Libertarian Theory of War, Section 3.1.1.

I have started writing the third part of the book on libertarian war theory. So far, not even a full chapter is ready, but only one section, and the style has mutated somewhat compared to the first two parts, so I would like your opinion on how well it harmonizes with the content. Plus, I finally gave in to the current trend and am now illustrating texts with neural networks. This book will be filled with illustrations in the style of red-figure Hellenic vase painting. Gradually, I will add images to other chapters as well.

Your opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

To be more specific, do you agree with the opinion that in modern history Israel defended itself against the aggression of its neighbors and was more of a victim than an aggressor (insofar as a state can be considered a victim at all)? What is the most optimal and politically feasible solution capable of stopping the conflict in the region, and what prevents its implementation?

Question from Zigoter

Having started writing a book on the libertarian theory of war, I realized with some bewilderment that, despite all my methodological individualism, I cannot construct correct descriptions without operating with fictitious entities such as collective subjects. These speculative subjects were named by me as spirits.

The Jewish people are very ancient and managed to survive over millennia because they possessed and diligently preserved a very strong spirit of the people’s divine election. Nothing could shake the Jews’ loyalty to their spirit, but the 19th century brought them a strong temptation: the spirits of nationalism were born—a phenomenon known as the Spring of Nations. From the connection between the spirit of divine election and the spirit of nationalism, the spirit of Zionism was born. Those possessed by this spirit made efforts to create a national Jewish state that could become a home for any representative of the divinely elected Jewish people.

In the early period of its existence, the State of Israel represented a very peculiar combination on the spiritual plane: the old Jewish spirit of divine election, the new Jewish spirit of Zionism, the new global spirit of socialism, the mature European spirit of individual freedom, and additionally, the spirit of a victim-people born during the Holocaust. These spirits supported each other in some ways, but in many ways they were at odds. The result was a dynamic, expansive state that not only habitually survived in a hostile environment, as the Jewish people had survived in a hostile environment for many centuries, but also actively expanded its borders, creating a zone of quite decent security within the assimilated space.

Currently in Israel, the spirit of the victim-people has completely exhausted its potential, and the positions of the spirit of socialism have weakened somewhat; otherwise, the picture remains the same. As long as Israel’s environment remains hostile, abandoning expansion is fraught with destruction for it: passive defense in conditions of technological progress does not allow for the effective containment of enemies.

And why, exactly, is Israel’s environment so hostile to it? Initially, Israel faced the spirits of nationalism, and these are quite weak in the Arab world. Therefore, it was sufficient for Israel to achieve a decisive military victory over one coalition of states or another for the situation to calm down noticeably. It was only the spirit of Islam, which gained significant strength at the end of the 20th century, that made the situation truly complex, because this spirit has strong grassroots support, which is precisely what makes it a real spirit and not a propaganda facade, like Orthodoxy in the RF.

Having finished with history, let us move to libertarian recipes. First of all, the rhetoric of “we are launching preemptive strikes because otherwise we will be destroyed” is already being received with difficulty by consumers of propaganda, even if it is true. On the other hand, it is precisely now that the rhetoric of “freedom is coming” is on the rise; it would be a sin not to take advantage of it. Externally, Israel needs to appeal not to the spirit of its divine election—it will only work on the Jewish diaspora, and even then poorly. Nor to the Holocaust, which as a news hook no longer sells (now October 7th must be used instead). And certainly not to socialism; it is sinful to be proud of one’s internal illnesses. However, the slogan “We are expanding the space of freedom” is not only dignified but also effective. “We are not destroying terrorist regimes in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran because they are against Israel, but because they are terrorist regimes. They are directed against all free people, whether inside the countries they control or outside. Islam is not a religion of slavery. It is quite compatible with the ideas of free trade. And those political regimes that are ready for trade rather than war, and in which their own citizens enjoy freedom, are welcomed by Israel.”

