Автор: Анкап-тян

Robots and Coventry

Recently, Bitarch and Voluntarist suggested Heinlein’s novella “Coventry” as a thesis for their idea of the bio-enhancement of morality. Briefly, the plot: the protagonist defended the right to physical aggression and, instead of psychological correction, preferred exile to a colony of similar aggressors. There, he became well-acquainted with the local customs, and when he discovered that these barbarians were planning to break out of their pen and enslave the peaceful inhabitants outside, he sided with those who had exiled him, being ready even for that very psychological correction.

Bitarch and Voluntarist’s conclusion: there is no need to fear correction; accept it voluntarily—it is not necessary to take a tour among aggressive savages first.

Robert Heinlein is a grandmaster of American science fiction, but he is only one of three. Arthur Clarke’s books are not very well known in Russian territories, so let’s not dwell on him; instead, let’s see what the third grandmaster—Isaac Asimov—writes about the correction of aggressive behavior.

In his version of future history, humans actively used anthropomorphic robots, whose intelligence, for fear of a machine rebellion, was limited by three now-well-known laws. Having colonized several dozen planets with the help of robots, humans built a cozy cosmonite society where the human population was comfortably small and the number of robots serving them was comfortably large. Robots not only refrained from using violence against humans themselves but also suppressed such attempts by anyone. This made life safe and completely eradicated the habit of physical violence. Having domesticated their planets and becoming domesticated themselves, the cosmonites ceased all expansion and focused primarily on prolonging their lives.

Those who remained on Earth were too numerous and only huddled closer and closer to save on utility costs through positive economies of scale. As a result, they developed a fear of the wilderness and also lost the capacity for cosmic expansion.

Asimov pulled humanity out of this trap literally using a deus ex machina. A certain robot accidentally acquired the ability to read and correct human emotions, became filled with thoughts about the benefit of cosmic expansion for humanity, and kicked humanity off Earth without robots—a real kick in the pants—and then turned out the lights on those departing so they wouldn’t think of returning, by triggering a mechanism that gradually made Earth completely uninhabitable. The result was twenty thousand years of expansion and star wars, the colonization of the entire galaxy, and then a transition to a hive mind, a pan-galactic intelligence—not so much to live comfortably without violence within a single humanity, but to be able to effectively resist an invasion from other galaxies if necessary.

Thus, using his artistic tools, Asimov demonstrates that aggression is vital for humanity’s expansion and defense against Aliens; when there is no space for expansion, the time comes for the correction of aggressive behavior, but this is a forced measure, similar to drugs for suppressing an immune response, and if overused, humanity weakens and degenerates. For any human society, according to Asimov, the best state is its period of expansion, when people are energetic, enterprising, and full of healthy aggression directed primarily at the external world. In Asimov’s work, this ideal is embodied by traders—people who conquer the frontier and explore what useful goodies are there that can be cheaply obtained and then sold dearly in civilized lands.

What is the difference between this world and the society shown in “Coventry”? There, aggressors end up not on the frontier, but in a reservation. Their aggression is directed at each other, positive selection occurs based on the level of ingenuity and ruthlessness of the aggressors, and sooner or later they turn to expansion, finding a way to break through the barrier with which the civilized and peaceful people have walled themselves off. It is the world of “Coventry” that is the ideal of modern Western civilization in our own version of Earth. This civilization is tired of wars and would like to live in peace with barbarians, or at least wall themselves off from them, although the most civilized representatives of Western civilization reproach the supporters of such walling off for excessive cruelty, as barbarian culture is also valuable and original, and one simply needs to help barbarians taste the pleasures of civilization, and everything will be fine.

In this form, Western civilization is doomed. Bitarch and Voluntarist, feeling this, advocate for the idea of psychocorrection, but they speak primarily about eliminating aggression within civilized society. And this is their rhetorical error. Their ideas would be perceived completely differently if they spoke of psychocorrection specifically as an offensive weapon against barbarism.

Bomb African savages, Russian orcs, Mexican cartels, and other scum with empathy and politeness using serotonin bombs! Cut their psychopathy out by the roots! Civilization will advance until the last Islamist kisses a lady’s hand!

