Self-defense and the inhibition of violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

An important question is how self-defense fits into the concept of the Lorenz mechanism (LM)/violence inhibition mechanism (VIM). From a rational point of view, restraining violence is a good and useful thing. But would a person with a strong LM/VIM be unable to defend themselves from an immediate threat of violence?

Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to find specific studies linking self-defense and the LM/VIM concept. In the future, I will try to study the neurophysiological aspects of self-defense in more detail and combine them with similar aspects of violence inhibition. However, I will now put forward a hypothesis about such a relationship based on the evolutionary aspects of the development of LM/VIM, which can serve as a starting point for further research.

According to Konrad Lorenz’s theory, the inhibitor is most pronounced in species whose representatives possess strong innate weaponry and do not have a statistically significant opportunity to avoid violence by fleeing. These two factors exert evolutionary pressure to strengthen the LM/VIM, as they create a threat to the survival of the species. And how did evolution handle this threat? It is not that complicated. Non-aggressive members of the population encounter intra-species violence only when they are attacked. Aggressive individuals, however, initiate violence themselves. Because of this, they end up in violent clashes much more often, and therefore die more frequently than other individuals, failing to pass their genetic material to the next generation. Thus, violence is weeded out, while the strong version of the violence-inhibiting mechanism is reinforced.

But for non-violence to be reinforced, it is necessary that the victims of violence be able to defend themselves during a direct attack using their weaponry. Otherwise, the aggressor’s life would be under no threat, and it would be the less aggressive individuals who die, leading to the opposite effect, and eventually to the extinction of the species (unless its representatives choose flight as an alternative, as hamsters do, for example, scattering after only a few mutual bites). But since we still observe heavily armed species in nature whose representatives are not prone to fleeing from intra-species aggression, and we also observe a strongly expressed LM/VIM in them, it means that victims of violence can indeed use their weaponry for self-defense against aggressors.

How might this work? An immediate threat of violence leads to a defensive reaction from the victim, which may weaken the operation of the violence inhibitor for a short period of time. As soon as the immediate threat passes, everything returns to normal. At the same time, the possibility of weakening the inhibitor to a state where the affected individual becomes capable of initiating violence themselves is excluded. Otherwise, the threat to the survival of many species would continue to exist, because the number of violent individuals in their populations would not decrease as a result of acts of violence, but might even increase, as victims would become new aggressors.

Self-defense is a permissible and evolutionarily optimal strategy for eradicating violence in a population. And humans are not exempt from this. If everything stated above is correct, then humans should also be capable of self-defense during a direct attack when there is a threat to their life, even if they have a strong version of the LM/VIM inhibitor. At the same time, they would not be capable of initiating violence outside of situations that directly threaten life, as this would relate to other, successfully inhibited types of violent behavior. I will also add that all of this points to the realism of evolutionary strategies for fighting and eradicating violence based on armed self-defense during direct attacks by various types of aggressors.

Digital gold of El Salvador

El Salvador now has a second national currency alongside the US dollar — bitcoin. Thus, since the autumn of 2008, in just under 13 years, bitcoin has grown from a project posted by an anonymous person for open discussion into a currency equal to the dollar. Although, so far, only in one country.

Now the world should wait for El Salvador to implement something like Estonian e-residency: then anyone wishing to do so will be able to remotely open a business in El Salvador and conduct completely official settlements in Salvadoran currency, because Salvadoran laws will mandate it.

To mark this giant step in bitcoin adoption, discounts have been announced: some lucky individuals managed to buy in today at a price of around 43 thousand US dollars per bitcoin. But it is still not too late: at the time of this post’s publication, bitcoin costs only 47 thousand dollars.

Vladimir Milov is preparing to make the first bitcoin transaction of his life: a hairdresser is telling him how to install a Lightning wallet

Stefan Molinieu. Practical Anarchy. Chapter 7

After an indecently long break, I am returning to the translation of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinari. I have already begun to miss his style, so I decided to ignore the lack of donations and translated another chapter just because; you’ll have plenty of time to chip in later.

