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It turns out that the libertarian party has had a YouTube channel since 2008, and a quite crowded one at that. Later, during one of the splits, the channel left the party, renamed itself RLN (russian libertarian network), and existed in that form for many years. Now, the RLN Telegram channel has gone to the Montelibero project, and the YouTube channel has been renamed Panarchy World.
In my opinion, Libertarian Band also did a pretty good job in its time, but I am biased.
Nevertheless, for me, collaboration with Libertarian Band is already in the past, but collaboration with Panarchy World will quite likely be established soon. So you can subscribe in advance, mention in the comments that you came from Ancap-chan, and this will be a signal to the channel owners that it makes sense to invite me. Of course, not exclusively, but simply as one of the content creators.
We have already previously considered the topic of why it is profitable for corporations to fight against violence. In order to produce new products and generate profit from their sales, it is extremely important for them to develop and implement new technologies. However, if violence as a general phenomenon continues to exist, further scientific and technical progress will simply become impossible. New technologies also provide new opportunities for committing acts of violence, including catastrophic ones. Imagine if a smartphone battery became energy-dense enough to cause a large explosion, or if home computers became powerful enough to allow any random person to create and test viruses using artificial intelligence for simulation, which could then be recreated in real life using a DNA/RNA synthesizer that has also become more advanced and accessible. For corporations, this is a collapse; they must participate in solving the problem of violence to preserve and increase their own income. You can find more details on this argument in the material “Corporations Against Violence”.
But one must consider not only the risks of individual acts of violence. If dangerous technologies available to the general masses have not yet been released on the market—meaning corporations have nothing to worry about in that regard for now—then violence on the part of the state threatens them directly already. Recall what recently happened to Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba Group. Due to critical remarks regarding state economic regulation, the Chinese authorities began to pressure him in every way and destroy him as a businessman. In general, China has taken up the harsh subordination of all large technological corporations on its territory.
Such a scenario could happen to any billionaire and any corporation. Well-known figures such as Elon Musk, Bill Gates, or Jeff Bezos possess enormous funds and influence in society. But the state can nullify all of this at any moment by applying certain sanctions supported by security forces, who are always ready to forcibly compel obedience if the orders of a stationary bandit are not followed. Using China as an example, we clearly see that rulers like “Comrade Xi” do not care at all about the funds and influence of corporations and their owners; for the sake of their own desires, authoritarians will take all of this by brute force.
It would be correct to note that specific governments may not be interested in using force against corporations. But what guarantees eternal power to those specific people in government? Nothing! Sooner or later, power always changes. And if the current government is peaceful enough not to threaten corporations, the next government—regardless of whether it was elected democratically or seized power in an armed coup (although this scenario is more dangerous, as it most often brings deranged dictators to power)—could well declare so-called “nationalization” for corporations and subject the corporation owners to harsh repression. Moreover, such changes can occur even within a single administration—after all, nothing can guarantee its commitment to the same interests over a long period of time.
For these reasons, it is quite profitable for corporations to invest in the fight against violence, and they will do so if initiatives to combat violence become noticeable enough to attract their attention. It is far better to invest a few percent of their profit in balancing the potential for violence or, for technology companies, to participate in the development of gene therapy against violence, rather than constantly risk being destroyed by violence.
When a couple of years ago I congratulated readers on Cosmonautics Day, I mentioned that while the state might have fucked things up in space, the market has arrived there for real and for the long haul, and it won’t be possible to kick it out anymore. Since then, many interesting things have happened in space, but the most promising, of course, is Elon Musk’s Starship.
And as for everyone’s preferences, ancaps care about the displacement of the state. I’ll allow myself a simple extrapolation. Musk perfects Starship and organizes more or less regular communication with Mars. An orbital station, a base on the surface, supplies for that very base; some of the population works on a rotational basis, some settle for the long term. Nothing stops Musk from declaring that his private colony has its own jurisdiction, a certain legal code, contractual citizenship, an embassy on Earth in the city of Starbase, and other state attributes.
