Тег: Forecasts

The Russian Frontier and Its Prospects

I subscribed to the channel Russian Frontier. Today, the author posted a review of the Montellibero project, in which he notes our ideological closeness in everything except for the assessments of the investment climate in Russia. He suggests that today, the creation of contractual jurisdictions in Russia is not officially regulated in any way, which means one can and should enter this market—until the state shows a keen interest in them, after which they should be repurposed into something else, even swingers’ clubs.

Indeed, there is still a niche in Russia today (and perhaps it will remain for a long time) for the relatively free pursuit of agriculture and trades—in regions where there is a relative surplus of land. In other words, it is impossible to expand in the conditional Krasnodar Territory, but in Altai, like Justus Walker, or even in the not-so-distant Moscow region, like Mikhail Shlyapnikov or Herman Sterligov—why not? Thus, an enthusiast can indeed create a strong farm with quite original customs, and it is unlikely that this farm would even be seized, since the basis of its prosperity is labor and entrepreneurial talent, not capital.

Of course, such benevolent ignorance from the state will continue only until a specific entrepreneur gets into politics or at least makes loud media statements that clash with the general background. And if such entrepreneurs start getting in the way not as an exception, but literally every second person, then a standard solution will be quickly devised for them that will either abolish them or distract them significantly.

How well are such solutions replicated? It seems not very well. Most likely, associations of free farmers will be weeded out more eagerly than loners, and the positive scale effect of any given association in this particular industry is small. A milk producer in Belgorod will in no way help a honey producer in Bashkiria; each deals with a unique environment of varying degrees of aggressiveness.

How well do such solutions scale? This is likely dangerous. As soon as a farm advances significantly from the exploitation of labor to the exploitation of capital, it becomes a tempting morsel for a takeover.

So, I would view the Russian frontier as a good training ground for those who have sufficient competencies to build a sole proprietorship. At the same time, cultural originality can provide such a farm with media visibility—which can attract investors, product buyers, and even serve as some kind of vaccination against raids that are not too motivated. So, donning the guise of a contractual jurisdiction for such a farm is also an excellent idea; it’s worth considering.

But once some experience and capital have been accumulated, it makes sense, instead of expanding the current project, to invest in a farm in countries with more reliable protection of private property. Fortunately, globalization allows one to avoid making a hard choice between the Russian and Montenegrin frontiers. In the best case, this will simply be diversification, and in the worst—also a platform for evacuation.

And I still hope that the experience accumulated on the Russian frontier will simply create a desire to be applied to something greater, and then welcome to Montellibero.

Navalny in every home (on the coming mass repressions)

In response to the start of the procedure to declare them an extremist organization, Navalny’s team is calling for a final and decisive “Chinese warning” to the regime. Namely, let’s go to a rally in a huge crowd, like the Belarusians, and then defeat them in elections, like the Belarusians. “If they shot at us with rifles,” the FBK leadership states, “and we bravely pushed forward, then now, when they are unpacking the machine gun, we need to close our ranks even tighter; they can’t shoot everyone.” The main thing is not to become like them and not to unpack the guns ourselves.

Indeed, the judicial system in the RF has a certain terminal velocity for turning free people into colony inhabitants, and in the event that any political activity not coordinated with the regime is officially declared a criminal offense, this very system will have to work for quite some time at maximum capacity — which, however, is easily optimized (google troikas).

Now let’s look at a simple chart. This is the dynamics of the change in the number of prisoners over three Putin terms and one Medvedev term. As you can see, at least 360,000 vacant spots have opened up in Russian prisons and colonies during this time. 440,000 people have already signed up for Navalny’s rally, and an unauthorized mass action is planned for when 500,000 sign up. What is there to say? Indeed, it will be difficult to imprison everyone. Perhaps you will be among those 140,000 lucky ones who won’t fit in the prisons and will therefore receive a suspended sentence. Navalny also started with a suspended sentence.

Unfortunately, I cannot offer any more reasonable alternative than to get out of the country right now. Just imagine that you live, for example, in the USSR, and it is, for example, 1968. And by some incredibly lucky chance, you have the opportunity to physically be outside the country. You can leave, you can stay, but the regime will only collapse in 1991. That is roughly the picture we have today.

Could you criticize Stasik Ay Kak Prosto in this video?

https://youtu.be/ymVOQpFkQSY

The video contains several assertions.

