If, for example, we take ancap according to Molynieu, is it really possible that a few rich kids who caused a car accident while drunk or high, even without fatalities, or raped a girl, will be able to pay compensation, even tenfold, and continue to roam free? Money is money, but the danger to society hasn’t disappeared. Would you yourself, God forbid, if the above happened to you, turn to a state or private court, assuming we have minarchism with ancap tendencies and a choice between them? Yes, a state court would shake out a tiny compensation, as usually happens, but would isolate rapists in a colony for 5-10 years, with a small chance that they won’t return, or will return as broken and sick people. A private court, however, would shake out compensation exceeding the damage dozens of times over, but would release the rapists, as we know that the goal of punishment under ancap is not correction or retribution, but restitution for damages. What do you say to that?
Fortunately, I have already managed to write the first chapters of a book on libertarianism, so I can immediately send you to read about libertarian law. The task of the court is not to punish the criminal or to squeeze the maximum amount of money out of them. The task of the court is to resolve the conflict. Even if I couldn’t reach an agreement with the rapists regarding which court should consider our conflict, and the court turns out to be imposed on the defendants, this does not cancel the main task of the court. The outcome must be a situation where the conflict between me and the rapists is considered exhausted.
For me, it is extremely important to understand that I will never see these people again in my life. This will allow me not to flinch upon seeing an indistinct figure in my peripheral vision (at least, I hope). So I would insist that they receive an order to live in some specific city known to me, even if it is quite large. Accordingly, I will never set foot in that city, and they must stay out of mine. Of course, monitoring their compliance with this point will cost money—there’s no way around it, let them cough it up, it’s important to me.
I have a very strong psyche, but when I heard in an interview with Shulman that she suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome for a year after an attack on her husband, I am forced to admit the possibility of some psychological traumas needing treatment for myself. So my second requirement, of course, would be the payment for my rehabilitation.
Also, naturally, I would like to receive significant monetary compensation, however, I placed this point third because my priorities fully correspond to safety regulations: first, the dangerous factor is eliminated, and only then is aid provided and compensation paid.
As a fourth point, I would like the rapists to also receive psychological treatment, but if they have no money left for this after the payments for the previous points, I will not insist.
If the rapists were too poor to immediately pay the compensation assigned to me and fund other measures—well, they will have to take out a loan. They’ll pay it back someday; that’s no longer my business, but theirs and the bank’s.
It seems to me that my requests are modest enough: I do not insist on castration or execution, I do not demand that they necessarily languish in a cramped cell and be subjected to rapes by cellmates. I don’t need them to lose their health, nor do I want those who deprive them of health to lose their human form. So I hope the court will grant my claims. And if a victim of violence insists on all the crap described in this paragraph, I hope the court manages to convince her to abandon such requests. If the court appoints some severe punishment in this vein, for me, it will be a clear red flag: the court is not libertarian, I will never voluntarily deal with it, and I will try to dissuade others.
Before answering the question of what would happen in the event of a victory, it is important to understand under what conditions such a victory could occur at all.
Part 1. Before the elections
One could devise many scenarios of varying degrees of implausibility, but they would all share one common premise: both Putin and Navalny are physically removed from the race before the elections. That is, they do not simply decline to participate for one reason or another, but they have no possibility of influence whatsoever. Simply put, they die. Let us assume a rather crude scenario: Navalny dies in colony from COVID, and Putin dies of a stroke. Thus, we are not inventing any terrorist organizations or lone wolves, but leaving the realization of this historical coincidence to the will of Mother Nature. Mishustin becomes the Acting President; he tries to seize the reins, fails, and the Federal Assembly unexpectedly passes a law that explicitly prohibits the acting president from running. Mishustin is smart enough not to veto it.
