Тег: Bitarch

Externalities of Violence

Bitarch’s Column

In discussions with subscribers, I occasionally encounter the opinions of “moral monsters” who believe that morality does not exist, that it is all “talk for the poor,” and that only a fool would forgo such an effective tool as physical violence. Such people, of course, deserve the harshest condemnation and ostracism, following the example of how anti-racism and anti-homophobia activists do it in the USA. But to convince the general public, it is still necessary to outline utilitarian arguments regarding the inadmissibility of aggressive violence in society. After all, deontological morality does not appear “out of thin air”; it is the product of repeated interactions between subjects in society.

To begin, let us note that a morality of non-aggression exists even in many animal species. As proven by the famous biologist Konrad Lorenz, an innate, inherited morality of non-aggression toward members of one’s own species is present in all animals with “innate armament” (for example, hedgehogs, porcupines, echidnas, venomous snakes). It became fixed in their DNA through natural selection, as individuals prone to aggression died in clashes without leaving offspring.

When do you think a moral prohibition on a certain behavior emerges in society? I assume the answer is obvious—when such behavior causes inconvenience, reduces the quality of life, or creates excessive risks for the majority of society members. In economic terms, the behavior of one subject creates enormous negative externalities for all members of society, even though such behavior may be very profitable for that specific subject.

We can find plenty of examples of such negative externalities if we look at world history. Here are some examples of such externalities:

1) Various environmental challenges (the ban on leaded gasoline, the insecticide DDT, freons in refrigeration units, and in recent years—internal combustion engines in some countries).

2) Problems of socially unacceptable risk (the closure of nuclear power plants in many countries after the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, the limitation of carbon dioxide emissions to reduce the risk of global warming).

3) Child abuse (the ban on the use of violence against children has already been introduced in most countries of the world). It has been proven that this leads to an increase in cases of drug addiction, alcoholism, and suicide, reduces their chances of success in life, and also leads to an increase in the average level of violence throughout society.

4) Animal cruelty—leads to an increase in the average level of violence throughout society.

As we can see, in all these cases, there is a conflict between the individual, for whom selfish dangerous behavior is profitable, and the entire society, which will bear the costs of that behavior. For example, for negligent parents, spanking a child is much easier than explaining in words why they should behave in a certain way, but the consequences of this act will be spread across society as a whole. The same applies to the use of a diesel car—it is cheap and convenient for the owner, but for other city residents, it means poor air and various diseases. Such externalities only begin to be seriously discussed when the harm from them becomes noticeable to a significant part of society.

The use of aggressive violence as a tool for achieving any goals (usually coercion and punishment) carries the greatest externalities that exist on Earth. Far, far greater than even the use of Chernobyl-type reactors or a coal-fired power plant without any filtration systems in a city. Here are just a few utilitarian arguments as to why aggressive violence is bad:

1) The average level of violence in society increases. If a stationary bandit (the state) uses cruel methods of coercion against its “serfs,” they quickly become hardened and no longer consider it shameful to beat a wife and child or take money and a phone from the weak. Constant shootouts and police chases lead to frequent injuries of accidental (unrelated) persons. The stress level of many people increases, leading to an increase in mental illness, suicides, drug use, a decrease in creative abilities, and a slowing of economic growth. For these reasons, in Scandinavian countries, the state now sends people to prison only for intentional murder, and the prisons themselves are more like health resorts.

2) The risk of a man-made global catastrophe or even the self-destruction of humanity. With the development of technology, the total harm that one person can inflict is constantly growing. If aggressive violence in society is the norm (especially state violence, as it is the hardest to escape), then sooner or later a person driven to despair will decide to use some dangerous technology as a doomsday weapon (DDW)—threatening to blow up a nuclear reactor or release a deadly virus. When a stationary bandit threatens to lock you in prison forever, there will be no talk of humanity; any means are good to be left alone, even the threat of causing a global pandemic. For society, even an infinitesimally small probability of such an event is unacceptable, as the potential damage would be simply catastrophic and could even lead to the extinction of humans as a species.

3) The productive development of the economy and quality of life stops because violence becomes the “objective function” of societal development. Instead of developing technologies and producing goods and services that benefit the majority of the population, society’s resources are spent on creating tools of violence. There is a common misconception that the “arms race” drives scientific and technical progress. This is true, but only over a very short period of time. The potential for violence can be viewed as an analogue to the concept of an “objective function” in mathematics. It strives toward a very specific value that practically does not change over time (or rather, is constantly decreasing)—inflicting unacceptable damage on the opponent (tolerance for violence has a constant tendency to decrease; accordingly, the threshold of unacceptable damage also decreases). This distinguishes violence from all other areas of human activity, in which the goal is the improvement of human life. Human needs constantly grow, and this provides a stimulus for scientific and technical progress, the emergence of new niches in the economy, and the growth of quality of life. However, a society that develops through an “arms race” comes to collapse, as already happened with the USSR. When the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on each other became available to all developed states, technological development slowed down sharply.

