Easements under ancap

The topic was raised in the panarchist chat, but I had not previously published the considerations I shared in response, so I decided to organize the topic into a separate post.

To begin with—here is what I have already written on the topic of transit through someone else’s territory. In short: in densely populated areas, owners of adjacent plots will have a market incentive to profit from transit, while in sparsely populated areas, models of reciprocal altruism are more likely to work, where allowing transit costs little, forbidding it costs a lot, and the reciprocal gratitude for granting permission may prove very valuable at the right moment.

And now, what I would like to add. In essence, an easement is a claim by one neighbor to use the property of another neighbor, recognized by the latter. As long as the agreement lasts, there are no problems. One lets another use their lawnmower, and in return, the other allows them to use a bicycle; everyone is happy. But then the bicycle is sold to a third party. Naturally, by default, it is not burdened by any easement upon sale: the new owner does not care who had the right to use their newly acquired property or on what grounds; all agreements regarding this must be built from scratch.

Now, it is roughly the same story with land. If an old neighbor used the right of passage through your plot, then when they sell the land, the new owner does not automatically acquire the right of passage. However, if the old neighbor brought the buyer to you during the sale and said, for instance, “I’m leaving, this person will be here instead of me, discuss the passage with him”—then it’s a completely different matter; you sit down and substantively discuss what and how you will concede to each other for the sake of maintaining good neighborly relations.

Of course, if the easement had already been embodied in specific physical communications passing through someone’s land, then an attempt to sever these relations would likely affect not only the interests of the new owner but also those of other neighbors, who should not lose the easement because their agreement remains in force. Nevertheless, the new owner is brought up to speed, for example, on the terms of joint maintenance of these communications.

Generally, it’s quite funny to hear that ancap is supposedly a rampage of unrestrained individualism. No, it is under the state that there is a rampage of unrestrained individualism, because a mediator is forcibly inserted between people, and any issues must be resolved not between each other, but specifically with the mediator—that is, with one state office or another. In conditions of decentralized law, as is proper in decentralized systems, network nodes agree among themselves on the rules of interaction, so individualism is individualism, but the interests of neighbors must be taken into account.

An important point: since the rules are based on tradition, by default, this tradition is dictated by the older owners. They are the ones aware of how things are done here, and new owners may adapt, they may suggest changes, but they are unlikely to be able to change the rules at their own discretion if it affects the interests of the previous owners.

Chapters about ancap finally appear in the book about ancap. The reader will be disappointed.

I have started writing the final, fourth section of the first and most important part of the book about ancap. As usual, I produced two chapters: The first — the concept of ancap, where I simply formulate the banality that anarcho-capitalism is, believe it or not, anarchy plus capitalism. The second — the expansion and contraction of ancap — concerns the dynamics of how the corresponding relations penetrate society.

Essentially, my theory regarding libertarianism and ancap ends here: I tried very hard to be extremely concise, so I don’t even intend to push the fourth section to the traditional four chapters. Instead, I want to write a fairly detailed conclusion summarizing the first part, after which it could well be set sail as a standalone book, serving as a convenient (hopefully) entry point into libertarianism.

The second and third parts are intended to be the application of the previously outlined theory to various practical issues — regarding how different aspects of life may be organized under ancap, and what practical steps are envisioned for the transition to ancap. These parts, unlike the first theoretical one, should lose relevance much faster, whereas the first was written for eternity, to take a small spot on the pedestal, where it is already quite crowded with the greats.

40 years ago, SEK3 wrote in the New Libertarian Manifesto that California is ahead of the entire planet in the transition to libertarianism and agorism.

Right now we observe that California is a top statist socialist state in the USA. How did it happen?

L29Ah

I avoided this question for quite a while because I didn’t understand how to provide a detailed answer without falling into a tedious chronicle, which is not so much useless as it is meaningless on its own. Every tax increase and every tightening of regulations had its own unique reason, and digging into them is not the level of a popular channel.

To put it very briefly, California became “Commifornia” because its voters wanted it. It remains in this status now largely despite the will of the voters, but that is usually how socialism works: people try this drug because it is trendy and advertised everywhere, and then it turns out that it is easier to die than to get off it; thus California (as a system of effective resource management for the territory to improve the territory in the interests of its residents) is dying.

It seems possible to get off this drug—the example of Thatcher’s Britain shows this. But relapses are also extremely likely, as shown by the example of modern Britain. Anyway, let us leave the medical metaphors and the abuse of holistic constructs alone. I would like to draw attention to another point.