That—now that would work.

Minnesota and the Libertarian Theory of War

For a long time, I struggled to find the right tone for the final chapter of the book on libertarian theory of war, where a libertarian analysis and recommendations for wars initiated by the state should be provided. However, then a road incident occurred in the US state of Minnesota, which was accompanied by heated discussions online—and things finally started moving. So, I express my gratitude to all security services, civil activists, and lovers of online flame wars for their valuable contribution to science.

So far, only section 3.3.1, in which the state attacks the individual, is ready, but things should move faster from here.

Oh, and a small warning has been added at the very beginning of the third part of the book, regarding the fact that war with the state can be understood in different ways; in this book, we are interested in war in its more brutal sense, as it is precisely this form that has so far lacked libertarian theoretical reflection.

On Futurism of War: Discussion

Atomic Cherry uploaded a four-part article cycle for his paid subscribers titled “On the Futurology of War”, and he sent me the drafts in Word. There was a brief discussion afterwards, but I’ll have to prepare a short overview of the cycle, where I partially restate the author’s opinion and partially supplement it.

The cycle briefly describes how a professional army, with the invention of nationalism in the 19th century, mutated into mass conscripted armies, and during the Cold War, due to the second demographic shift, there was a renewed trend towards professionalization. It also describes changes in military doctrines, from competition about who can outmaneuver the other, to the idea of a general battle, and then to total war, from which offshoots of information, hybrid wars, etc., later detached themselves.

The key contradiction that led to the crisis of modern wars, the author sees in this dilemma. On one hand, nationalism is still quite strong, and it intensifies even more when an invasion takes place, so it’s relatively easy to mobilize a large, motivated contingent for defense. On the other hand, most countries have already undergone the second demographic shift, have negative demographics, and gathering a motivated army of aggression is difficult. Thus, nationalism inevitably dictates that the aggressor follow the doctrine of total war, but demographics don’t allow them to draw an endless supply of human resources. Moreover, international humanitarian rhetoric forces them to be shy about blatant genocide, if, of course, the war is on the front pages of international media.

In light of this dilemma, the author describes several scenarios.

  • In countries where the second demographic transition has not yet occurred and a lack of industrial power prevents conducting a total war in the manner of the World Wars, low-tech genocide is taking place. Examples are primarily focused on Africa.
  • If the aggressor has overwhelming technological superiority, we have a war in which it destroys the enemy’s military and civilian infrastructure remotely, and the phase of ground operations either follows after complete suppression of resistance or does not occur at all. The most successful example of such a war is the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict, when bombings alone were enough to bring the enemy out of the war and convince it to change its political regime.
  • The aggressor may also solve the problem of a lack of motivated living force by outsourcing military tasks to private companies. This has been actively used in the Middle East and continues to be applied in Africa. However, the loyalty of mercenaries is tied to the economy, and the feasibility of their use is largely determined by the economic tasks they solve, so it often comes down to nothing more than power control over objects generating income.
  • Finally, in a situation where opponents are comparable in strength but cannot ensure a full-scale total war of the scale of Korea, positional confrontation occurs, examples of which are the Iran-Iraq and Ukrainian wars. The latter is particularly interesting because it is a war of states that have already undergone the second demographic transition.

Discussing the articles, I noted that they somehow focus on the fact that total war remains the only way to resolve interethnic conflicts by force, while there is also another way – eliminating the ruling elite of the enemy. To this the author replied that Hamas’s leadership had already been destroyed several times and it didn’t help. It seemed to me, however, that for countries with a negative demographic, such a method should still be relevant. Understandably, he was referring to removing Putin: the regime is quite personalized, the population is sufficiently apathetic, therefore eliminating the first face should, in my opinion, make the regime much more willing to negotiate. Atomic Cherry argued that the Russian regime is not so personalized, and that a no less frozen character will come to Putin’s place, who will continue the same policy, and in the worst case there would be many such frozen characters, they would arrange a full-scale civil war, and then it would be like with the Soviet Union, which calmed down after the citizen and went to seize the world.

