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I have now distanced myself quite a bit from the current Russian agenda, which is why I hardly ever speak on this topic. However, the Global civil war between supporters of the unlimited expansion of the state and supporters of its limitation affects even little Montenegro, so it is worth dedicating at least one post to this.

Statists use a specific vulnerability of economic theory to political pressure—externalities—to attack personal freedom. Anyone can become a carrier of a virus and infect others, meaning that by their very presence, they potentially represent a significant negative externality for those around them. And while attempts to restrict human freedom under the pretext that people breathe and emit terrible carbon dioxide, which will soon boil the Earth, meet with serious misunderstanding, it turned out to be noticeably easier to frighten people with a deadly and immediate danger, rather than one decades away.

In Montenegro, society is holding its defense quite steadfastly. It is helped by serious disagreements between the president and the prime minister, which prevent truly unpopular decisions from being made. But it is hindered by pressure from the European Union, on which loans and the flow of tourists bringing money into the country depend. Therefore, the state advances very cautiously and immediately takes a step back upon encountering serious resistance. This provides the EU with the necessary image: that we tried, but these obscurantists started blocking roads, and we had to find a compromise. For example, in the autumn there was an attempt to gradually make entry to large supermarkets available only by certificate, but after a couple of weeks, all restrictions were cancelled. Closer to winter, they promised to require certificates for entry to Christmas markets, but a couple of weeks later, they conversely announced relaxations: practically all restrictions are lifted during the Christmas holidays, celebrate to your heart’s content. Naturally, society has to fight for every relaxation through street actions.

In Russia, everything is much worse. Society was almost completely paved over last winter; no one is surprised by imprisonments for single-person pickets, social media posts, and other arbitrariness, about which most of my readers have a much more direct understanding, so I will not dwell on it. However, it seems that the attempt, at the end of the second year of the war for public health, to introduce a permit system for movement has nonetheless encountered fairly widespread grassroots resistance.

The Libertarian Party of Russia (the one of the two that the state seemingly hasn’t completely crushed) has announced the launch of a public campaign against QR-codification. I have read the list of proposals, and they look reasonably sound. As is usual in the RF, the level of support for an initiative is determined primarily by the number of signatures on change.org, so the first thing to do is go there and sign, and then figure out how else the campaign can be helped.

And, of course, we welcome everyone who cannot bear this entire frontline atmosphere to cozy, damp, and rainy Montenegro. At least the borders are still open.

Critique of the Libertarian Movement from the Right

Instead of a regular question, I received a rather detailed discourse, apparently with a suggestion to comment on it in some way.

If you are truly a libertarian or an anarcho-capitalist, then you must abandon the progressive “Overton window,” after which anarcho-capitalism becomes feudalism, and you become a reactionary. If we truly had anarcho-capitalism, we would have the death penalty for most crimes typical of the lower class, as well as serfdom or slavery for vagrants and the able-bodied poor, the death penalty for everything, the abolition of voting, at least for the poor and the stupid, serfdom or some similar way to disable people who are not inclined to work.

Most “libertarians,” since libertarianism is close to being illegal, have abandoned libertarianism. Now it is a completely dead doctrine. The great flaw of progressive “libertarianism” is egalitarianism. People are not equal, groups are not equal, reproductive roles are not equal.

Higher people should rule lower people; otherwise, lower people will create problems for each other and for their betters. The best people need to be freer. Lower people cannot handle freedom; they need supervision, discipline, and control. Lower people should be significantly less free. In order for people to have a reason for savings and investments, those who save and invest must possess greater political power compared to those who do not. Children need fathers. For children to have fathers, fathers must have power over their families. For the economy to function, property must be secure. For property to be secure, those who have it must have political power over those who do not.

The Enemy

I would say that some of the theses in this pamphlet coincide with the theses of Moscow republicanism according to Belkovich: people are not equal, the best people should have political power, and so on. But here the position is presented even more exaggeratedly.