  1. From the perspective of world-systems theory, civilization constantly goes through the same cycles: a new center of global business activity rises, money flows to money, a huge bubble inflates, and soon any production at the center of the bubble becomes unprofitable, and money begins to be made directly from money, through the turnover of various securities. Eventually, the bubble bursts, and soon a new one begins to inflate around a new center. The US will burst as the global hegemon, and China will take the stage.
  2. Any attempts to imitate the global hegemon can no longer be successful: it is pointless to try to increase one’s investment attractiveness, open markets, reduce tariffs, and build institutions—it is impossible to break out of the status of the periphery during the inflation stage of a financial bubble.
  3. Cryptocurrencies have become exactly the same overvalued financial asset, and when the bubble bursts, they will similarly lose the lion’s share of their value.
  4. The shortage of graphics cards caused by increased demand from miners cannot be covered by expanding production because the era of globalization is ending, trade wars are beginning, and the local Chinese market does not need that many graphics cards; fear, honest gamers, you will be stuck with five-year-old junk.

I will answer briefly by points.

  1. As strange as it may sound, stocks are not just numbers in brokerage accounts. These are investments that go to the companies that issued the shares, and they, in turn, by no means spend everything on management bonuses and buybacks—some is indeed invested in production, specifically in the periphery, where it is cheaper. At this moment, it is important for peripheral countries to be attractive for these very investments.
  2. If it is pointless to imitate the hegemon, then how will a new hegemon emerge? If world-systems theory reflects real processes adequately enough, then someone must launch a new cycle with themselves at the center. This means there is a mechanism for leaving the periphery. And it is logical to assume that for this purpose, one really should not simply imitate the hegemon. One should not imitate the hegemon in its current dying state, but rather look back to the time when it was young and healthy—while, of course, adapting to current technological realities.
  3. What does a burst bubble mean? Many companies suddenly lose value and find themselves unable to find a buyer for their goods. Demand is mainly for consumer goods, which become more expensive relative to capital goods. The proud owner of crypto, who previously invested in mining, begins to invest in potatoes, selling first the miners (and they become cheaper), and then the crypto itself (its price also falls). The market becomes saturated with cheap used graphics cards, demand for new ones decreases, it becomes unprofitable to invest in their production, and no trade wars are even needed—gamers are stuck with five-year-old junk. I will only note that miners and crypto will get cheaper relative to conventional potatoes during the deflation stage of the bubble, but relative to a conventional dollar—that is far from certain; it might enter a tailspin of hyperinflation.
  4. Will globalization end as a result? For adherents of world-systems theory, it is somewhat strange to discuss this. Where will a new global hegemon come from if there is no globalization? Without it, hegemons will be local. So, since everything goes in circles for you, global trade turnover will not disappear anywhere.

I am not attempting to judge here how correct the theory itself is. The theory is relatively young, more or less explains the observed facts, and makes verifiable predictions. As it becomes clear which predictions turned out to be false, they will either be patched, or this line of thought will be considered a dead end, and a theory based on completely different premises will be used—why not.

Predatory Things of the Century and Their Digital Immortality

Once, depending on my mood, I wrote a short review of three books by the Strugatsky brothers, among which was Predatory Things of the Century. In that book, among other things, there was a description of a certain secret order of patrons who found pleasure in stealing masterpieces from museums and then secretly destroying them in a solemn atmosphere. In the sixties of the last century, the Strugatskys managed to predict modern society quite well. And yesterday, on the MyGap channel, I stumbled upon an almost literal embodiment in our world of that very order of patrons.

A blockchain company burns a painting worth 95 thousand dollars on a live stream. What is the difference from what the Soviet sci-fi writers predicted? The difference, naturally, is that the company bought the painting honestly, and there was no need to burn it in secret; on the contrary, it became a public action. What can you do—while having an amazing intuition for social trends, the Strugatskys happened to be quite out of their depth in economics.

Burning a painting followed by the issuance of a unique token containing its digital copy and denoting ownership of it demonstrates how value arises from rarity. If the token were linked to an undestroyed painting, it could be thrown away, and one could simply settle for factual ownership of the painting without any certificate. It is precisely the fact that the token is left all alone that gives it value; otherwise, it would be an unnecessary tag.

