Тег: Strategy

Porridge from an axe, part 2. Cooking ancap from left-wing ideas.

Thanks to Bitarch for the idea for the article

I’ve been thinking about how to illustrate the “porridge from an axe” strategy as applied to government people to move closer to ancap, and it seems the only working option is flirting with the idea of separatism. Local leadership, of course, would be happy not to depend on Moscow, and then the task is broken down into small pieces, and campaigns begin for the redistribution of taxes and powers from the center to the localities and so on. But perhaps it would be more interesting to show the strategy by pitching ideas not to officials, but to the people.

As is well known, left-wing sentiments prevail in Russia, and the key idea of the left is equality. Great, let’s cook some porridge out of equality.

Let’s start by exploiting such a wonderful base human quality as envy. If my own cow was taken away, let the neighbor’s be taken too. Not long ago, there was a pension reform where the retirement age for citizens was raised by five years. But not for everyone. Employees of security agencies and several other categories still retire early. To begin with, one could demand that their retirement age also be raised to the same age to ensure equality. If you can’t serve in the FSB at 50, that’s no reason to retire; just transfer to a civilian job and work until the end. The saved funds should be demanded to be divided among all pensioners, so the measure looks sufficiently populist.

Furthermore. If the pension amount for ordinary citizens is determined by how much they paid into the pension fund, then for privileged categories, it is a percentage of their salary. This is an irregularity; down with privileges, let’s have accruals for everyone according to a single formula!

If these measures, which do not put the state directly under attack, can be pushed through, the people will smell blood, and it will be difficult to stop them further. I will outline the remaining steps in dotted lines; the order of their implementation may change anyway.

Abolition of in-kind privileges, such as free public transport, official transport for high-ranking officials, official apartments, and the like. Everything should be folded into the salary for greater transparency and ease of administration.

Abolition of the prosecutor’s office. If the state needs a representative in court, let it hire a lawyer on general terms, rather than keeping a special staff of officials for this purpose. And to initiate lawsuits for various violations, shoulder straps are not needed at all; citizens can handle this themselves, personally or through public organizations.

Abolition of military conscription. Wagner is fighting for Russia anyway, so let it do so officially, along with Tchaikovsky, Liszt, Chopin, and other fine fellows providing their services on the market. For a locksmith with a mortgage, a competitive choice of employers is definitely more profitable than a single PMC, which moreover operates under the table.

Abolition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. How is the police better than the Cossacks, Serba, and other guardians of traditional values and citizens’ peace? The municipality will figure out for itself whom to hire to guard the peace on the streets. And as for forensic experts—how are they better than laboratory employees who perform paid analyses for citizens? Down with inequality!

Sale of state property. Why is some official disposing of the people’s assets? Seize and redistribute! We sell state property and divide the proceeds equally among all citizens.

And so on. The entire sequential dismantling of the state is perfectly performed under left-wing slogans of equality and justice, and most importantly—there is no need to scare anyone with scary ancap.

In the twentieth century, citizens achieved the most victories under slogans of equality. This includes the movement against segregation in the USA, anti-colonialism, and feminism. And in Russia, social protests are often quite successful. So why not start using this energy in a more useful channel instead of simply branding leftists?

By the way, speaking of bayonets: the right to bear arms is also about equality

Porridge from an axe

or
He who says he hates the state simply doesn’t know how to cook it

Thanks to Bitarkh for the idea of the article

There is a fairly common negotiation strategy that I know as the Napoleon principle: ask for the impossible, and you will get the maximum. I can’t speak for Napoleon, but today it is practiced, for example, by Trump, and it is also loved by various terrorists who have taken hostages. This strategy is good, but it has one small flaw: it only works when applied from a position of strength. Therefore, when some political activist comes forward with maximalist demands addressed to the state, the first thing I do is calculate what they can threaten if the demands are not met, and usually, I immediately get bored. Empty demands are ignored at best, and punished at worst.