New elections are announced. They are preceded by a broad public campaign to repeal the law that strips those involved in the activities of extremist organizations of their passive voting rights. The campaign yields no result, and Navalny’s associates, from Volkov to Guriev, find themselves ineligible—some due to extremism, others due to residence permits. The opposition holds primaries, where the remaining old democrats easily drop out, and in the second round, Svetov defeats Yuneman by a slim margin. Putin’s associates also struggle, and they too have to organize primaries in which Sobyanin loses to Shoigu; dirty scandals break out about how municipal workers voted for one candidate in formation, and conscripts for the other. Things are no less dirty for the Communists, where Zyuganov still hasn’t dared to let anyone run instead of himself. To top it all off, Patrushev is nominated for some reason from Rodina, and Prilepin from A Just Russia. Thus, by the time the signature collection campaign begins, the largest systemic parties are in total disarray, huge public attention is fixed on the elections, and the CEC lacks the political will to cut Svetov off at the start. He receives generous funding from both liberal business emigrants, like Chichvarkin, Durov, and Khodorkovsky, and from certain entrepreneurs who did not flee under Putin, starting with Potapenko. This proves sufficient to collect signatures and get on the ballot.
But is such a setup enough for a libertarian to win the presidential election in Russia? No. Therefore, let’s add two more factors. First, extremely successful liberal reforms—for example, in Kazakhstan—which, a couple of years before the Russian elections, provided him with a serious leap, and his successes are currently very well known. Second, Svetov announces a left turn, telling a tale that the super-rich are to blame for all the people’s woes and explaining how he will strip them of their levers of political influence. He also promises to transfer state corporations to a pension fund and pledges to introduce a progressive income tax by abolishing personal income tax for everyone earning less than two minimum wages, while leaving the previous rate for others minus the aforementioned two minimum wages from the taxable base. Furthermore, he announces a 30% reduction in military spending by abolishing the entire conscription system and a 90% reduction in spending on special services—transferring the savings to social budget items. In short, there is plenty of room for libertarian fantasy when writing a radically left program.
Against this backdrop, Zyuganov’s promises of nationalization look not only unconvincing but bland, and reasonable doubts creep in regarding Shoigu’s ability to reduce the army—what stopped him before? To top it all off, for the first time in many years, all candidates participate in debates, and this is where Svetov crushes everyone, demonstrating the highest level of discourse in Eastern Europe. This is how grandmothers on television learn about him, and it secures his victory.
Part 2. After the elections
Svetov comes to power, but he is a president without a party. Elections to the State Duma will not take place until 2026, but he needs to show at least some results. By the way, regarding the State Duma. In 2021, a very small cross-factional group of deputies was formed who managed to get in thanks to smart voting and did not condemn Navalny for it, but instead worked, however poorly, for the voters. After Svetov’s victory, their informal influence increases significantly, and they become conduits for a large number of bills that materialize Svetov’s program. Nevertheless, all these bills progress with difficulty and slowly.
On the other hand, measures where the president can rely on his own orders as Commander-in-Chief are carried out very quickly. Thus, Russian security forces begin to leave Donbas even before the Duma approves a new prime minister. By the way, that becomes Dmitry Potapenko—he didn’t start sending money to Svetov’s headquarters first for nothing. Navalny’s followers demand Milov and Guriev in the government. Milov gets the post of Minister of Energy, and Guriev is appointed to run the pension fund. Kudrin triumphantly returns to the post of Minister of Finance, which ensures that the State Duma becomes slightly more cooperative. Ekaterina Schulmann becomes the Minister of Education. There are many ministries in Russia, and even more worthy people; I am too lazy to fantasize about other posts, but one way or another, the government will soon be updated. The president also introduces a bill for broad amnesty for all political articles, as well as for Article 228. The bill stalls, so Svetov simply issues pardons for the political prisoners. The Federal Agency for State Property Management is transferred to the jurisdiction of the pension fund.
What manages to be done in the Duma?
First, changing the election law once again, continuing the good tradition of not holding two elections under the same rules. The bill is written by “Golos” and introduced by the president. Election deposits are restored, the entry threshold for parties is lowered to 3%, signatures for candidate registration are permitted to be collected electronically via Gosuslugi accounts, electronic and multi-day voting are abolished, the rights of observers are expanded, and, of course, lustration norms for convicts, holders of foreign residence permits and dual citizenship, and those involved in extremism are abolished.