4) The formation of a military hegemon, a hierarchy of dominance, and, as a result—the collapse of the birth rate and the extinction of humanity. In Jack Hirshleifer’s research, a proven assertion is presented that the disruption of the uniform distribution of the balance of violence potential (BVP) in society leads to the emergence of a hierarchy of dominance (the state in human society is one example of this), and if the unevenness of BVP continues to increase—a global “military hegemon.” The danger of the long-term existence of a rigid hierarchy of dominance was identified in various animal experiments, such as “Universe 25.” The population simply died out due to a decrease in the birth rate. You will probably say now that “the conditions are different,” “a human is not a rat,” “an analogy is not an argument,” but look the truth in the eye and at the statistics of the total fertility rate in various countries of the world: in most countries, it is already below the replacement level (averaging 2.1 children per woman). There is also a certain dependence between the birth rate and the actual degree of state interference in a person’s life. In Africa and India, there may formally be many regulations in various spheres of life and high taxes, but in reality, the state is physically unable to reach every resident. But in Singapore, with exit visas and caning for dissent, the population for some reason is in no hurry to reproduce, despite even a high level of income. As in South Korea, where the level of personal freedoms, if viewed impartially, is not much higher than in the North.

Conclusions. As we can see, the morality of the inadmissibility of aggressive violence is not just someone’s “wish,” but a banal condition for the survival of civilization and even humans as a biological species. The rejection of this morality essentially means exactly one thing: “I am the boss here and I don’t care if all of humanity dies.” All normal people should have a corresponding attitude toward such a person—as toward the worst scoundrel, a new Hitler or Pol Pot.

In the entire developed world, society has accepted the inadmissibility of using leaded gasoline, DDT, the operation of nuclear power plants, and violence against children for utilitarian reasons. Next in line is violence by the stationary bandit (the state).

An argument for BPN from evolutionary theory

Bitark’s Column

An interesting study by biologist Konrad Lorenz shows how natural “armament” in animals leads to the emergence of morality against aggressive violence. Similarly, restoring the balance of violence potential (BVP) in human society will lead to the adoption of the non-aggression principle (NAP).

There are many species whose armament is so devastating and whose methods of application are so lightning-fast that a real combat clash between rivals would end with the death of one of them, or even both. Take, for example, venomous insects and snakes. Therefore, it is not surprising that natural selection develops a prohibition against using weapons in intra-species clashes for such species. Ethologists, following Lorenz, call this system of instinctive prohibitions that limit animal behavior “natural morality.” It is stronger the more powerfully the animal is armed by nature. During a territorial clash, venomous snakes exaggerate their size by stretching out to see who can stand taller, swaying, and pushing each other, but they never bite, nor do they even demonstrate their weapons. Some species even threaten each other with their heads turned away. It is no wonder that not only ordinary people but also many zoologists mistook the tournament battles of snakes for mating dances.

Well-armed animals can threaten each other for a long time, and when one of them grows tired, it abruptly changes posture, exposing its most vulnerable spot to the opponent for a decisive combat strike. The moral prohibition acts on the winner like an electric shock: all their angry fervor evaporates, they turn away from the opponent and hide their weapon. Similarly, a proud boy, feeling that he will lose a fight, suddenly puts his hands behind his back, lifts his face to the victor and shouts: “Go on, hit me!” Unlike a wolf or a snake, a human may actually strike in response.

After analyzing many species, Lorenz reached a conclusion of stunning simplicity more than 50 years ago: a strong animal has strong morality, while a weak one has weak morality. In terms of its natural history, a human is a very poorly armed animal; unlike monkeys, humans cannot even bite properly. Therefore, humans initially have weak instinctive prohibitions and weak natural morality. An unarmed man cannot cause significant damage to another in a clash: one will tire of hitting, and the other can always run away. Innate prohibitions in humans correspond to this. But subsequently, humans began to create and improve weapons and became the most armed species on Earth. Morality, however, has hardly changed.

Shareholder Viktor Rafaelevich
“Ethological Excursions to the Forbidden Gardens of the Humanities”

The main mistake of ancaps

Bitarch’s Column

In her recent post, Ancap-chan wrote that she is not convinced by my arguments regarding the necessity of an absolute NAP. Unfortunately, such a misunderstanding of facts and inconsistency of positions is constantly encountered among many libertarians. Since Ancap-chan was not convinced by the real threat of a global catastrophe (the example with the virus), she should be convinced by a stronger threat in the understanding of any libertarian — the impossibility of realizing a free society (panarchy and ancap) without the adoption of an absolute NAP. Without it, ancap is indeed a utopia. Here is why:

1) The study by Jack Hirschleifer on the stability of anarchy, recognized in the scientific community, mentions, among other things, the scenario of the emergence of a “military hegemon” (which is nothing other than the appearance of a stationary bandit — the state) when the uniform balance of violence potential (BVP) in society is disrupted. And where a uniform BVP exists, coercion through physical violence is impossible by definition.