Chapter Seven continues the first part of the book dedicated to methodology — the author approaches the explanation of his subject quite thoroughly, yet quite vividly. In particular, here he shows where the main strength of the existing world order, in which everything is divided among states, lies — in the fact that we cannot imagine it being any other way, although if we were to start designing the best possible world order from scratch right now, it wouldn’t occur to anyone to voluntarily build all this crap. On the contrary, the solution we devised would likely resemble something anarchic — simply because these recipes work perfectly in private life. In short, give it a read; it is presented quite well and convincingly.

Next, I am switching back to the translation of Libertarianism by Eric Mack, because a donation of sufficient size has arrived for the translation of another chapter, from which we will learn what Hayek thought about economic justice.

Watched Milov’s video, letting my inner libertarian out for a walk

Yesterday, I put on a video by Milov to listen to before sleep, but I fell asleep before reaching the scandalous phrase about the inner libertarian. I had to start it over in the morning.

In short, Vladimir’s thesis boils down to the idea that it is not always appropriate to take the side of big business when it is in conflict with a state defending certain political interests, especially when big business is lobbying for its own interests. And if your inner libertarian only knows how to say “everything private is good, everything state-owned is bad,” then kill it and grow another, more adequate one. Because values are subjective, and nothing is “good” or “bad” in a vacuum; these terms are always attached to a specific interested party—specifically, who exactly benefits and who exactly suffers.

Is it good for the German gas consumer that their country will receive cheap fuel supplies with massive excess transport capacity? Obviously, it’s good, and from Montenegro, I can only be happy for them. Is it good for a Pomeranian worker that a new employer comes to their land and creates many high-paying jobs? Yes, it’s wonderful for them! Is it good for a Ukrainian worker that their local job maintaining the pipeline is under threat of abolition or at least salary cuts? Nothing good about that. But is it good for them that they can travel to Germany without a visa to maintain the pipeline being built there, already earning a German salary? You bet! True, they will have to compete with Germans, and here, if the German tries to use state protectionism, the Ukrainian will suffer.

Is it good that gas is extracted in Russia and a transport network is built allowing its delivery to various corners of the world? This is an incorrect question. The question does not specify the subject for whom we are making assumptions—whether it is good or bad for them. For Putin, it’s good—the geopolitical club is long, heavy, and shiny. For the rotational workers laying the pipes—it’s great. For Gazprom shareholders—it’s questionable, because the commercial profit from the project is unclear; it’s less about money and more about geopolitics. For Russian citizens counting on some taxes from this Gazprom—don’t count on other people’s money and you’ll sleep sounder; and what are you even doing in Russia? Get out of there, following me and Vladimir Milov. The inner libertarian sticks its head out and gives the budget workers the finger.

In short, a huge thank you to Vladimir Milov for promoting libertarianism. Navalny is in prison and can no longer, as before, send us to forced labor, so Milov has to take the heat. It’s okay, he’ll manage.

The Worst-Case Scenario Argument

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Quite often, the “worst-case scenario” argument is brought forward against the idea of a free society. It posits that we cannot abandon the state because we have something to lose; although the state may be a poor solution to our problems in many respects, it could be much worse without it, and therefore it is not worth the risk. This argument cannot be called valid because it does not consider the possibility of the opposite situation—that is, the “best-case scenario”—and moreover, it completely ignores the worst-case scenario that could occur if state power is preserved.

Absolutely any human activity and any aspiration carry both the possibility of achieving a positive result and the risk of encountering various dangers. This applies even to everyday actions, such as walking to the store or to work. Even in such elementary activity lies a small, but still present, risk of tripping on something along the way, falling and being seriously injured, or being hit by a car at a pedestrian crossing. And what can be said about something more complex than a walk?