Well, of course, then the Maduro takeover happened, a regime that wasn’t particularly personalized – and the country is obviously experiencing depopulation. So we’re both thrilled to observe this natural experiment: will this methodology work or won’t it? Will old-fashioned nationalism prevail, or postmodernism? If the latter, then a total war looks like a viable alternative, and that’s definitely a plus. And the next important precedent in the history of wars will be the forceful elimination of a nuclear dictator. I, of course, am betting that this won’t lead to a nuclear war, and that the world is almost ripe for this revelation.

2025 results

Перечитала свои итоги прошлого года, сдержанно оптимистичные. К сожалению, оптимизм этот никак не оправдался. Канал вёлся скорее по инерции, Монтелиберо существовало скорее по инерции, каких-то жизнеспособных форков от него не отпочковалось, любые инвестиции в Черногорию оказывались убыточными, а само черногорское государство начало избавляться от иностранцев: а хули, мы уже одной ногой в ЕС, сейчас как сядем на европейские субсидии, и нафиг нам после этого работающая экономика, давайте разгоним уже всех этих понаехавших.

У меня не закончен ни один из предполагавшихся к завершению долгосрочных проектов, остались буквально последние главы, может, хоть в новом году доползу до финиша. В качестве следующей страны для поселения пока рассматриваю Сербию, и там снова придётся выращивать вокруг себя комьюнити с нуля, а такие фокусы мне стали с годами как-то тяжелее даваться.

В общем, мир вокруг настраивает на резкое повышение временного предпочтения: жить одним месяцем и не планировать на следующий, избавляться от любых долгоиграющих активов при первой же возможности, потому что когда припрёт, хрен их реализуешь за приемлемую цену, не держаться даже за людей, всё равно они сегодня здесь, а завтра в Парагвае. Хочется же прямо противоположного: осесть, накрепко вцепиться в клочок земли, завести клан, набить хлева всякой полезной скотиной, а гаражи полезной техникой, нарожать детей, учить их экономической теории и пилотированию дронов…

Пока же единственным моим реальным достижением за год стало обучение пилотированию автомобиля, он-то меня теперь и кормит. Со времён белой эмиграции известно, что самые ходовые профессии для русских – это шофёры и гувернантки, вот я теперь худо-бедно совмещаю обе, имея работу в сфере доставки и долю в детском садике.

За окнами адский ветер, сшибающий с ног. Но я обязательно выживу. И это единственное, что я могу достаточно искренне пожелать своим читателям в новом году.

Удивительно, но тут даже есть новые подписчики. Откуда вы берётесь?

Murray Rothbard and the End of Socialism

I was approached by the founder of the “Molinariy” project, for whom I had already translated one of the chapters of “Evenings on Saint-Lazare Street,” written, in fact, by Gustave de Molinari, the author of the key idea of anarcho-capitalism—namely, the private production of security in a free competitive market, similar to any other consumer services. Molinariy consists of a Telegram channel, which at the time of this publication has 70 subscribers, a Substack with a whopping six subscribers, and a YouTube channel with 1.13 thousand subscribers. This asymmetry is due to two factors. First, YouTube promotes channels through a suggestion system, while Substack and Telegram do so far less effectively. Second, the primary content of Molinariy is video content, while the auxiliary text channels are used to store additional materials and alternative formats for delivering the main content. Thus, we come to the essence of the request. I was asked to give my opinion on the Russian translation published in Molinariy of a 1989 lecture by Murray Rothbard regarding the global political agenda of that time, primarily the collapse of the socialist camp.

The video is posted on YouTube, while on Substack and in Telegram, a transcript of the speech and comments on it are provided.

Rothbard begins with a brief overview of the history of socialism: how it appeared in Europe in the 19th century, how and why it gradually gained popularity, how liberals toward the end of the 19th century felt a sense of doom because socialist ideas had completely seized the masses, and how in the 20th century socialism finally had the opportunity to be embodied in practice. He then notes a phase-shifted movement of ideas: people in the socialist bloc countries were fed up to their teeth with this collectivist system and dreamed of capitalism, while Western intellectuals managed to maintain an untouched admiration for socialism throughout the decades because they had not truly tasted it in practice.