2) If someone in society can be forced through violence to pay compensation, then similarly, they can be forced to pay taxes — technically, there is no difference at all! And where there are taxes, welcome back to estatism! Mikhail Svetov understands this perfectly, which is why he repeats on every stream: we must get rid of bad tools, destroy the “One Ring” (which is nothing other than the ability to apply aggressive physical violence for one’s own benefit regardless of the goals — it is simply a tool, moral categories play no role here).

3) Everyone’s understanding of justice is different. For a member of the “Socialist” ECU, organizing a strike is a heroic act; for the “Classlib” ECU, it is a crime. Suppose a worker — a citizen of the “Classlib” ECU — organized a strike, the employer sued, and he was sentenced to pay an unaffordable compensation, which essentially means being sent into slavery. He asks the “Socialist” ECU for protection, and they agree. What are your actions?

(a) If you recognize the absolute NAP, then all is well — at most, businesses from the “Classlib” ECU will no longer deal with him.

(b) If you do not recognize it — you are a corpse yourself, even if you have nothing to do with this case. “Classlib” sends security forces to the defector, “Socialist” security forces counterattack, “Classlib” launches missiles at military targets and the main office of “Socialist,” and they respond using WMDs. You will be very lucky if it is only tactical nuclear weapons. But nuclear weapons are complex and expensive, so most likely, a global pandemic of a truly serious virus with 30-50% mortality breaks out, and the virus tests the immune system already inside your body.

4) Before the appearance of WMDs and the doctrine of deterrence (John von Neumann’s M.A.D.), such a conflict between ECUs (“protection agencies,” tribes, phratries) always led to the formation of the state familiar to us, with giant extensive borders like those of Russia. Although I dislike many of Robert Nozick’s arguments, he was right here. You don’t recognize the absolute NAP — welcome back to the state!

5) Suppose we admit that violence cannot be used against an ECU, but why can it be used against one person? And why not against 10? Where is the line?! In panarchy, the ability to create your own ECU and leave the jurisdiction of the previous one is the basis of the model’s existence; without this, panarchy is impossible. Just as in ancap, there is “individual sovereignty”: one person equals one state in the modern sense. And sovereign states, as we well know, do not use violence against each other, otherwise they are not sovereign at all.

6) The world of “John Wick” will not appeal to the majority of the population. Whatever you say, even to me, a moderate state like Sweden seems a more attractive option than living in such a hell under the mafia. For most people, even more so; accordingly, the attractiveness of such an “ancap” is zero!

7) Finally — the proof of history itself. Thus, the examples of ancap in the past loved by many libertarians — medieval Ireland and Iceland — did not end their journey because of some typical ancap problems that are constantly discussed (roads, courts). But for a banal reason — they were conquered. But this did not happen by chance and was quite expected. If these societies had been ideologically voluntarist, they would have purposefully fought against aggressive violence, created cultural works, methodologies, and technologies for this purpose, and most importantly — carried these values to the whole world. In that case, the English themselves would have expelled Cromwell from society at the first attempt to initiate aggressive violence in his youth, and Ireland would still be ancap today.

By the way, in some societies, women’s rights sometimes appeared spontaneously, but then disappeared when conquerors or a new cruel leader arrived. Globally, however, women’s rights became a new normality, a given for all, only in the 20th century after the directed activity of suffragettes. It is the same with ancap — for it to become a reality and not disappear in a second, directed activity to combat aggressive violence is needed; i.e., the absolute NAP must become the new normality of life.

Scylla and Charybdis of the discourse on nonviolence

Several articles by Bitarch on “absolute NAP” have already appeared in this channel, by which he understands a ban not only on aggressive violence, but also on delayed retribution or the enforcement of sentences. I am not yet convinced by his arguments, but I consider the topic itself important enough to continue introducing you to it.

Briefly, the idea is as follows. Technical progress increases the scale of violence available to humans and reduces the relative cost of violent impact. Tomorrow, any biology student could launch a pandemic like the current one, so we need a society where people have as few reasons as possible to threaten such things and as many moral constraints as possible that prevent them from even thinking about it. As one option for action, Bitarch considers a non-violent state. To provide a hypothetical Greta Thunberg with arguments, he published an article on the externalities of violence, where he lists how violence harms society. I will briefly go through the theses of this article and several others on similar topics.