Generally speaking, Konkin did predict the crisis of the state, because if people had the opportunity to use political methods for the constant and irreversible reduction of state interference, there would be no need for agorism. At the same time, Californian crypto-anarchists indeed seriously pushed humanity toward the implementation of useful agoric technologies, so Konkin’s notion that California would play an important role in the struggle was also justified to some extent.

Thanks to open borders between states, many agorists and libertarians found it easier to bail out to tiny New Hampshire rather than try to turn the tide in massive California; therefore, those who wish to focus on business and legal politics rather than survival naturally leave the leftists alone with the governments they chose, heading where their efforts will bring more benefit. For some reason, Konkin warned against such tactics as a kind of simple and wrong solution, calling it anarcho-Zionism. On the other hand, he also predicted the emergence of certain agoric ghettos where people could effectively resist the state’s attempts to regulate them into oblivion, thanks to the fact that their concentration there would be higher, making it difficult for hostile agents.

In short, Konkin was hardly concerned with the fate of a specific state that was one way or another in the hands of statists, and nitpicking that his territory is not the current locomotive of agorism is like nitpicking Ayn Rand for the absence of Rearden Metal based on an iron-copper alloy in our lives.

There can be no rights and freedoms to violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

To the question of whether a person has the right to commit violence, we have only one answer — they do not! No single person in the world should possess the right to initiate an act of violence against another person. But some people (most often supporters of authoritarian-conservative views and force-based methods of solving problems) may say that this is a restriction of freedom. Freedom to commit violence is a freedom like any other, which means we are contradicting ourselves and are authoritarians ourselves, wanting to forcibly impose a single life scenario on everyone.

This is a rather inadequate manipulation in essence, which ignores the fact that violence leads to people being deprived of their freedom. That is, when one person initiates an act of violence against another person, they thereby deprive them of their freedom. Accordingly, violence is non-freedom. The right to violence is the right to deprive people of their freedom. However, the elimination of violence, the striving for its complete eradication as a phenomenon as a whole, is the elimination of the factor that leads people to non-freedom. And no verbal manipulations will change the essence of the phenomenon of violence!

Book about ancap – finished the section on the marketlet

I’ve unexpectedly ended up hanging out in Albania, so my posting pace has slipped a bit. On the other hand, dropping out of the usual flow is very conducive to slow-paced creativity, so I relatively quickly finished the two remaining chapters of the market section in my future book: specifically on the market and on capitalism. In the next section, I will finally begin describing ancap—assuming, of course, that I don’t get swept away somewhere again.

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Hayek’s views on social justice

I have processed another large donation and finished translating the fourth part of Eric Mack’s book “Libertarianism.” The chapter being posted is interesting because it is the first time Mack polemicizes with the discussed views of a particular author rather than simply transmitting them. Previously, there was nothing like “Locke is wrong here” or “Spencer is wrong there,” but he makes such assertions about Hayek. Apparently, this means he considers Hayek sufficiently his contemporary for it to make sense to argue with him.

Mack classifies Hayek’s argumentation against social justice, highlighting five arguments against it, and notes at the end that in his further reasoning, Hayek still departs from his own principles and argues that society does have the right to provide its members with a basic income, and that this is fair. In short, Nozick, in Mack’s presentation, appears far more consistent.

Strangely enough, this concludes the main positive exposition of the principles of libertarianism by Eric Mack. One more part will be devoted to the critique of libertarianism, and one bonus part contains a set of surnames completely unknown to me, who tweaked the ideology in their own key—I suspect, somewhere toward the left. I will deal with them starting from the next donation.

Elections, elections!

I have finally received the recommendations from the State Department Smart Voting regarding which specific single-mandate candidate I should vote for in District 96 in the north of the Irkutsk region: that is where our little warm western Montenegro is located. It turned out to be a certain Andreev Andrey Anatolyevich, from the CPRF. For Navalny’s pawns, this information is quite sufficient, but those who enjoy thoughtfully analyzing the varieties of shit can visit the shit directory kindly created by Khodorkovsky and check the details of all candidates there.

As for the voting by party lists, I intend to balance my vote for the communist single-mandate candidate by voting for the LDPR list—especially since, as far as I can tell, Smart Voting mainly recommends communists for the single-mandate districts, and I don’t really want to give them an overly populous faction.

One should not take elections in modern Russia with animal seriousness; it is nothing more than a way to piss in their slippers. It won’t make them feed us better or bully us less, but we know that when we piss in their slippers, it infuriates them. Is that not enough?