If your negotiating position is weak, it is far more appropriate to apply the opposite strategy, which could be called the “porridge from an axe” strategy, because it is well illustrated by this fairy tale:

A soldier was returning home from war and asked an old woman for a place to stay for the night. She let him in. He asked for something to eat, and she replied that she had nothing herself. Seeing an axe, he said: light the stove, bring the pot, we are going to cook porridge from an axe. She was surprised and did as requested. The water boiled, the soldier tasted the water and asked for salt. Then for grains. In different versions, there were other requests for ingredients; finally, the porridge was enriched with butter, served on the table, and eaten with appetite. As for the axe, the soldier either took it with him to finish cooking and eating, or left it with the old woman along with similar instructions.

If the Napoleonic strategy is used by terrorists who have taken hostages, then “porridge from an axe” is used, conversely, by the negotiators who talk those terrorists into submission. The strategy boils down to gradually wheedling out small concessions, and it is based on the assumption that the second party will incur costs not only from fulfilling the request, but also from refusing it. Another assumption is that the second party must have a larger goal and must believe that a series of small deals leads them toward that goal. If the soldier had not lured her with the promise of porridge from an axe, but simply asked for access to the stove, firewood, water, a pot, salt, and so on, he would have received a firm refusal somewhere at the salt stage, as in, “boiling water is enough for you.” Similarly, a terrorist will release hostages bit by bit if he is convinced that this advances him toward his stated goal, and not simply because he was asked.

In negotiations with representatives of the state, it makes sense for libertarians to use exactly this strategy. That is, one needs to find out what goal a specific official is pursuing, and then begin offering them small steps that should lead them toward that goal in exchange for giving up positions on some things that are not principled for them.

We will develop this topic in the next article.

Let’s assume that I dyed the soldier’s hair black and his forelock gold)))

People’s Self-Defense, platform review

Lately in Russia, it has become very simple to understand who possesses political agency. They are the ones the state fights against. If the state is not fighting someone, it means they are either completely under control or staying out of sight: the Russian state seems to have completely forgotten how to tolerate those who conduct noticeable independent activities.

By this criterion, it is difficult to deny political agency to the Russian anarcho-communists of Narodnaya Samoborona: they are actively persecuted, and most of their activities are forced to take place under the mask of anonymity, but if anyone is caught, it is almost always criminal charges, torture, and other trash.

I tried to examine their platform to understand how promising these guys are as allies and how dangerous they are as enemies. On the movement’s website, it is presented as a rather voluminous text. It consists of four parts; I will go through them.

Part 1. How the world is structured. Global division of labor

This section describes how ancoms view the modern world order and its main problems. It discusses the division of labor between countries: raw material providers, industrial nations, sources of labor migrants — and the post-industrial peak of the food chain, for which all the above categories of countries toil. It is pointed out that as wealth grows in industrial countries, production must be moved to places where cheap labor still exists. It is also mentioned that the social democracy of first-world countries is a fragile compromise between power and society, maintained only through the exploitation of the rest of the world. Countries that generate problems, according to the author, fight to raise their status within this system, rather than to change the system itself. Finally, it is explained that escaping the system within a single country is impossible, because isolation from the world economy condemns a country to barbarism and poverty.

I will note that the description is generally quite correct, while the analysis is conducted in terms of almost Marxism; and although the growth of welfare in developing countries is noted, the beneficial role of the market is ignored, as is the fact that the described distribution of countries according to their place in the global division of labor correlates best with the level of economic freedom in those countries.

Part 2. Capitalism and the state

This section provides a historical overview of the emergence of modern types of states, stating that modern states are a product of capitalism. It discusses the growth of inequality and globalization as a logical result of the functioning of capitalism. Examples are used to explain that the state is not required for the self-organization of society, but is needed only to legitimize plunder. It is stated that all forms of state organization fail to fully account for the interests of people, and therefore there is no need to try to improve the state; it must be abolished. It also discusses the dangers of new platform-type businesses, which, in exchange for their services, place a person in a serious state of dependence on them.

