What to spin state bans on

As I wrote recently, a wave of criticism regarding its inefficiency in fighting the pandemic awaits the state in the near future. However, it is precisely in Russia that the state acts in such a peculiar way that it receives a barrage of criticism in a slightly different key. The Russian state is enthusiastically helping the infection spread as widely as possible, while with equal enthusiasm bankrupting its poorest inhabitants and helping the wealthiest with money. In short, everything is as usual, but in an especially exaggerated form.

I heard a good selection of grievances against the state from Alexander Tatarkov. He is a rather original anarchist with an interesting and quite constructive view of the world (one major flaw: he is excessively talkative—listening to hour-long monologues is often an excessive luxury for me). What is interesting about this video is that these are practical grievances from the perspective of an ordinary citizen—this can be effectively replicated in conversations with those very same citizens, and they will nod in agreement and throw in just as many more examples, so it is useful to master this style of rhetoric.

Alexander is particularly irritated, of course, by the actions of the cops, as the most harmful and senseless. All these precinct officers walking door-to-door, picking on drivers of private cars—though it’s hard to imagine a place more epidemically safe—harassing pedestrians with idiotic demands to prove their right to be on the street, and so on. After listening to these grievances, Bitarch, by the way, immediately put forward his constructive proposal, suggesting sending the security forces into quarantine—this is done by simple methods of telephone terrorism, only instead of a mined object, a specific police officer with such-and-such a badge number is used, and as the means of mining—an infected citizen.

While Alexander complained about the direct harm from the state, it didn’t bother me that much, but then he mentioned that the fashion for masks sharply reduces the danger during, for example, robberies, and this is far more unpleasant for ancap ideology. Therefore, I would like to separately address everyone who will be driven to poverty and despair by the state’s actions in the coming weeks. If you decide to commit thefts or robbery—please rob the state. Firstly, it is more ethical, since the state has no legitimate property and cannot have any. Secondly, it is safer, because no one will protect state junk that desperately. Thirdly, government employees are far more likely to be sitting at home and therefore will not suffer in any way during the robbery. Fourthly, if you are caught, public opinion will be far more favorable toward you than if you had robbed your fellow sufferers.

However, I would prefer that it not come to this, and the only thing that can prevent such a catastrophic scenario is the blatant violation of the self-isolation regime by citizens. As in, dear state, since you do not intend to compensate us in any way for the ban on working, we don’t care about your ban. Since Putin suddenly remembered that Russia is a federation and announced that specific measures to fight citizens should be introduced by regional heads, there will surely be more sane governors who will either manage to carve out funds from their meager budgets to encourage people to stay home, or try to let any measures that kill the economy of their domains slide as much as possible and turn a blind eye to the fact that citizens continue to earn money. And good practices tend to be borrowed if they receive positive reinforcement. So it is worth encouraging your mayors and governors with a kind word if the comparison with neighboring incompetents truly looks in their favor, and it also makes sense to remember more severe instruments of pressure.

No one but ourselves will find the balance of freedom and security that is most suitable for us. We shall seek it.

Quarantine Sabotage

Bitarch’s Column

Around the world, many governments have introduced the strictest form of quarantine, involving a ban on leaving the house except for “necessary cases.” The authorities in Italy were the first to adopt such a measure, then Spain and France joined in. Now, it seems, such a measure will also be introduced in the large cities of Russia. I have already written about why this measure not only destroys the economy but also fails to help stop the epidemic. But we are forced to live in an unpleasant reality imposed by the stationary bandit (the state), so I will try to give practical advice on how to bypass the imposed restrictions.

The basis of the strategy is plausible deniability. The point is to have a plausible legend for being out on the street that the police cannot verify. There is no need to declare that the quarantine violates the law or to behave provocatively in general. The police are simply following instructions and are not interested in verifying a plausible lie.

I will provide examples of strategies. The best strategy is to avoid attracting the attention of the police so that you are not stopped and asked why you came outside at all. To do this, take a plastic bag from a well-known retail chain and put some object in it for show (an apple, a bottle of water). Of course, the store’s name must coincide with its opening hours (if you go at night and Pyaterochka is already closed, it will look implausible).

If you are walking alone and get caught:

1) Say that you are going to a store or a pharmacy—if they are open at that time. If you are asked why you walked so far from home, say that the required product/medicine was not available in the store/pharmacy near your home. For maximum credibility, you can always carry a pack of paracetamol and say that you felt cold symptoms and are returning home from the pharmacy. Paracetamol is often taken to relieve symptoms of coronavirus infection, so a police officer will run away from you like a bullet as soon as they hear that you needed paracetamol.