Second, the president guarantees a veto on any law passed in violation of regulations. No more accelerated consideration in three readings at once.
Third, the share of secret budget items drops sharply. Serious public battles take place in the Duma over the budget. Reducing the budget for security agencies is only partially achieved, and the savings are indeed redirected to education and healthcare. Spending on state propaganda is radically cut, and this becomes a problem—as in Yeltsin’s time, the president begins to be attacked via private channels, and he counters them with his own streams.
What is not achieved? Naturally, all lustration plans fail. It is impossible to abolish personal income tax for the poor. It is impossible to abolish even the transport tax, despite it being such a small thing, so it would seem.
After this, in 2025, the president dissolves the Duma and announces early elections. About fifteen parties enter the Duma, including one libertarian party. The largest faction belongs to the Communists—twelve percent. The pace of reforms accelerates after this, but only slightly, because the team of reformers effectively has to form their own coalition for every new bill. Towards the end of his first term, Svetov manages to achieve the adoption of a constitutional norm stating that every new federal law or other regulation, except constitutional ones, must contain an expiration date, which cannot exceed ten years. If the norm is not extended or modified before the end of its term, it automatically ceases to be in effect. At the same time, since the constitution is being amended, a second important edit is adopted: from now on, the president may serve for only one six-year term.
What manages to be done in foreign policy?
The issuance of loans to other countries ceases. All troops are withdrawn from abroad. Ukrainians rejoice, Armenians are sad. Crimea is declared a free economic zone, which has the right to choose in any matter which legislative norms to follow—Russian or Ukrainian. Ukrainian citizens receive the right of free settlement in Crimea, with the granting of voting rights in elections of all levels up to the presidential. Ukrainian political parties receive the right to operate in the territory of Crimea. Residents of Crimea with Russian citizenship receive the right to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine. The border between Russia and Ukraine in Donbas is handed over to Ukrainian control. Ukraine receives a long-term headache in the form of former people’s republics, which must be brought back to a human state. Thanks to this compromise, Russia gradually emerges from most foreign sanctions—all except restrictions on the supply of high-tech weaponry. Its own sanctions, of course, are lifted immediately.
The market for external hydrocarbon supplies is liberalized. The buyer purchases them on the Russian exchange or directly from the producer, after which they choose the exact method to ensure delivery. Thus, the volume of oil and gas pumped through Ukraine is now determined only by how competitive the transit tariffs set by the Ukrainian side are.
Results of the rule
Russia entered a peaceful path and stopped acting foolishly in foreign policy. Internal policy was also rid of the dictate of the security forces. A strong left opposition in parliament did not allow a serious reduction in the tax burden and state spending, however, their character changed to be more social. Under Svetov, Russia remained a country with a low level of public debt and a budget surplus.
In 2030, Mikhail Svetov leaves the post of President and in the same year is elected to parliament, where he leads the libertarian faction. In 2035, he leaves parliament, buys a house in Kamchatka, settles there with his young wife, and leads a private life.
I don’t know if I’ll disappoint you or if this will simply be feeding a troll, but for the poor and foolish, whether in a market economy or under socialism, there are only two paths: to lean on someone else or to find unskilled work. If they are also lazy, only the first option remains.
Leaning on someone is more profitable in a country with a market economy: there are charitable shelters and soup kitchens, freeganism, crashing on couches, acquaintances who are more or less well-off (there will be more of them in a market economy), or begging. Under socialism, there are fewer options: he who does not work, does not eat, so only acquaintances and crashing on couches remain (even begging is often forbidden under socialism).
Unskilled labor is easier to find under socialism, since the right to work is one of the most important positive rights guaranteed by the socialist system. The utility of such labor for people may well be zero or negative, but that depends on luck. In a free market, unskilled labor will likely be more intensive, but it will also be paid higher.