However, the probability of the worst-case scenario occurring does not deter people from activity and aspirations if they can also lead to a best-case scenario, and especially when there exists a worst-case scenario associated with abandoning them. I think it is obvious what worst-case scenario awaits you if you refuse to go outside. Many initiatives have found realization in an attempt to avoid the worst-case scenario of inaction, even though action also brought certain risks. If every initiative were discarded solely on the basis of the presence of risks, without considering the risks of inaction, we would now live in a more backward world without many of the phenomena and technologies we are accustomed to.

Perhaps in the pursuit of achieving a free society, as in any other pursuit, certain risks are hidden. However, again, let us not forget that there is not only a worst-case but also a best-case scenario, and that there is a worst-case scenario if the status quo is maintained. By the way, history has already shown us many examples of the latter. How many state regimes have destroyed millions of lives. And can anyone really say that the worst-case scenario of a free society would be even worse than life under another Stalin, Hitler, or Pol Pot? After all, all states strive precisely for centralization and the strengthening of their power, and we can observe this process even now. Just 10-20 years ago, both in the Western world and in our post-Soviet space, there were freer orders, and now one can very easily receive punishment (up to imprisonment) even for actively defending positions, or simply making statements that do not coincide with the state agenda. Thus, it is not far to go to the level of the authoritarian communist/fascist regimes of the last century.

States have always moved, and continue to move now, toward their own worst-case scenario. This alone indicates that we should attempt to achieve a free society as an alternative capable of providing a best-case scenario. This is especially relevant in the case of the post-Soviet space. Perhaps people of the Western world have something to lose in economic terms; they have accumulated a certain wealth, the risk of losing which most likely will not justify such a pursuit in their eyes. We do not even have that. For us, a free society is like an injection of an experimental drug for a terminally ill patient—either this, or nothing will remain but to resign oneself to the rapidly deteriorating state of affairs.

A new serving of propaganda from Libertarian Band

Out of habit, I continue to watch new videos from my former team, but I’ve somehow forgotten to promote them on my own page; that’s untidy, so I’m correcting it.

In the video, which this time is dedicated to propaganda, as usual, there is an extensive historical introduction, and, as usual, it hangs in the air somewhat, because no thoughts are derived from it that the main part of the video could rely on. Next, there is an equally extensive analysis of how it works and what methods it employs, and in conclusion, it is stated that propaganda is not bad in itself, since it can be used for benevolent purposes. For example, promoting vaccination against a fashionable disease and other beneficial methods of state care for the population—what else could libertarians bring up as a positive example? Certainly not Svetov with his propaganda for lustration!

Legal systems that differ greatly from ours. Law of the Chinese Empire.

I continue translating Friedman’s latest book. This time, I’ve gone in order. I translated the introduction and the first chapter, regarding law in the Chinese Empire. An attentive reader may notice that I haven’t fully completed the work, and about half of the footnotes are missing from the text. That is the case; I got exhausted. Tomorrow, I plan to quietly upgrade the text—both for online reading and in the ebook. I also still hope that someone will take on creating a Russian-language cover for the book.

What I like in the book are the constant comparisons: look, here’s how it was for the Chinese, exactly like in modern America. And this—just like in 18th-century England. And then there are attempts to show for what purpose the legislation was made exactly this way, what worked, and what didn’t quite.

The Importance of Fighting Violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In connection with the recent anniversary of the terrorist attacks committed by Anders Breivik in Norway, I would like to remind you of the importance of fighting violence. Although such a tragic event is not a global catastrophe, it is frightening to imagine what future Breiviks might present to us, especially considering what fruits of scientific and technical progress could end up in their hands. Perhaps it will be another shooting, which is very bad, but it will most likely not affect you personally. Or perhaps such a person will decide to use some high-tech means to cause as much harm to people as possible—for example, by constructing a dirty bomb, releasing a previously unknown strain of a very dangerous and deadly virus (a scenario I described in the material “The Reality of the Viral Threat“), or using some other extremely destructive means unknown to us now.

