I liked the analysis: the pros, cons, pitfalls, limitations, prospects, and so on are listed. I will separately note the point that not everyone practicing counter-economics methods is an agorist. For example, North Korea earns from counter-economics, but they are not our bros.
It seems to me that for agorism to succeed, two factors must coincide. First, there must be an anocracy in the country (I would even say a failed state, but this term has many negative connotations because that state is mainly associated with contempt for private property). Second, agorism must be fashionable. Ideally—on the level of the movie Alongside Night. And if we can do little in terms of weakening the state, then as for the second condition, the cards are in our hands.
The development of biotechnology brings us closer to the moment when it will be possible to create a gene therapy capable of activating the violence-inhibiting mechanism in humans that Konrad Lorenz wrote about. However, along with this, there arises the risk of the appearance of a completely opposite gene therapy aimed precisely at eliminating any inhibitors of violence in a person. Therefore, some may consider the idea of creating gene therapy against violence to be useless, as if it can be made, then gene therapy to unleash violent potential can also be made. Demand for it could be found among certain psychotics, maniacs, and people who overly prize their aggressiveness, consider it the meaning of their life, and are unwilling to part with it because of some dart with a drug fired at them during another attack. Additionally, some groups of people (supporters of authoritarian power) may consider it important to achieve certain goals by force, meaning that the security forces executing these orders must be protected from the risk of losing their capacity for violence.
Of course, the vast majority of scientists are against violence, and it is unlikely that any of them would engage in such developments. But what happens if there is someone among them who decides to help violent degenerates? Let’s go through this step by step:
1) There is a probability of the uncontrolled spread of a drug that disables the Lorenz mechanism, and if this happens, the whole world will be mired in violence and wars, and the survival of humanity will become impossible (practically repeating a typical scenario from a zombie movie).
2) This risk will lead to the necessity of creating an updated gene therapy against violence. It may be capable of preventing the disabling of the Lorenz mechanism by any means whatsoever; however, if this cannot be guaranteed, the only remaining option will be to make it so that a person dies from an attempt to remove their own restrictions on violent behavior. Allowing the survival of people striving for violence in such a situation is simply impossible; otherwise, the previously mentioned scenario will occur.
3) After this, a fairly rapid equalization of the balance of violent potential will occur; absolute universal armament will be achieved (it will become clearly apparent to every average Joe that weapons in such a world are the only guarantee of survival). The new status quo will be maintained because a minority of sadists will be afraid to deactivate the Lorenz mechanism to attack the majority of non-violent people, who are capable of destroying them at the very first attempt to initiate violence.
4) The stationary bandit (the state) will not survive either the appearance of gene therapy against violence, since it would then lose the ability to impose its order by force, nor the appearance of a blocker of the violence-inhibiting mechanism, because in that case, the security forces working for it will receive Molotov cocktails, bottles of sulfuric acid, infectious agents, bursts of automatic gunfire, etc., instead of peaceful protests, from the very people who removed their restrictions on violence and will manifest it toward everyone, including them. Zombie movies, although pure fantasy, nevertheless quite accurately convey what will happen to the state in such a scenario.
As a result, it turns out that the creation of a drug to disable violence-inhibiting mechanisms will also lead to the elimination of the stationary bandit, whom supporters of authoritarian power and forceful measures love so much and consider the best mechanism for achieving any goals. They do not understand this, but even worse, they do not understand the catastrophic scenario that the creation of such a drug would lead to if gene therapy against violence is not updated in time according to the parameters in the second point, or at least if the balance of violent potential is not equalized so that all resulting rapists and violent criminals can be liquidated during their attacks.
If it is unclear where exactly you are admitting it – here is the chat dialogue:
Purple Dragon: @ancapsan, I wonder, if Bitarch actually invents his libertarian vaccine, tests it, and gets approval from independent doctors, would you get vaccinated?
Ancap-chan: It’s important to understand exactly what changes will occur in the body and decide based on the specifics. If the effect is exactly as Bitarch dreams—which I don’t believe in, because genetics doesn’t seem to work that way—then why not? It wouldn’t affect self-defense capabilities, and if I needed to take violent revenge, I would still prefer to hire a specialist rather than act myself.
At first I thought about joking it off, but I think I’ll answer seriously.
