This is not an April Fool’s joke: Libertarian Band has finally released the long-awaited video about courts under ancap. I consider it one of our most important works, and I hope the video goes viral at least as well as the old video about ancap itself.
The film crew are absolute legends for managing to produce content at a good pace despite the current situation. Throw some money their way; they’ve earned it.
While creating the script, I leaned heavily on Hayek as interpreted by Zolotorev and, to a lesser extent, Chetvernin, as well as David Friedman and some other sources. I hope I managed to combine these diverse concepts harmoniously and create a truly original product.
I look forward to your likes and comments under the video.
After all, finding such villains is not enough; you also need to compel them to stop, and in most cases I can imagine, they will be reliably protected by their contracts.
анонимный вопрос
And in a world where there is a state monopoly on violence, and in a world where the enforcement of rights is handled by private parties, and even where, as discussed in a recent post, violent collections are extremely limited, the strategy for fighting hacking groups is generally the same: to increase the cost of the attack.
To jump on a trendy topic, let’s liken the activity of a hacking group to the spread of an epidemic. You can invest in individual protection, you can make the transmission of the infection more difficult, or you can find its source.
A hacking attack can cause irreparable harm immediately. For example, a hacker steals your private keys, and your bitcoins vanish to someone else’s address. A virus can also encrypt your disk and demand money for decryption. If you send the money, the data will either be decrypted or not, depending on the strain you were infected with. An attack can also simply cause noticeable inconvenience, as in the case of a DDoS attack, for instance. For the state, catching hackers is long and expensive, and the barrier to entry into the market for such attacks is not particularly high. For a private individual, finding a hacker and preparing a body of evidence would also be costly. Thus, it is unlikely that the cyber-epidemic situation in a stateless society would be fundamentally better.
Since the cost of catching a hacker is high and the probability of success is not very great, there is every reason to impose quite large fines, in addition to damages, on those unlucky few who are actually caught. You can read about the principles of calculating fines in “The Mechanics of Freedom,” in the recently published Chapter 43.
What happens if a hacker is caught, but nothing can be seized from them? For example, they claim they forgot the wallet key. There are no legal grounds to apply thermo-rectal cryptoanalysis, and besides, it provides no guarantee of a result, as the key may indeed be lost. In this case, the only option is to impose installment payments on them, and let them compensate as new legal earnings appear. Or, perhaps, they will decide to speed up the process by remembering the key.
For the end user, I would recommend passive protection methods and insurance. As for the actual catching of hackers, let insurance companies pay for it on a systemic basis if they deem it a market-efficient measure.
Recently, on a stream, Svetov rashly claimed that a woman has the right to dispose of her own body and get rid of an embryo that causes her discomfort, but in the case of a voluntary and conscious sexual act, doesn’t the responsibility for conception and for the child ending up in such a dependent position lie with the parents?
Margo
As I have already written on another occasion, a right is a claim that is tolerated. A prenatal child does not make claims, therefore “the rights of prenatal children” is a claim made by third parties, which the parents of such children either acknowledge or they do not. Each side can present its own arguments.
Here are examples of arguments from the attacking side:
abortion is murder
childbirth is beneficial for the body
childbirth is beneficial for demographics
And for comparison, here are examples of arguments from the defending side:
my body, my choice
the embryo violates the NAP
there is no money to live on
the marriage has fallen apart, so the “child” project is no longer relevant
Generally speaking, people tend to present similar arguments to parents whose child has already been born, but whom they, in the opinion of critics, are raising in an improper manner.
Svetov’s arguments boil down to the fact that in any case, the resolution of such conflicts cannot be entrusted to the state. But the state cannot even be trusted to take out the trash, so let’s immediately imagine that it has long been gone, while people’s claims toward each other regarding the treatment of children, born or unborn, remain, and they must be resolved in some way privately.
