I continue to write the introductory part of the book about ancap bit by bit, describing the main principles of libertarianism. I think that later I will reformat the text a bit, but for now, it’s becoming quite a large chapter in one piece.
Usually, when I answer a question, I do it in a detailed manner, with examples, metaphors, and other rhetorical gems. In the book, I try not to ramble, and now I’m wondering if I should, and whether it’s becoming too dry. I would like to know your opinion.
On May 20, I fly to Montenegro. This may affect the regularity of posts for about three days, or it may not. I usually don’t schedule publications, so such things are not very predictable.
Since living in Montenegro will be more expensive for me than in Russia, I will have to pay more attention to making money. If you want me to be less distracted from working on the channel, send donations. It will be especially helpful to chip in for the book — the more financial enthusiasm it generates, the faster I will write and the sooner I will finish. The same applies to current translation projects.
Since I will need to register a company to obtain a residence permit in Montenegro, I will try to take advantage of this and organize the acceptance of donations directly in Telegram — Durov created this possibility quite a long time ago, but I didn’t use it because connecting a Telegram store requires a legal entity — and that’s exactly what I will now have.
Also, in the comments of the donations page, I was asked to set up a Monero wallet. I downloaded the wallet from the official website, synchronized the blockchain, and now I’ve even started mining, although that is just for fun, of course. So, here is the Monero address for donations:
Most likely, I will use the flights to read the Strugatsky brothers’ “Snail on the Slope,” which was ordered for a review long ago — what else is there to do on a plane besides reading books? It’s getting a bit embarrassing; payment for the review was received back in April, which is quite untidy.
Possibly, I will post some fresh travel impressions if they don’t clash too much with the general theme of the channel. If they do — I’ll post them on Boosty.
In the Russian Frontier channel, which I recently promoted, a brief summary has begun to be released of Titus Gebel’s book “Free Private Cities.” The ideas covered in the book are currently being used in the construction of a contractual jurisdiction such as Prospera. It is possible that some of them will be applied in Montellibero in the future.
So those who are too lazy to read the book itself can subscribe to the channel and gradually absorb the material along with its author.
Sometimes it seems that there are many people prone to violence all around us. Almost every day in the news, you can see how someone beat, maimed, or even killed someone else. Perhaps you often encounter various kinds of hooligans and “gopniks” on the streets. Therefore, it is difficult to even imagine how to fight violence if so many people commit it. However, this is a quite deceptive perception that does not correspond to reality. In fact, there are very, very few people prone to violence, and therefore, by applying certain strategies, the problem of violence is entirely solvable. Now we will perform a detailed calculation of the actual number of violent offenders to ensure that there really are not that many of them in society.
The peculiarity of acts of violence is that, in their visibility, they far outpace all other events. Millions of different events happen every day, but it is exactly a few cases of violence that end up on the front pages of news resources and on television broadcasts. Hundreds of thousands of people live beside you, leading their ordinary lives, and you don’t even notice them. On the other hand, you will easily notice a dozen hooligans whose behavior will naturally stand out strongly among everyone else. You see them; you don’t see the other people. That is the whole point. In reality, violent offenders and the acts of violence they commit are very, very few on the scale of society as a whole; it is simply that acts of violence are among the most noticeable deeds.
How does this assertion relate to real data? Let’s look at the statistics of violent crimes in Russia. Non-violent crimes do not interest us, as they are not related to the infliction of direct physical harm to a person or forced coercion. Material damage can be fully compensated, including obtaining compensation from the perpetrator himself by applying various reputational and financial sanctions, and moral harm can be avoided by not maintaining relationships with people who might inflict it (of course, there are situations where a person is forced to interact with someone against their will, but here everything again boils down to forced coercion itself). Only the infliction of physical harm and forced coercion are real problems. Furthermore, our topic is the determination of the number of violent offenders specifically, and not just dishonest and unscrupulous people.