What grounds, precisely, would other states have to prevent this? Would the US claim the surface of Mars based on the fact that it is being colonized by an American company? It’s unlikely this would pass through the UN. Would the US begin criminal prosecution of Musk for secession? That’s bad PR; moreover, the PRC is nipping at their heels, and while you’re putting spokes in the wheels of an American entrepreneur, the red planet will be annexed by the red Chinese.
But if an independent sovereign contractual state forms on Mars, the majority of its citizens will be Earthlings who have never left Earth. Formally, they would, for example, be waiting in line for relocation, hold a residence permit and a correspondingly broad list of civil rights associated with that permit. They would even pay taxes, for instance, in the form of fixed regular contributions as a subscription fee for the maintenance of their interests by a diplomatic mission before Earthly states. In short, all the attributes of a state will be present, but its sole function for citizens will be the provision of legal norms; in all other respects—complete freedom of entrepreneurship. This means that the space offshore will rapidly grow its citizenship, while states will face the prospect of being left high and dry.
Why do I think that something like this could quite possibly happen? Why not, that’s why. Musk has repeatedly demonstrated that “it’s not done that way” is not an argument for him. The idea of getting rid of state dictate is in the air, as is the idea of space expansion. I don’t see why the noble Don shouldn’t combine two promising ideas.
The usual answer is that the difference lies in the right to freely leave. But the rules of life in a community can differ so much from the requirements of the outside world that leaving becomes practically impossible. Where would someone who leaves an Amish community, or a communist one, go? They are simply not adapted to life.
Where is the guarantee that some community won’t prepare for an aggressive war against others? Where is the guarantee that anyone wishing to leave the community will be allowed to? Where is the guarantee that someone who has left will be accepted elsewhere?
Anonymous question
States are territorial communities recognized by the leadership of other similar territorial communities as sovereigns over their territory. There can also be territorial communities that are not recognized as sovereigns. For example, condominiums. They may have their own customs, but the state remains the sovereign over that territory. There can be extraterritorial communities. An example is the church. The only church that also has its own state is the Catholic Church. It can be viewed both as an extraterritorial jurisdiction with sovereignty over a small territory and as a state with a very powerful diaspora abroad.
The freedom to leave does not separate communities from the state in any way; it has nothing to do with it here. There can be states with the freedom to renounce citizenship. There can be any other territorial and extraterritorial communities with the freedom to leave. And, similarly, all the same can exist without the freedom to leave. The freedom to leave is the characteristic by which we can judge whether a community is compatible with a libertarian order.
Your concerns regarding guarantees of how decent the order will be in various communities, and how dangerous these orders will be for both the members of the community and those around them, are quite justified, since current sovereign territorial communities aka states cannot provide any such guarantees and regularly demonstrate that such concerns are not groundless.
Today, a state can be coerced into observing propriety in three ways: by the threat of attack from other states, the threat of severing interstate economic ties, and the threat of internal regime instability. In a world without states, similarly, a community that is dangerous to others would have those same incentives to behave decently. So why abolish states at all?
In principle, there is no need. If the vast majority makes constant active efforts to ensure that territorial sovereigns do not violate individual rights, it will be a quite decent world. But in such a world, states would not have the opportunity to fight those who wish to associate in a different manner, for example, within the framework of a contract. Thus, a world of minimal states will inevitably be diluted by extraterritorial associations of people who maintain rules within themselves that are not tied to a territory.
As for the fear that people fleeing a highly exotic community will find themselves completely maladapted to life in a global world, it seems exaggerated to me. There are a huge number of migrants in the world who adapt to life in new conditions, and the easier it is, the more they like these new conditions. So this particular factor is not something to fear. Migrants are dangerous if they become a tool of politics. Purely economic relations benefit all their participants.
If the Amish are such maladapted folks, why are they so wealthy?
Less than a year has passed since I returned to translation and to this book. Another chapter is modestly titled Just a Personal Confession and is a phantasmagoria of poetic metaphors, from which we learn a lot about cathedrals and shoulders, about fish and the desert, about kings and about cabbage…
Something similar — a description of the author’s personal feeling of the immense value of the knowledge gained — is found in many libertarian authors; I am not immune to this myself. And at the end of the chapter, it describes quite accurately why I am moving to Montenegro and what I want to build there.