Finally, there are intermediate regimes, which are the majority. There are regimes like the Russian one, where there is no proper social safety net, but you can hardly make any money in unskilled work. There are social democracies eating away at their liberal inheritance: there, one can live quite well on benefits—however, there are many such poor, foolish, and cunning people there; they form ghettos, and few would like the conditions within them.
Shortly after my summary of Konstantin Morozov’s article stating that libertarians must either accept moral realism or give up the idea of proving that their ideology is the best, I began reviewing materials from the recently held “Capitalism and Freedom” conference in St. Petersburg. There, I came across Sergey Sazonov’s presentation, “Entrepreneurial Theory of Property.”
It seemed to me, and Valery Kizilov confirmed my suspicion in the Facebook comments, that the topic of this presentation echoes Morozov’s article.
The presentation showed that, purely philosophically, the concept of property can be based on two opposite foundations: deep private property (initially all property is the domain of individuals, and they can subsequently delegate their rights to society) and deep public property (initially everything belongs to everyone, and subsequently society may agree to allocate something into individual ownership).
It was further explained that the idea of deep private property in the most widely accepted Lockean interpretation has an insurmountable flaw—which is exactly what Konstantin Morozov points out. The basis for primary appropriation is the universal right of non-exclusive use of any ownerless resources, but everyone who appropriates them thereby deprives all others of their right of non-exclusive use. Deep public property, however, is devoid of such a logical flaw.
Although both concepts of the origin of property rights allow for the derivation of similar worldviews, there is a serious difference between them. By deriving property rights from deep private property, we must prove the extreme necessity of any state intervention. By deriving them from deep public property, conversely, we must prove any of our own authorizations to dispose of certain things—whether this will indeed be a socially beneficial use of property.
Sergey then demonstrates a justification for deep private property that is devoid of the aforementioned flaw. The transformation of a simple object into a resource that can be turned into property occurs not at the moment of the Lockean “mixing of labor with land,” but at the moment of making an entrepreneurial judgment about them. One sees how something unwanted by anyone can be applied—and that’s it, it’s appropriated. The Lockean contradiction is resolved because a simple object is transformed into a resource instantaneously, and no one is deprived of their non-exclusive right of use in the process. In contrast, within this approach, the idea of deep public property develops insurmountable problems.
In short, I highly recommend getting acquainted with the presentation; it’s a great mental workout. As for me, I will need to think about whether to include this material in my book, and if so, in what form.
I was sent a link to an interesting article on the god-forsaken VKontakte, where a certain Konstantin Morozov discusses the moral justification of taxation, specifically for the purpose of implementing a Basic Income, and other interesting mental constructs of the left-libertarian camp. Without irony, I was interested in understanding their logic.
In short, the author’s argument is as follows. The compulsory nature of seizure is not in itself a criterion for its injustice: this is easily demonstrated by the example of damage compensation. Thus, to speak of the injustice of seizure, one must show that property is being seized to which you have a right. But how do you determine what a person has a right of ownership to? What makes them think they have ownership rights to that which is seized as a tax? Legally, this is state property and is subject to payment. Therefore, the libertarians’ resistance to taxes is rooted not in laws, but in morality.
This raises the question of the objectivity of morality. If we stand on the positions of moral relativism, where one thinks one way and another thinks another, and both are right, then the state is just as right in collecting taxes as the libertarian is in refusing to pay them. Thus, if a libertarian wants to justify to others that he specifically is right, he will have to adopt the position of moral realism.
By tracing the immorality of taxes back to the non-aggression principle, the libertarian relies on the idea that freedom requires no rational basis; it is some kind of self-evident good toward which everyone strives. But what exactly is the freedom being discussed? The libertarian conception of freedom as the absence of coercion is far from the only formulation, not even the most popular one, and certainly cannot be considered self-evident.