But the capacity to commit violence is not the norm for a human being. On the contrary, 98% of people experience disgust at least toward brutal violence, and all brutal violence is committed by no more than 2% of people. This is because a natural part of human nature is the violence inhibition mechanism (Lorenz’s mechanism (LM) according to Konrad Lorenz’s theory, or VIM according to James Blair’s model). A person with a strong version of LM/VIM will never be able to commit violence. It is committed only by those who suffer from a pathology of the violence inhibitor. Violence is a pathological state. Therefore, it must be fought in an appropriate manner.

If violent tendencies were noticed to a sufficient extent in childhood—when a person is unlikely to be able to make a decision to intentionally hide them until the time they can organize a terrorist attack—or if mass testing for the congenital variant of LM/VIM were practiced in society, both in childhood and when conducting relationships with people in adult life, and if gene therapy treatment were then applied to those in whom the LM/VIM pathology was discovered, many terrorist attacks, as well as much violence in general, could have been avoided.

Perhaps in the past we did not have a sufficient scientific and technical base for this. But now the time has come; biotechnology and gene therapy are developing at a rapid pace. And now it is not too late to start fighting violence to avoid a catastrophic scenario in the future and finally completely rid human society of pathological violence. Does anyone really want the appearance of a new Breivik, and one who is even more heavily armed?

The Doomed City

Long ago, I was commissioned and paid to review three books by the Strugatsky brothers. Roadside Picnic I looked at in April, Snail in May, but I only got around to The City in August. Traditionally, I am not going to recount the plot; you can check the wiki, or better yet, read the book itself.

It is clear that after reading, many want to immediately start figuring out the physics of the strange place described. Here, space is rolled into a tube, there are folds here, some potent grass is packed here, and it’s scorching over there. But if you view the book at such a level, it’s no longer the Strugatskys, but Pelevin.

The book was written for the drawer, so it cannot complain that its content is the product of compromises with Soviet censorship—there was no attempt to publish it as long as censorship existed. Boris Strugatsky asserted that this was their favorite book, and its main character, accordingly, their favorite character. However, for some reason, I am not particularly interested in the characters of the Strugatskys; it is far more intriguing to see what is going on regarding society.

And the society there is quite modern; you wouldn’t say it was described in 1972. Globalism, with a single language and the collision of atomized representatives of various cultures. The triumph of equality and inclusivity (but for all the inclusivity, women in the City, as everywhere with the Strugatskys, are completely flat characters serving a purely decorative purpose—except, perhaps, for the entirely episodic Madame Matilda Gusakova—she is not flat, but also rather decorative). Constant sudden calamities—global warming, the sun switching off, COVID, water turning into bile, BLM, an invasion of baboons. The reaction of the people and the reaction of the authorities to these calamities.

And, you know, for some reason I get the feeling that the Strugatskys are convinced: humanity cannot be handled any other way. It must absolutely be put into a state of artificial stress and deficiency; otherwise, some people turn into Doctors Opirov, and others begin to organize some mysterious “sated riots.” The Strugatskys like to frighten people with sated riots. The idea is that when a person is gastrically satisfied, they aren’t very concerned about further self-development, and they unite with others like them for the sake of self-destruction (Fight Club was probably also inspired by the Strugatskys).

Unlike the Strugatskys, I have been fortunate enough to live in a relatively sated time, and I have seen sated riots in practice, not just in theory. Well-dressed, polite people go out to get hit on the head with batons, and then sigh that it seems they won’t be able to obtain political rights here, and emigrate to peaceful Montenegro, which is practically the model for the city from The Predatory Things of the Century (only this morning returned from a drozhka, that was a strong touch). In short, sated riots are quite inspiring for a very short time, and then, of course, there are abysses of frustration. The Strugatskys clearly imagined something far more disgusting.

