communities, some of which will grow to the high status of network states.

Chapter 4.6. Conditions for Victory and Unexpected Endings. Here the author considers alternative scenarios where one of the extreme poles wins, rather than the coveted centrism.

Chapter 4.7. Toward a Recentralized Center. And here Balaji Srinivasan only has to emphasize once more that institutions are not scary, centralization is normal, you just shouldn’t obsess over the fact that the old things don’t work, and it would be more correct to actually launch a market process for building new institutions.


I will try not to take too long with the translation of the final, fifth part of the book, which presumably contains the recipes for what the author proposes to do.

The Montelibero Association, my view

The channel is still on vacation, but the largest investor of Montelibero stopped by for a visit, and I had an evening to chat with him, so it felt strange not to publish my reflections on this.

My previous overview of Montelibero concerned tokenomics. Now I want to examine such a mysterious entity as the Montelibero Association. I first mentioned it in the sixteenth (and apparently final) news issue — since then, I no longer write about Montelibero as a whole, only about specific aspects.

The reason for the Association’s appearance was that the Montelibero community had accumulated problems:

  1. Goal setting. The stated goal of the Montelibero project was initially libertarian transformations in Montenegro. However, those coming to the country are somehow more concerned with issues of their legalization in this state, earning a living, increasing the quality of that very life by developing internal culture within the community, and so on. Ancaps do not want to build an ancap for others; they are perfectly satisfied building an ancap for themselves, plus some minimal costs to keep the state from getting in the way.
  2. Lack of activists to create public goods. Who will build the roads is not a particularly acute problem, because it is easy to outline the circle of main future beneficiaries of road construction. But who (or rather, for what incentives) will write the wallet code for our tokenomics, who will organize a large annual festival and many smaller intermediate activities, who will pay for hosting, who will handle the filling and promotion of information resources — and so on? Administering the collection of small targeted contributions for any such trifle would be too expensive; it is more profitable to aggregate administrative expenses somehow.
  3. Insufficient clarity of collective decision-making mechanisms. For example, who and how will decide whom to send to deliver a report at a conference if the conference organizers contact one of the Montelibero participants and invite some representative of Montelibero?

One could simply dismiss such problems, claiming that the “market” is meant to solve them. But the “market” is precisely a generalized name for the entire sum of voluntary private initiatives. And so, one such initiative sounded roughly like this:

Since a loose community without fixed membership responds poorly to such challenges, let’s create an organization with fixed membership from its participants, gather activists into it, implement liquid democracy there, and within the framework of the association, they can engage in creating various cool infrastructural things for the entire community, as well as make collective decisions that can then be communicated to the whole community.

Half of last summer, the Association was at the stage of preliminary discussion. It was officially created at the festival. Now it has slightly over a hundred people in its membership. I will try to briefly list its main achievements:

  1. Creation of a mechanism for identity verification of its participants and a standardized blockchain record of this fact
  2. Creation of a court, which has already managed to consider several cases
  3. Creation of an open standard for the blockchainization of relationships — personal, property, collaboration, and the like
  4. Creation of a competition commission to select the organizing committee for the Montelibero festival in 2024
  5. Creation of internal factions united by a common direction of interests (creates associations with secular Civil Society)

Even at the stage of preliminary discussion, the Association faced serious difficulties, and some of them became even more apparent after its activities began.

Firstly, the very idea of officially joining something, obeying the decisions of a collegiate body, and so on, proved alien to many ancaps. A working group around a specific project — as many as you like! Membership in a club — by all means! But the Association, by design, looked like something too similar to a political party, and therefore was rejected regardless of the arguments in its support.

Secondly, the Association has internally contradictory goals. On one hand, to engage in constructive activity, it needs a high concentration of activists. On the other hand, to communicate legitimate decisions to the entire large community, it must be as numerous as possible. On a third hand, principled opponents of the association perceive any attempts by the Association to communicate its decisions externally as encroachments on their freedom and try to delegitimize them in every way.

Liquid democracy deserves a separate mention. The Association’s council, to simplify the model slightly, consists of twenty of its participants with the highest number of votes delegated to them by other members of the Association. This creates an incentive for those wishing to enter the Council to campaign for their own sympathizers to join the Association, preferably passive ones, so that all their activity in the organization boils down to joining, verification, and delegating their vote.

As a result, a contradictory situation has emerged.

On one hand, the Association carries out some useful activity. For example, the court it created resolved several conflicts that were previously in limbo. However, in one of these conflicts, the defendant (a member of the Association) did not recognize the jurisdiction of the court over them, thus questioning the claim that the Association is a contractual jurisdiction. A potentially even more useful project is the development of a standard for the blockchainization of relationships. Finally, it is the Association that plans to carry the festival on its shoulders.

On the other hand, all this looks like an attempt to create a monopoly out of nowhere, combining completely diverse activities under a single brand, even to the detriment of efficiency. For instance, the development of the blockchainization standard and its accompanying toolkit requires a compact working group, not a bureaucratic structure. To create a tradition of resolving conflicts in court, examples of successful conflict resolution are needed, not attempts at forced court appearances under threat of loss of Association membership. Cumbersome democratic coordination procedures repel enthusiasts rather than attract them. Attempts to inflate the prestige of membership through economic incentives for Association members and restrictions for non-members lead rather to the opposite effect: any anti-statist knows that if someone tries to impose a certain free service on you, threatening sanctions for not using it, you should run as far away from such gifts as possible.

Now my conclusions.

  1. The creation of the Association was a response by a small active part of the community to quite real challenges facing the community.
  2. This solution is unsuccessful by design and is quite naturally rejected by part of the community.
  3. Attempts to infiltrate the Association from the outside for the purpose of correcting its design flaws are harmful: it is a sin to try to replace the market with politics.
  4. Attempts to destroy the Association for the purpose of returning to the past are counterproductive, since even if the price seems acceptable, as a result, the community will still have to solve the same problems that the Association tried to solve.
  5. The only strategy that seems reasonable to me: ignore its very existence as some unified entity, without rejecting the people who are part of it in any way. Membership in the Association is neither good nor bad; it has no more meaning than an earring in the ear.
  6. As for the little problems, they will have to be solved by our own efforts; no kind uncle will come and help, and no evil uncle will come and hinder. He doesn’t exist, this collective uncle.