In 2020, 2,044,221 crimes were registered in Russia. Of all crimes, 1.53% are murders (7,695), intentional infliction of severe physical harm (20,019), kidnapping (411), and rapes (3,535). Another 0.26% of crimes are robberies (5,280). Let’s also add 2.7% threats of murder or infliction of severe physical harm (55,223). Of course, this is not the infliction of physical harm itself, but we will consider these acts as failed attempts to commit violence by people prone to it. And finally, 1.66% of crimes consist of intentional infliction of moderate health damage (28,185) and battery (5,716). In total, about 6.1% of crimes are violent in nature [1].
We find that on average, 1,393 crimes were registered per 100 thousand people. Of these, 85 crimes are violent. Of course, far from all acts of violence are registered. This may include domestic violence, small fights, and many other cases. It would be quite reasonable to multiply this number by 4. I made this choice based on the results of a study by the Institute for Law Enforcement Problems at the European University, which discusses how many people actually report to law enforcement agencies and for how many reports a case is initiated. Unfortunately, the study does not have such a clear division of crimes by category as in the case of official crime statistics, so I will assume that about 25% of violent crimes fall into these statistics, based on the percentage of initiated cases for assault (55% of assault victims report to the authorities, and cases are initiated for 44% of reports) [2].
This gives us 340 acts of violence per year per 100 thousand people. The number may seem too small because some violent offenders commit violence frequently and regularly (for example, a bad parent may beat their child, or a bad husband may beat his wife every day). Therefore, for 1 act of violence, we will take all violent actions of one specific person toward another specific person, especially since the repeated commission of similar acts of violence by one person against another in official judicial proceedings will most likely be registered as one crime, and therefore will enter the statistics as only one crime. Out of 852,506 identified criminals, 492,107 (57.7%) had previously committed crimes. The statistics do not specify the number of previously committed crimes; most likely, in reality, 1 violent offender commits more than 2.36 acts of violence on average, but due to the lack of data, we will accept exactly 57.7% of acts of violence as those that do not increase the total number of violent offenders, but only indicate which of them committed violence again. Additionally, it is worth noting again that the vast majority of crimes you notice are non-violent in nature (most often they relate to the economic sphere), whereas we are considering exclusively the commission of acts of violence.
As a result, we find that 144 violent offenders are discovered per year per 100 thousand people, which is 0.144% of the total population, or 1 person out of 695. A very insignificant number, right? Some might say that in their place of residence there are clearly more violent offenders, however, the statistics we are considering concern all of Russia at once, where crime is distributed very unevenly. For example, if we consider severe violent crimes (including robbery), which make up 1.79% of all registered crimes in the general statistics, in Moscow they account for only 1.13% [3]. The total number of crimes registered in Moscow is 146,559, which is 7.2% of all crimes, which is also a more positive result than for Russia as a whole, since Moscow accounts for about 8.6% of the population.
From these calculations, of course, it is impossible to draw exact conclusions about how many violent offenders we have in society at a specific moment, i.e., at what level their number remains. However, as we have seen, the growth of violent offenders is minuscule, and it should be noted that there is also a decrease in violent offenders; they are no more invulnerable or long-lived than other people. Quite the opposite—violent offenders live less on average, as they more often expose themselves to risk due to active participation in violent clashes, whereas other people will not initiate them and will try to avoid them. The absolute number of violent offenders will, of course, grow with population growth, but their percentage ratio to the total population, all other things being equal, will not change.
Note that this result, revealing one violent criminal per 695 people per year, is the worst possible scenario, since we made a series of assumptions in the worst direction: all threats of murder and infliction of severe physical harm were taken as unsuccessful attempts to commit violence; the number of registered violent crimes was multiplied by 4 because many people do not report to law enforcement agencies or they do not initiate a case upon report; we assumed that 1 violent offender commits 2.36 acts of violence on average, but this would be true only for a single recidivism (whereas many violent offenders have multiple). There are all grounds to assume that the real number of violent offenders is many times smaller. However, it is not possible for us to find it, so we calculated the worst possible value, below which it certainly cannot be.