So, some outsider crosses a woman’s path and demands that she not do what she considers her right. She, naturally, asks how this concerns him at all. Any arguments along the lines of “you are responsible for the conception” are dismissed with the objection “yes, I am, but not to you.” Attempts at forceful coercion lead us one way or another to a picture of a legal proceeding, where the defendant has to prove why, specifically in the matter of abortions, his opinion as an outsider on what a woman should do with her own body is valid in any way.
The only argument against abortion that would sound convincing in a free market society is “if you kill the child, I won’t be able to buy it from you.” Only after such an answer to the question “what business is it of yours?” can the woman breathe, take her finger off the trigger, and begin to bargain. Ultimately, a transfer of parental rights occurs with the drafting of a contract for gestation services, and the rest is just a matter of technique. The woman trades the possibility of an immediate exit from pregnancy for compensation, and the moralist acquires guardianship duties over the child and that very responsibility for its further upbringing.
Of course, the moralist would be better off hiding his desire to buy a prenatal child at any cost, otherwise getting pregnant and crossing his path with a brochure for an abortion clinic would become a temptingly profitable business—no one cancelled the cobra effect. So it is more likely that various charitable organizations will mainly rely on non-material motivation, such as “do not commit a sin, give birth to God’s child and give it to be raised in the church of witnesses to the commandment Be Fruitful And Multiply.”
One way or another, anyone who hopes to talk a woman out of an abortion with words about responsibility to the child must be prepared, at the very least, to take that responsibility upon themselves, and ideally, also to compensate the woman for the costs associated with agreeing to their persuasion and condemning herself to several more months of pregnancy.
Of course, abortion is bad and all that blah-blah-blah, but we are not discussing anyone’s moral character here. Only responsibility for one’s decisions.
The clip has no direct relation to the topic of the post, but watch it anyway
Thanks to the influence of Mikhail Svetov, many perceive ancap as a stateless society for the most morose individualists—and contrast it with the bright world of contractual jurisdictions, territorial and extraterritorial, where people gather into communities, agreeing to live by common rules, and where the most sacred right of every member of such a community is the right to leave it.
But for a human being, it is actually quite uncomfortable to completely enclose oneself within the framework of a narrow community, perceiving the world beyond the fence as a habitat for cynocephali. Rarely does any community in the world outlive its founder. Even the ideologues of left-wing anarchism, who generally adhered to collectivist values, such as Kropotkin, noted that a bleak existence in a closed collective on the sidelines of life is absolutely not what the vast majority needs.
Therefore, for a person wishing to live in a just society, the most important thing is the ability to build it without falling into self-isolation. Does one have such opportunities under ancap? Let’s figure it out.
Only the most hardline communists or theocrats are willing to expect that humanity will entirely adhere to identical notions of justice; therefore, we can start from the premise that under ancap, these notions will vary among different people.
So, you have certain notions of justice, and you would like the arbitrator to adhere to them specifically in the event that you encounter conflicts, even if the other party to the conflict holds different views. To me, the most workable David Friedman model seems to be the one that assumes competition and natural selection between law enforcement agencies, between arbitration agencies, and between legal systems. Thus, the client only needs to ensure one small thing: that the law enforcement agency they approached for a specific conflict uses the services of a court that operates within a specific legal system that meets the client’s notions of justice.
What do you need for this? To conduct effective propaganda of the principles you follow. The more popular your ideas are, the easier it will be to insist that the court rely on them. In turn, in a free market, ideas will be most widespread in those areas of activity where their application is most convenient and provides the maximum economic gain. So, the less your ideas are detached from reality, the easier it will be for you to promote them.
Finally, if there are not many supporters of your notions of justice, you may prefer not to bother with a court, but to attract like-minded people for mutual aid. In doing so, you will earn a reputation as a community that stands firmly by its own. This has advantages: people will be afraid to touch you without a significant advantage in strength. But there are also disadvantages: people will be afraid to enter into contracts with you. Do you need such a reputation? Decide for yourself. There is no state under ancap that would treat everyone with a one-size-fits-all approach and make things equally inconvenient for everyone.