Of course, one should not confuse freedom with democracy; this mistake cost the USA dearly, there is no need to repeat it. What matters is not how a political leader took office, or if there even is one, but how free people are within that political regime, period. But, of course, such rhetoric imposes restrictions on Israel’s internal policy as well, which, however, is only for the better.

Libertarian Theory of War. Chapter 2.5. Summing Up the War.

Writing a new chapter of my book about war happened to coincide by pure chance with another anniversary of the end of the European phase of World War II, as well as with the vibes in the air regarding the conclusion of the current Russian-Ukrainian one. The chapter turned out to be somewhat pensive and lyrical. Also, while creating it, I was occasionally plagued by imposter syndrome: what right do I have to write about such matters without having military experience? May those who do have it forgive me, or better yet—comment on my amateur fantasies from their expert perspective.

This concludes the main, theoretical, second part of the book. The third part is expected to feature the practical applications of the theory.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 2.3. Waging War

Another section of the book on libertarian theory of war has been completed—specifically, on the conduct of war. Surprisingly, it is once again almost entirely dedicated to the final stages of preparation for war and the actual beginning of combat operations. This is because these are the moments when actions can still be planned in advance. After that, either the plans will work, or everything will go wrong, you will get bogged down in a stupid war of attrition, and the next section—on how to get out of the war—will become relevant.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 2.2. Entering the War

After a very long pause, I am continuing work on the book Libertarian Theory of War (thanks for the inspiration to the Canadian catgirl). The new section Entering the War is dedicated to an overview of the reasons for entering a war and the reasons for not entering one. As usual, spirits frolic on the pages of the book alongside economic analysis.

In the next chapter, in theory, the real meat should begin, as the preparations for the main action have dragged on a bit.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 2.1. Preparing for War

A substantial piece of text is ready for a book on the theory of war, covering various aspects of war preparation. It took a very long time to write; it is evident that excerpts from different periods differ in style, but I do not want to delay publication; I will still have time to proofread it.

Let us consider this as a substitute for the routine post on the anniversary of the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops, and after all, I promised to speed up after Navalny’s death. So, I am speeding up.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 1.2, Objectives of the Libertarian Theory of War

I have finished writing section 1.2 of my new book on libertarian theory of war, where I outlined the objectives it addresses. Also, before that, I inserted a small paragraph on statism into the previous section. It might have turned out a bit tedious, but it doesn’t seem too dragged out. With that, the introductory part of the book is finished, and from here on, things should get more or less concrete.

If the previous book about ancap, which we managed to print on paper for the Montellibero festival last September, ended up being 74 A5 pages, then I hope this one will not be of such monstrous size and will fit into about forty pages. However, we shall see; I might get carried away with epic descriptions of helmet-glinting Hectors or drawing organizational charts of network-centric warfare—due to such off-topic tangents, the size of the book could expand significantly.

As a reminder, I would be very pleased with donations, showing me that my work is not only in demand, but that there are also people who consider it worthy of immediate material gratitude, and who have prudently invested at least part of their savings in bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies.

Libertarian Theory of War, Chapter 1.1.2, Speculative Subjects and Their Relations

While I was on a roll, I managed to finish another chapter of the book on the theory of war, which offers the reader a fascinating journey into the world of spirits. The previously planned separate chapter on the principle of methodological subjectivism seems redundant to me for now, as I do not see what could be added separately about this principle, which already operates throughout the text. Perhaps I will decide to insert it over time, but for now, I am removing this item from the table of contents.

The next section is intended to briefly describe the goals of the libertarian theory of war as they apply to its individual stages.

Libertarian Theory of War, Chapter 1.1.1, Definition of War

The book is still coming along slowly — I’m finding my style, plus there is a lot of other work. The chapter on the definition of war and why I use this specific one is ready. For those who read the book on ancap, my definition has long been no secret, but it was somewhat cumbersome; now a short form has been added: war is a conflict in which people are ready to kill.

For now, the relationships between individual subjects are being detailed, but in the next chapter, I will move on to collective theoretical subjects, which are far more familiar to us when it comes to war.

The main advantage of the book is still intended to be its size: it will be short.