This chapter was translated with the financial support of Bitarch in the amount of 0.00110501btc.
After a long break, during which I was busy finalizing the edition of Mechanics of Freedom, I am returning to two other projects translating libertarian literature that have been pending. Since there are currently no donations coming in for the translation of Stephan Mol liqueur, but two donations of 500 rubles each arrived for Eric Mack, I am posting a chapter from Mack. Don’t forget to encourage the translation process.
With a story about the views of Herbert Spencer, Eric Mack concludes the first part of his book dedicated to the precursors of libertarianism; moving forward, he is expected to approach the main theme of his work.
The focus is on an early and not very well-known work by Spencer, which was moreover partially revised by him in a later edition toward greater moderation and acceptance of the status quo. In it, he introduces as the primary principle of justice the Law of Equal Liberty, which is still actively used by libertarians — the idea that everyone is free to do as they wish, provided they do not violate the similar liberty of other people.
What personally seemed worthy of attention was Spencer’s direct indication that the right of property is determined by the society’s consent to satisfy the corresponding claim. This is almost identical to the phrasing I use when defining any right as a claim that is tolerated.
Also, importantly, Spencer approaches the adoption of the principle of methodological subjectivism when he notes that to move within the principle of the greatest happiness, there is no need to compare whose concept of happiness is superior; it is sufficient that everyone has the opportunity to actively pursue their own.
One of the options for achieving a social order in which human rights are respected, property is protected, and there is the maximum possible absence of violence is proposed by the concept of open access order, described in the work of Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast titled “Violence and Social Orders.” Those seeking a solution to various social problems, including the problem of violence, while remaining within the framework of the institution of statehood, are increasingly turning to this concept. But is it truly workable, and can it solve these problems?
To begin, let us briefly familiarize ourselves with what is meant by open access order. We will do this in comparison with another concept – limited access order. In limited access, state power is held by a coalition of elites who mutually recognize and share rent-seeking income (income from monopolized economic spheres and natural resources, as well as the issuance of licenses to conduct activities). In contrast, open access means the impersonality of political management mechanisms, the influence over which is available to all citizens of the state.
Some conclusions can already be drawn from this definition. Political management mechanisms cannot, in principle, be made impersonal, since in any case they require managers and executors. Even if one imagines some kind of absolute direct democracy (the reality of which does not exist on a large scale), an infrastructure for executing decisions is still necessary, which, again, contains these groups of people. In this case, the managers are indeed the elites of the established system. Why? To explain this, we must point to another fact – rent from monopolies does not disappear upon the achievement of open access order. Economic spheres, natural resources, and types of activities that no one has the right to manage without appropriate state permission still generate income directed into the centralized budget of political management bodies, meaning directly into the hands of those same managers. I believe that corruption, lobbying of interests, and the embezzlement of budget funds, which currently exist in any state, should indisputably explain that these managers are merely another elite redistributing these funds for their own benefit, thus deriving income from them.
Another thing that clearly does not align with the reduction of violence in society is the fact that a mandatory prerequisite for achieving open access order is the consolidation of all security structures in the hands of a single organization. In effect, we have the complete elimination of the balance of violence potential in favor of a monopoly on violence, which, by the way, is an inherent property of the current state. And what reduction in the level of violence can be discussed if the monopolist of violence, due to the defenselessness of other subjects, has greater opportunities to commit acts of violence?
This can be particularly confirmed by examples of open access orders in the form of states that have reached this condition. The work “Violence and Social Orders” lists 20 such states. This list includes the USA, Great Britain and its former dominions, Scandinavia, Benelux, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, as well as some other states with certain reservations. And really, has violence been defeated in these countries? Does the monopolist of violence there never abuse its position?
And finally, I will give you a general fact – any state that has a monopoly on power, regardless of its structure, is an organ that commits violence. Even if one imagines the same absolute direct democracy, it is inevitably linked to the forceful coercion of the minority to the will of the majority. Furthermore, the very fact of the existence of a state, in which you are required to be a member by compulsory order, points us to the impossibility of eradicating violence with its help.