2) If you go out often and during the day, it is better to agree with a friend so that in case of a check, they answer the call and confirm that you are going to their place to fix a computer, repair a faucet, lay a floor, or something like that. Working is not forbidden.

3) During the day, you can also say that you are going to some company’s office to apply for a job.

4) Delivery of goods is not forbidden. If you have paracetamol with you, you can explain to the police that you are bringing it to a sick friend who can no longer go to the pharmacy themselves.

5) If you go at night and everything in the city is closed, a hospital is surely open. Say that you feel unwell and are heading there.

If you want to take a walk with a friend/girlfriend or a child, say that they feel unwell and you are going to the hospital/clinic together. This can be done even at night.

As an alternative—obtain or independently manufacture a pass. This is not as difficult as it may seem at first glance.

1) Register your cat public page as a mass medium and obtain a journalist’s pass.

2) Print a similar certificate, posing as an employee of an enterprise that is not subject to quarantine. It is drawn up in free form.

If you have other strategies, please send them.

P.S. I do not deny the problem of the spread of coronavirus infection, and only suggest ways to avoid aggressive violence from the stationary bandit. Be sure to maintain a social distance of 2m, wear a mask and glasses, open handles and press elevator buttons through a napkin, which you should throw away immediately, and do not leave the house if you have COVID-19. Deliberately infecting peaceful people with the virus contradicts the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP) and is in no way permissible.

Coronavirus as a challenge to the idea of the nation-state

The apology for the nation-state is primarily based on the idea that it is the best way to solve problems on a national scale. The problem is that there are fewer and fewer tasks for which this specific level of resolution is the most appropriate.

The coronavirus epidemic clearly demonstrated that the task of fighting epidemics cannot be solved at this level. Not a single country managed to resist the spread of the virus into its territory through quarantine measures. Not a single country proved capable of preparing enough equipped hospital beds to provide necessary aid to the sick. Conversely, there are countless examples where the measures taken by states only fueled the spread of the epidemic. I will provide just a few.

The very first case is, of course, the sanctions against the Chinese doctor who first tried to convey information about the start of the epidemic. This is exactly how the motivation system built inevitably by state bureaucracy works. A second example is the conduct of electoral events by states in the midst of the epidemic. Iran experienced a powerful surge in morbidity after parliamentary elections were held there on February 21. On April 22, something similar, though far less rational, awaits Russia. Against this backdrop, the banning of rallies in Russia looks quite inconsistent. A third example is the mass deportation of infected and suspected individuals from the countries where they were located back to their countries of permanent residence, often transiting through third countries, and not always with the observance of proper safety measures.

The nation-state is not only unable to fight epidemics, but it also hinders solving this task at both a lower and a higher level. At a lower level, it suppresses private medicine. Market demand allows for a more flexible approach to providing people with vital necessities. But the state, for example, begins to fight price markups on masks and thermometers, and thereby deprives manufacturers of incentives to invest sufficient funds into expanding production. At a higher level, the state obstructs the work of international organizations by insisting on the priority of national regulations over their recommendations.

One can also recall examples where, in the context of epidemics, the national level of management comes into conflict with the regional level. For instance, a story from 2011 recently surfaced about how the federal government in Germany insisted that the states purchase a huge amount of swine flu vaccine, and two years later, most of what was purchased had expired and had to be burned. In Russia, a significant share of healthcare spending also falls on the regional level, but it is all subject to federal regulations. Thus, any emergency will inevitably cause conflicts because some people steer, while others pay and bear the responsibility.

Thus, it can be assumed that in the coming years, the nation-state will be attacked from literally all sides, as epidemics are only one example of its inefficiency. There will be attempts to dilute its sovereignty, on one hand, in favor of global bureaucracies like the EU and other political blocs; on the other, in favor of local self-government; thirdly, in favor of international non-governmental organizations; and fourthly, in favor of TNCs. And we agorists will surely find a way to profit from these murky waters as well.

Carthage must be destroyed.

Italy fights the epidemic

Big Changes

Sorry, I’m focusing on current events again, which is actually not very characteristic of my channel about theory.