I will note that the historical analysis overlooks the fact that capitalism appeared not thanks to, but despite the state: the old aristocracy was quite satisfied with total stability, and only the military efficiency of capitalism forced the state to make concessions and restructure. I also consider it important to mention that the basis of capitalism is not so much wage labor as the possibility of replacing labor with capital — it is this that increases labor productivity and, subsequently, its price.

Part 3. The new society

This section describes a wonderful humanity of the future, representing a federation of direct-democracy poleis — something like the Athenian League from Themistocles to Pericles, but without a hegemon polis, and with robots instead of slaves. Instead of the market, decentralized planning should be the basis of the economy, with the collection of requests from consumers and their aggregation in automated production management systems. The problem of corruption in management and distribution is solved by frequent rotation, full involvement of citizens in the process, and where possible, the replacement of elections for positions with a lottery. To simplify distribution, comprehensive prosumerization is envisioned, where people use 3D printers and similar tools rather than ordering a finished product. Money and private property are abolished.

I will note that the author is clearly more familiar with history than with economic theory, and perhaps his views on planning will change somewhat after becoming acquainted with the impossibility theorem of economic calculation under socialism. Also completely overlooked is the factor of the lack of natural motivation for innovations, and especially for their implementation, within a planned economy. Finally, it would be good to understand to what extent the factor of the tyranny of the majority is overcome in the new society, when direct democracy tramples human freedom, forcing the individual to submit to the collective on issues that do not actually directly concern the collective. These aspects are not analyzed in the text at all.

Part 4. Achieving the new society

In the final and most extensive part, the methods for building a new society are discussed. It is stated that one should not search for a permanent revolutionary class; instead, it is more important to find those with whom there is a commonality of interests. The possibility of reforming the system is categorically denied, and the necessity of its collapse is postulated. Direct action is recognized as the best way to accustom people to anarchist doctrine — the transmission of the practice of self-organization to solve various tasks through direct experience and personal example. It is pointed out that although social revolution is the only possible way to transition to a new society, it is fraught with the emergence of a revolutionary dictatorship, through which the state inevitably revives. It is also shown that early ancom societies will be forced during the transition period to operate within the global market economy — which, in turn, can easily turn any cooperative into an ordinary capitalist enterprise; therefore, once started, one must not stop but finish off capitalism worldwide.

The prospects for Russia to become the flagship of the transition to a new society are seen by the author as extremely low, so a long period of underground activity with a gradual growth of the activist network is predicted. It is stated that it is important to create not large leadership structures, but a network of small groups with maximum participant involvement and an emphasis on passing experience from veterans to neophytes. The author suggests approaching violent actions with extreme caution, as they can both inspire supporters and lead to the destruction of cells and even networks due to the reaction of the state security apparatus. Pro-state paramilitaries are indicated as a suitable target for training and demonstrating combat capabilities, as the state will not step in for them. Finally, advice on conspiracy and psychological preparation is given.

The section ends with an ellipsis: the author lists many dangers, points out that none of the previously practiced paths is capable of leading to victory on its own, and that the movement will remain marginal for a long time.

I really liked this chapter, where the author finally moves from the shaky ground of theory to things he clearly understands well and weighs all dangers quite soberly.

Summary

For me, it was important to understand what these ancoms hate more: the state or private property. If it is the former, then we are on the same path for now. If the latter, then it is better to leave them to themselves and not touch them first, while being ready to respond harshly to violence. Fortunately, it seems there is more common sense in them than outdated political-economic ideas, and the obvious bandit that the state is appears to them as a more priority target than well-meaning but mistaken guys like us, the ancaps: they are nonetheless more ready to persuade us than to kill us.

Therefore, I would like to suggest the unknown author of the text discussed above, or any other sufficiently authoritative ancom, to return the favor and analyze the libertarian platform for strengths and weaknesses, inconsistencies, prospects for alliance, and so on. As a basis for analysis, I suggest using the text on libertarianism from the Libertarian Party website — it is detailed enough, yet relatively compact, and has the advantage of being a more or less official document, which my articles, for example, are not.