1. Referring to Konrad Lorenz, it is stated that humans have no natural morality of non-aggression toward members of their own species embedded in their genes, since human natural weaponry is small. Therefore, one alternative to violent punishments for violent crimes could be voluntary genetic correction of behavior, if it can be developed.

Humans have almost no genetically determined patterns of behavior; there are only some inclinations, while all the specifics are set through social mechanisms. Thus, references to biological evolution serve more as illustrations than as a literal guide to action. Social evolution also exists; it is better to look for examples there.

2. Examples are given of how humanity introduced a ban on certain activities and successfully enforced it (the use of leaded gasoline, DDT, CFCs). It is pointed out that in the same way, humanity successfully enforces restrictions on morally unacceptable actions (for example, cruelty to animals, children, and prisoners). Therefore, a campaign of political pressure would also help in establishing the absolute NAP.

The state is always happy to ban something; the justification is not that important. For instance, the arguments for banning CFCs, which supposedly eat the ozone in the stratosphere, and DDT, which supposedly can cause cancer, mainly boiled down to so-called scientific consensus. The same applies to the arguments for banning carbon dioxide emissions, which are supposedly responsible for global warming, which supposedly poses a threat to humanity.

So, for political pressure on a global level, serious arguments are not even needed; one only needs to seize a spot on the agenda. To do this, climate change will have to be pushed aside, but first, its younger brothers like the Rothschilds, microchipping, and GMOs must be overcome. This is a solvable task, but the methods of such campaigns require more screaming than thinking, and that is personally difficult for me, despite the fact that I am screaming in my avatar.

3. Arguments are presented regarding the long-term negative consequences of high social tolerance for violence. At the very least, widespread violence becomes a factor hindering the economy—too large a share of resources goes toward ensuring security, including the security of transactions. Conversely, the long-term positive consequences of low tolerance for violence are shown. For example, in a recent note, a study is mentioned on how a culture of hugging and freedom of teenage sex leads to a decrease in hierarchy within society.

Now, arguments are a different matter; there is something to discuss here.

To summarize. Anyone wishing to ensure the success of non-violence ideas will have to pass between the Charybdis of the sleaziness of moral hysteria and the Scylla of the limited impact of scientific discussion. I would advise Bitarch to stick closer to Scylla, as Homer enjoined us, but here let everyone who sails the waters of public discourse choose their own path.

That leftist whirlpool over there is more dangerous

P.S. We, of course, did not agree with Bitarch on the content of the article. I reworked some takes, but not all. So, most likely, a continuation of the discussion awaits us.

Nonviolent State

or a realistic scenario for the transition to a free society

Bitarch’s Column

The text has been substantially revised by me with the author’s permission. The original publication is in Bitarch’s public page.

After reading the headline, you probably can’t immediately tell if it’s a joke. The phrase looks like an oxymoron! A stationary bandit (the state) exercises its power through violent coercion, so how can there even be such a thing as a non-violent state?! In reality, such a form of social organization could very well exist as a transitional stage toward a completely stateless society. To understand the idea, one must separate the state’s tools for physical coercion from everything else (legislation, courts, property registries, infrastructure, roads, medicine, and so on) and remove the former.

How could such a hybrid emerge at all? In short, as a result of society adopting the idea that aggressive physical violence is unacceptable. While non-aggression is a necessary condition for creating a free (libertarian/voluntarist) society, it could very well be achieved by activists who have no connection to libertarianism whatsoever. For example, in the Scandinavian countries, an unambiguous consensus on the ban of violence against children has been reached for half a century, and this was done by non-libertarians. Nothing prevents the launch of a public campaign to promote the universal principle of non-aggression, for example, by motivating it with the threat of strong negative externalities of aggressive violence for society as a whole (this argument has already proven its effectiveness in banning violence against children and even animals, leading to its eradication in most developed countries) or even the self-destruction of humanity. With a fairly high probability, this campaign will be carried out by activists who do not even know the meaning of the word “libertarianism,” although, by doing so, they will open the way to a world where libertarianism can be implemented in practice.

A rough scenario of how events might unfold:

1) A new (or even the same) “Greta Thunberg” actively promotes the idea of the unacceptability and danger of aggressive violence. These ideas gain viral distribution, quickly reaching the masses. Perhaps some of the activists even become “Person of the Year” according to Time magazine.

2) Pressure on officials and security forces increases. Even neighbors begin to tell them, “You’re a new Hitler, get out,” friends stop communicating with them, and they are no longer allowed into bars and clubs. An increasing number of security officers refuse to handle the enforcement of victimless “crimes,” such as speeding, because they fear subsequent shaming. For officials, terrorizing businesses, especially small ones, also begins to mean political death.