A small, cohesive community with its own notions of justice
Either I will have to enter into a contract with every person on earth, or there will be some kind of external coercion, wouldn’t there?
katta
On February 13th, on the channel Anarchy Debates, we were discussing property rights with an-coms, so right now, while I’m on a roll, I’ll be happy to elaborate further on this topic.
A right is a claim that is tolerated.
Let’s consider the emergence of a certain right from scratch. There is a group, one of whose members puts forward a claim. For example, “I am taking this chair because I sat on it first.” If the others tolerate this claim, the next person can take any free chair, and from the repetition of similar claims, a legal tradition for this specific group is formed: the right of use belongs to the first claimant.
Suppose someone challenged this right and stated, for example: move over here, I want to sit next to Masha. Regular requests of this kind can supplement the legal tradition with a rule: by mutual consent, usage rights can be exchanged.
Finally, someone may present a claim in the following form: get off, or you’ll get beaten. If such claims are regularly satisfied, congratulations, the right of the strongest has appeared in this group.
The more someone’s claim makes you want to challenge it, the more unjust you consider it to be. But whether you will actually challenge it depends on several other factors. First, your self-interest: how great your costs are from the fact that an unjust claim is implemented. Second, your self-confidence: how high you estimate your chances of forcing the claimant to abandon the claim. Third, your stubbornness: how much cost you are willing to endure for the sake of challenging someone else’s unjust claim.
Thus, first, a right is not absolute: everyone has their own opinion about who possesses which rights. Second, explicit consent of all interested parties, i.e., the conclusion of a contract with them, is not necessary to establish a right. Their non-opposition is sufficient. A legal tradition of a society is formed from the repeated experience of declaring rights and the reaction to these declarations. The fact that a contract with the previous holder of these rights is the most weighty argument for asserting someone’s rights is a widespread legal tradition. The reason for the wide distribution of this specific tradition is that very many believe such a mechanism for asserting rights to be fair.
Nevertheless, you may well encounter a situation where a property right you acquired by contract, which was recognized in one society, will not be recognized in another. For example, you will encounter the fact that hashish, honestly purchased by you in one place, in another place is not only not considered your property, but is also a reason for you to be deprived of your right to freedom of movement. And if you believe that such collisions are impossible under ancap, I am forced to disappoint you. They are possible, although they are unlikely to be so glaring.
What do you mean—I have no right? But I bought this hashish honestly!
The GNU GPL (general public license) is an interesting example of how, within the framework of modern state copyright laws, it is difficult to permit the acquirer of an information product to do anything with it. Forbidding is a piece of cake, and then you can take that prohibition to court, and the state will help you with the enforcement of that prohibition. In fact, most prohibitions are built into the legislation by default.
The GPL reserves the right for the author to be called the author, while obliging the acquirer to disclose the source code of any products made based on code distributed under the GPL license, and to further distribute them under the same license—the so-called copyleft system. Otherwise, the acquirer of a product under the GPL license has completely free rein: they can resell the product, modify the code, sell the modified version under their own name, and so on.
How is the situation with code distributed under this license likely to change under ancap? Currently, the creator of the code has the right to insist through legal proceedings that an acquirer of their product who has modified the code must further distribute the resulting product under the same license. Under ancap, they would be able to demand compliance with the license in the same way, but they would no longer have any tools of pressure other than reputational ones. I do not think this will significantly affect established practices, as the values of GNU are quite compatible with libertarian ones, and reputational pressure is usually a sufficiently serious argument for IT companies.
For example, a friend invited me to a party at his house. I brought apple juice with me. Suddenly, the police burst in, and it turns out that juice is prohibited in his contractual jurisdiction. 1) Did I start violating the NAP from the moment I took it out? 2) How does the effect of another jurisdiction apply to me if I have not entered into contracts with it? 3) What happens if I am a user of another jurisdiction that the first one does not recognize and simply engages in vigilantism?