Another important point to mention is that we considered only cases of inflicting fairly serious physical harm. The least brutal of violent crimes that can be found in official statistics is battery. Of course, there are many more people capable of violence that is very weak compared to battery, for example, hitting someone with a fist once or intentionally pushing. This is the kind of violence you notice most often, which is why it may seem to you, again, that there are many violent people. Of course, this violence is also a problem, but far from such a large one, considering the following factors:
1) such violence is not enough to maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance in society (one form of which in human society is the state), nor can it seriously threaten people in general;
2) it is very easy to control through upbringing, condemnation, as well as the threat of ostracism and other reputational methods;
3) it is easy to defend against using simple means of self-defense, such as pepper sprays;
4) its danger is not that great, so there is no need for a priority struggle against it; it is sufficient only to concentrate efforts on fighting violence exhibited by a small percentage of brutal violent offenders, and weak violence can be dealt with later.
From everything we have now considered, a simple conclusion can be drawn—real violent offenders are not that many; they make up a very tiny percentage of the population. This means that the deterrence, and in perspective the complete eradication of violence, is a completely achievable goal, which clearly does not face the problem that there are too many violent offenders and therefore we cannot deal with all of them.
In one of the streams, he mentioned to an interlocutor that economic schools are irrelevant and that everything best from those schools has been integrated into the mainstream. Do you agree? Has he gotten too fat?
P.S. It’s a pity the site crashed. I hope all is well with you. I haven’t figured out crypto yet, but I’ll donate somehow.
Some Kazakh
Thank you for the explication from Vatoadmin, because I would have been too lazy to sift through his streams in search of specific quotes. As for the thickness, he is still far from Kakha Bendukidze; let him keep trying.
Now, to the main part of the question.
Economic mainstream today, indeed, has long ceased to be some kind of cohesive theory. It is simply a set of views on economics, none of which are perceived by economists as complete nonsense. At the same time, taken together, they can be internally contradictory—to this, an economist will say that each economic tool has its own area of application, and that is perfectly normal—and the task of economics is precisely to study when a wise regulator should apply what.
The Austrian school is indeed part of the mainstream. It primarily describes exactly how economic agents behave in a free market, and also shows with disdainful curiosity what distortions are introduced by this or that form of coercion. The mainstream also describes how economic agents behave in a free market (and often does so using an apparatus that grew out of the Austrian school), and then asserts that the market can and should be regulated, that it is done in such-and-such a way, for such-and-such goals, and produces such-and-such results. Or it doesn’t, in which case one must study what went wrong and make corrections to economic policy next time.
Regarding the Austrians’ dislike of using mathematical apparatus to describe complex phenomena, I would explain it roughly like this. A mainstreamer will imperturbably calculate how many human bodies and how many horse bodies a White Walker needs to lay out a pattern in the snow, how much time he will spend on it, and by how much the temperature in the forest will drop as a result of performing this ritual. An Austrian simply postulates that White Walkers are an evil that has no place in the forest, and he will not require mathematical models for this.
Now tell me, how can a decent economist not despise such primness?
I subscribed to the channel Russian Frontier. Today, the author posted a review of the Montellibero project, in which he notes our ideological closeness in everything except for the assessments of the investment climate in Russia. He suggests that today, the creation of contractual jurisdictions in Russia is not officially regulated in any way, which means one can and should enter this market—until the state shows a keen interest in them, after which they should be repurposed into something else, even swingers’ clubs.
Indeed, there is still a niche in Russia today (and perhaps it will remain for a long time) for the relatively free pursuit of agriculture and trades—in regions where there is a relative surplus of land. In other words, it is impossible to expand in the conditional Krasnodar Territory, but in Altai, like Justus Walker, or even in the not-so-distant Moscow region, like Mikhail Shlyapnikov or Herman Sterligov—why not? Thus, an enthusiast can indeed create a strong farm with quite original customs, and it is unlikely that this farm would even be seized, since the basis of its prosperity is labor and entrepreneurial talent, not capital.