Next, the author examines several possible approaches to justifying the morality of compulsory seizures for redistribution in favor of the poor: the Lockean proviso, utilitarianism, Nozick’s compensatory justice, reducing the concept of negative liberty to its republican formulation… The author does not insist on the truth of any particular argument; he merely points out that smart men know how to reason beautifully and competently with logic and facts, while frenzied Eastern European libertarians, having filled their heads with their Svetov and up their asses… remain unconvincing, narrow-minded dogmatists demonstrating an extremely low level of discussion.
I am not going to start refuting the points from the article right now. For me, this is rather a useful warning that will come in handy when writing the brochure on ancap. In particular, I need to figure out what to do with moral realism. I define morality as a spontaneous order of entering into conflicts, and it will, of course, differ in various communities. Thus, the book about ancap acquires a sort of ethnographic character. As in, listen, there is such a people as ancaps in the world, and they have these amazing tribal customs, so unlike what is accepted among civilized people, but attractive in their own way, just as the customs of some Polynesians regarding free love are attractive to us. Will I justify why the libertarian social order is the best? Well, I don’t know. I’m not sure.
Mohawks, metal, port wine, speakers, Yegor Letov, Grazhdanskaya Oborona, Yuri Hoy and Viktor Tsoi! And of course, mother-anarchy!
But seriously, do you think there are common grounds between libertarians and anarcho-punks, and is interaction or even cooperation between them possible?
Perhaps the most punk thing I’ve ever seen is the movie “Fight Club.” There, it’s no longer just Tsoi’s “you must be strong, you must be able to say don’t tread on me,” but an aggressive denial of the dominant system as a whole, in which, of course, the distinct contours of some anti-system are visible: how wonderful it is to destroy something beautiful, how wonderful it is to wage guerrilla warfare against the regime by any means from spitting in soup to blowing up buildings, and most importantly—how wonderful self-destruction is. Self-destruction proves the sincerity of one’s views and provides a person with a high platform, even if before that they were nobody and had no name. And here, everyone repeats in chorus—his name is Vladislav Roslyakov! That is impressive.
Of course, the punk movement is a product of the twentieth century with its disregard for individual human life and very large-scale thinking. Punks did not defend their own individual freedom (freedom within the existing system is shit), because it is only possible through a transition to anarchy, and that primarily means the breakdown of the existing system. It is pointless to discuss whether punks have a positive agenda and to make its presence a condition for cooperation with them. It is quite enough that a punk will fight not against every system, but only against the one that spawned him. We are all a bit like virologists now, so I think the analogy of punks as antibodies to the state would be quite appropriate.
I think it’s clear from the above that there are common grounds between anarcho-punks and anarcho-libertarians. But what about interaction and cooperation? Here, I’m afraid, anarcho-libertarians will seem like boring, stifling and useless theorists to anarcho-punks. What is this “respect for private property”? The state holds you as property tighter than it holds your balls; forget about it. As long as you are afraid of living in shit, they will scare you by dipping you in shit, and in the fight against the system, one cannot be distracted by such trivial fears.
Punks are guerrillas. I think they could have quite mutually beneficial and mutually understandable cooperation with sufficiently hardcore agorists, who are also essentially guerrillas. But still, I would like to see a lecture, say, by Pavel Usanov before an audience of anarcho-punks, dedicated to some kind of brutality. Well, for example, a talk on the economics of Mexican cartels from the position of AEL. Naturally, Pavel should be in full dress, with a bow tie, otherwise the picture won’t be right.
The image is very important in terms of influence on society, so there should, of course, also be many carnival punks in a strong subculture, who mostly copy visual images rather than the style of thinking and, most importantly, actions. But please forgive me for not dwelling in detail on the visual component, such as mohawks and studs: that’s for the designers, they understand the language of material culture better.
If there is no state, and my wife cheats on me, would it be lawful to throw her out the window if I live on the second floor of a building owned by a homeowners’ association that has opted out of insurance services, but has an oral contract for territory security with a private security company (PSC) registered in a territory where a state exists, of which our joint daughter is a citizen, and who, under their law, is obliged to look after disabled parents—a category that includes stateless persons, which my wife is, having applied for a residence permit that was formally accepted due to the difference in time zones?