A similar question: will self-ownership help if a person runs onto someone else’s field? Can I shoot them without a trial or investigation?
What could be called laws under ancap is the codification of successful practices. Such codes, which generalize successful practices on various topics, are in demand in a stateless society because they save effort by allowing one to avoid analyzing every case from scratch. Saving effort will mean saving money, and a cheap court, all other things being equal, will naturally win in the competitive struggle against an expensive one. But even if an expensive court provides a higher quality review of the issue, there will also be demand for a cheap one; this is a natural market segmentation by price.
Thus, by recognizing the jurisdiction of a particular company over oneself regarding a certain circle of issues, a person under ancap usually has the opportunity in advance to find out which sets of norms are used within that jurisdiction.
Furthermore, humanity has a rich experience in resolving conflicts between persons belonging to different jurisdictions. In most cases, it was a convenient practice to recognize the laws of the party on whose territory the conflict occurred. Deviations from this principle were usually stipulated separately. This could be related, for example, to the particularly important status of certain persons, or to the disputed status of the place where the conflict occurred. Thus, the concept of diplomatic immunity and international maritime law emerged.
Now let’s move directly to your questions. Let’s replace apple juice with a more understandable irritant. You brought sausage to a vegan party and began to eat it with appetite alongside the salad. Naturally, for vegans, this is a very irritating situation. And they know in advance that something like this would upset them greatly. Therefore, the party announcement usually states right away that it is a vegan party, no meat will be served, and bringing it along is prohibited. Thus, your actions violate the agreed-upon conditions of presence, and you are fully entitled to be evicted from the party.
Worse, if the announcement states that the party is vegan, no restrictions are explicitly written, you are not a vegan and do not hide it, but you were invited anyway. Respecting the hosts’ right not to serve you meat, you decide to provide for yourself—and you run into a legal conflict. Here, both the hosts, who failed to explain the rules to you, and you, who failed to understand the local defaults, are in an awkward position. Usually, such mishaps are resolved by one of the parties making concessions, but if the party hosts do not concede, you will still be evicted, because this is a place where their interpretation of disputed norms takes priority. I had a similar case during a Kupala night celebration when I started kissing a guy; it turned out he was taken, and his girl confronted me for it, which caused my bewilderment: I sincerely believed that different rules apply on Kupala night—but I yielded; the world didn’t end over that guy, basically. Similarly, our hypothetical vegans might yield to you, albeit with a sense of deep bewilderment at your tactlessness.
Now let’s move from elaborate tales to conclusions.
You are not obliged to follow the norms that you did not pledge to follow.
You may be forced to comply with them if it is a fundamental point for the enforcing party, but not for you.
You have the right to demand compensation for such coercion, but it is not a fact that you will receive it.
The more the parties are interested in future cooperation, the more likely it is that they will make mutual concessions regarding a specific current case.
In light of these theses, how can we resolve the second case, with trespassing—that is, the violation of property boundaries, even without explicit damage to that property?
A person is not obliged to be aware that you are against them walking across your field. It is better to put a sign on the border saying “No Trespassing,” so that the person knows that a famous Willy No-Trespassing lives here, and he is not to be trifled with (for additional reading, I recommend the well-known text about Piglet’s grandfather, floating around the internet).
You can force a person to leave the field if this is fundamental for you. And if they have read the sign and ignored it, you can carry out the enforcement using lethal force, without wasting time on additional persuasions.
Compensation may be demanded from you if, for example, there was a beaten path across your field, the boundary was not marked, the sign turned out to be unreadable and hidden in the grass, and then you pop out like a jack-in-the-box with a Winchester in hand and start shooting. State your rules in the most explicit form possible.
The more you are interested in future cooperation with the trespasser, the more likely it is that you will allow them on your field, even if they wandered in without permission. For example, it turned out to be a traveling salesman with a magical gift of persuasion, and now he will be your permanent supplier of tin foil hats.