Of course, such benevolent ignorance from the state will continue only until a specific entrepreneur gets into politics or at least makes loud media statements that clash with the general background. And if such entrepreneurs start getting in the way not as an exception, but literally every second person, then a standard solution will be quickly devised for them that will either abolish them or distract them significantly.
How well are such solutions replicated? It seems not very well. Most likely, associations of free farmers will be weeded out more eagerly than loners, and the positive scale effect of any given association in this particular industry is small. A milk producer in Belgorod will in no way help a honey producer in Bashkiria; each deals with a unique environment of varying degrees of aggressiveness.
How well do such solutions scale? This is likely dangerous. As soon as a farm advances significantly from the exploitation of labor to the exploitation of capital, it becomes a tempting morsel for a takeover.
So, I would view the Russian frontier as a good training ground for those who have sufficient competencies to build a sole proprietorship. At the same time, cultural originality can provide such a farm with media visibility—which can attract investors, product buyers, and even serve as some kind of vaccination against raids that are not too motivated. So, donning the guise of a contractual jurisdiction for such a farm is also an excellent idea; it’s worth considering.
But once some experience and capital have been accumulated, it makes sense, instead of expanding the current project, to invest in a farm in countries with more reliable protection of private property. Fortunately, globalization allows one to avoid making a hard choice between the Russian and Montenegrin frontiers. In the best case, this will simply be diversification, and in the worst—also a platform for evacuation.
And I still hope that the experience accumulated on the Russian frontier will simply create a desire to be applied to something greater, and then welcome to Montellibero.
Between different jurisdictions, there has always been the question of maintaining strategic parity—that is, an equality of chances of emerging victorious in the event of a military conflict. Without this, it is impossible to either deter a potential aggressive attack or repel it should it occur. But what strategic parity can there be in the case of an excessive difference in power potential? And the problem here consists not only in the quantitative and qualitative difference in weaponry, but also in the difference in violent tendencies among people. However, a solution exists even for absolutely pacifist societies, which we will now discuss.
Imagine Scandinavia, where although violence has not been completely eradicated, certain social factors have clearly reinforced low violent tendencies in the vast majority of the population over time. Even among state security agents, violent tendencies there are relatively low; at the very least, they are not even close to the violent tendencies of similar agents from other countries, such as Russia. If we assume that a military conflict arises between the Scandinavian states and Russia, the latter would be able to seize them almost without a fight. Even weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons or a class 4 pathogenic virus, would not help if they suddenly came into the possession of the Scandinavians, for because of their pacifism, they would hardly dare to actually use them. And given a similarly pacifist army and the lack of a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population), for security forces highly prone to violence—those who previously toured actively in Donbas and Syria—it would be no problem at all to march across the entire territory of Scandinavia and easily deal with any possible resistance in their path.
This same problem can be transferred to a potential free stateless society in which different contractual jurisdictions exist. Imagine that in such a society there is a jurisdiction of pacifists, in which violence is completely eradicated, and any offenses are punished by non-violent methods (ostracism or financial sanctions). But alongside this, there exists a violent jurisdiction, in which all problems are solved by brute force and cruel physical punishments (such a jurisdiction might be created, for example, by some conservatives). Obviously, there is no strategic parity here either; the order of the second society will lead to the reinforcement of violent tendencies in its participants, whereas in the case of the first society, these tendencies will be maximally suppressed (reinforcing a strong version of Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism). I think it is easy to understand who would win in the event of a direct military conflict.