Topotushka
This question, if I recall correctly, was cited by Alexei “Komendant” Tereshchuk as an example of how even non-trolls—but quite enthusiastic ancaps—can be intensely interested in the most minute details of a completely hypothetical stateless society of the future, falling into the deductive heresy of deriving any, no matter how subtle, specifics from a few general principles.
But no. In order to derive specific consequences from general principles, one must add additional information to the general principles regarding the conditions to which we are deriving those specific consequences. The more assumptions the initial data rely on, the more unstable the result of such reflections becomes.
Does this mean that the deductive method is useless? Of course not. It simply means that to obtain reliable results, you need to take the general principles and bring them as close as possible to the local environment to which you will be applying them.
Now, let us return to the joking question and provide a serious answer to it.
The question of the lawfulness of throwing a cheating wife out the window can only have a positive resolution under conditions where cheating is considered a legal offense. Can cheating be considered a legal offense in the absence of a state? It can. Let us note that in our hypothetical society, marriage is officially considered a property relationship—at least, Topotushka’s “ownership” over his wife.
Moving forward. The homeowners’ association’s refusal of insurance services means that causing harm to the health of one of the association’s residents does not constitute a tort against the association.
The fact that the PSC is fulfilling an oral contract for territory security means that oral contracts are recognized in our hypothetical stateless society.
If the PSC operating legally on the protected territory records damage to the adjacent territory caused by the fall of Topotushka’s wife, I find it difficult to imagine a legal construction within which the responsibility for the damage would be placed by the PSC on the wife rather than on the Topotushka who threw her. Thus, we can state that since throwing a large object out of a window entails a risk of damage to the adjacent territory, it is an unlawful act, and we have obtained an answer to the original question without even delving into the intricacies of time zones. Moreover, according to the oral contract, the PSC may be obliged to prevent even the throwing of cigarette butts on the lawn, which are viewed as litter; therefore, Topotushka’s arguments that his wife is quite compact and did not cause any significant damage are unlikely to hold weight. Littering under the windows is an unlawful act, period.
I arrived in Montenegro on May 21st to work on the Montelibero project. During this time, I have personally accomplished a little for the project: I settled in relative proximity to the plot of land being acquired as part of the project, participated in clearing the territory so that the surveyor could mark the cadastral boundaries of the plot and the future road leading to it, and submitted documents to be appointed as the director of the LLC Montelibero, which is currently in the process of registration. Until the company is registered, the possibilities for further offline activity regarding the land are limited.
Surveyor at work
Many are concerned about the cost of living in Montenegro. Here is a summary for the first month.
A total of 834 euros was spent — this is only for myself, excluding expenses within the framework of Montelibero. However, this amount includes some items that will be significantly lower in the future.
Housing cost 282 euros; it will be much less moving forward. First, the first 7 days were in a hostel at 6 euros per night. Second, when I rented long-term housing for 120 euros a month, I had to leave one month’s payment as a deposit, with a potential return not for a long time.
113 euros were spent on furnishings. For instance, I brought almost my entire desktop computer from Russia, except for the monitor and the case because they are heavy, and I forgot to take the router. I had to buy used hardware locally. Or, for example, the apartment turned out to have no electric kettle or clothes drying rack. In the future, I expect one major expense in this category, and after that, it will almost vanish.
A very unpleasant expense is the 30-euro tourist tax, which is 1 euro per day of stay in the country. The tax must be paid until a residence permit is obtained, which in turn is tied to the registration timelines of the company where I am the director. So this expense will decrease next month and eventually disappear completely. However, company maintenance costs will begin; but in my case, fortunately, these will be paid for by the project — a kind of social package for an employee with a monthly salary of 80 euros.
The wildest expense item from the perspective of former residents of Russia is the cash-out commissions, which cost 29 euros. Local ATMs charge 2% + 5 euros. In supermarkets, of course, you can pay by card, but between people — only cash; there is no “I’ll transfer to Sber via phone number” here. This is a serious reason to start earning cash here or making useful acquaintances for more profitable cash-outs than via an ATM.