The subject of my main disagreement with Bitarch is my dislike of operating with holistic constructs. I prefer to consider not violence as a phenomenon, but violence that one specific subject manifests toward another specific subject. And only then do I view this specific violence in the context of libertarian ideology, which proclaims freedom as its value. And this very freedom means that I reserve the right, among other things, to revenge, if I so wish. Naturally, I also leave others the right to try to stop me and hold me accountable.
My own moral views, which may prompt me to enter into a conflict, including a violent one, are higher for me than an abstract desire to have a world completely devoid of aggressive violence. Attempts to manipulate me in the spirit of “as long as violence remains in the world, humanity is in danger” might lead only to a shrug: “then let it remain in danger.” I would perhaps even sharpen the thesis. If we assume there is a button that, when pressed, destroys humanity, I would want to have it. Not to press it, but to know that I can do it. This is a very important incentive for a person—the expansion of possibilities, that is, degrees of freedom. Freedom.
And it is all the more important for me to have the ability to respond to violence against me, both directly at the moment of attack and ex post facto, if that is more convenient for me. I will not voluntarily destroy in myself the capacity for such a thing. So please forgive me, in the dialogue quoted above, I lied.
At the same time, I deeply appreciate Bitarch’s research with the Voluntarist regarding the investigation of mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes toward the manifestation of violence. Moreover, I respect Bitarch’s striving to obtain a button that eradicates the inclination toward aggressive violence in humanity. After all, how is this worse than the desire to have a button to destroy humanity? True, he craves this button in order to press it, and that changes the situation slightly: perhaps I will still have to stop him, as they stop mad scientists in classic action movies. Well, that would be interesting.
If, for example, we take ancap according to Molynieu, is it really possible that a few rich kids who caused a car accident while drunk or high, even without fatalities, or raped a girl, will be able to pay compensation, even tenfold, and continue to roam free? Money is money, but the danger to society hasn’t disappeared. Would you yourself, God forbid, if the above happened to you, turn to a state or private court, assuming we have minarchism with ancap tendencies and a choice between them? Yes, a state court would shake out a tiny compensation, as usually happens, but would isolate rapists in a colony for 5-10 years, with a small chance that they won’t return, or will return as broken and sick people. A private court, however, would shake out compensation exceeding the damage dozens of times over, but would release the rapists, as we know that the goal of punishment under ancap is not correction or retribution, but restitution for damages. What do you say to that?
Fortunately, I have already managed to write the first chapters of a book on libertarianism, so I can immediately send you to read about libertarian law. The task of the court is not to punish the criminal or to squeeze the maximum amount of money out of them. The task of the court is to resolve the conflict. Even if I couldn’t reach an agreement with the rapists regarding which court should consider our conflict, and the court turns out to be imposed on the defendants, this does not cancel the main task of the court. The outcome must be a situation where the conflict between me and the rapists is considered exhausted.
For me, it is extremely important to understand that I will never see these people again in my life. This will allow me not to flinch upon seeing an indistinct figure in my peripheral vision (at least, I hope). So I would insist that they receive an order to live in some specific city known to me, even if it is quite large. Accordingly, I will never set foot in that city, and they must stay out of mine. Of course, monitoring their compliance with this point will cost money—there’s no way around it, let them cough it up, it’s important to me.
I have a very strong psyche, but when I heard in an interview with Shulman that she suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome for a year after an attack on her husband, I am forced to admit the possibility of some psychological traumas needing treatment for myself. So my second requirement, of course, would be the payment for my rehabilitation.
Also, naturally, I would like to receive significant monetary compensation, however, I placed this point third because my priorities fully correspond to safety regulations: first, the dangerous factor is eliminated, and only then is aid provided and compensation paid.
As a fourth point, I would like the rapists to also receive psychological treatment, but if they have no money left for this after the payments for the previous points, I will not insist.
If the rapists were too poor to immediately pay the compensation assigned to me and fund other measures—well, they will have to take out a loan. They’ll pay it back someday; that’s no longer my business, but theirs and the bank’s.