I cannot say that the described society is unviable. What is described here is a very ordinary urban aristocratic republic, which existed in various forms from antiquity to the modern era. Such a society is sufficiently stable and historically died, if not from external conquest, then from the degeneration of the aristocracy. What can be done; political power is a poisoned fruit—you may pluck it to preserve your property, but you quickly discover that power is perfectly suited for preventing your competitors from getting rich, and even better, for plundering those under your control. The aristocratic little world closes in on itself, and in the best case, after a few generations, it finds itself tedious to everyone and needed by no one.

Is it possible in the modern world to maintain a society culturally similar to the one described, but without political power? This seems doubtful to me. At the very least, families relying on the dominance of the father of the house are struggling to survive in a world where there are many well-paid labor vacancies for women. On the other hand, if no one has political power (that is, the right to seize someone else’s property under the pretext of implementing socially important projects), then property ends up being relatively secure, and that is exactly what you need.

And what about the numerous rabble—lazy, unable to handle responsibility, living for the day? Let them hang out. At the current level of labor productivity, they will be quite able to afford working to a minimum, without straining themselves much, and it will be enough for them to live. Why worry about these downshifters? They won’t be able to cheat anyone or overthrow anyone. Well, they’ll quietly die from an overdose at fifty—why should you care? For a person without savings, it won’t be such a bad way out.

In short, in order to recreate the society you dream of for yourselves, you no longer need to harshly pressure the mindless mass, and they won’t pressure you either. You can breathe a sigh of relief.

So why on earth do you need these guys as serfs?

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Loren Lomasky.

I am continuing to translate the bonus section of Eric Mack’s book Libertarianism. It contains a selection of views from relatively obscure contemporary theorists who are developing libertarian ideology in directions they find most convenient. The second bonus chapter refers to Loren Lomski’s essay People, Rights, and the Moral Community, and primarily describes exactly which rights and for exactly what reason people would find it appropriate to waive in the interests of others.

In his reasoning, Lomski introduces the curious concept of personal projects—essentially, certain strategic goals that largely define each person’s personality and that somehow connect people with one another. Everyone knows that another person also has a personal project, and this means that they can be given a small amount of respect for it, expressed at minimum as non-interference, and at best, as unburdening assistance.

I would say that these arguments are far more appealing than those of Steiner in the previous chapter, and I am glad that something useful can actually be gleaned from the book being translated, although, of course, the concentration of useful ideas is incomparable to that of Friedman in The Machinery of Freedom, it seems to me.

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The Stanford Prison Experiment – can a person become cruel if their social role requires it?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Continuing the theme of experiments that allegedly demonstrate the violent nature of humans and their willingness to cause pain and harm to others if circumstances demand it, it is worth considering the Stanford Prison Experiment. This experiment is as well-known as the Milgram experiment we considered earlier. Its published data suggest a willingness of the majority of people to inflict pain on others on the orders of an authority figure. However, as an analysis of unpublished data showed, 56% of participants stopped as soon as they felt the victim was actually experiencing pain, and 72% of those who continued to participate did so because they did not believe in the authenticity of the experiment and the reality of the pain caused to the victim (and indeed there was no pain, only acting). But while in the case of the Milgram experiment the issue was merely about unpublished data, the Stanford Prison Experiment turned out to be completely baseless.

The participants of the experiment were divided into two categories—guards and prisoners—who lived in a simulated prison. All participants were expected to play their respective roles. But, as published data suggest, the experiment soon became truly dangerous. The guards began to cruelly abuse the prisoners, and a third of them displayed sadistic tendencies. Two prisoners were even excluded from the experiment due to the psychological trauma they suffered, and the experiment itself was stopped prematurely for ethical reasons. For nearly 50 years, many believed in the reality of these results and their corresponding conclusions. However, a series of pieces of evidence has recently been revealed that completely refutes this experiment. We will now consider some of them.