3) People who desire firm order and discipline, and who are used to reporting their neighbors to the police, are, of course, outraged. The police no longer throw anyone in the slammer, but instead arrive and gently persuade people to behave decently—this works worse, and it causes moral indignation: why the hell are they pandering to these scoundrels using our taxes, instead of taking decisive measures.

4) Inevitable changes occur at the legislative level—primarily, of course, in parliamentary democracies. Anyone who advocates for maintaining the status quo will simply lose the election, as if they were advocating for the legalization of DDT or leaded gasoline. Responding to the voters’ demand, parliamentarians are forced to invent measures of coercion that do not involve the use of violence. At this stage, deputies likely won’t even consider issues so familiar in libertarian discussions (how to transition to private roads, schools, hospitals, pensions, the legal standing of children, legalization of drugs, etc.).

5) Thus, parliaments begin to pass laws abolishing restrictive measures and punishments such as imprisonment, and banning the use of weapons by the police; at the same time, of course, they make it harder for private individuals to acquire weapons—but the state will not be able to enforce this particular ban effectively, since it has renounced violent coercion itself. Defense funding is reduced, the army stops training in hotspots around the world, and is limited to peaceful exercises.

6) All other functions of the state (except for forceful coercion) continue to operate as before: educational and medical institutions, issuance of documents, courts, traffic regulation, and even the tax service. After all, when many European countries began talking about banning internal combustion engine (ICE) cars, no one suggested getting rid of the habitual “automobile” lifestyle entirely. ICE fuel is much more convenient than a bulky battery, but it becomes a victim of the fight for ecology, even if that fight contains only 10% common sense and 90% hysteria. It is similar with violence—for the state, it is a very convenient tool, but since it is considered unacceptable, an alternative must be found. Nevertheless, the law-abiding majority, who hardly encounter state violence even now, will at first not even notice that something has changed.

7) In international politics, the mechanism of economic sanctions has long been used instead of military coercion. Most likely, this same method will now be applied to citizens instead of direct police violence. This tool, despite its deceptive softness, is quite powerful, especially in a welfare state where all sorts of payments and the acquisition of countless permits for activities depend on the state.

8) People caught in the steamroller of state economic sanctions will be forced to look for ways to survive independently. Informal mutual aid associations will emerge, which will gradually provide their participants—who have de facto exited state jurisdiction—with more or less acceptable living conditions. In fact, these are the contractual jurisdictions we have long studied theoretically.

Thus gradually, thanks to political pressure making the use of violence unacceptable, classic territorial states will turn into panarchies. Only some of the contractual jurisdictions will be libertarian, but converting humanity to libertarianism entirely is a completely redundant task. It is quite enough that the choice of orders under which a person lives occurs voluntarily.

A few reviews

Principles of agorism – now in video format

I recently published a post Principles of agorism, in which I included a comment by Alexander Tatarkov made to my post regarding a business idea for an agorist in the catering sector. Now Alexander has released a YouTube video, where he has significantly expanded his text, adding a historical introduction, various motivational inserts, and presenting the principles of agorism in a more detailed manner.

It is intended that he will continue to expand on the topic, so subscribe to the channel; you will be able to learn many interesting things. The author is still excessively wordy, so I listen to him at 1.5x speed.

Popularization of freedom

Vitaly Tizun, whose essay Theory of a Free Society I suggested for your attention in early March, has started a sequel and has already released the first chapter, Popularization of Freedom. In it, he argues the idea that arguments in favor of panarchy are more convincing to the masses because they do not require giving anything up, but on the contrary, boil down to everyone getting what they want, much like what the famous Russian panarchist Vladimir Zhirinovsky also promised, with the only difference being that these promises will be truthful. It is difficult for me to judge the intent of the entire work so far, but the style is generally good, so I will follow the process, although I do not guarantee that I will cover it in detail. Vitaly posts announcements in his Telegram channel, so you can subscribe and track it yourself.

Contagious Libertarianism

Bitarch released an article Contagious Libertarianism, in which he complains about the linear growth rates of the audience for the overwhelming majority of libertarian resources. Likening libertarianism to an infection, Bitarch notes that contagion occurs only through a few passionate individuals, and thereafter, the transmission through the chain of those infected is quite weak. He then uses Greta Thunberg as an example, noting that she managed to make her discourse truly contagious, as illustrated by a graph of her Twitter follower growth, which showed exponential growth until the coronavirus, after which the Thunberg epidemic finally plateaued because humanity went into quarantine.

Наблюдается экспоненциальный рост числа сторонников

Indeed, my successes look significantly more modest, and the trend is closer to linear (the major jump was the advertisement by Pozharsky):

So immediately forward this post to ten friends, and let each one subscribe to my channel; only in this way will libertarian ideas acquire the necessary contagiousness. You don’t want to? How dare you!