It seems to me that my requests are modest enough: I do not insist on castration or execution, I do not demand that they necessarily languish in a cramped cell and be subjected to rapes by cellmates. I don’t need them to lose their health, nor do I want those who deprive them of health to lose their human form. So I hope the court will grant my claims. And if a victim of violence insists on all the crap described in this paragraph, I hope the court manages to convince her to abandon such requests. If the court appoints some severe punishment in this vein, for me, it will be a clear red flag: the court is not libertarian, I will never voluntarily deal with it, and I will try to dissuade others.
Before answering the question of what would happen in the event of a victory, it is important to understand under what conditions such a victory could occur at all.
Part 1. Before the elections
One could devise many scenarios of varying degrees of implausibility, but they would all share one common premise: both Putin and Navalny are physically removed from the race before the elections. That is, they do not simply decline to participate for one reason or another, but they have no possibility of influence whatsoever. Simply put, they die. Let us assume a rather crude scenario: Navalny dies in colony from COVID, and Putin dies of a stroke. Thus, we are not inventing any terrorist organizations or lone wolves, but leaving the realization of this historical coincidence to the will of Mother Nature. Mishustin becomes the Acting President; he tries to seize the reins, fails, and the Federal Assembly unexpectedly passes a law that explicitly prohibits the acting president from running. Mishustin is smart enough not to veto it.
New elections are announced. They are preceded by a broad public campaign to repeal the law that strips those involved in the activities of extremist organizations of their passive voting rights. The campaign yields no result, and Navalny’s associates, from Volkov to Guriev, find themselves ineligible—some due to extremism, others due to residence permits. The opposition holds primaries, where the remaining old democrats easily drop out, and in the second round, Svetov defeats Yuneman by a slim margin. Putin’s associates also struggle, and they too have to organize primaries in which Sobyanin loses to Shoigu; dirty scandals break out about how municipal workers voted for one candidate in formation, and conscripts for the other. Things are no less dirty for the Communists, where Zyuganov still hasn’t dared to let anyone run instead of himself. To top it all off, Patrushev is nominated for some reason from Rodina, and Prilepin from A Just Russia. Thus, by the time the signature collection campaign begins, the largest systemic parties are in total disarray, huge public attention is fixed on the elections, and the CEC lacks the political will to cut Svetov off at the start. He receives generous funding from both liberal business emigrants, like Chichvarkin, Durov, and Khodorkovsky, and from certain entrepreneurs who did not flee under Putin, starting with Potapenko. This proves sufficient to collect signatures and get on the ballot.
But is such a setup enough for a libertarian to win the presidential election in Russia? No. Therefore, let’s add two more factors. First, extremely successful liberal reforms—for example, in Kazakhstan—which, a couple of years before the Russian elections, provided him with a serious leap, and his successes are currently very well known. Second, Svetov announces a left turn, telling a tale that the super-rich are to blame for all the people’s woes and explaining how he will strip them of their levers of political influence. He also promises to transfer state corporations to a pension fund and pledges to introduce a progressive income tax by abolishing personal income tax for everyone earning less than two minimum wages, while leaving the previous rate for others minus the aforementioned two minimum wages from the taxable base. Furthermore, he announces a 30% reduction in military spending by abolishing the entire conscription system and a 90% reduction in spending on special services—transferring the savings to social budget items. In short, there is plenty of room for libertarian fantasy when writing a radically left program.
Against this backdrop, Zyuganov’s promises of nationalization look not only unconvincing but bland, and reasonable doubts creep in regarding Shoigu’s ability to reduce the army—what stopped him before? To top it all off, for the first time in many years, all candidates participate in debates, and this is where Svetov crushes everyone, demonstrating the highest level of discourse in Eastern Europe. This is how grandmothers on television learn about him, and it secures his victory.
Part 2. After the elections
Svetov comes to power, but he is a president without a party. Elections to the State Duma will not take place until 2026, but he needs to show at least some results. By the way, regarding the State Duma. In 2021, a very small cross-factional group of deputies was formed who managed to get in thanks to smart voting and did not condemn Navalny for it, but instead worked, however poorly, for the voters. After Svetov’s victory, their informal influence increases significantly, and they become conduits for a large number of bills that materialize Svetov’s program. Nevertheless, all these bills progress with difficulty and slowly.