I used the search and found a review of Rainbow. I’ve never seen it from such an angle! It turned out to be an unexpectedly pleasant, intellectually stimulating stereoscopic effect
Semarg (Question accompanied by a donation of 0.1 dash)
At this rate, sooner or later I will become acquainted with practically the entire legacy of the Strugatsky brothers. To start with, I read “Roadside Picnic,” and now I will share my thoughts on it, and in time I will get to the other two commissioned novellas.
What invariably pleases me about the Strugatskys is that their world is quite psychologically authentic, and since economics largely continues psychology, it turns out to be economically consistent as well. For example, it is quite accurately noted that no matter how much you lower the iron curtain, you cannot completely isolate any Zone; it will inevitably become part of world trade, bringing prosperity to both itself and the outside world, while the paranoiacs from the secret services will have to accept it.
But, of course, the Zone is not only a metaphor for a frightening and incomprehensible foreign land, but simultaneously a metaphor, let’s say, for the sphere of scientific knowledge. In “Hard to Be a God,” the Strugatskys showed science as a box. A scientist puts his hand in and pulls out some random thing. He thinks he will use it this way, but it turns out that others start using it that way. It is similar in “Picnic.” A stalker drags some mysterious loot out of the zone, which is then adapted for use in unpredictable ways. The fact that the result will be unpredictable is no reason not to haul it, because the risk pays off.
And since we’ve started talking about science, I cannot fail to note that the only representative of the USSR in the book is engaged, conventionally speaking, in studying the influence of the philological characteristics of the word “concrete” on the drilling properties of a gaze. All the conversion of the Zone’s wonders into technological wonders is left to greedy capitalists. The stalkers act as sorts of startups that skim the cream off new markets, but gradually give way to fat corporations that rely not on courage and art, but on capital investments and methodicalness. As usual, the vast majority of startups go bust.
In conclusion, I will note that in the world of “Roadside Picnic,” humanity was terribly lucky. The most important thing about the aliens’ visit to Earth was the very fact of the visit. After this, humanity simply had no choice but to stop closing its eyes and pretending that it was alone in the universe. Our humanity also most likely encountered an alien probe in 2017, but preferred to pretend that nothing special happened, because acknowledging the very fact of contact with an extraterrestrial civilization is psychologically unbearable. I am talking about the visit to the Solar System by an object named ‘Oumuamua and its performance of non-gravitational maneuvers in the system. So we live as if nothing happened, as if there had been no Visit.
In the Telegram comments, several points were quite rightly noted.
First, classical individual insurance is always based on statistics and probabilities, so it will primarily be applied where transactions are standardized and risks are sufficiently random. It is quite difficult to imagine, for example, insuring a bank against a borrower’s intentional non-payment of a loan while prohibiting the insurance company from forcibly recovering that very loan. If such an insurance service were provided, there would be a fairly strong temptation for bank employees to organize a scheme of issuing non-repayable loans to shell companies for kickbacks, with the bank subsequently receiving insurance when the loan is not returned.
Second, the use of escrow accounts is usually imposed on transaction participants by the platform owner who sets the trading rules. If transactions occur without an intermediary, the use of an escrow scheme is unlikely, especially if the freezing of funds is expected to be long, as in the case of shared construction agreements.
Third, I was reminded of my year-old post about, suddenly, juvenile justice, where I noted certain difficulties with liability insurance.
In this regard, I want to mention another convenient way to reduce the risks of contract non-performance that is not related to violent coercion. These are the good old insurance groups, meaning archaic collective responsibility. In the old days, a person’s entire kinship, tribe, clan, or community—in short, a group of relatives and possibly neighbors—was responsible for them. Therefore, one didn’t have to worry much about personal reputation; instead, a person was judged by who they belonged to.
Of course, in a stateless society, there is no need to necessarily restore communal living, although the factor of belonging to an insurance group would be a compelling reason to cluster in such a way. Then again, there is certainly no need now to organize specifically by kinship, as friends and like-minded people play the role of the kin today. But I want to discuss not interest-based circles, but how transaction risks can be further reduced.