First, as the experiment’s organizer Philip Zimbardo assured, the participants were free in their actions, and those playing the role of guards received no prior training. In reality, however, the guards were aware of the expected results of the experiment; they were given clear instructions on how to act in various situations, and efforts were made to instill in them the belief that they were assistants to the experimenters in this study.

Second, and very importantly, the participants understood the requirements of the experiment in advance and corresponded to them. As Zimbardo claimed, the requirements for participation were minimal. However, almost all potential participants understood, for example, that guards were required to be despotic, hostile, and aggressive. This led to the assumption that participants, due to a clear understanding of their role, may have played it to the fullest extent in order to ensure the success of the experiment. In fact, after some time, they stated that they were only playing a role. They also always understood that they were participants in an experiment, that they were being observed, and that none of it was real.

I would like to draw attention to one more point. Such an understanding of the upcoming role could have influenced the selection of participants in favor of those with tendencies toward more cruel behavior, since that was exactly the behavior required. And can an experiment for which more cruel people may have been selected say anything about the cruelty of the average person?

There are many other facts that cast doubt on the experiment. It is worth remembering the participants who had to leave it due to psychological trauma. One of them later admitted that he only simulated a psychosis because he did not like the experiment and wanted to leave as quickly as possible. The unrealistic nature of the experimental conditions should also be understood. And finally, the researchers did not provide all the data—out of 150 hours of the experiment, only 15% were recorded (6 hours of video and 15 hours of audio). Very little personal data was collected from the participants, which could have influenced the course of the experiment.

Sources:

  1. Thibault Le Texier (2019). Debunking the Stanford Prison Experiment;
  2. Ben Blum (2018). The Lifespan of a Lie.

The 2008 Crisis: Now a Direct Answer to Yesterday’s Question

Yesterday, responding to a question about the libertarian interpretation of the 2008 crisis, I used the question more as an opportunity to talk about my own topic. This left some commenters bewildered, especially given that the corresponding disclaimer did not fit within the limits of the Telegram post and is only found in the full version of the post on the website.

Fortunately, in the Facebook comments, Valery Kizilov provided a link to his own article from 2008, written in the immediate aftermath of that crisis, where he explains the Austrian theory of the business cycle very clearly and concisely. He also recommends a book for a more extensive study of the topic, where everything is explained in much more detail: Jeffrey Friedman, Vladimir Kraus. Man-Made Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. M., IRISEN, 2012.

I haven’t found a detailed libertarian analysis of the origin of the 2008 crisis. The answer that state regulation is to blame for everything is clear, but insufficient.

Anonymous question

I will use this question to reflect on something abstract.

Humans have a natural abyss of empathy. Not surprisingly, since we are social animals. Thus, a person usually enjoys doing what they consider to be good, especially if others also agree that it is good. But it is usually sporadic acts of kindness that are pleasant. Out of generosity, a person performs a one-time good deed and departs, pleased with themselves—after all, it is wonderful when it costs you absolutely nothing to make someone else feel good. If the recipient expresses gratitude, it may increase their chances of receiving another good deed in the future, but one should not rely on this too heavily. Once good deeds become a routine, they begin to be perceived as work. And for work, one wants payment.

So, we pulled a person out of a destitute anarcho-commune and were quite satisfied with how wonderfully we organized the expedition. But then it turned out that the person is completely lacking in independence, very capricious, doesn’t know how to work, and dreams only of living on a generous social benefit. We fell into a trap, because we have no desire to continue carrying this burden, yet we can’t exactly throw them out onto the street. They live like a pet, yearning and whining. It’s unpleasant.

Now let’s imagine that we have a large external source of funding for charity. In this case, of course, it would be no problem for us to rent an apartment for the person that satisfies their demanding tastes, give them an undemanding job that they can actually perform—and if they can’t, who cares—or simply provide them with an annuity, and let them live for their own pleasure; why not? And why should we personally bother? We’ll hire a separate social worker to sit on a salary and wipe their nose, while we will only rejoice in how kind we are and how much benefit we have brought. It’s pleasant.