It turns out that there is only one way to prompt people to abandon an externally attractive but false idea: let them try to implement it and wait until the idea is discredited. However, even in this case, the abandonment of the idea will most likely not occur until the first generation of its carriers physically dies out.

Here, a mischievous question occurs to me: could the same happen with ancap? Perhaps it will gradually win over minds, a certain critical percentage of politicians will be permeated by it, and then everyone will be more or less unanimous that it is finally time to let people realize this bright idea. And then, when the first generation of those who dismantle the state in favor of the free market begins to physically die out, the idea will lose its sincere carriers, and in the eyes of the next generation, it will already be discredited. And if at the end of the eighties of the last century, the rulers of the socialist camp countries bewilderedly asked such clever Western experts if there were any reliable ways to carefully abandon excessive state regulation and transition to a free market, then in a hundred years, will free participants of a spiraling libertarian society bewilderedly ask how to carefully find those who are ready to take responsibility for people and start managing them, rather than complaining, “Why on earth would I want to do that?”

Life, of course, has shown that the world is more complex than the picture Rothbard saw at the end of the eighties, but overall his view was quite correct. For instance, he correctly grasped that in American society at that time, people were tired of high government spending under Reagan, and soon under Clinton, the national debt began to decrease. But the momentum did not last long, and now it is growing at unprecedented rates. He identified the problem of “too big to fail” financial institutions, and this problem eventually triggered a global crisis. He correctly noted that China would have problems with a market economy if it were not accompanied by general liberalization. And indeed, thirty years later, China’s economy eventually faltered due to a lack of freedom and an excess of state regulation, but by then it had managed to become a superpower. Finally, Rothbard noted that now that the Cold War between superpowers has ended, this would not be a reason for the US to demilitarize; instead, the government would frantically seek any excuse to fight with anyone or anything.

Rothbard also harshly criticized the Libertarian Party, which practically failed to notice that liberalism had won over socialism and in no way took advantage of the fruits of this victory, focusing instead on its own internal administrative squabbles. In fact, this criticism applies to any libertarian party in any country at any time: libertarians are especially vulnerable to the bureaucratization of their institutions. This applies not only to parties but also to scientific institutes or projects like Mont Pelerin. The thing is, a volunteer comes to an organization for a result, while long-term institutions work for the sake of the process. As a result, enthusiasts burn out and leave, leaving behind those for whom routine is comfortable, and work results are measured by the number of meetings.

And finally, I want to leave hanging the key prediction Rothbard made in his lecture: that the 21st century would be the century of freedom. Of course, compared to the 20th century, in very many aspects and in very many countries, people have become noticeably freer. But regulators have not been idle, and many freedoms that people enjoyed at the beginning of the 21st century are now unthinkable in its second quarter. However, I want to note an interesting pattern here: modern enslavement is not total. It exists only where the state maintains its monopoly. For example, it has turned air travel into a sophisticated mockery. But in the field of money transfers, people endure the mockery only where the transaction must be shown to the state. But if it needs to be hidden, everything is done in two clicks. And so in many industries. People are learning and getting used to bypassing government desires, and they seem to stop longing for a boot over them. Perhaps freedom really is arriving? I want to believe it.

How to make a good economy without taxes so that the whole economy is from the market?

Zxcutehikka

This is an interesting question. I suspect the author of the question wants a statist answer: how to build a good economy from scratch, having come to power in some state. There are several quite decent examples in recent history, such as Kakha Bendukidze’s reform of the Georgian economy or Argentina’s economy – under Javier Milei. What unites these cases, and more classical examples of economic miracles – Western German, Japanese, South Korean, Singaporean and so on?

Primarily, it’s that the economies in these countries were completely wrecked before the reforms began. Only when the horse was dead would the bureaucratic horde graciously agree to dismount and say, “Well, alright, reform us, don’t interfere with me, but only weakly, and as soon as the horse gallops again, of course, my time will come, and I’ll push you aside.” And then the reformer more or less carefully dismantled regulatory blockages, allowing the economy to breathe.