The year has been quite rich in events. So much so that some of them, which seemed very important when they occurred, are now almost forgotten. Who remembers that at the very beginning of the year, a war between the USA and Iran almost broke out? It didn’t happen, so that’s fine. Nevertheless, each such surprise, even if it was managed quickly, rocked the boat. Perhaps the global economy would have digested another fallout between the USA and Iran, but then the coronavirus happened. Perhaps it too would not have caused a global recession, but then the cartel agreement between OPEC and the RF collapsed. If the global economy miraculously digests this as well, tomorrow some new horror will surely happen that will break the camel’s back.

One of the business cycle theories, the so-called real business cycle theory, argues that crises occur not because of some internal reasons and accumulating contradictions in the economy, but exclusively due to external shocks that sharply change consumer behavior. I am not ready to fully adhere to this theory (essentially, it is an application of Taleb’s black swan idea to the theory of economic cycles), but it is hard to deny that external factors are quite significant. However, it is also hard to deny that external factors become quite significant precisely when enough internal contradictions have accumulated.

And as if we didn’t have enough external shocks, the Russian leadership is bustling with activity in domestic politics as well. The resignation of the government, the first wave of constitutional amendments, the second wave of amendments, the idea that the constitutional amendments reset presidential terms—all of this is a reflection of active mental churning at the top. No one knows what ideas will surface in public policy tomorrow, but it is perfectly obvious that fish are easily caught in muddy waters. This must be taken advantage of.

The notorious plebiscite on constitutional amendments is an attempt to scoop up at least a drop of legitimacy from the people. And since legitimacy is needed, populism can be expected. This means it is the perfect time to announce a public demand.

Of course, I don’t know exactly which demand will be widely supported, because even sociologists can only provide support percentages for a closed list. As for us, we have yet to toss that list out there.

I already suggested the first proposal in connection with the Litreev case: the repeal of Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the RF, at least regarding the criminalization of possession without intent to sell. The beginning collapse of the Russian economy provides additional support for this idea: by reducing the prison population by a quarter, the FSIN budget can be significantly cut.

It is unlikely that ideas for tax cuts will be pushed through—we now have a former tax official as prime minister. But it is still necessary to complain about the unbearable tax burden, so that they at least don’t try to exacerbate it. On the other hand, there is a chance to simplify regulations—if presented under the guise of budget savings. For example, trying to replace the abolition of fire supervision with mandatory fire insurance. Or pushing for the easing of control over the circulation of hunting weapons. Or canceling the licensing of various types of activities.

It is very possible that it will be possible to selectively expand the rights of local self-government and bring back mayoral elections in some places.

In short, right now, supporters of reducing the state through political methods have a good opportunity to make progress. Even if success cannot be achieved in all areas, at least they can build up competence. As for the fact that Putin intends to rule forever, it’s too early to worry. Maybe tomorrow he’ll catch the coronavirus, and in a month he’ll kick the bucket—there’s no need to predict so far ahead; Putin currently plays no role in our calculations at all.

On Fears

I enjoyed listening to Ekaterina Schulmann’s lecture on Pravokon, dedicated to the fears that influence Russian society. The lecturer calls the most important category of fears the fear of some unexpected meanness on the part of the state. This could be repressions, tax increases, some new regulations, or simply a banal economic collapse, which the state illustrated in Ekaterina Mikhailovna’s lecture literally just a few days ago.

Analyzing the nature of this fear, Schulmann notes that it is not a manifestation of darkness and ignorance—on the contrary, it is a deeply justified distrust of both the motives of those in power and their competencies. Later, admittedly, she focuses on how best to coordinate in order to defend one’s political rights, but I think we should forgive the political scientist for her love of her subject of study, which prevents her, despite all her criticality toward the state, from sharing a libertarian worldview.

In such situations, one can react to the environment in different ways. Those who practice agorism will likely gloomily calculate what profit can be derived from the coming expansion of the black market, and how to facilitate this expansion. Those who put effort into regime change are considering where it is best to apply those efforts now, when the regime may be on the verge of faltering. Those looking for a country to flee to are considering whether it makes sense to try to save a little more, or if doing so here is already counterproductive. Moreover, as Bitarch recently correctly noted, relative freedom of movement between states is by no means the norm, and for Russia, it is an anomaly; it is unclear how much longer it will last, as it is already being gradually curtailed. And, of course, there are those who will run right now to buy dollars or household appliances at the old prices. Although, keeping in mind the coronavirus wandering around, perhaps a much larger percentage will actually start stocking up on canned goods: this is both an investment in a relatively hard currency and an opportunity to survive a quarantine.