That is how the social state works: you take money from the budget and do good at someone else’s expense, because you are a kind person. And taxpayers are kind people, so why would they refuse to pay social taxes, since they go toward good deeds! And if taxpayers’ money is not enough for all our ambitious social programs, it’s no problem—we can issue government debt bonds, or simply print new money; this is far more humane toward taxpayers than taking more from them than they are used to paying.

Kind government men desperately wanted even a poor person to be able to afford a good home. Therefore, special organizations were created to finance these expenses. And banks were ordered to generously issue mortgage loans to poor people so they could afford a house. The trouble with the social state, however, is that someone else’s money eventually runs out.

How did it happen that the mortgage crisis turned into a global financial one? What can you do, humans are social animals. Papers that were considered ultra-reliable turned out to be junk, and everyone collectively began to look suspiciously at their own portfolios of securities, wondering if it was time to dump the junk before others did it first. The global financial market deflated significantly, meaning those who lost their capital outnumbered those who profited from the crisis.

But who is even interested in that ancient crisis when we are living in the heat of a new one? And this one, too, was caused by kind people who terribly did not want miserable people to die right on the streets from the terrible coronavirus. People were put under house arrest, forcibly stuffed with experimental medicines, had tests shoved in every orifice, streets were sprayed with chemicals, beautiful fluffy minks were destroyed—what wouldn’t one do out of love for humanity at someone else’s expense!

This does not mean that covid does not exist. Poverty also exists. And homeless people exist. But when you try to solve other people’s problems by paying for it out of your own pocket rather than someone else’s, you will have much more balanced priorities regarding how much to spend and on what exactly. And that means that your kindness, at least, will not cause global crises.

Harsh coercive measures have failed again

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Considering the concept of harm reduction, I have already shown why the best result is achieved not through prohibition and accusation, but through awareness and attempts to encourage a person toward less risky behavior. For example, the needle exchange program during the AIDS crisis in the 80s, which allowed drug users to take fewer risks by using fresh syringes instead of the same ones repeatedly and sharing them among several people, proved to be much more effective than strict prohibitions. Program participants began to use drugs less frequently, their health improved, and many of them eventually voluntarily sought help for addiction treatment.

Similarly, awareness and encouraging people toward less risky behavior could have been used instead of harsh coercive measures in the fight against coronavirus. Unfortunately, most governments chose the second method. However, it is good that not all of them decided to resort to force and strict prohibitions, so we can easily compare the results of these approaches. Research on the impact of strict measures, light measures, and all measures combined on the growth of infections has already long shown that both types of measures produce approximately the same effect. This means that the introduction of harsh coercive measures is unnecessary, or even harmful, given their consequences for social and economic life.

Sweden is a good example. From the very beginning of the pandemic, it refused to introduce harsh and coercive measures within its country; even the wearing of masks, which was mandatory almost worldwide, remained only recommendatory in Sweden. Initially, the number of infections and deaths greatly exceeded the corresponding figures in other countries (though in reality, this was not the case in all instances; for example, they were quite comparable to the figures in France). However, it was already clear then that compared to other countries, Sweden’s economy would suffer less and recover faster after the pandemic. And importantly, the last wave of the pandemic, which put many countries in a critical position, had almost no impact on Sweden. By the way, the inspiration for writing this post was the comparison between the situation in Israel, where people are already being given a third dose of the vaccine, where covid passports are being actively implemented, and where there were multiple lockdowns, and Sweden, where there is and was nothing of the sort. At the same time, in both countries, the vaccination level for the first and second doses is approximately the same, but the situation is fundamentally different.

Slightly stricter measures were introduced in other Scandinavian countries—Denmark and Norway. The governments of these countries, of course, called these measures extremely harsh, but if compared to measures in other countries, they also seem quite mild. It is also worth mentioning an experiment conducted in Norway. Fitness clubs were considered breeding grounds for coronavirus, so they were closed at first. Later, 5 clubs were opened, allowing half of their clients to attend classes and the other half not to. As a result, over two weeks of observation, only one case of illness was registered, although it was in the group attending fitness clubs, but the infected person had not even managed to reach the sports facility. Also, the director of the Norwegian Institute of Public Health claims that the country could have gotten by without quarantine and achieved the same results. In general, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have already lifted all restrictive measures (except for border controls) and were the first in Europe to return to the life they had before the pandemic. Other countries are still very far from this.