An excellent solution to the problem of maintaining strategic parity on the part of more pacifist jurisdictions and societies is the creation of gene therapy against violence. It could be implemented in the form of a drug delivered to attacking agents via a fired dart. In an extreme case, implementation as a pandemic virus is possible (we do not approve of this option). Of course, the latter faces many risks, including the fact that bystanders would be affected, some of whom might die (even with the highest quality vaccination, not everyone tolerates it). However, such a “non-violence virus” is not a traditional weapon of mass destruction in terms of the physical destruction of the attackers; it is intended only for the forced eradication of violence in the aggressor’s army and is therefore the best possible solution within the framework of the classical MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) that can be imagined if there is no chance of stopping the aggressor through immediate resistance.
Both darts with the drug and a pandemic “non-violence virus” (personally, I do not approve of this option, but the opinions of others regarding the admissibility of such a “weapon” may differ) could be used even by fierce pacifists, given that such a “weapon” does not initiate violence in the biological sense, and even a person with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism would be able to apply it. They would allow for the deterrence of potential aggressors, as they would fear losing their violent tendencies as a result of attacking pacifists. But if someone still decides to attack, then we will arrive at the following scenarios:
1) Security agents sent to the front by the aggressor will come under fire from darts with gene therapy. And these darts will reach their target far more often than bullets do now, because soldiers, for the most part, are not rapists or violent criminals; they most often try to simulate activity at the front, avoid shooting, and if they do shoot, it is not at people on the other side of the front, but into the air, again, merely to create the illusion of performing some activity. There are quite few actual violent criminals in war, and this is confirmed by research, which you can find here. But anyone can fire a dart. And if the darts accurately hit the soldiers on the other side of the front, including those actually prone to violence, then the aggressor will soon find themselves completely without people capable of pushing the war further.
2) It is impossible to stop the attack; even darts with gene therapy are not enough to deter the overwhelming forces of the aggressor. In such a case, a pandemic “non-violence virus” is deployed across the front. After this, a few weeks may be enough for the aggressor’s forces to be completely disorganized and the soldiers to turn into pacifists incapable of attack. The war ends quite quickly.
Do you see now what an effective means of deterrence and ending war gene therapy against violence is? In principle, this is the only possible salvation for peaceful and non-violent societies from attack by violent aggressors. Moreover, compared to the weapons of mass destruction that are currently suggested as means of deterring aggressive attacks, this solution is extremely humane.
By the way, this solution is an excellent answer to the question of how a free society can protect itself from aggression by surrounding states in the event of a local rather than global achievement. It is also very useful in the very process of achieving a free society—the same darts with gene therapy can be successfully launched at security agents who beat and arrest peaceful protesters. Ensuring a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population) to achieve a state of affairs where any aggressor can be eliminated upon immediate attack can be a quite difficult task, but it is not necessary to provide everyone with darts with gene therapy—a small number of activists ready to fire them upon seeing another security officer in case of need will suffice (this is especially effective if security officers are deanonymized, as is currently done in Belarus; then they can be caught even in everyday life). And activists will be able to do this even while being less violent people than the security officers, or even absolute pacifists, because, again, this is not a means of inflicting physical harm or killing another person, but merely a means of depriving them of their violent tendencies.
As we can see, for the sake of maintaining strategic parity on the part of pacifist societies and for the sake of ensuring an effective struggle of peaceful protesters against the security agents of the state, it is very advantageous to develop gene therapy against violence. What is very important for us is that this is advantageous even to many modern governments, for example, in Scandinavia, and it is quite likely that they will want to help us. This would be the best and most humane solution to these problems that could possibly be imagined.
I accidentally stumbled upon a collection of videos featuring Vladimir Zolotorev on YouTube. It is some sort of tiny channel called Libertarian Site, but since 2019, a fairly large number of videos have been posted there, presumably quite useful ones, though so far I have only watched Vladimir’s most recent lecture, where he discusses the nature of the state and other related matters—not very structured, but fascinating. I suspect that other videos with him are constructed in a similar vein, so their main value, it seems to me, is the demonstration of exactly how a person’s thinking style changes when they begin to share a libertarian worldview. A worldview is a contagious thing, so even without being presented systematically, it will still influence you. Watch and be indoctrinated)
As for my book, which is currently being written, I would still like to save the reader’s time and provide an understanding of libertarianism as briefly and consistently as possible. Maybe it will work…
The fourth video from the “Anarchist Cookbook” series, dedicated to the darknet, has been released on the Libertarian Band channel. I watched it with great pleasure and learned a lot of new things. There’s nothing to criticize; everything seems clear and on point. Thanks to the guys for maintaining the standard. I highly recommend it.