On the other hand, measures where the president can rely on his own orders as Commander-in-Chief are carried out very quickly. Thus, Russian security forces begin to leave Donbas even before the Duma approves a new prime minister. By the way, that becomes Dmitry Potapenko—he didn’t start sending money to Svetov’s headquarters first for nothing. Navalny’s followers demand Milov and Guriev in the government. Milov gets the post of Minister of Energy, and Guriev is appointed to run the pension fund. Kudrin triumphantly returns to the post of Minister of Finance, which ensures that the State Duma becomes slightly more cooperative. Ekaterina Schulmann becomes the Minister of Education. There are many ministries in Russia, and even more worthy people; I am too lazy to fantasize about other posts, but one way or another, the government will soon be updated. The president also introduces a bill for broad amnesty for all political articles, as well as for Article 228. The bill stalls, so Svetov simply issues pardons for the political prisoners. The Federal Agency for State Property Management is transferred to the jurisdiction of the pension fund.
What manages to be done in the Duma?
First, changing the election law once again, continuing the good tradition of not holding two elections under the same rules. The bill is written by “Golos” and introduced by the president. Election deposits are restored, the entry threshold for parties is lowered to 3%, signatures for candidate registration are permitted to be collected electronically via Gosuslugi accounts, electronic and multi-day voting are abolished, the rights of observers are expanded, and, of course, lustration norms for convicts, holders of foreign residence permits and dual citizenship, and those involved in extremism are abolished.
Second, the president guarantees a veto on any law passed in violation of regulations. No more accelerated consideration in three readings at once.
Third, the share of secret budget items drops sharply. Serious public battles take place in the Duma over the budget. Reducing the budget for security agencies is only partially achieved, and the savings are indeed redirected to education and healthcare. Spending on state propaganda is radically cut, and this becomes a problem—as in Yeltsin’s time, the president begins to be attacked via private channels, and he counters them with his own streams.
What is not achieved? Naturally, all lustration plans fail. It is impossible to abolish personal income tax for the poor. It is impossible to abolish even the transport tax, despite it being such a small thing, so it would seem.
After this, in 2025, the president dissolves the Duma and announces early elections. About fifteen parties enter the Duma, including one libertarian party. The largest faction belongs to the Communists—twelve percent. The pace of reforms accelerates after this, but only slightly, because the team of reformers effectively has to form their own coalition for every new bill. Towards the end of his first term, Svetov manages to achieve the adoption of a constitutional norm stating that every new federal law or other regulation, except constitutional ones, must contain an expiration date, which cannot exceed ten years. If the norm is not extended or modified before the end of its term, it automatically ceases to be in effect. At the same time, since the constitution is being amended, a second important edit is adopted: from now on, the president may serve for only one six-year term.
What manages to be done in foreign policy?
The issuance of loans to other countries ceases. All troops are withdrawn from abroad. Ukrainians rejoice, Armenians are sad. Crimea is declared a free economic zone, which has the right to choose in any matter which legislative norms to follow—Russian or Ukrainian. Ukrainian citizens receive the right of free settlement in Crimea, with the granting of voting rights in elections of all levels up to the presidential. Ukrainian political parties receive the right to operate in the territory of Crimea. Residents of Crimea with Russian citizenship receive the right to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine. The border between Russia and Ukraine in Donbas is handed over to Ukrainian control. Ukraine receives a long-term headache in the form of former people’s republics, which must be brought back to a human state. Thanks to this compromise, Russia gradually emerges from most foreign sanctions—all except restrictions on the supply of high-tech weaponry. Its own sanctions, of course, are lifted immediately.
The market for external hydrocarbon supplies is liberalized. The buyer purchases them on the Russian exchange or directly from the producer, after which they choose the exact method to ensure delivery. Thus, the volume of oil and gas pumped through Ukraine is now determined only by how competitive the transit tariffs set by the Ukrainian side are.
Results of the rule
Russia entered a peaceful path and stopped acting foolishly in foreign policy. Internal policy was also rid of the dictate of the security forces. A strong left opposition in parliament did not allow a serious reduction in the tax burden and state spending, however, their character changed to be more social. Under Svetov, Russia remained a country with a low level of public debt and a budget surplus.
In 2030, Mikhail Svetov leaves the post of President and in the same year is elected to parliament, where he leads the libertarian faction. In 2035, he leaves parliament, buys a house in Kamchatka, settles there with his young wife, and leads a private life.