170 euros were spent on shops, and another 54 on establishments. These expenses can be optimized, but I would assume that food and small household needs will continue to cost around two hundred.
In short, if you rent a very modest apartment in a cheap city (Bar is perhaps the cheapest city on the coast), then once life more or less settles down, you can expect to fit within 350-400 euros per month — if living alone. A family will have lower per capita rental costs and will likely fit within a price tag of 300 euros per person.
However, for expenses to stay within this modest price tag, a couple of other conditions must be met. First, forget about smoking; cigarettes are very expensive here, more than 2 euros per pack. I didn’t even start, which is easier for me. Second, you can choose not to apply for a residence permit and instead do a visa run. More on that below.
If a tourist does not pay the tourist tax, the state theoretically threatens to fine them. In practice, only those who apply for a residence permit without having paid their taxes are fined. Therefore, instead of applying for a residence permit, you can simply cross the border with Albania once a month. My landlord actually makes a side income from this: he crowds 4 people into his car, charges 10 euros from each, and drives them to Shkodër, a lovely Albanian town on the shore of Lake Skadar. In Albania, almost all fruits and vegetables are about twice as cheap, as are many items in supermarkets. So many people go there just to stock up, and at the same time, they get a border crossing stamp, which gives them the right to extend their legal stay in Montenegro. So, if you aren’t planning far ahead and aren’t chasing Montenegrin citizenship in ten years, then a visa run is the cheapest way of legalization. No PCR tests are required; I haven’t even seen people wearing masks in Albania at all.
Just a funny Albanian brand
In conclusion, a scattering of general impressions about the country.
The language is related enough to Russian that after a month, you can understand most of what is being said to you, especially if they speak slowly. Ordinary communication happens in a mixture of Montenegrin and Russian, but in difficult cases where this is not enough, switching to English is sufficient and solves the problem.
Locals are quite friendly, although not as breathtakingly hospitable as, say, Georgians. They love to chat: communication with locals almost always boils down to them talking, you occasionally giving one-word answers to their questions, and them being happy that they were understood and that you even replied on topic. They talk little about politics, and this usually concerns the question of whether they should join the European Union, rather than whether some Russians or Belarusians have a dispute with their government. Libertarian values are quite organic for them, though they are not articulated.
Business culture in Montenegro is a legendary topic. You get the feeling that by the time you manage to pull off a more or less complex deal, you will have already gotten to know the counterparty’s entire family and perhaps even become related to them. The price of the deal ultimately turns out to be noticeably higher than expected, but in the process, some unexpected benefits arise that have a completely indirect relation to the original subject of discussion. In short, you have to immerse yourself in it, and it’s harmful to spend too many nerves on it.
There is work here, in principle, both skilled and unskilled. Until your knowledge of the local language is proficient, you can look for work through Russian-speaking groups on Facebook; they are populous and informative. When a person begins to chat fluently, their opportunities expand significantly. Also, nothing prevents working remotely, but you already understand that. The internet is expensive, but the quality is decent enough.
The food is tasty, but the cuisine is not very diverse: meat, cheese, bread, vegetables, fruits. The culture of smoking meat is top-notch. There is fish, but it’s not highly prized by the locals. They eat a lot of pastries, but here I don’t particularly align with the locals.
The climate surprised me at first: at the end of May, evenings were openly cool. Now it much more resembles my idea of the subtropics: hot during the day, pleasant at night. Humidity is not very high and isn’t irritating. I haven’t even turned on the air conditioner yet, but I think it will be needed after some time. The sea is still quite cool, so the beaches are already quite crowded, while the waves are still spacious. They say the locals migrate to the mountains, where it’s cooler, during the height of the heat. I haven’t been there yet, but I plan to.