Perhaps the only example of an economic miracle that didn’t involve any reforms comes to mind: Hong Kong. There, according to reports, the governor simply sabotaged metropolitan policy and didn’t interfere much with what was happening in the local economy for a long time. And then the metropolis simply handed over Hong Kong to the Chinese socialists.

The path of Hong Kong is just what anyone can use, not only the chosen or unchosen politicians. The business is simple – you just need to ignore government directives and deal with your private affairs. If no one will pay taxes, we’ll get a tax-free economy, which, incidentally, is what the questioner is interested in. Of course, the modern state knows how to cope without taxes. For example, it could simply print money and finance its needs from this source. So it would be good to ignore government funds too.

The problem, however, is that mass ignoring of official wishes doesn’t begin until people realize that the state has botched things. And therefore, at the start of the economy, we have ruins. Worse than that, the level of economic literacy among people at the start is probably shockingly low – otherwise how did our economy end up in ruins? Why “presumably”? Because there’s a more favorable alternative: people are generally more or less literate, and the economy is ruined, for example, by war and economic sanctions. And this is why Russia has a better chance of achieving economic prosperity after forcibly displacing the current government than Cuba or Venezuela.

And the fact is, even if the Venezuelan government is now crushed by the US Army, there’s probably not much good that will come of it – because the local socialists will be convinced they were right all along, it was just a force majeure situation, and now let’s fix our wonderful Bolivarian socialism. Where do I get this certainty? Well, there’s the precedent of Iraq: an external overthrow of a socialist government doesn’t allow the people to become smarter; instead, the people become enraged.

The answer came out sprawling – more like rambling thoughts than a coherent lecture – and political studies isn’t really my forte. But somehow I managed to look at the topic from several angles, and that’s enough bread.

Dignity for the herd, honor for personalities

Bitarch and the Voluntarist claim that of the two cultural models of behavior—honor and dignity—the second is more attractive to libertarians, as the first is collectivist and the second is individualistic.

Let us use the same definitions. In a culture of honor, a person’s standing is determined by how much their behavior conforms to certain high standards. In a culture of dignity, a person is valuable by the mere fact of belonging to humanity.

From this, it is easy to draw both the conclusions of the article and the exact opposite: honor is about individualism, since a person defends their own honor or chooses dishonor; dignity, however, is a collectivist thing, since only collective trends will determine what offends human dignity and what does not. Other people within a “culture of dignity” may turn out to be so valuable that any sidelong glance would humiliate their dignity, and the law would punish this, for example, with imprisonment for “inciting hatred.”

If today a person chooses to rely on the protection of an impersonal law instead of individual action, then tomorrow that same law will strip them of their dignity, and the person will have already lost the capacity for individual action in the previous step.

What is the culture of honor based on? On the fact that a person is always ready to demonstrate their willingness to defend themselves against the encroachments of others, and thereby avoids the need to repeat this again and again. Others see the readiness to repel and are wary of infringing upon another’s honor. Of course, the concept of honor is broader than the readiness for violence, but in the article under discussion, it is reduced only to this, so we will not expand the topic unnecessarily.

And what is a culture of dignity, if described in the language of a culture of honor? It is the presumption that everyone can defend their honor. I do not know if every person I meet is truly a person of honor. But I will assume this and base my behavior on it. Therefore, I will not encroach upon what is dear to them, knowing that their honor commands them to defend it. They are worthy of this. In other words, dignity grows out of honor. It limits honor, but does not deny it.

Bitarch and the Voluntarist propose to cast aside honor in favor of dignity. They want to deprive a person of the right to forcefully defend what is dear to them, while hoping that the law will be observed in a culture of dignity. But they forget to remind us that the law can become anything. A society with dignified laws (referring not to written norms, but to the actual practice of their application) will preserve a culture of dignity. A society with undignified laws will lose it. But what will compel people to fight for dignified laws and against undignified ones? Honor, of course!