“Legitimate” and “illegitimate” bandits

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The recent case of the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban movement only further confirms the theory of the stationary bandit, according to which states arise not through a mythical social contract, but because nomadic bandits decide to settle down and move from irregular looting to stable tribute (or taxation) and the subjugation of people. Even the most liberal and democratic states continue this tradition, as in their case as well, a person has no right to disobey the orders and tax rates established from above—disagreement with this is punished by violence, exactly as in the case of a bandit attacking an unarmed and defenseless victim. And even the provision of certain socially useful services by the state does not change the essence—it is the same as so-called “protection rackets,” where you either agree to pay bandits for some form of protection, or they will attack you.

But it is also important to note that the legitimacy of a specific group on the world stage, that is, its recognition as a state by other states, is purely a question of victory and the seizure of power. Some states are already ready to recognize yesterday’s Taliban terrorists today, and there are even talks of cooperation, including from Russian government structures at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, in their time, the Bolshevik bandits were recognized; after they seized power, the representatives of the previous Tsarist government suddenly became the bandits.

The winner is recognized and always spoken with, even if they were a mad bandit only yesterday. And this is the only thing, rather than any “social contract,” that distinguishes a “legitimate” and recognized political force from an “illegitimate” bandit-terrorist. But the essence itself remains the same.

A couple more chapters for the book about ancap

I have put together the first two chapters of the third section of the book about ancap. The section is called “The Market” and, of course, the first chapters are dedicated to anything but the market. In the first one, I ramble on about labor productivity, and then suddenly switch to inequality, and I’m currently pondering whether to remove the final passages. The second chapter is dedicated to planning, and this is the first place in the book where I appeal to specific named authorities, Mises and Hayek, which also creates a certain dissonance, as it might overcomplicate the text.

Overall, I am dissatisfied with the writing pace; I thought I would announce three chapters at once, but the chapter about the market isn’t coming along yet, so I have to report on only two.

How do the courts and police work—no, not under ancap—under FPKYU?

I absolutely do not understand how, in a polarized society, the Ural Federal District and the Southern Federal District would agree on, say, the criticism of oatmeal cookies, because some have a liberal attitude toward oatmeal cookies, while for others, insulting oatmeal cookies is haram. It is obvious that judgments applicable to classical panarchy cannot be applied to FOCJs, since the conditional Ural Federal District is driven not by a desire for profit, but by other forces—the political goals of the elites of this Ural Federal District, for example. What should be done if a federal district continues to play at isolationism (which is impossible in classical panarchy); how should federal authorities react in this situation?

Old friend

The question refers to a translation I published quite a long time ago of a work on functional overlapping competing jurisdictions. However, it demonstrates a lack of understanding, quite traditional for a modern person, of how functional jurisdictions differ from territorial ones. A conditional Ural Federal District is a territorial jurisdiction. A conditional Ural University is a functional jurisdiction: although it has a certain territory, the university’s jurisdiction is defined not by territory, but by the function it performs. Its jurisdiction includes the process of its students obtaining higher education and certain related issues. Universities can play at isolationism, up to the extraterritoriality of campuses and their own security services, or they can remain dull agencies under the subordination of the Ministry of Education.

The FOCJ model was proposed by the authors primarily for the EU, as a development of the idea of federalism, in order to take away some powers from the states comprising the EU, but transfer them not to the level of the European Union, but to functional jurisdictions. A rather flexible model is proposed, with the possibility of forming FOCJs from the bottom up, and exactly in the sphere that covers the scale of the problem being solved.

Relationships between FOCJs can be competitive if they perform related functions; they can be reduced to relationships between a customer and a client, as, for example, between an FOCJ serving nuclear power plants and an FOCJ serving the power grid; they can be conditionally neighborly, like the police and the fire department in one city; or they may be completely absent, as between a consortium for the certification of boiled sausage production and an association of kosher food producers.

Since the interests of different FOCJs can indeed come into conflict, legal proceedings between them are possible. Within the original model, it was not intended to shift the judicial system onto FOCJ rails, so most likely one arbitration or another, such as the Stockholm Arbitration, will be used. Police interference in FOCJ activities is also possible if some higher jurisdiction, such as a relevant ministry, sees abuses or simply errors in reporting.

In some ways, FOCJs look like an under-panarchy, since they may imply not only contractual relations with those people whose lives they regulate within their function, but may even collect targeted taxes from them if the state delegates these powers to them. In other ways, they are ahead of the panarchy model, because under panarchy we have something like contractual extraterritorial states regulating a more or less arbitrary set of life areas, while the powers of FOCJs are strictly limited by their function, which makes them similar to Friedman’s ancap model.

Functional overlapping oatmeal cookies