I can easily understand how all of this blows the minds of the adepts of material production, who are convinced that humanity has fallen victim to digital delusions. But there is nothing to be done: the substance of value is not contained within things themselves. Value is in the consciousness. And consciousness is fickle, quickly loses interest in routine, and clings to everything fresh, rare, and unusual. The more sophisticated the consciousness, the harder it is to find such rarity. The more abundant the society, the harder it is to lure consciousness with the ghost of scarcity to suggest that this particular entity is rare and valuable. And so we have lived to see these patrons. What’s next on the Strugatskys’ plan? Sleg?

Could you please analyze this video?

Your friendly neighbor from LPR

Thank you, very good channel, I’ve subscribed. Now about the video.

In effect, it was convincingly demonstrated to us, with illustrations, that modern corporations differ little from states, and vice versa. Not every business becomes a mega-corporation capable of effective expansion, but rather the one that performs the function of a platform for other businesses. The costs of scaling a platform business are relatively low, and profit primarily depends on the network effect. Therefore, old-style corporations, like Gazprom for example, will not move the needle in the new global market, but Yandex, for instance, is a serious player with prospects for further growth, especially if it manages to devour the Russian Federation that is getting in its way.

But here is the thing. There are relatively few actual employees in such corporations. However, the development of platforms is a factor that contributes to the success of small businesses, or even freelancers, who earn their living on these very platforms. With every new platform, there are more and more people earning money on them. The platforms themselves have far more, of course, but why should we care?

No, we shouldn’t care, as long as the game looks fair. The video describes several cases where the game was played ruthlessly, while the players were in significantly different weight categories. Corporations, becoming comparable to states in power, can well afford methods that are more appropriate for criminal gangs. Should we expect the good old territorial gangster to take a swing at the young, arrogant, and extraterritorial one? Should we fear the new gangster more than the old one?

Anything is possible. One can easily imagine evil corporations in a free market, as Hollywood has depicted them in abundance. But there is still a certain air of theatricality surrounding such companies. It is much easier to imagine a corporation merged with a classic state in symbiosis, using political methods to eliminate rivals when brute force is more convenient, and economic power when a softer approach is better. We see such corporations already; they eat US presidents for breakfast. But we also see the power of civil opposition to dirty tricks, as exemplified by the recent GameStop story.

Following the author of the video, I shrug my shoulders many times in this post because we see that the rules are changing right before our eyes, and it is not entirely clear exactly how “the market” will resolve it. But for now, I can make a cautious assumption that the market will push states further aside so they don’t interfere, and the owners of various platforms, as the market saturates, will fidget less and value the predictability of rules more. And for this, they will have to follow them themselves. By rules, I don’t mean what the platform owner demands from their users, but what the platform owners have agreed upon among themselves. And with the emergence of law, conflicts are resolved much more easily and cause much less damage.

Navalny. Prospects.

I read with great interest Navalny’s publication about the investigation into his poisoning conducted by Bellingcat. It is also available in video format; it’s roughly the same as the text, just slightly more detailed and interspersed with memes. It’s better to open it directly on YouTube rather than in the embedded player, so you can leave a like.

It seems to me that Navalny is mistaken in thinking there will be hysteria across all channels now. Rather, the opposite: they will ignore him, like some Hunter Biden. But, of course, a purely Russian quirk will be added—the reverse cargo cult glorified by Ekaterina Schulmann. The cult servants will snicker sardonically and wonder why we think all other planes in the world aren’t made of twigs and actually know how to fly. Naturally, all intelligence agencies of all countries in the world that have any ambitions at all poison or otherwise deal with those they dislike; everything is under control everywhere. And the fact that the dealings of specifically Russian intelligence agencies are so well-known is not because they are so reckless, but only because an info-war is being waged against them.

And, for the most part, these guys are right. Indeed, any state is a systemic aggressor. Indeed, any state, if its hand is not slapped, quickly senses impunity and begins to create total chaos. And those who try to slap its hand and expose it face various absurd misfortunes all over the world, like some Assange.

What will happen next? Next, Navalny will return to Russia, and then he will finally be killed, only this time bluntly and without artistry. The man just doesn’t get the hints, mocks in every way, makes them look ridiculous, and what then—will the old man give up and decide to leave him alone? What is there to be shy about? Will people really take to the streets? Well, let them come out once a year, on the anniversary of his death, like they did for Nemtsov. Let them leave flowers and light candles; that’s a problem for the municipal workers. Or is someone counting on a Maidan? And who will call people to the barricades? Kira Yarmysh or Yulia Navalnaya? Perhaps Leonid Volkov or Vladimir Milov? Alas, we can count on the Belarusian scenario at most, with peaceful unauthorized strolls that will be either ignored or brutally dispersed, with endless fines slapped on the participants.