Libertarianism is based on natural rights; why is Svetov against them?
анонимный вопрос
In a recent video by Mikhail Svetov, which your question is about, much seemed strange to me. Since that is the case, I will first go through the entire video and then move on to the topic of the question, so as not to make two posts about one video.
To begin with, Svetov uses a definition of anarchy as a Hobbesian war of all against all. I don’t remember if Hobbes used the exact word anarchy; I recall the term state of nature more. However, in our video on the deterrence doctrine, I tried to show that a war of all against all is not the natural state of society, meaning that Hobbesian (and Svetovian) rhetoric is based on a dubious foundation.
Svetov also uses the word rights as a synonym for the word privileges, thereby limiting himself to so-called positive rights. This is indicated by his phrase “fear people who want to grant you rights.” Libertarian discourse, however, usually concerns negative rights, which are freedoms. One is not “granted” such rights, because their realization does not require the actions of others; non-interference is entirely sufficient.
In attacking liberals, Svetov implies progressives of the American type, given that he uses headlines about minority quotas and affirmative action as illustrations. In Europe, they more often call themselves social democrats, and it is unclear to me why Svetov separates them from socialists at all, saying that from one side we are pressed by a socialist boot and from the other by a liberal one, while in fact he is speaking of the same socialist boot.
Another interesting point: Svetov opposes morality and conscience, claiming that evil liberals removed conscience from man and replaced it with morality. However, Svetov does not define what conscience is and where it comes from, if not from the experience of interacting with other people and the memory of their moral evaluations. Or does he want to say that conscience is the voice of God? Well, in that case, it is unclear what he has against natural rights, understood as divine decrees.
Another phrase that Svetov uses in his video: “where there is no law, there is no crime.” Yes, that is correct; crime is a term from positive law, which is a system of commands. There is a command, someone violates the command, they have committed a crime. In private law, there are no crimes; there is property damage, breach of contractual obligations, and so on, and the person who suffered the damage is free to oppose this and demand compensation—or not oppose it and not demand it.
Thus, I would say that Svetov’s video is simply a juggling of terms. We define anarchy in a way that no anarchist defines it, after which we prove as simply as two plus two that anarchy is bad, and even that the state is anarchy. Everything is logical, but we get nothing but confusion in the end.
Now let’s return to the question of whether libertarianism grows out of natural law. Historically, yes, but today that is not important because human thought has not stood still. We can derive libertarian principles deductively based on the laws of logic: here is an apodictically true statement that a person belongs to themselves; now we show that any attempt to refute this statement implicitly relies on the very premise we are trying to refute. Those whose brains haven’t melted have grasped the Tao and discovered natural law. Or we can examine human interactions and show which behavioral strategies prove more advantageous and therefore survive through natural selection. This utilitarian approach gives us the same libertarian principles, but in this case, the laws of logic do not stick out as if they were god-given and people were merely objects under them. Therefore, such an approach is less irritating to people like the hypothetical Mikhail Svetov with their obsession with ethics, but more so to connoisseurs of mathematical rigor.
Personally, I first became acquainted with Rothbard and the Hoppean derivation of the principle of self-ownership, and then with Hayek and the Friedmanite utilitarian justification of property, and I suggest not arguing over whom to love more—father or mother. Both praxeology and spontaneous orders are two equally useful methodological principles; let us use both, depending on the situation, rather than imitating Svetov, who is so right-wing that he tries to bite off libertarianism’s left leg.
Everything is clear with the economy — it’s based on blockchain. But what about the ideology? Not in terms of party differences, but how to self-organize? Who produces politics?
Gastello
If there is no state, by what laws will criminals be judged? And who will issue the laws?
Bvl72
From the perspective of the state’s creators, it must be a monopoly on legitimate violence and a monopoly on making final decisions. This is required to perform the two key functions of the state: robbery and arbitrary rule, namely taxation and rule-making. And while in the economic sphere it is generally clear that it is better without robbery than with it, and that any economic benefits the state strives to provide would be provided better and cheaper by a private individual in a free market, many reach a deadlock regarding rule-making: who will ensure that everyone follows a single set of rules?