Seriously though, Bitarch goes on to propose a set of criteria that a sufficiently contagious idea must satisfy, and at the end, as an example of such an idea, he offers his slogan freedom NAP or death! It seems to me that the premise the state does not save from the pandemic, but civil society does. Down with the state, long live civil society! would look much fresher and more relevant today. I am not, of course, referring to the high-society GrOb, which only saves you from boredom.

Conditions for the Stability of Anarchy

The Anarchy+ channel released an analysis of several approaches to researching the conditions for the stability of anarchy. It mentions the published translation by me in early February of Hirschleifer’s work Anarchy and its Decay, but also provides links to some other works. For convenience, all materials have been kindly collected by the author into one archive attached to the post.

The post calls for attention in kitchen discussions of anarchy to be paid not only to the models of society being proposed, but also to their sustainability conditions; and to avoid profanation, to familiarize oneself with various approaches to this topic, to remember the limits of the models’ applicability, to clarify the terminology used, and to observe other basics of civilized discussion.

Conflict between protective organizations is a false argument against ancap

Bitarkh’s Column

Original publication on VKontakte

Critics of ancap constantly cite the well-known argument from Robert Nozick’s 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia regarding the impossibility of ancap. Its essence is that different protection agencies may reach contradictory decisions regarding a particular case, enter into an armed conflict when attempting to execute them, and ultimately, one strongest agency will remain, becoming an ordinary mini-state with a territorial monopoly. In his work on the conditions for the stability of anarchy, Jack Hirschleifer demonstrated the conditions under which this occurs, leading to a war for hegemony instead of a state of anarchy.

But this argument applies exclusively to models of a stateless society where the use of violence is still permissible for certain purposes (enforcement of contracts, collection of compensation). For example, this position is partially held by Murray Rothbard and fully by David Friedman (the book The Machinery of Freedom). For a fully voluntarist society, the problem of conflict between protection agencies, as well as the determination of a higher court instance (which makes the final decision), is completely absent.

In any model of a voluntarist society, conditions are created where the initiation of violence is impossible or instantly extinguished (there is a uniform balance of violence potential (BVP) “everyone has weapons” and a deterrence doctrine (DD), i.e., the readiness of the majority of society to use counter-violence to stop aggression). Counter-violence can only be applied during a direct attack, but one cannot start a war to “punish a violator” or “collect compensation.” An offender, if they are not initiating violence at that moment, can only be boycotted—that is, no business is conducted with them. By the way, this is standard behavior between all subject players with BVP, such as stationary bandits (SB, “states”) in their relations with each other.

Under ancap, a trial (as is currently the case in relations between SB) can occur only by the mutual consent of both parties. The parties also agree in advance on the conditions for appealing the court’s decision if it does not satisfy them. And what if one party does not want to go to court? In a voluntarist society with BVP, no one can force them to go, but the refusal may be viewed as an admission of guilt, leading to a demand for compensation for the plaintiff, and in case of refusal—a decrease in reputation and possible ostracism. If the violator does this constantly, the severity of the ostracism will increase; eventually, they will simply stop being provided with utility services and sold goods in most stores, and they will be forced either to agree to cooperate or to move far away, to where their reputation is not taken so close to heart. Although with a ruined reputation, entry into all more or less decent jurisdictions will be closed to them.

As we can see, there is absolutely no room for the conflict described by Nozick.

Commentary by Ancap-chan

Nozick shows how a system of competing protection agencies can turn into a system of minimal states without violating the gentlemanly principle of compensating damage to clients affected by their activities, as well as to third parties. Bitarkh shows that if we take away from protection agencies this convenient pretext to coerce anyone for their own good, the problem of the state’s renaissance is resolved. Then the question arises, “well, how do we actually coerce if we really want to,” and to this Stefan Molinier answers. Which scenario is less realistic—the emergence of ultra-minimal states based on protection agencies or the emergence of a voluntarist society based on universal armament and readiness to actively counteract violence directed at oneself—we leave for the reader to judge.

The (In)effectiveness of Violence

Bitarch’s Column
(with editorial edits by Ancap-chan)

When you want to achieve a certain goal, you choose one of many available tools. Suppose a hostel has opened in your house, which constantly creates noise and a criminogenic environment near your home. What can you do? The simplest option at first glance is to force the owner to close their business by using physical violence.

But what if they have at least a pepper spray? Now, in the event of your attack, your potential costs have increased. Violence as a tool no longer looks as profitable as it seemed initially. So, willy-nilly, you have to look for other ways to influence them—persuading, explaining the situation to the property owner so they terminate the lease, giving the hostel a one-star review on online resources, and calling on other residents of the building to do the same. In short, you have a incentive to act civilly.