Thus, we are once again convinced that awareness and encouragement of less risky behavior can achieve at least the same, if not more, than strict prohibitions, control, and force. And in general, a huge price will have to be paid for harsh measures in any case. So what is the point if, in the end, they cause more harm than good?

Montelibero Project News, Issue 7

In the previous issue, I wrote about the fact that excess forest had been cleared on the plot for our future libertarian village and road construction had begun. As of today, the road to the plot is fully graded, and I can now ride my scooter right under the shade of the native olives.

In the second half of October, I personally took a job working on the road construction and plot clearing, and by yesterday, we already had a full women’s crew working. The work is, of course, not easy, but here in Montenegro, the ladies are quite tough, and one has to keep up. After the first working day, I spent a couple of days recovering, but then I eventually got into the swing of things, and over the past three weeks, I’ve even grown a bit stronger.

The plot has brought in its first small income: several kilograms of olives and some firewood. The highest quality olives were salted, and a tasting is expected in mid-December. The lower quality ones were turned into a liter of oil. I will continue the harvest, but overall the scale will remain modest: without special care, the yield of our olives is small.

As for the firewood, it was sold mainly to neighbors, for self-pickup, and quite cheaply—because long-haul trucks cannot reach the plot, so the logistical costs of hauling the firewood far away would simply eat up all the profit. As of today, 475 euros of this profit has been earned. After this, we will likely stop sales, and the remainder is intended to be kept for the future needs of the village, for which it will be necessary to equip a storage area.

Since the construction of houses will soon begin on the plot, a trailer was delivered there, which is planned to be used as a utility room and a guardhouse. And since the permanent residence of a guard is expected, this will also require the deployment of some minimal domestic infrastructure. The trailer had to be hauled up the hill by a tractor, so we will soon need to concrete the steepest sections of the road; otherwise, it will be difficult to deliver many cargoes. In time, the road will be fully concreted.

Since the construction of houses is about to begin, the issue of privatizing individual plots for building has become urgent. For now, a preliminary plan was drawn up, and mechanisms for mutual agreement on who gets which plot were tested in the chat. For instance, I was chased off a piece of land I liked twice, until I grabbed one for which competition was slightly lower. In addition, a drone was purchased; it is intended to perform aerial photography, tie it to the stakes set in the ground by the surveyor (whose coordinates are precisely known)—and then the preliminary plan can be corrected taking into account the features of the terrain and the remaining trees on the plot. A test flight was conducted yesterday; it didn’t go very well, and it is expected to be repeated soon with slightly corrected parameters. The drone, as is customary in Montelibero, was purchased by a private initiative group through equity participation and using the tokenomics built around the project; its use is regulated by an agreement drawn up between them, and whether they use it for entertainment or monetize it in some way is their business; for me, it is more interesting as a practical solution to various problems related to property rights.

Last week, project volunteers carried out a humanitarian special operation: they rescued one Russian political emigrant from an anarcho-commune at a farmstead near Bijelo Polje. Following her, another communard migrated to us on his own (he is the one we plan to use as a guard living in the trailer). This is how communities work under ancap. Ideologically, they aren’t very close to us yet, but they will do as fellow travelers, and we’ll see from there.

But we are, of course, not so much stealing people from other projects as we are attracting our own settlers. For example, the other day a family of five migrated to Montenegro, which is a record for us so far. Unfortunately, the project website is updated very rarely and sporadically because there is no one to manage it, so the settler counter on it is unlikely to be up to date. As for the freshest information about Montelibero, as before—it’s in the project’s telegram channel.