And after both sides are convinced that there is a minimum understanding between them, it will be possible to consider the possibilities for cooperation.

Anonymity, protest, division of labor

A post from the Telegram channel “IT criminal cases SORM rossiyushka” is actively spreading across the network about how important it is for everyone to set the correct privacy settings in Telegram, after first updating it to the latest version. The update was made following the outrage of protesters in Hong Kong, who discovered they were being deanonymized by adding all possible phone numbers to the contact list, after which Telegram’s friendly interface immediately gave up the activists’ accounts by phone number. The hole has now been patched, but the old settings are still there by default; they must be changed manually.

Not long ago, I also mentioned a post from the Cryptoagora channel about how to obtain fake bank cards and SIM cards without intermediaries (spoiler: realistic silicone masks are used).

And very recently, Bitarch spoke out regarding the fact that automatic facial recognition systems are inevitably doomed to false positives, meaning that one can not only cover their tracks this way, but also try to feed the opponent members of their own gang: other security forces, odious officials, and so on.

In light of the fact that the Russian authorities are actively purchasing cameras for facial recognition at mass protests, the opportunity arises to provide the press with headlines like: “Zhirinovsky threw feces at a Rosgvardiya officer,” or “Three Putin doubles urinated on a cop.” But—no.

The complication of the protest and the tightening of the screws by the regime currently dictate a clear maintenance of the boundary between legal and illegal actions. During a legal protest, whether agreed upon with the city administration or not, a person limits their toolkit and also expects other protest participants to do the same. Any other behavior will logically be perceived by them as a provocation. At the same time, at other times when the streets are not flooded with security forces, nothing prevents anonymous individuals from carrying out well-prepared actions that discredit the regime, appearing on camera in the images of, for example, Petrunko or Kusyuk.

It is also worth considering in advance which role in the protest suits you best and not striving for versatility. You can sit anonymously on the internet and write articles of a quasi-extremist nature, or you can speak from a podium—but it will be very difficult to combine both functions, as attention to a known activist increases the probability of deanonymizing their persona. You can attend agreed rallies, appearing on surveillance cameras and in cell operator logs, but it will be difficult to combine this with posting flyers or smashing police windows, deanonymized using Russian Elephant. Finally, you can donate to projects you like, although earning money for this may not leave you, for example, with opportunities for serious offline activism.

There will be no post tomorrow; in my offline incarnation, I am going to observe the elections. But if the whim of running for office myself had entered my head, I would have had to hand the channel over to someone else. There is no helping it; every choice entails costs. So let’s drink to the hope that tomorrow we will not regret the choice we made today!

Put on a mask — don’t get caught

Navalny, Libertarians, and Protest Discourse

Civil society in Russia has been trying to rock the boat and change the government for something more human-like for quite some time now, in order to stop the country’s slide into an authoritarian hole. Alexei Navalny has long and firmly been the frontman of the Russian protest.

The core of Navalny’s agenda is the exploitation of the public demand for justice. Lawlessness, corruption, and the looting of the state budget—covering all these topics ensured Navalny’s well-deserved popularity. Nationalists tried to speak out against the infringement of the rights of the Russian-speaking population, but this aspect of justice proved not to be particularly in demand among the masses. Old-regime democrats peddled the theme of Russian foreign policy aggression, the tightening of civil liberties, and the escalation of political repression—but they only earned the label of “demshiza” (democratic crazies). Libertarians protested against increased regulation and higher taxes—they were completely ignored. Everything flowed in its own way until Svetov arrived.

In the eyes of the average citizen, Navalny’s agenda boiled down to the idea that once he comes to power, he will imprison all the crooks and thieves, thereby restoring justice. Svetov increased the level of populism even further, adding: those we don’t imprison, we will fire without severance pay and strip of their political rights. Such a demand for revenge, due to the use of the sophisticated word “Lustration,” did not resonate with people immediately, but aggressive advertising did its job. The Libertarian Party received a huge influx of fresh blood and rightfully took its place in the protest pantheon to the right of Navalny himself.