Initially, the simplest tool of coercion, physical violence, quickly loses its effectiveness when the potential victim is capable of applying counter-violence, even in the smallest amount. The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, once praised violence as a tool of extremely high efficiency. But for this to be the case, he had to introduce some of the strictest rules for purchasing and owning weapons in Singapore, even for self-defense—because even a slight leveling of the balance of violence potential in society leads to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of violence as a tool of coercion.

I can propose a hypothesis well-supported by facts: the costs of aggressive violence increase exponentially as the possibilities for counter-violence by the victim increase.

Suppose a stationary bandit (the state) wants to use violence to force someone to comply with its demands. If the victim of state aggression has no lethal weapon, a small operational group is sufficient for the arrest. But what if the victim has a pistol? Police special forces must be sent. For a minor reason, such as unpaid fines or the retail sale of psychoactive substances, no one will send special forces. In Alexander Rozov’s blog, there is a post with confirmation of this fact using the example of Sweden.

Suppose the potential victim of state aggression is not some tax delinquent, but a more significant target—for example, a clan leader in Somalia. He doesn’t just have a pistol, but a thousand fighters with Kalashnikov rifles, albeit poorly trained. As history has shown, the damage even from such “bandits” proved unacceptable for the US government.

Imagine that the followers of the Branch Davidians sect, who took refuge at the Waco ranch in 1993, had anti-tank grenade launchers in addition to shotguns and rifles. As we know, the FBI decided to use tanks at the time to ram the walls and release tear gas. If the defenders had anti-tank weapons, such an option would have had to be rejected as excessively risky.

In such a situation, the state could either turn the assault on the ranch from a police operation into an army operation, using mortars or other lethal indiscriminate weapons, or starve the ranch out, with the prospect that these fanatics would indeed all die of hunger. Both options in a democratic state are fraught with significant political damage, which for politicians is even more important than economic damage to the state. For more details on such factors, I recommend reading Martin van Creveld’s book The Rise and Decline of the State.

Finally, we have already analyzed a potential situation where a potential victim of state violence threatens the use of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, this is perceived as something extremely unlikely—not because the state effectively prevents the creation of WMDs by private individuals, but because people who have enough skills to create WMDs also have strong internal moral convictions that preclude the use of indiscriminate mass violence, including against innocent people. If a democratic state sets an example by being the first to use WMDs against its own citizens, this moral prohibition will be weakened, and over time will disappear altogether. No official in a relatively civilized state is ready to allow such consequences.

Conclusions can be drawn:

1) The costs of coercion by the state or any other aggressor increase exponentially as the means of counter-violence by the victim are strengthened. Minimal self-defense weapons, therefore, sharply raise the price of an attack, and against a cheap dirty bomb made from nuclear waste, even the nuclear arsenal of a superpower will be ineffective.

2) In order for a free society (a territorial or extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction) to protect itself from conquest by the state, it is more profitable for it not to invest in a single “wonder weapon,” but to provide incentives for clients to acquire personal weapons, skills for their use, and the readiness to use them for defense. This will also help society protect itself from its own coordinating bodies, should they decide to become a state, since it will ensure an even distribution of the potential for violence. This is discussed, in particular, in the previously translated work by Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Dissolution.

Finally, I will provide a good quote from the book The Liberal Archipelago by Chandran Kukathas.

Take gamblers and casino owners. Their activities may be alien or even repulsive to us. However, would the fact that gambling takes place in another country be sufficient grounds for invading it?

Take “monopolists.” They may set prices for their products that we consider unfair. However, would we consider the fact that a country supplies its goods too expensively a sufficient ground for declaring war on that country?

But why are we ready in similar cases to send armed men (police) to our fellow citizens, take them captive (prison), and take tribute from them (fine)? Probably because, unlike a neighboring state, they cannot defend themselves.

What to spin state bans on

As I wrote recently, a wave of criticism regarding its inefficiency in fighting the pandemic awaits the state in the near future. However, it is precisely in Russia that the state acts in such a peculiar way that it receives a barrage of criticism in a slightly different key. The Russian state is enthusiastically helping the infection spread as widely as possible, while with equal enthusiasm bankrupting its poorest inhabitants and helping the wealthiest with money. In short, everything is as usual, but in an especially exaggerated form.

I heard a good selection of grievances against the state from Alexander Tatarkov. He is a rather original anarchist with an interesting and quite constructive view of the world (one major flaw: he is excessively talkative—listening to hour-long monologues is often an excessive luxury for me). What is interesting about this video is that these are practical grievances from the perspective of an ordinary citizen—this can be effectively replicated in conversations with those very same citizens, and they will nod in agreement and throw in just as many more examples, so it is useful to master this style of rhetoric.