The potential structure of a free society is usually presented as a system of territorial and extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions (CJs) with voluntary participation and various internal orders. Thus, proponents of differing views on life and social organization can unite into separate communities to realize their own scenarios of happiness. Such an approach assumes absolute freedom and voluntariness of human choice. However, along with this, a question arises: what should be done if violent practices begin to be carried out in one of the CJs?
First, let us examine the question of “violent” CJs more closely. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how violence could occur against the will of the participants themselves. Effectively, a CJ is simply a service provider that has no ability to restrict freedom of movement within certain territorial borders (as states do now), which is necessary for carrying out forced violent practices. Moreover, this becomes impossible if there is any sort of uniform balance of violence potential in society (universal armament), because in such a case, infringing upon their freedom to exit would be, at the very least, disadvantageous for rational agents.
But besides the scenario of forced violence, there is also the option of consensual violence, or violence against people who are not fully capable of self-defense and are not considered independent legal subjects in that CJ, such as children. Such a CJ could be established by some fanatical traditionalists and conservatives. Through propaganda, they could convince weaker members of society that a violent hierarchy of dominance is normal, or even necessary. And as for children, no one will ask them at all. By the way, regarding children, the idea of a pedophile CJ is sometimes brought up as an attempt to discredit the concept of a free society. But, of course, no true supporter of freedom and the impermissibility of violence would support such a thing and, in the event of such practices, would advocate for intervention aimed at stopping them. In real life, intervention would also inevitably occur in CJs that support any forms of slavery, regardless of any previously concluded contract.
Some might believe that there is nothing wrong with consensual violence, or with violence as a method of raising children, and that these are acceptable practices within separate communities. However, violence in any form leads to sad consequences. It becomes a “normal” social phenomenon, and the people most prone to violence, who best fit violent orders, achieve the greatest success in life, while people without such inclinations effectively become outcasts. Both socially and in terms of “human nature” (evolutionarily), violence is reinforced and becomes an integral part of life.
Recently, I posted a picture depicting human sacrifice, typical for the Mesoamerican peoples who lived in the territory of modern Latin America, where one spectator says to another: “It’s fine, they built the roads for us.” In the comments, people immediately began to point out the inaccuracy of the analogy with current states, since these sacrifices were performed with the voluntary consent of the victims, who often sought benefit for their relatives, who received certain privileges after the ritual. But I am sure no one will dispute that such practices clearly leave behind only people prone to violence, capable of murder, while those not prone to it become the victims. Selection works in favor of violence and violators, reinforcing extremely weak variants of the Lorenz violence-inhibiting mechanism in the population. We can even see the result of such negative selection in Latin America today, especially its northern part (not to be confused with North America where the USA and Canada are located). Many people living there now are descendants of the indigenous population with their violent rituals and descendants of cruel Spanish conquerors. This mixture ultimately caused an extremely high homicide rate (it is the highest in the world in El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela), as well as excessive brutality in the massacres occurring there, against which even the activities of some Islamic terrorists pale in comparison.
Obviously, it is precisely from violent CJs, due to the extremely high percentage of violators within them, that one can most expect military attacks on other peaceful CJs and their participants (including the use of weapons of mass destruction), and ultimately the restoration of a violent hierarchy of dominance across the entire society. We cannot justify even voluntary violent practices, as they will inevitably lead to an increase in the number of people capable of violence and the corresponding consequences.
Of course, we are against violence and war as a solution to any problem, including the problem of violence itself, therefore we do not support military intervention. Moreover, to carry it out, we ourselves would have to become violators, capable of initiating an aggressive attack. But overall, specifically on this issue, we are for intervention, as only it will prevent the growth of the number of violators and the expansion of the problem of violence. Any violent practices, such as intentional infliction of physical harm, forced coercion, and even more so killings (even if they are voluntary), must be condemned, and their perpetrators must at least be subjected to various reputational and financial sanctions, making their lives extremely difficult and unpleasant (of course, until they decide to abandon such practices). If this proves insufficient, then the opposition (opponents of violence in such CJs) should be helped with supplies of weaponry and gene therapy drugs, so that they can eliminate violators at the immediate moment of attack on themselves, as self-defense. Not even the slightest justification of violence can be allowed. And this intervention is not a violation of freedom and voluntariness as such, since we are not proposing specifically forceful measures. And various non-forceful measures of influence are absolutely justified in the case of the risks carried by any violent practices.