At the current stage, the best thing Navalny is capable of doing, he is already doing. He is gaining publicity from the assassination attempt and trying to squeeze the harshest possible personal sanctions against Putin and his inner circle from other states. So he should stay in Europe for now, especially since there are two excellent, very compelling reasons. First, the rehabilitation period after poisoning can be extended indefinitely—there is no clinical practice, no one will check. Second, he can focus on searching for the foreign assets of Putin’s circle and striving for their seizure. Let them go to the Yukos shareholders; that’s still better than paying 57 billion from our taxes.

Who even cares where a popular blogger is physically located if he regularly produces quality content? But Navalny will go to Russia because he believes that is where he belongs. This will end tragically; I am very sorry.

Belarus 4

This is my fourth text about Belarus (others can be found via the hashtag ), and this time it was prompted by watching a conversation between Mikhail Svetov, Roman Popkov, and Elena Borovskaya, as well as Roman’s post summarizing the stream on his channel.

Roman Popkov’s account of the current state of Belarusian civil society was very informative and explained why things are going the way they are, but right now I want to talk about something else.

During the conversation, Roman reproached “Moskals” for their excessively technological mindset. Ponasenkov took the brunt of it with his Die erste Kolonne marschiert, die zweite Kolonne marschiert, but Svetov, who agreed with Ponasenkov, also got hit. I, for one, although I live separated from Moscow by a considerable distance and the Ural range, am still one of those very same “Moskals,” and therefore I also have a purely technological approach to this political science problem: how to ensure the transit from an illegitimate dictatorship to a transitional government, constitutional reform, and a new legitimate government. And I see exactly two options.

Option one. Do you want it to be like in Ukraine?

If the dictator previously had enough strength to weed out combat organizations (hello to Roman Popkov and his NBP) by the root, then now, with constant street protests occurring, it is quite easy to disguise combat coordination training as episodic spontaneous coordination. Tens of thousands of people daily search for the most effective ways to exhaust the opponent’s resources, get to know each other, find out what everyone is capable of, and if the degree of anger continues to rise, then at some point the hundreds of corpses mentioned by Roman will stop seeming like a serious restriction on the path to overthrowing the dictatorship.

Of course, they don’t charge head-on toward administrative buildings, but, as we saw in Ukraine, they seize military warehouses and armories in police stations. After that, a transition to the hot phase of street fighting is inevitable, even if no one is injured during the seizure of weapons. And street fighting will inevitably end with the overthrow of the dictator.

Option two. What is the name of the President of Switzerland?

What follows is a fantasy story; do not take it as a forecast.

Tikhanovskaya arrives for Biden’s inauguration. This is an excellent pretext to discuss exactly how to overthrow Lukashenko. The invasion option is dismissed, and a cheaper one is proposed. Lukashenko is placed on an international wanted list, and a serious reward by Belarusian standards is set for his capture, dead or alive—say, a conventional hundred million dollars. Simultaneously, a second very important person enters the fray; his name is Guy Parmelin. He is the Vice President of the Swiss Confederation, who by the time of Biden’s inauguration will be the new president (hello to Mikhail Svetov and his constant rhetorical question about the name of the President of Switzerland). Switzerland is a neutral country with a very stable political system. Only it can give Lukashenko a guarantee of lifelong political asylum (Russia or the USA cannot).

That’s it; now we start the clock and watch to see what happens first: one of Lukashenko’s guards presents his head and demands the reward—or Lukashenko seeks guarantees from Mr. Parmelin and leaves the country immediately after they are confirmed.

What to do with digital data under ancap? What will the privacy policy be in minarchism?

In our new world, data has turned into a very profitable commodity traded by states, companies, hackers, and anyone else who feels like it! Could they all possibly give up this resource at once, even if you were to cut the state out by the roots? Moreover, people mostly don’t care about their personal data when visiting websites, downloading games, apps, or TikToks. In other words, it’s a kind of exchange of one’s data for convenience/benefits. I don’t think anyone’s property rights are being violated in this case. What do you think?

P.S. This question occurred to me while I was downloading a certain hyped-up Chinese game (those who know, know what I’m talking about). They wrote it right there: that you agree to let them use your account info for their own purposes. In other words, in simple language understandable to a human, and not like in other apps where everything is blurred and vague, explained as if saying, “we aren’t stealing from you, but we’ll take it somehow, and it’s better if you don’t think about it at all, ciao!”