To summarize. In reality, we are talking about the same thing. Respect for the values of the individual is important for building a prosperous society. But we do not agree on the means. If the NAP is reduced only to the refusal to initiate direct violence, then an encroachment on another’s freedom can bypass the NAP through indirect methods. This is exactly why the capacity for proactive violence cannot be taken away from a person. Without this capacity, a person will be unable to resist their own enslavement. Bitarch and the Voluntarist are developing mechanisms to strengthen the inhibitor of violence. If their means worked, it would make me their enemy. Fortunately, they work only on paper.

Stephan Molynieux, Practical Anarchy, translation of chapter 27 of 29

In recent days, I have experienced a considerable slump in energy, so I’ve accumulated a backlog of texts. The weather outside has noticeably improved now, and I hope to shorten this queue a bit. But first, I am publishing the final version of the translation of Chapter 27 of Stephan Molinari’s “Practical Anarchy,” simply because this work required less creative effort. The chapter is devoted to describing the system of incentives that a market stateless society is capable of creating to encourage good child-rearing and, accordingly, punishment for bad parenting.

The main flaw of the text, of course, is the complete omission of the fact that children and their parents share a common budget. The greater the financial sanctions against the parents, the less money can technically reach the child. At some point, the ubiquitous representative of the PRS must appear on the doorstep of a problematic parent and announce that since the parent cannot pay the increased insurance, they can, of course, waive the policy entirely, but then neither they nor their child will be allowed to set foot in any decent place (I won’t recount it; the logic is roughly the same as in Chapter 25 regarding stateless prisons). But the parent can also sign a waiver of parental rights, and lo and behold, we have a list of people wishing to acquire such rights here; would you like to review their offers? If you do not sell your rights today, their value will be lower tomorrow, because in all the ratings, your child will be considered more and more problematic. Think about it. After which, the PRS representative vanishes in a cloud of smoke with a demonic laugh.

Of course, the PRS will be financially interested in ensuring that various marginals go bankrupt paying increased rates on contracts with the PRS, and subsequently, by hook or by crook, hand over their children to well-bred and wealthy members of society, who will not create problems for those around them, but, more importantly, will be able to further financially motivate the PRS inspector to pay particularly close attention to a specific problematic family. The more people there are wishing to acquire a child at as early an age as possible, the higher the financial incentives for the PRS to introduce the strictest possible rules, the violation of which will trigger a chain ending in the financial collapse of the family and separation from the child.

How did it happen that Molinari prefers not to write about the extortion aimed at taking children away from parents deemed problematic? Because he is a conservative, he is categorically against state juvenile justice, and for him, the raising of children by the parents themselves is a value of very high order. But market logic couldn’t care less about the values of a specific Stephan Molinari.

About One Objection to Panarchy

Here, Georgiy Freeman made an interesting observation about panarchy:

The problem with panarchy as an optimal world order, in my view, lies in the realm of human psychology. It’s predictable that liberal jurisdictions will be more economically successful and materially wealthier than socialist ones. And it will inevitably happen what has already occurred in the world with closed sub-communities like Jewish groups. Unsuccessful, impoverished extraterritorial jurisdictions will invariably blame wealthy liberal jurisdictions for their misfortune: “they parasitize us,” “they rob us,” “they live off our backs.” And this will inevitably lead to irrational conflicts, wars and pogroms. And ultimately, to the destruction of the ECU and panarchy as an idea.

The problem with panarchy as an optimal world order, in my view, lies in the realm of human psychology. It’s predictable that liberal jurisdictions will be more economically successful and materially wealthier than socialist ones. And it will inevitably happen what has already occurred in the world with closed sub-communities like Jewish groups. Unsuccessful, impoverished extraterritorial jurisdictions will invariably blame wealthy liberal jurisdictions for their misfortune: “they parasitize us,” “they rob us,” “they live off our backs.” And this will inevitably lead to irrational conflicts, wars and pogroms. And ultimately, to the destruction of the ECU and panarchy as an idea.