Alexander is particularly irritated, of course, by the actions of the cops, as the most harmful and senseless. All these precinct officers walking door-to-door, picking on drivers of private cars—though it’s hard to imagine a place more epidemically safe—harassing pedestrians with idiotic demands to prove their right to be on the street, and so on. After listening to these grievances, Bitarch, by the way, immediately put forward his constructive proposal, suggesting sending the security forces into quarantine—this is done by simple methods of telephone terrorism, only instead of a mined object, a specific police officer with such-and-such a badge number is used, and as the means of mining—an infected citizen.

While Alexander complained about the direct harm from the state, it didn’t bother me that much, but then he mentioned that the fashion for masks sharply reduces the danger during, for example, robberies, and this is far more unpleasant for ancap ideology. Therefore, I would like to separately address everyone who will be driven to poverty and despair by the state’s actions in the coming weeks. If you decide to commit thefts or robbery—please rob the state. Firstly, it is more ethical, since the state has no legitimate property and cannot have any. Secondly, it is safer, because no one will protect state junk that desperately. Thirdly, government employees are far more likely to be sitting at home and therefore will not suffer in any way during the robbery. Fourthly, if you are caught, public opinion will be far more favorable toward you than if you had robbed your fellow sufferers.

However, I would prefer that it not come to this, and the only thing that can prevent such a catastrophic scenario is the blatant violation of the self-isolation regime by citizens. As in, dear state, since you do not intend to compensate us in any way for the ban on working, we don’t care about your ban. Since Putin suddenly remembered that Russia is a federation and announced that specific measures to fight citizens should be introduced by regional heads, there will surely be more sane governors who will either manage to carve out funds from their meager budgets to encourage people to stay home, or try to let any measures that kill the economy of their domains slide as much as possible and turn a blind eye to the fact that citizens continue to earn money. And good practices tend to be borrowed if they receive positive reinforcement. So it is worth encouraging your mayors and governors with a kind word if the comparison with neighboring incompetents truly looks in their favor, and it also makes sense to remember more severe instruments of pressure.

No one but ourselves will find the balance of freedom and security that is most suitable for us. We shall seek it.

Risky behavior

Continuation of the discussion on the coronavirus. Beginning, continuation.

Bitarch’s Column

My recent article about the idea of bypassing house arrest (“self-isolation”) for healthy people while observing all possible safety measures sparked a huge wave of criticism. I’ll be honest — I have never received so much hate directed at me. Nor so much support. Subscribers were split roughly in half: about 60% on my side and 40% against, but they proved to be extremely uncompromising in their positions! In reality, this exposed a very important problem that I had been planning to write about for a long time. The disputes regarding the permissibility of quarantine measures provided a good opportunity for this.

We are talking about the assessment of any risky behavior that does not directly cause harm to anyone, but has some probability of unintentionally causing harm to third parties. This is far from just forced “self-isolation” against the spread of coronavirus (do you not notice the oxymoron here?!), but also driving a car at high speed, under the influence of alcohol and drugs, the use of certain psychotropic substances, the construction of certain facilities (gas stations, explosives warehouses, chemical and nuclear waste sites) near residential buildings, placing a level 4 biosafety laboratory in an apartment of a residential building, launching pyrotechnics near houses, and much more. If a stationary bandit imposes a ban on any such action, he creates a victimless crime.

Any person calling themselves a libertarian, even a minarchist, cannot support punishment for a victimless crime; otherwise, they have no right to call themselves a libertarian. Some say that, for example, complying with a ban by a stationary bandit against leaving one’s home is normal, as I could potentially be infectious without even knowing it, and consequently, I initiate aggressive violence against the people around me. But if we follow such logic, then even an openly gay person, walking down the street holding hands with their partner, initiates violence against religious conservatives who might have a heart attack with some probability. This can lead to absurdity, which is why libertarian philosophy clearly answers this question: no victim — no crime!

Nevertheless, the problem of risky behavior does not disappear. For some people, the values of freedom, progress, and economic development are more important, while for others, safety and risk minimization are paramount. There are scientific studies proving that the predisposition toward certain values is partially determined by genetics. People from these two categories will never be able to reach an agreement. This is, in principle, an insoluble problem.

All that remains is to seek ways of peaceful separation:

1) Freedom of association and private discrimination;

2) For more conservative people, territorial communities/jurisdictions (TCJs) will likely be suitable, while for those more tolerant of risk and diversity — extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions (ECJs).

In any case, I recommend moving from the habitual authoritarian two-step style of thinking “Crime — Punishment” to a three-step “Action – Counteraction – Agreements for the future.” Only when it becomes natural for you to think in terms of the equality of subjects will you be able to start feeling out your own approach to the problem of balancing freedom and security.