Fortunately, this problem does not need to be solved. Rules do not have to be uniform; they have to be convenient. The concept of rules is embedded in humans literally at a biological level. Even young children develop rules for playing in a sandbox. The more established a company becomes, the clearer and more developed its rules are. Rules appear in any chat or other club, and people actually appeal to them with even greater seriousness than to state laws, because state laws are for lawyers to study, while people need the rules themselves.
Rules can exist as text or simply as a set of assumptions. Compliance with rules can be monitored by a specially appointed moderator, or simply by everyone. Rules can be immutable, or they can be regularly revised. For breaking the rules, one might be expelled from the collective, hit on the forehead with a candelabra, or have an eleven-meter penalty kick taken against them. But what would definitely not occur to anyone without a state is to collect absolutely all rules into a single code, from football and preferance to the order of taking out the trash and washing dishes in the family.
Nevertheless, for greater efficiency in creating rules, certain general principles are usually laid as the foundation for their composition. For example, if there are different roles in a collective, different standard powers may be provided for them, but within a single function, it is more convenient for its holders to be subject to the same norms, whether it be football or organizing production. When organizing a competition, it is appropriate to ensure equality of conditions for the competitors, whether it be preferance or an auction. It is appropriate to explain existing norms to a newcomer, and until they have mastered them, it is appropriate not to hold them to the full severity of the rules, whether it be an internship in production or mitigated criminal penalties for teenagers. If a judge is appointed to monitor compliance with rules, they must not have an interest in the process they are judging, or they must not have the right to judge themselves.
The question of what happens if different groups have different rules is also contrived. The rules of football and chess do not conflict; each is created for its own game, and if a football player and a chess player go to a bar, they follow the rules of behavior in a bar. If it suddenly turns out that people are in a situation where there are no rules, or everyone is used to following their own, they either try not to bother each other or they develop common norms. For instance, newlyweds quickly set aside what their own parents taught them and form their own norms. For instance, meeting on a mountain path, people look at each other and silently decide who will press against the rock and who will squeeze past them closer to the cliff. For instance, farmers will agree among themselves how long to wait for the owner of an abandoned plot to appear before it is appropriate for a neighbor to claim it, and how to proceed if the previous owner does appear afterward.
But, of course, in a complex and global world, uniform norms can certainly exist for millions of people, or even for the entire population of Earth. For example, popular languages have hundreds of millions of users; very few connector standards for external devices connected to computers have taken hold worldwide, and there is only one markup language for web pages. Global rules can be quite detailed, and their development can be handled by entire consortia involving many companies. Such standards will be followed simply because it is more convenient.
Some sensible norms are also contained in the existing legislations of individual states. Some of them will continue to exist after the state, if using the ready-made ones proves more convenient than developing them from scratch.
Bet you can come up with great rules for the game in this picture in five minutes?
I have repeatedly defined law as a complex of approaches to conflict resolution. Zolotorev goes further and describes it as a language of human interaction, meaning all spontaneously emerging rules that people follow when interacting with one another.
Within both my definition and Zolotorev’s, there is no such thing as gender equality. It simply does not emerge spontaneously, due to clear differences in approaches to human interaction, or even at least to conflict resolution, if we narrow the topic to my definition of law.
A sufficiently obvious reason why representatives of different biological sexes tend to use different approaches to interaction is that human behavior is largely hormonally determined, and hormone levels differ between the sexes. However, the higher the level of abstraction of the rules, the smaller the role these differences play, and that is normal. Therefore, demanding gender equality at the family level is damn strange, while at the level of large communities, it is damn natural. There is no contradiction here; one simply should not force absolutes everywhere and engage in Procrusteanism (damn, I’m starting to self-cite and invent my own language; soon I’ll become completely incomprehensible to the reader).