An interesting situation emerged where the theme of freedom practically vanished from the public discourse of the LPR, replaced by that very theme of justice, since this rhetoric brings more political points. The main task of the LPR now, judging by the rhetoric, is to overthrow the regime together with its allies; after that, they can distance themselves from Navalny and other fellow travelers and begin advocating for their own specific agenda of reforms. To what extent the Libertarian Party will preserve libertarian values within itself by that time is not yet very clear; however, it is becoming obvious that libertarianism is much broader than what the party does (and what is generally appropriate for a political party to do).

Previously, the activities of the LPR consisted not so much of politics as of education; now the situation has changed, and politics has come to the forefront. This is wonderful, as the division of labor usually contributes to greater efficiency of that very labor. At the same time, of course, it should be expected that those who are not interested in political activity at all, and who were members specifically for the sake of education, or who viewed it as a hobby club, will leave the party. This is logical, since many ancaps fundamentally believe that engaging in politics is pointless, and it would be far more appropriate, for example, to promote a libertarian lifestyle.

I believe that minarchists and panarchists may also receive some indirect profit from the spread of ancap ideas among the apolitical masses, and ancaps are unlikely to lose from having a conditionally friendly political representation—after all, they have nothing against using the state’s weak points to weaken it. Therefore, I urge you not to interfere with libertarians getting into politics, not to quarrel with LPR members, but also not to believe that this party is the only beacon of hope, and that any libertarian activity must be somehow coordinated with this political organization.

However, entering politics under libertarian slogans outside of the LPR is already a serious claim that the libertarian market niche is large and capable of accommodating more than one libertarian party. Perhaps this is true, but here you will have to be ready for fierce competition, which may prove counterproductive, as it diverts resources away from competing with pro-government organizations.

Libertarians in Navalny’s right hand, and coffee in his left. That is how we shall conquer!

Discussion on Panarchy and Libertarianism

A detailed question from Vasily, to which a donation of 0.00008257 btc was kindly attached for urgency.

I do not believe that panarchy is libertarianism

Yes, a panarchist structure of power will most likely be freer than a centralized one. But the ideas of panarchy resemble a tool for state or social organization more. There is nothing in them about traditional libertarian self-ownership, and nothing is clear even regarding the freedom to exit a jurisdiction. Most academic articles acknowledge the need for an additional jurisdiction that ensures the legal capacity of people and their freedom from the oppression of panarchist jurisdictions. Panarchism as a tool could well be used by a quasi-statist regime: transforming the power of oligarchs into actual serfdom jurisdictions where corporate slaves have no right to exit. This results in the classic cyberpunk scenario that sci-fi writers warned about. For real freedom, we still need classic libertarian works: the concept of self-ownership, the NAP, and their political implementation, whether it be ancap or minarchism. And only then, if people need FOCJs, the market will decide. In short, there is no guarantee that panarchy leads to libertarianism, and I see no libertarian value in the idea of FOCJs itself.

Proof from your own translation of FOCJ:

One condition is fundamental for the correct functioning of FOCJs: the guarantee of political and economic competition. This means the openness and freedom of markets, specified in the “four freedoms”—the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital—all of which must be protected. At the same time, the political markets of FOCJs must be competitive, meaning that human rights and basic democratic rights must be guaranteed. This includes the right of people to use direct democracy as a tool.
Like states, FOCJs will by nature strive to undermine any competition, following their commercial interests by attempting to build cartels or monopolies. This requires the existence of a “competition oversight board” responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules. This body will also regulate the limits of fees for entry contributions and exit penalties.