This year, the Russian oil industry is unlikely to bring significant sums to the budget, which means they will squeeze money out of citizens to the fullest. This means that to minimize losses, one should not only try to earn money “under the table,” but also avoid showing money to banks whenever possible: banks are completely transparent to the state. So, those who have not yet acquired bitcoins should do so now and start practicing settling accounts with each other in this currency.

This is probably one of my most banal posts recently. I simply needed to voice all these fears, if only for myself.

Psychological strategy for fighting against state support

Vitaly Tizun’s Column

We are all familiar with the specifics of how the state functions. Its foundation is compulsory and indisputable power over its citizens. This particularly concerns the ability to regulate their activities, apply violence against them, and seize their funds through taxation.

Regardless of how the government system and political mechanisms are implemented, many people are always dissatisfied with the current state of affairs to some extent. And while in a market environment dissatisfaction is resolved simply by renegotiating agreements or switching from one service provider to another, it is not so simple with the state. A person cannot change one state for another as easily, since economic, cultural, linguistic, and other barriers will stand in their way. Because of this, such a change is completely pointless, as for the majority of the population of any state, these barriers are insurmountable, which makes states organizations that compete for people only to a very small degree. This fact confirms the monopoly position of states and all the resulting negative aspects.

An individual also lacks the ability to effectively influence the policy the state pursues toward them. In a market environment, they are able to resolve many issues privately, whereas in the political sphere, their own interests mean nothing; they are obliged to submit to the interests of others. And even if a politician whose plans coincide with their wishes wins an election, or if they themselves become a politician, this only provides the opportunity to support their interests at the expense of infringing upon the interests of other people.

As we can see, the institution of statehood and political methods of management, in contrast to voluntary and market relations, are designed such that the forced and compulsory submission of some people by others is simply inevitable. In fact, the activity of the state is equivalent to the activity of a rapist and a robber. Indeed, it emerged precisely as a nomadic robber who decided to settle in a certain territory and impose his power on the local population through violent methods, as told to us by the stationary bandit theory. The essence of the state fully corresponds to its origin.

What do we get from this? We get that any person who supports the institution of statehood and political methods of management is, in fact, a rapist and a robber themselves. For how else can one call someone who justifies the use of violence and robbery, who considers them natural phenomena? Of course, whether violence and robbery are bad or good phenomena is a purely ethical question, and none of the answers to it can be defined as an objective truth. However, we do not need that; we only need to clearly define who is a supporter of peaceful and voluntary relations, and who supports forced submission and robbery.

Naturally, in current conditions, most people are passive assistants to violence and robbery, since they perceive the state as a natural social institution. It is the revelation of this fact that will allow the positions of the currently existing system to be shaken. For it is one thing when people support violence and robbery without realizing it. However, few are capable of openly admitting themselves to be rapists and robbers; this is the lot of only a minority of people who see nothing wrong in such things, while for the rest, the very concepts of violence and robbery are primarily associated with something immoral.

Using all the above arguments, we can form a psychological strategy for promoting the ideas of freedom. The first stage is the revelation of the fact that the state is a criminal organization specializing in violence and robbery. Next, it is necessary to establish a link between the state and its supporters. Since the state is a rapist and a robber, the people who support it are accomplices in the crimes it commits. Few truly want to be criminals and are capable of declaring (at least to themselves) without any remorse that they are rapists and robbers. The facts mentioned above, since they reveal the link between the criminal state and the person who is at least its passive supporter, are capable of causing psychological discomfort and perhaps even a sense of shame for one’s own complicity in anyone who considers violence and robbery immoral. Thus, in any peace-loving and benevolent person, associations of “state – bandit” and “supporter of the state – also a bandit” should develop. After this, there can be no question of such a person supporting the state; it will be, at the very least, unattractive to them, and possibly even repulsive.

Ancap-chan’s Commentary

Rhetoric addressed more to emotions than to logic does not appeal to me, and I see little value in such argumentation, but value is subjective. I fully admit that some well-meaning statist might indeed be unsettled by these arguments. However, even while sharing the belief that the state is an evil, a statist will believe that the state is the lesser evil. The logic of statists is that without the state, we would get not a peaceful market order, but a rampage of banditry, and only unpleasant types in police caps somehow restrain this very rampage. Yes, they themselves are prone to banditry, but checks, balances, public control and other blah-blah-blah.