Entrepreneurs wishing to earn the trust of potential counterparties can form associations. Admission to such an association can be based on various criteria. Some may be accepted for an already established good name. Others—for promises to conduct business with impeccable honesty and a large deposit. Others—under the guarantee of respected members of the association. For external counterparties, the association acts as a group guarantor for the transactions of its members.
Every member of the association is, on one hand, interested in the growth of its membership, because this means that in the event of collective responsibility, the losses of each member are reduced. On the other hand, everyone is interested in ensuring that only honest and reliable entrepreneurs enter the association—those who insure others rather than parasitize the collective. The association will cover the costs of a breached contract not only for classic insurance events, but also in cases of force majeure, and even if a member of the association turns out to be a fraudster. But, of course, in the latter case, it would mean a “wolf’s ticket” (blacklisting) for such an entrepreneur.
Finally, I will note that the proven, well-known dishonesty of an entrepreneur by no means means that he will die in a ditch because no one will sell him anything and no one will hire him for anything. It simply means he will not be taken at his word, and all transactions for him will operate on a “money upfront” principle.
Any attempts to depict a stateless society as something totally cannibalistic imply either an incredible scarcity of resources for which people must tear each other’s throats out, or a post-totalitarian syndrome of complete mutual distrust. Naturally, the gradual dying out of non-violent practices in general and the state in particular cannot be accompanied by such catastrophic symptoms.
Interview for admission to the association of agricultural producers
The topic of non-violent tools for implementing measures against those who violate agreements has been raised by us several times before. Usually, in such cases, the conversation revolves around reputational institutions and ostracism, but besides this, the case of financial instruments providing the possibility of predetermining mechanisms to cover damages caused by a breach of agreement is particularly interesting. Transaction insurance can be called a fairly universal tool of this kind.
To demonstrate what is meant by transaction insurance, let us look at a case of an existing implementation of this practice. It is actively used in lending, especially when it comes to large loans or mortgages. The essence is that the person borrowing the funds also signs an insurance contract, under which they undertake to additionally pay an insurance premium, usually in the amount of a certain percentage of the remaining debt. This percentage is small; its value rarely exceeds 1%, and in the case of a mortgage, one can find an insurance premium rate as low as 0.25% of the remaining debt.
Why is this necessary? If a person finds themselves unable to repay the loan, or if they took it solely for the purpose of stealing the credit funds with no intention of returning them, then these funds are covered by insurance. Given that, in reality, not such a large percentage of people actually violate the terms of the transaction, the funds collected through insurance premiums are quite sufficient to cover the damage caused by a small percentage of deceivers.
As for me, transaction insurance has very great potential. This concept could be applied to a wide spectrum of transactions in principle. During any transaction, the parties could register the contract with an insurance company and contribute a certain small percentage of the transaction amount to an insurance fund. If one of the parties violates the terms of the transaction, the insurance company where the insurance was registered compensates the damaged party.
This method can also be combined with other types of non-violent sanctions, such as the aforementioned ostracism. A violator of a transaction will, of course, end up on blacklists; the insurance company, which had to spend funds from its fund to compensate for the damage, is especially interested in this. The violator’s life will be very difficult; many will refuse to conduct transactions with them or offer less favorable terms that account for the risk that this person might cheat. But, of course, they can get out of this situation if they eventually agree to cooperate and make concessions to those who suffered from their violation. Of course, they may not have the opportunity to compensate for the damage caused at the moment, however, in such a situation, the parties usually agree on more accessible terms for fulfilling obligations. In the credit sphere, a good example is the debt restructuring procedure, when payments are shifted to the future, stretched over time—which reduces the payment amount—or when a part of the interest rate or the debt itself is written off. In the end, all parties prefer some solution to the problem over the absence of one.
Reputational institutions can also be combined with transaction insurance in a different way. If someone is known for their honesty, with many transactions behind them that they did not violate, they may be offered lower insurance premiums, or even their complete absence. If, however, someone is a known violator or an unreliable agent, transactions with them can be concluded only on the condition of paying higher insurance premiums. Thus, it becomes profitable for people not to violate agreements, since the replenishment of the insurance fund will be shifted specifically onto the violators.