In other words, this article explicitly acknowledges that what they call “jurisdictions” must exist within a single legal regime. What the authors call “jurisdictions” looks less like jurisdictions in a political-legal sense and more like providers of certain services; their jurisdictional nature lies only in the fact that they obtain the right to “collect taxes.” A libertarian minimal state does not solve the problems the authors propose handing over to FOCJs, but rather the problems that allow FOCJs to exist and function.

Restricting trade is locally beneficial, which is why historically, people who gained power over a jurisdiction began introducing various fees, penalties, fines, and so on. One could say this was only possible because there was no exit from jurisdictions (and there wasn’t). The thing is, every jurisdiction will be interested in restricting exit, which is exactly what is discussed in the area of the FOCJ article excerpt I quoted above. That is why the authors themselves introduce some minarchist or ancap—it doesn’t matter which—body that stands above and before the FOCJ. And this is exactly what libertarians propose to implement. As for the FOCJs—let the free market decide.

Answer from Ancap-chan

You correctly noted the main shortcomings of the idea of functional overlapping competing jurisdictions proposed by Eichenberger and Frey: it is a certain optimization of existing government functionality without eliminating the key flaws of the state and without guarantees that a management system reformed in this way will not revert over time to a level of oppression as high as it is now. The internal protection against abuse in the FOCJ system is not much higher than in modern states.

The advantage of the FOCJ system is not that it offers the best solution, but that it offers a solution implementable within the specific framework of the European Union. In conditions where, due to flaws inherent in this political Frankenstein, one of the largest European economies is already separating from it, a political force that raises FOCJs on its banners has some chance of success. Moreover, FOCJs can be implemented locally first, and only then can the experience be extended to wider territories.

FOCJ is not panarchy. “Competing,” although it starts with the same letter as “contractual,” is not necessarily contractual, meaning there is no talk of voluntary entry into one jurisdiction or another. As a control mechanism, the authors propose good old representative democracy, which forms the corresponding bodies, as well as direct democracy, allowing local decisions to be made at the level of a particular FOCJ. I have written about the flaws of democracy, so I will not repeat myself.

You suggest the option: “first pure ancap, and then let the market decide if FOCJs are needed.” This brings us closer to Nozick’s speculations: let’s imagine we have pure ancap, and now I will demonstrate to you how it will over time transform into an ultra-minimal state without contradicting libertarian principles. Similarly, based on certain assumptions about human nature and what is just, one could probably derive that pure ancap will inevitably mutate over time into panarchy, i.e., a system of FOCJs.

Either way, for such reasoning to become relevant, one must first achieve pure ancap. Meanwhile, both minarchism and panarchy are ways of reducing state oppression that may or may not lead to pure ancap, and putting the cart before the horse here makes sense only as a thought experiment to determine how stable pure ancap is.

The remaining question is whether the FOCJ system can turn into panarchy over time, and whether that would then turn into ancap. If yes, then it makes sense to support it. If not, then it is a dead end, and FOCJ is as much an obstacle for a true ancap as a regular big state.

Here, as with any forecasts, I step onto the shaky ground of conjecture. My conjecture is that it is easier to bring sparkling cleanliness where it isn’t already heavily soiled, than where the initial cleaning requires bringing the waters of Alpheus and Peneus to the Augean stables. Switzerland, Singapore, North Korea, and Somalia are all far from ancap. For pure ancap to appear there, one must, first, abolish the state, and, second, ensure non-state institutions for the protection of private property. Of course, in Somalia it is easier to abolish the state, and in Switzerland it is easier to ensure the protection of private property, so choosing which of these countries is easier to establish ancap in may prove difficult. But comparing North Korea and Singapore, it is quite obvious that building ancap is easier in Singapore: the state is slightly weaker there, and property is much better protected. Likewise, it is sufficiently obvious that building ancap is easier in a Europe built on the basis of FOCJs than in the current European Union.

So I would wish the esteemed authors of the article on FOCJs a swift adoption of their ideas by European politicians. Even if FOCJ is not libertarianism, with FOCJ, libertarianism has a better chance.

Let Reiner and Bruno dig the canal, and we will come through with the broom afterward.