Anal Magician

I would like to take this question as an opportunity to recommend to the reader an article in a channel with the immodest name without compromises, but with a surprisingly modest number of subscribers. However, the text of the article itself is posted on VKontakte, where the author has an order of magnitude more subscribers. There, a particular take interested me.

If one blindly honors the text of a contract with all its squiggles, reservations, and footnotes in tiny print, then the service provider has an economic incentive to cushion their own fall in the text of the agreement: the consumer will not look into the details, but the text of the agreement will significantly restrict them. However, the details of the agreement that are in plain sight must be made more attractive to the client because of competition.

But if we consider only that which was explicitly stated during the conclusion of the agreement as the contract, and treat all implicit nuances that were not discussed as merely unilateral good wishes—then an economic incentive appears to make contracts short and clear, so that the process of concluding the agreement is not burdensome for the buyer, otherwise they will go to another provider.

As we can see from the example you provided, when there is no need for legal hair-splitting, lawyers quickly switch to human language and state directly what rights they reserve. And, as we see from your reaction, the client tends to approve of such honesty. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that you would be so lenient toward a stated intention in a contract by the game developers, for example, to withdraw money from all your bank accounts or bitcoin wallets that the company manages to access. Even though, it would seem, this is also just a matter of access to data.

We live in an increasingly transparent world, which, moreover, will soon be filled with a large number of fakes indistinguishable from reality. Legal protection of personal data, privacy protection of personal life, private keys and passwords—all these are rearguard actions before full capitulation. What to do after capitulation? I wrote about this in one of my old posts titled Digital Identity.

The future is shaky, but I have a feeling that our generation has already accepted the new rules of the game in advance and isn’t particularly worried about it. As for those who, out of habit, will want to hide something, they are doomed to occasionally find themselves in an embarrassing position. Let’s wish them not to get too nervous over such blunders.

I apologize for not answering the direct question about what color underwear we will wear under ancap, and what style under minarchism. What can be done, if we will be going without underwear.

The Stability of Panarchy

Is the long-term stable coexistence of different political-economic systems in different (or even the same) territories possible, provided that the state monopoly ceases to exist?

For example, a large ancap city neighboring a network of anarcho-eco-communes, and nearby, indigenous rainforest dwellers with their own variation of a stateless arrangement. What are the prerequisites and what are the obstacles to stability in a global sense?

meta-anarchist

Ever since progress (interpreted primarily as scientific and technical, but inevitably affecting social relations as well) became a significant value for a certain critical mass of people, the stability of any political-economic systems has been under constant threat. Liberal regimes of the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries differ from each other so much that their own mothers wouldn’t recognize them.

Therefore, in the long run, no current configuration of communities will, of course, be preserved. More stable societies (like the selva aborigines mentioned in your example) will be eroded by less stable ones. Less stable ones will borrow certain practices from more stable ones. Different societies will have slightly different dynamics in population change—both through natural growth and through co-optation into neighboring societies.

One thing can be said with reasonable confidence: if concepts of property in neighboring communities prove to be compatible, then, at the very least, conflicts between them will be minor and episodic, without any nonsense like wars of extermination. How property is defined within a community is not that important; the main thing is that when interacting with neighbors, the peculiarities of their worldview are taken into account.

For instance, if raids for brides are launched from the forest, if people from the fields visit suburban gas stations to get fuel for free, and if city dwellers place new residential quarters in the fields and turn a piece of the forest into a park—then irritated dialogues with the general message of “what exactly did you have in mind?” are inevitable. After some time, a mutual adjustment is inevitable: raids will become ritualized and turn into a folklore festival for the city dwellers; fuel will be gifted to the communists in exchange for their eco-products; suburban housing will adopt some features of communal living; and the park on the border of the selva will be used for raids once a year, and for peaceful walks and picnics the rest of the time.

As scientific development progresses, humans tend to decrease, rather than increase, their impact on nature. If food can be grown in a test tube in a cupboard, it is much more convenient than growing it in manured fields. If metals are extracted from seawater, it is far more pleasant than digging up mountains in search of ore. If additional space can be packed into a fourth dimension and put in a pocket, then the wild and untouched selva will begin right at the doorstep—there will be no need to clear-cut it.