The book on ancap that I recently announced will be gradually posted in the corresponding section on my website. Since this is my first such experience, I cannot guarantee that the text will not change significantly in the process, so you are unlikely to see regular announcements like “5 out of 70 chapters written” — I will certainly be shuffling pieces of text back and forth until the very end, adding some things, removing others, and reworking some ten times over.
For now, you can read the ultra-brief foreword, which promises that the book will be written without overly academic jargon, and right alongside it — the section dedicated to the principle of self-ownership, which turned out to be quite academic. So, after reading what I produced, I fell into a pensive mood: is it necessary to dig this deep, or should I try to lower the level of abstraction?
I look forward to your comments on this matter, and it is quite possible that I will take them into account.
I could have looked for a picture of an even more pensive girl, but this one reflects the process quite clearly
A rather interesting study was conducted by Gordon Hodson and Michael A. Busseri from Brock University regarding the explanation of adherence to prejudices and support for authoritarian-conservative ideology based on a person’s cognitive abilities. This work analyzed two large representative datasets from the United Kingdom: the 1958 National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS). Both datasets contain data on the cognitive abilities of the participants, as well as their attitudes toward racism and social conservatism. Cognitive abilities were assessed using standardized measures when NCDS participants were 11 years old and BCS participants were 10 years old; attitudes toward social conservatism and racism were assessed at ages 33 and 30, respectively. In total, 15,874 people participated in these studies.
As a result of forming statistical models, it was found that a lower level of general intelligence in childhood predicts a greater tendency toward racist prejudices in adulthood and, furthermore, adherence to social conservatism largely mediates this effect. This model is particularly convincing because in both the NCDS and BCS, the measurement of childhood intelligence preceded the assessment of adult prejudices by at least two decades. Moreover, all predictive effects were independent of socioeconomic status and education.
A secondary analysis was also conducted based on a dataset from a 2010 American study by Kayler, in which 254 students participated. It was confirmed that a low level of abstract thinking predicts anti-homosexual prejudices. This relationship is partially mediated by both support for right-wing authoritarianism and a low level of intergroup contact. The results of this analysis align with the results of the analysis of the NCDS and BCS datasets: the hypothesis about the influence of cognitive abilities on adherence to prejudices was confirmed by sample data from another country. This means that the tendency toward prejudice and authoritarian conservatism can be confidently explained by a person’s low cognitive abilities.
Another study was conducted by Satoshi Kanazawa from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He uses the “savannah principle,” according to which human behavior, remaining to some extent adapted to the ancestral environment of early Homo in the savannah, can lead to problems in a modern (industrial or post-industrial) environment. In a 2010 article, Kanazawa proposed the savannah-IQ interaction hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that smarter people are more likely to acquire and maintain evolutionarily novel values and preferences than less smart people. He used data from a national longitudinal study of adolescent health. A sample of 15,197 adolescents from 80 high schools and 52 middle schools in the USA was taken (their first survey was conducted in 1994-1995, the last in 2001-2002). Data from the General Social Surveys (GSS) were also taken as a sample of adult US citizens, with 1,500 people for each annual survey and 3,000 for each biennial survey. The results of the study confirmed that people with higher IQs are more likely to be liberals than conservatives.
Incidentally, some might object that this study is merely a fabrication by a liberal scientist; however, Satoshi Kanazawa was once even suspended from writing articles for claims regarding the difference in intelligence levels between different races, and the London School of Economics banned him from publishing in non-peer-reviewed publications for 12 months, so he can hardly be accused of being linked to the current social-liberal movements of the West.