I don’t know if I’ll disappoint you or if this will simply be feeding a troll, but for the poor and foolish, whether in a market economy or under socialism, there are only two paths: to lean on someone else or to find unskilled work. If they are also lazy, only the first option remains.
Leaning on someone is more profitable in a country with a market economy: there are charitable shelters and soup kitchens, freeganism, crashing on couches, acquaintances who are more or less well-off (there will be more of them in a market economy), or begging. Under socialism, there are fewer options: he who does not work, does not eat, so only acquaintances and crashing on couches remain (even begging is often forbidden under socialism).
Unskilled labor is easier to find under socialism, since the right to work is one of the most important positive rights guaranteed by the socialist system. The utility of such labor for people may well be zero or negative, but that depends on luck. In a free market, unskilled labor will likely be more intensive, but it will also be paid higher.
Finally, there are intermediate regimes, which are the majority. There are regimes like the Russian one, where there is no proper social safety net, but you can hardly make any money in unskilled work. There are social democracies eating away at their liberal inheritance: there, one can live quite well on benefits—however, there are many such poor, foolish, and cunning people there; they form ghettos, and few would like the conditions within them.
Shortly after my summary of Konstantin Morozov’s article stating that libertarians must either accept moral realism or give up the idea of proving that their ideology is the best, I began reviewing materials from the recently held “Capitalism and Freedom” conference in St. Petersburg. There, I came across Sergey Sazonov’s presentation, “Entrepreneurial Theory of Property.”
It seemed to me, and Valery Kizilov confirmed my suspicion in the Facebook comments, that the topic of this presentation echoes Morozov’s article.
The presentation showed that, purely philosophically, the concept of property can be based on two opposite foundations: deep private property (initially all property is the domain of individuals, and they can subsequently delegate their rights to society) and deep public property (initially everything belongs to everyone, and subsequently society may agree to allocate something into individual ownership).
It was further explained that the idea of deep private property in the most widely accepted Lockean interpretation has an insurmountable flaw—which is exactly what Konstantin Morozov points out. The basis for primary appropriation is the universal right of non-exclusive use of any ownerless resources, but everyone who appropriates them thereby deprives all others of their right of non-exclusive use. Deep public property, however, is devoid of such a logical flaw.
Although both concepts of the origin of property rights allow for the derivation of similar worldviews, there is a serious difference between them. By deriving property rights from deep private property, we must prove the extreme necessity of any state intervention. By deriving them from deep public property, conversely, we must prove any of our own authorizations to dispose of certain things—whether this will indeed be a socially beneficial use of property.
Sergey then demonstrates a justification for deep private property that is devoid of the aforementioned flaw. The transformation of a simple object into a resource that can be turned into property occurs not at the moment of the Lockean “mixing of labor with land,” but at the moment of making an entrepreneurial judgment about them. One sees how something unwanted by anyone can be applied—and that’s it, it’s appropriated. The Lockean contradiction is resolved because a simple object is transformed into a resource instantaneously, and no one is deprived of their non-exclusive right of use in the process. In contrast, within this approach, the idea of deep public property develops insurmountable problems.
In short, I highly recommend getting acquainted with the presentation; it’s a great mental workout. As for me, I will need to think about whether to include this material in my book, and if so, in what form.
The security forces of a stationary bandit (state) are, on average, staffed by people who are clearly more prone to violence than the general population. However, even their violent tendencies are not absolutely unrestrained. Most of them would still be unable to kill a person by initiating violence against them, rather than acting in immediate self-defense. Murder is an order of magnitude more serious act of violence than knocking someone onto the asphalt, twisting their arms behind their back, or beating them with a baton, which we can observe at the same rallies. To commit it, a person must be a completely reckless violent criminal. But in most cases, such individuals are unlikely to even make it into the security services, having been caught committing violent crimes in their adolescence. This means we can develop one very radical but effective strategy for fighting the stationary bandit.