In general, in terms of tourist attractions, Montenegro is still passing me by. I visited the Old Town of Budva — and that’s pretty much it. Although literally right next to me is some breathtakingly ancient olive tree, 2400 years old, which all the locals speak of with literal breathlessness, and three kilometers away are the ruins of Old Bar — but somehow I just haven’t found the time. Instead, today I plan to visit the tourist center to extend my registration after the visa run, and tomorrow I’ll go to the capital, where I spotted a used scooter (that same expected major expense for furnishings). Perhaps when I have wheels, I’ll be able to ride around the country and explore it in more detail, but that will likely be the topic of the next report.
Old Town Budva — the only tourist attraction I’ve explored in detail
I think I’ve finished writing the first section of my book on ancap, regarding the basic principles of libertarianism. I’ve broken it down into separate chapters so it’s not too cumbersome. Also, for the convenience of the readers, I’ve moved all the numerous definitions of terms provided in the text to a separate page. There, you will have the opportunity to get a concentrated overview of the strange conceptual apparatus I use.
I’ve also sketched out a rough table of contents for the second section, which is currently tentatively titled “Power.” The third section will presumably be devoted to the relationship between ancap and libertarianism, serving as an afterword to the first part of the book. I haven’t sketched out the structure for the other two parts of the book yet.
As before, I don’t rule out various edits, additions, and removals, especially if you provide active feedback.
Everything is fine with the right to bear arms in El Salvador (ownership from age 21, carrying from 24, a test and a criminal record check are required for a license), freedom of activity for private security companies, a government sector share of only 7.6% in the economy, and the lowest tax burden in all of the Americas. Now they are even giving permanent residency for three bitcoins. It’s not exactly ancap, but much has been successfully implemented. At the same time, El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the world: robberies, murders, etc. Where is the notorious BPN (Balance of Violence Potential) if any law-abiding citizen can be armed no worse than any gangster?
Anonymous question
The Balance of Violence Potential (BPN) is a concept once used by Bitarch as a universal recipe against violence (later he abandoned such a vulgar interpretation), which he drew from Auzan, who in turn recounted Hirschleifer’s model regarding the conditions for the stability of anarchy. However, in the original model, everything was by no means reduced to the BPN alone. For the stability of anarchy according to Hirschleifer, low conflict intensity, high resource dispersion, and a sufficiently high income from peaceful activities are required.
The intensity factor is a sort of integral indicator consisting of the characteristics of military technologies, the motivation of the parties, and so on. It cannot be calculated directly, so it is rather understood through comparison between different conflicting societies. Resource dispersion ensures the difficulty of achieving hegemony through control of the economy. High income from peaceful activity reduces the motivation for war.
What do we have in El Salvador? Its history includes a war with Honduras in 1969, followed by a civil war that lasted until 1992, meaning one can assume a certain habit of solving issues by force—something institutionalists trace back to ancient colonial times and which is quite characteristic of Latin America in general. Resources are distributed very unevenly: in a tiny, densely populated agrarian country, there is a severe shortage of fertile land, and it is all concentrated in mountainous areas. Poverty and unemployment levels are very high, meaning there must simply be a large number of cheap fighters in the country who will inevitably dispose of themselves while terrorizing businesses, thereby further increasing poverty and unemployment.
What factors should lead to a decrease in the level of violence in El Salvador? First, the notorious second demographic transition. Fewer young people mean less banditry. Second, because a significant share of the economy consists of remittances from abroad, this increases resource dispersion. Recognizing bitcoin as legal tender will reduce remittance fees, which will increase income from peaceful economic activity. Finally, the country has recent experience with a truce between gangs and the government, during which the murder rate dropped sharply. If they wish, they can repeat this, which would not only reduce the level of violence but also increase the decentralization of power.
Why might the government in El Salvador be willing to decentralize? Because there is neighboring Honduras, a former military adversary. And Honduras is implementing panarchic projects, such as the Prospera charter city on Roatan island and a couple of smaller ones. Small El Salvador cannot afford the Russian Federation’s tactics toward neighbors attempting liberalization because it lacks the strength. Instead, it will have to catch up to their level. And wealthy citizens are a far more significant factor in reducing violence than any mythical BPN.