Indeed, on the example of this assumption we see a fascinating phenomenon of human psychology. The answer to the expressed concern is already contained in the description of the concern itself, however it is ignored. “If people will walk down the streets, dressed festively and sending everyone to hell, then they will quickly encounter violence against them, so the institution of walking down the streets will soon be destroyed, as an idea.” But why not just not send everyone to hell.

Similarly, respected G. Freeman suggests paying attention to the disastrous fate of closed extraterritorial sub-entities and immediately prophesies the same fate for open sub-communities. A liberal extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a secret club with seven degrees of initiation, but simply clients of courts and other legal infrastructure working according to liberal norms, namely respect for freedom and private property. Any communist jurisdiction client can enter a liberal jurisdiction if, of course, the communist masters let him out, allocating his due share of public communist property. And if they don’t let him out, then claims will, presumably, not be directed at liberals.

The problem described by G. Frijman is quite typical of prosperous territorial communities with developed redistribution in favor of the poor: the poor, for some reason, strive to infiltrate such communities, and those who have already infiltrated them suddenly stop loving migrants and demand that borders be closed. Of course, after closing the borders, this territorial community begins to be perceived by many neighboring communists as a fattening on neighbors’ accounts, an education that is subject to destruction. However, until there is mandatory social support within this territorial community, there are no problems with migrants in it: they simply flood into it, hoping to earn a living, and many of them succeed.

Novemberish

I am currently experiencing a period of some confusion, I don’t know where to best apply my efforts. Not having a ready answer, I simply want to discuss this openly in the post, hoping something will occur to me during the process, and perhaps the readers will offer suggestions too.

Let’s briefly review the past. Since 2018, I have publicly been disseminating libertarian theory, while simultaneously mastering it and filling in gaps where I found them. Since 2021, the theory has become supplemented with practice, and we began building a libertarian community in Montenegro. In 2022 something happened, and respectable Russian emigrants became those upon whom it’s convenient to vent complexes. In 2024 something else happened, and anti-migrant rhetoric began to gain mainstream traction worldwide. At the close of 2025 in Montenegro we have preparations for government to sharply tighten conditions for foreign nationals’ legal stay and readiness of Russians to a mass exodus from the country towards Serbia primarily.

What should I personally do within this entire situation?

There’s a path that Montelibero is pursuing. It has re-qualified as an international movement and now manifests mainly online, with occasional offline activity shifting to Serbia, Georgia and Argentina. I’m already distanced from this movement, because it’s hard for me to understand what’s going on within it and what place makes sense for me to occupy.

There is a spontaneously emerging movement in Montenegro advocating for immigrant rights, covering today three diaspora: Russian, German and Turkish. This is new for me and quite insightful. Russians are still organized worse than everyone within this situational alliance, aside from the Serbs, of whom there are more in Montenegro, but they do not consider themselves true immigrants and possibly think that all these tightening conditions are not written for them. However, the movement attracts local citizens who realize that without immigrants, the country will be very difficult.

There is an obvious route – within about a year to relocate non-hurriedly to Serbia and settle there, and to cease all black Montenegrin activities. For me this means withdrawing previously made investments from Montenegro, finding funds for earning on a new place, forming a new community of communication and mutual assistance. The same could be done with Georgia, but learning Georgian after Serbian – it’s obviously a significant challenge.

In any case, my priorities have changed quite a bit. I don’t really feel like investing in online communities anymore because economic connections are more important than ideological ones. It doesn’t matter that there’s another powerful libertarian festival happening somewhere in New Hampshire, or another major conference in Prague, or another significant reform taking place in Argentina – it won’t directly benefit me. But a good auto mechanic will be useful to me, even if he doesn’t particularly understand praxisology. You need to be friends with him, drink kofu with him, jointly defend your rights and, where possible, bring him some benefit besides just paying for the service, because local communities are held together by exactly these kinds of mutual services.

And also, I need to remember that practice makes perfect, but generally speaking, my strongest trait is precisely the theoretical understanding of how the current world is structured, from a libertarian ideological perspective. These musings don’t feed me directly, but subjectively they seem most important to me. Are they in demand among channel readers? It’s hard to say.