What seems far more important to me is the ability to demonstrate the functioning of peaceful market mechanisms in those areas that are weakly subject to state influence, or where the state fails to meet the obligations it has undertaken and for which substantial budgets are spent.

In general, I would soften the premises presented in the text. Not “every accomplice of the state is a bandit,” but “one who defends the right of the state to continue spending money knowingly inefficiently in a sphere where there is a working non-state alternative — that person is truly a conscious accomplice of bandits.”

Well, it’s something…

Stationary Bandit

It’s been a while since we’ve delighted you with fresh videos from the Libertarian Band! Today’s video concludes the second part of the cycle on libertarianism. In the first part, we started with the fact that the state has failed, and then discussed how libertarians try to eliminate it through various means. In the second part, we explained various terms and concepts popular among libertarians. And now we have returned to where we began, talking about what the state is, all its pros, cons, and pitfalls.

In the third part of our long cycle, we will proceed to explain how a stateless society is organized and how it works.

From Dictatorship to Democracy. Overview.

Commissioned by the Tea Club

Gene Sharp’s essay “From Dictatorship to Democracy” could just as easily have been titled “From the State to Ancap” or “From Bad to Good.” In fact, it is simply a collection of reflections on how to change a political regime if you dislike it, feel morally justified, and assume public support for your position.

The central idea of the book is that the most reliable strategy for this is political disobedience, also known as nonviolent resistance. A consistent denial of the state’s legitimacy can indeed make it illegitimate as this denial becomes increasingly stylish, fashionable, and youthful.

The weak point of the approach proposed by Sharp is that everything must begin with strategic planning, and then the resistance develops its activities strictly according to the plan, centrally deciding which of the 198 methods to choose for today and which for tomorrow. Thus, the best tactic for a dictator is to sow discord within the opposition, letting them fight among themselves to determine under whose banners they should unite in the war against the bloody regime.

Decentralized resistance, according to Sharp, is far less effective, and this is bad news for ancaps wishing to act through political methods.

On the other hand, Sharp explicitly points out that one should not just fight a dictatorship, but already at the stage of resistance plant the seeds of a new society that will already be legitimate by the time the regime falls, and this fall will merely provide them with legality. Thus, if the ultimate goal of the resistance is to adopt the construction of a stateless society with decentralized law and a free, unregulated market, then the idea of building the resistance on these very same principles seems damn logical; Sharp simply did not consider such a goal: his political fantasies did not extend beyond the Swiss cantons.

The least useful part of the book turns out to be the most famous—namely, the appendix listing the notorious 198 methods of nonviolent resistance. The book was written in 1993; in 27 years, the toolkit has changed significantly, and those methods that are still relevant are already more or less well-known. So, I can understand Leonid Volkov, the chief of staff of the Russian resistance, stating that the book is weak, but I do not accept his reproaches that it is harmful. It is definitely worth reading. As for using it in practice—do so with great caution. Especially since, since the book was written, dictatorships have increasingly mutated into electoral autocracies, and the set of methods for abolishing them will be very different.

Among the book’s strengths is its modest size; if one wishes, the essay can be finished in one evening.

In Praise of Moderation

On February 1, the Tea Club held a conference with the elegant title “Keep to the Right” in Moscow. Among others, speaking was Mikhail Pozharsky, whom I have quoted many times, who used simple examples from the First World War to explain why you don’t need to fight the left to defeat them.

Today, the state handed down huge sentences in a flimsy case regarding the preparation of terrorist attacks, the so-called “Network” case. But this case was preceded by a real terrorist attack by anarchist Mikhail Zlobitsky, after which security services employees smirked with joy, having received new powers, budgets, and quotas for fabricating extremists. History has known cases where liberal reforms were rolled back or bloody wars were unleashed as a result of terrorist attacks, but I cannot recall a single instance where a terrorist attack prompted the state to loosen its grip on society. At best, the state limits itself to increased security measures for top officials, as happens in the USA, with its traditions of shooting presidents.

The other day, a second round of debates on anarchy took place between a team of ancaps and a team of left-wing anarchists. This was preceded by a long period of personal negotiations and attempts to find common ground; now, they managed to organize a civilized conversation in a public forum. And this is bearing fruit—for example, this review in an anarcho-channel. Each side is discovering the other, searching for conciliatory language, avoiding escalation during the debates themselves—and realizing that the main common enemy is not the left or the right, but the state.