It is presumed that through all these endless experiments on humans, some “new man” is being forged, who is the only one capable of building a new world. However, through the example of the novella’s protagonist, we see that the only thing the experiment succeeds in is knocking the ground from under a person’s feet, destroying any ideological supports, and ultimately driving them to suicide, instead of building anything at all. Although, of course, there is hope that after returning to Leningrad in 1951, Voronin will start writing interesting science fiction and become an idol for the entire Soviet intelligentsia.

Imperfect People and the Social Ideal

In your posts, you often state that under ancap, all people (or most of them) will not be prone to violence (and those who are can be “reprogrammed”), which will allow for the construction of a violence-free society. But hold on! With ideal people, one could build an ideal society based on almost any ideology—even communism in its early idealized conceptions. Any modern social structure, however, is built on the fact that people are almost always imperfect—emotional, foolish, aggressive, greedy, cowardly, and so on—and the social order must neutralize human flaws. How can ancap exist in a society of imperfect people, if even now criminals are stupid enough to steal right under cameras, and in the absence of a universally recognized police force, they will become completely brazen, and their capture/shooting by private security companies will become difficult due to the scale of crime and overloaded courts? Will this not lead to a rapid slide of society into a wild state, where even adequate people are forced to be in a permanent state of war against all?

Anonymous question

You are right; many things can be built from ideal people. That is precisely why Bitarch and Voluntarist—the authors of the posts regularly appearing on this channel about building a non-violent society—do not bother with building specifically ancap; for them, the economic model is secondary, and the absence of a central authority is secondary, while the primary value is non-violence, in its narrow sense of the absence of physical coercion.

The doctrine of anarcho-capitalism assumes that the human inclination toward physical coercion will not undergo serious changes. The only thing required for its triumph is the emergence of a critical mass of technologies that make decentralized production and trade more economically viable than centralized ones—this is if we proceed from a materialist position, where being determines consciousness and the base determines the superstructure. If, on the contrary, we assume that consciousness shapes being, then the triumph of ancap requires a critical mass of people for whom libertarian ideas have significant value. To me, it essentially makes no difference which end of the loaf I bite into; it tastes equally good from both ends.

When decentralized technologies dominate everyday life, it means that an uber-police force will arrive faster and provide service more cheaply and with higher quality than a police squad from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; therefore, the Ministry will lose the economic competition for the client and die off. And if people steal right under cameras, decentralized technologies will more likely provide the ability to issue them a fine right under those same cameras. And if they wave at the camera instead and claim that they are, say, renting this car, then instead of a disproportionately large fine, a modest rental fee will be debited from them in favor of the car owner. Or perhaps I am talking nonsense, and the “market” will decide some other way.

When libertarian ideas dominate society, then even under conditions of technologically driven centralization of a large number of industries, people will still value freelancing or freelance-like relationships relatively higher, and the owner of the production facility will have to adapt to this demand if they wish to secure a workforce. People will join the police, but will still view their patrol crew as an autonomous entrepreneurial unit, with its own permanent clients and obligations to them that mean far more than formal subordination within a police department.

The most terrifying thing for libertarianism is an increase in the efficiency of the centralization of violence. In the middle of the 20th century, such efficiency was at its maximum; humanity fought with armies of millions, and there was not the slightest prospect for building a libertarian society. Now, an army of a hundred thousand is considered large, and one hopes that decentralization will continue at an accelerating pace. Cheap and effective decentralized violence, which scales very poorly as the number of involved persons increases or additional capital is invested—this is exactly what is required so that even in the event of armed conflicts, they quickly fade away without further escalation.

As you can see, it is not at all necessary to indulge in empty dreams about how chipping will make everyone “sweethearts and darlings.” Instead, one can indulge in empty dreams about how total armament with handheld weapons—effectively and as painlessly as possible incapacitating a person, but having low lethality—will make everyone “sweethearts and darlings.” As for my time free from empty dreams, I prefer to build a local libertarian community where all necessary skills of interaction between people are acquired through simple habit—and these habits will strongly conflict with the habits of obeying the state or any other centralized force.

No one needs a Leviathan. Hobbes is sad.