Finally, I would like to recommend an English-language blog about settling in Montenegro by one of the project participants, which is posted in the English-language Montelibero telegram channel under the hashtag . There are slightly fresher impressions of the country and how local life is organized than what you can find from me.

Stéphane Molinier. Practical Anarchy. Translation of Chapter 8, on collective defense.

Alex Dvoretsky kindly sponsored the translation of another chapter by Eric Mack, but the donation caught me in the process of translating another chapter by Stephan Molinari, which I was crafting according to the dictates of my own soul (and in the hope that donations would follow post factum). So, I finished with Molinari first, and now I will switch to Mack.

In the chapter Collective Defense: An Example of Methodology, Molinari analyzes the third most popular question about ancap, after courts and roads: how ancaps will defend themselves against an attack by an evil neighboring state. The book was written before Putin loudly enough declared his claim to be the world’s number one villain, so Germany is used as the model villain instead of Russia, and the dictator there faces a difficult choice: whether to conquer statist Poland or ancap France. I would say that in his fantasies about how the defense problem is resolved, Molinari appears more overconfident than Friedman, who, at least, considers the problem serious, and even admits that for this specific need he would, grimacing and wincing, agree to feed the state.

Social credit rating and the monopoly on violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In today’s information world, the institution of reputation plays an important role. It is already difficult to imagine purchasing an expensive product or seeking a moderately serious service without first checking the provider’s rating. Ratings and reviews have become an essential part of many services. Most likely, over time, reputation tools will be used in all transactions, including direct deals between individuals. This leads us to the emergence of a social rating, in which different people will have different reputations depending on whether they fulfilled their obligations honestly, or whether they deceived others, violated the terms of deals, or even harmed their well-being through robbery or violence.

The institution of reputation and financial instruments, especially ostracism and transaction insurance, are capable of replacing coercive tools as a method of influencing offenders. The need to initiate forceful measures simply disappears, and in cases where the offender themselves has not committed violence, the need for any form of forceful resolution essentially vanishes (in the event of a violent attack, of course, self-defense is unavoidable). This would only contribute to solving the problem of violence and reducing its level in society. But at the same time, in a world of stationary bandits, where states hold a monopoly and the “legal” right to commit violence, reputation institutions and social ratings could well serve a harmful purpose.

It is important to understand that states often monopolize services that are important to society. Previously, they took strict control over roads, the financial system, fire services, medicine, the extraction of many resources, social security, and—most importantly within the framework of our topic—the quality control of services and goods supplied to the market. It is quite reasonable to expect that if, at some point, the vast majority of people begin to rely on the institution of reputation, states will take control over it as well. Officials will claim that private solutions are unreliable and that there is a need to issue strict rules for the operation of reputation services, or even create a single state reputation service for everyone, banning private rating and review systems. In a world where some states decide which charging device standard people should use (referring to European Union states), such a scenario has a high probability of becoming a reality.

Thus, the institution of reputation will not only become bureaucratized and inefficient, it could also become a tool for persecuting and punishing people disliked by the current political power. This is already happening in China—a minus in one’s social rating can be received for friendship with an opposition member or for statements against party policy. By a single order from above, any person can be deprived of access to many state benefits. And never mind these benefits—if the state were not a violent monopoly, alternatives to its benefits would exist. But under states, there are no alternatives, as private activity is heavily controlled or prohibited in the spheres they have monopolized. In the end, instead of being a method to fight violence, robbery, and deception, the institution of reputation becomes a supporting tool for strengthening state power and coercive control.

A simple conclusion can be drawn from all this: the institution of reputation is very useful in ensuring the security of transactions, and it is also important for the transition from coercive methods to non-violent influence as the basis for maintaining public order. But when combined with violence, especially state violence, it loses these positive qualities and begins to work toward the strengthening of state power and coercive control. Therefore, it is very important to fight violence and prevent the institution of reputation from being taken under the control of any coercive agents. After all, we cannot fight violence if the institution of reputation is used only by violators for their own benefit, as is currently happening in China.