Perhaps, over time, it will be possible to sway the brave left-wing anarchists away from revolutionary rhetoric toward something more moderate, so they stop their meaningless self-sacrifice for the benefit of provocateurs from the security services.

Indeed, I myself have significantly reduced the degree of approval for purely military tactics in my articles. I was quite rightly reprimanded during the discussion of my article on the doctrine of deterrence for the example of eliminating the King of Thailand. Truly, the will of one person does not decide so much that one can expect to solve a problem by eliminating that person or creating a deadly threat to them. It is far more useful if the idea of an attack by state representatives is viewed as ethically unacceptable, and this is achieved through the softening of manners.

So, let us continue our activity of education and persuasion, continue peaceful protest and the creation of a mass feeling of the state’s uselessness—and under no circumstances let us give it a reason to claim its necessity for the sake of fighting various dangerous extremists. The slogan that extremism in the defense of justice is not a vice is false.

As for those innocently imprisoned, they must, of course, be fought for against the state. This means taking to the streets, public appeals from celebrities, and other boring but effective political practices.


P.S. I was immediately written to saying that I confused cause and effect, and that Zlobitsky’s bombing happened precisely as a reaction to the “Network” case. Please forgive the blurred take; however, in such a scenario, the situation only becomes even more tragic.

The Road to Serfdom. Review

Commissioned by the Tea Club

Many reviews and critiques have been written about Hayek’s “The Road to Serfdom,” where the book is placed within its historical context, its position among Hayek’s publications is identified, and a brief analysis of its ideas is provided. As much as I would like to avoid all this academicism, it is impossible, as the entire book is a political pamphlet on the pressing issues of the day, and the only reason the work remains relevant to this day is that ideas do not die—and this applies not only to Hayek’s own ideas, but also to those he fought against.

“The Road to Serfdom” was published in Great Britain in 1944, when the country was finishing its fifth year of war with the National Socialist Reich. Victory over the Reich was simply a matter of time, and one could have calmly begun to reflect on the postwar restructuring of the world, but the author felt it was far more important to draw the public’s attention to the fact that the dragon-slayer was beginning to increasingly resemble the one he was fighting. Hayek saw the victory of the Labour Party in the upcoming general elections as the most terrifying danger for Britain. That is exactly what happened. As a result, Great Britain accumulated an economic lag behind freer countries right up until the Thatcher reforms.

The main idea Hayek fights against in his book is the notion that economic planning brings prosperity. He painstakingly demonstrates that the temptation to slightly regulate from above for the greater benefit of society is the first step toward regulating everything and everyone to the point where it is impossible to breathe: there is no natural optimum on this road, upon reaching which the government would stop on its own and declare that things are now good and nothing more needs to be tweaked. He also shows that regulation is total, and economic freedoms are inseparable from political ones, so people far removed from economics should not look benevolently upon interventionist efforts, thinking that as long as political freedoms are left untouched, economics is a narrow specialized topic and experts know best how to steer it.

Hayek did not claim that everything was hopeless and that, having stepped onto the road to serfdom, humanity would be unable to stop. If he had believed so, he would have had no need to write the book. He did, however, argue that the further one goes down this road, the harder it is to stop, and therefore socialism is best fought at the far approaches. Unfortunately, practice has shown the exact opposite: it is extremely difficult to deny socialists small concessions while society as a whole is liberal, but when everything is already regulated to shreds, both society and the government tire of the constant tightening of the screws. A sufficiently strong demand for deregulation emerges, it is carried out, and people breathe a sigh of relief, but it soon turns out that the leviathan, having retreated in one place, is already pressing in another.

In the article Barrier on the Road to Serfdom: Dead End or Detour?, Bitarch and I mentioned John Meadowcroft’s thesis that it is the hybrid society that proves to be stable, unlike the liberal or totalitarian ones, and we also pointed out that neither increasing transparency nor reducing direct state participation in the economy helps avoid the fact that the overall regulation of society continues to grow slowly.

The book “The Road to Serfdom” is a good example of rhetoric that can and should be used when working with politicians. The fact is that most of the arguments in the book are no longer relevant, unless, of course, you are dealing with hardline Marxists; against more or less modern supporters of state regulation, it makes sense to apply Hayek’s later texts, such as “The Fatal Conceit.”