To implement this, we will need a “self-destruct device,” for example, a collar with a small amount of explosives. Few people would voluntarily put such a device on; however, there are activists who, as a sign of protest, go so far as to commit self-immolation, and here, sustaining significant or fatal damage to oneself is not even necessary, as the goal is not to commit ritual suicide, but to deter security forces from committing an act of violence. How? An automatic activation device must be built into this collar, for example, triggered by any attempt to strike or immobilize the wearer (an artificial intelligence program can be used to determine this). The activation must be specifically automatic, since only a very small percentage of people (only those capable of self-immolation) would dare to manually activate it. Security forces know this, and therefore they would likely venture to immobilize and disarm a person if the activation were not automatic, which they would most likely succeed in doing. Additionally, the activist must inform the media before the action or the security forces directly during it that they are wearing such a device.
Thus, any violent action by the security forces would lead to serious injury or even the death of the activist. And they cannot afford this; after all, there are very few completely deranged maniacs among them, and even they might not dare, given that this would result in serious consequences for them, considering that such a death of an activist and the security forces responsible for it would immediately be in the public eye. Even with terrorists, security forces initially try to negotiate rather than liquidate them immediately. By the way, there was a recent case where an armed man, visited by security forces on suspicion of stockpiling weapons, decided to offer armed resistance, barricading himself in his home. The simplest option for the security forces to solve this problem would have been immediate liquidation, given that there was no one else in the house except this man. However, for a full 9 hours, they spent time cordoning off the house and attempting a storm; in the end, it ended with a grenade launcher shelling, which caused a fire in the house, during which the defender died.
Now imagine that even a small percentage of activists put the security forces before a choice: either don’t hit, or kill? Effectively, the activity of the security forces would be paralyzed; they would have to spend their strength and time dealing with these activists (though they would not be successful, as the only acceptable option for the security forces would be to persuade the activist to remove the device, which not everyone would fall for). Meanwhile, other protesters would be able to conduct their actions more freely and calmly while the security forces are distracted from them. Also, over time, they may generally begin to fear using violence against protesters, as such a device could be on any one of them.
I was sent a link to an interesting article on the god-forsaken VKontakte, where a certain Konstantin Morozov discusses the moral justification of taxation, specifically for the purpose of implementing a Basic Income, and other interesting mental constructs of the left-libertarian camp. Without irony, I was interested in understanding their logic.
In short, the author’s argument is as follows. The compulsory nature of seizure is not in itself a criterion for its injustice: this is easily demonstrated by the example of damage compensation. Thus, to speak of the injustice of seizure, one must show that property is being seized to which you have a right. But how do you determine what a person has a right of ownership to? What makes them think they have ownership rights to that which is seized as a tax? Legally, this is state property and is subject to payment. Therefore, the libertarians’ resistance to taxes is rooted not in laws, but in morality.
This raises the question of the objectivity of morality. If we stand on the positions of moral relativism, where one thinks one way and another thinks another, and both are right, then the state is just as right in collecting taxes as the libertarian is in refusing to pay them. Thus, if a libertarian wants to justify to others that he specifically is right, he will have to adopt the position of moral realism.
By tracing the immorality of taxes back to the non-aggression principle, the libertarian relies on the idea that freedom requires no rational basis; it is some kind of self-evident good toward which everyone strives. But what exactly is the freedom being discussed? The libertarian conception of freedom as the absence of coercion is far from the only formulation, not even the most popular one, and certainly cannot be considered self-evident.
Next, the author examines several possible approaches to justifying the morality of compulsory seizures for redistribution in favor of the poor: the Lockean proviso, utilitarianism, Nozick’s compensatory justice, reducing the concept of negative liberty to its republican formulation… The author does not insist on the truth of any particular argument; he merely points out that smart men know how to reason beautifully and competently with logic and facts, while frenzied Eastern European libertarians, having filled their heads with their Svetov and up their asses… remain unconvincing, narrow-minded dogmatists demonstrating an extremely low level of discussion.
I am not going to start refuting the points from the article right now. For me, this is rather a useful warning that will come in handy when writing the brochure on ancap. In particular, I need to figure out what to do with moral realism. I define morality as a spontaneous order of entering into conflicts, and it will, of course, differ in various communities. Thus, the book about ancap acquires a sort of ethnographic character. As in, listen, there is such a people as ancaps in the world, and they have these amazing tribal customs, so unlike what is accepted among civilized people, but attractive in their own way, just as the customs of some Polynesians regarding free love are attractive to us. Will I justify why the libertarian social order is the best? Well, I don’t know. I’m not sure.