Thus, there are long-term factors that will promote the outward expansion of the city, and there are factors of the opposite direction. There are factors promoting the expansion of ancap culture as the culture of a wealthier society, and there are factors promoting the expansion of communist and primitive relations (the abundance of goods makes such downshifting attractive to many). There will be no stability for us. Let us weep!

Money, a continuation of the discussion

I am grateful to Grigory Bazhenov for continuing the discussion about the future of money. Cross-posting on Telegram is a somewhat autistic format for conducting a conversation, but what can you do—it’s a quirk of the platform.

Consumer inflation in the USA.

Here is my quote from our discussion in the YouTube comments:

If people are sitting at home in quarantine, then the production of consumer goods and services will decrease one way or another. Meanwhile, governments are proposed to subsidize people’s lost wages, meaning they will have money to go to the store, but goods will appear there in smaller quantities. In other words, either the government regulates prices, as already announced in Russia, and gets a shortage, or it doesn’t regulate, and gets price increases.

After some time, I read in a post by the authoritative Americanist Dudakov:

The forecasts of economists, who predicted that after the epidemic the USA and other Western countries would experience a jump in consumer inflation for the first time in 40 years, are coming true.

The spike in meat prices served as an illustration there, but the problem is much broader. I had not read the economists’ forecasts mentioned by Malek, and I made my own forecast based on the simplest logic. To be fair, I thought governments faced a dilemma—regulate prices or accept their growth. It turned out that Trump resorted to a third option—direct directive management of production.

However, the assumed rapid recovery of developed economies will most likely lead to the fact that prices for temporarily underproduced consumer goods will return to values close to pre-crisis levels. So, on this relatively unimportant issue, I see little sense in debating for long.

The role of Bitcoin

My original question to Grigory was formulated as follows:

How will an economy behave in which money created in a fractional reserve banking system and money that does not provide for fractional reserve circulate in parallel on comparable scales?

I am not an economist, and I was interested to know the opinion of professionals about how the behavior of a system with the proposed parameters would look. Alas, instead of an answer, I received assurances that Bitcoin’s capitalization today is too small, its volatility is too high, it cannot be used as money, it is poor as a hedge asset, and so on. In short, I was told about today’s Bitcoin, not about a hypothetical situation in which its capitalization has already reached values comparable to the money supply of global reserve currencies, or at least gold.

Well, for now—yes, I fully agree that Bitcoin is more volatile than gold, that it is a poor hedge asset, and that its liquidity is lower than that of the dollar (although on the global market, Bitcoin’s liquidity is much higher than that of the Russian ruble). Today, the role of Bitcoin is less an instrument for short-term speculation and more an instrument for long-term investment. For someone who bought Bitcoin five years ago, it doesn’t matter much how much today’s rate jumps, because they have been firmly in the green for a long time. Similarly, for today’s buyer, it doesn’t matter much at what price they buy if they intend to hold Bitcoin for at least five years. They will be in the green anyway. If Grigory disagrees with this statement, it would be interesting to read his arguments.

However, even in that unlikely situation where the long-term trend of the BTC/USD currency pair turns from growing to horizontal or even falling, Bitcoin retains its significance as digital peer-to-peer cash—that is, value that can be passed from hand to hand via communication channels without using unreliable intermediaries such as state-regulated banks or transfer systems. However, my question to Grigory concerns only that hypothetical situation where the capitalization of BTC and the volumes of trade in it have already grown significantly—not the current picture, which we already know.

Unsecured obligations and fractional reserve

Separately, there is a post by Artem Seversky stating that money is an anti-commodity, and that issuing loans from own savings is inefficient, and it is much more sensible to issue loans with money created out of thin air. I see no reason to forbid anyone from giving others unsecured obligations; it is quite enough for me that secured and unsecured obligations cannot be confused, and beyond that, let market mechanisms work.

For example, I can use Bitcoins in settlements, and if I receive a Bitcoin loan, it is only because the lender actually had those Bitcoins on hand before kindly lending to me. Or I can issue my own ancap-tokens, tie their price to a single commissioned article—and sell tokenized obligations for creating texts to anyone willing in exchange for consumer goods. This would be an unsecured obligation, but what does fractional reserve have to do with it? Fractional reserve is if someone buys a hundred of my tokens and issues a thousand of their own, with an obligation to exchange them for mine upon first demand.

Franklin looks at the gypsy physical Bitcoin as an unsecured obligation