On the topic of the day

You know that my channel is completely non-political in nature. I have no right to call anyone to the barricades, as I maintain my own anonymity; I am quite skeptical about the prospects of decent individuals participating in legal politics, about the prospects of registering a couple of potentially good political parties—and so on. But regarding what has been happening in recent days, I have developed a distinct personal interest. The Russian government is depriving me of the opportunity to listen to people who interest me.

For a month, Aleksey Navalny, the host of the popular weekly program “Russia of the Future,” has been lost to me. The channel’s attempts to find an adequate replacement have not even come close to success so far. For a month, I have been deprived of Mikhail Svetov’s programs on SVTV—now, instead of interviews with various interesting people, the channel shows imperial stormtroopers beating peaceful citizens to touching music. For a month, I have been cut off from the best weekly program on economics, hosted by Vladimir Milov. Even Egor Zhukov’s channel, which provided rather thoughtful content on a wide variety of topics, has now closed for an as-yet-unclear period. Such a violation of my consumer rights by the state, of course, does not add to my affection for the institution of the state in general and the Russian political regime in particular.

I don’t have many opportunities left to somehow harm the state in return. I no longer pay personal income tax or various other personal taxes. I already try to choose stores that do not pay VAT (this is visible on the receipts), and whenever possible, I shop at the bazaar. For the state, I practically do not exist.

However, I have this channel, and I would like to use it to convey a simple thought as widely as possible. The state is your enemy. In open confrontation, it is stronger, but it is very vulnerable to guerrilla warfare. Do not feed the state with your money. If you are forced to work for it, work poorly. View yourself as a spy or even a saboteur in the enemy’s rear. Plunder state property: it will be better in private hands (this, of course, does not refer to various urban improvement items; why spite yourselves). Squeeze all the social benefits out of the state that it has carelessly allowed you to claim. Do not hesitate to do this using fake documents if you have the opportunity. Decorating the city with leaflets and graffiti saying that the state is the enemy is a great idea and a classic of guerrilla struggle. If you want to kill a cop—think thrice.

Before deciding on things that the state opposes particularly harshly, master the art of conspiracy. At least the basics, such as the fact that your smartphone is not only an invaluable assistant but also a spy that will help the state find you, and Vkontakte is simply a garden plot where the state grows criminal cases. Think not only about satisfying your own demand for justice but also about the PR effect. It is better if the direct damage to the enemy turns out to be smaller, while the state loses more in the eyes of society. Ultimately, the state must be expelled precisely from people’s heads, and it would be enough if it were only from ours—but we will have to reach the last grandmother.

As for the recent initiatives of the Russian security forces, I very much hope that they will serve to unite the opposition. For the state, we are all—regardless of the nuances of our ideas about the desired society—equally enemies. Let’s not feud with each other. I hope that Gudkov meets Svetov at the doors of the detention center, they shake hands, and go together to record a stream with prison tales and plans for joint action. I hope that Zhukov then arrives with a bouquet of flowers and is also happily welcomed into the company. I hope that people stop reminding Svetov and Navalny about various ancient questionable posts on LiveJournal, and if someone does, they are snapped at. I hope that Svetov starts collaborating with the Tea Club. Who said what bad thing to whom and how they threatened—it doesn’t matter anymore, we are not in that position now. It would be good if simultaneous imprisonment in a detention center helps the ambitious leaders of the Russian protest reach this simple understanding.

Oh, little apple,
Where are you rolling…

What do you think about the July 27 protests?

Do you think that people have started to change for the better? Also, what do you think about protest tactics?

I found one such tactic on the internet, apparently inspired by recent events; it would be interesting to hear your opinion on this:

Action Plan

Before the march begins – initial gathering point for protesters:

1. Protesters split into groups of 5-10 people. People organize into groups using:
1.1. Commanders
1.1.1. The commander indicates the group’s status with their hand – a fist means the group is assembled and waiting for instructions. The number of extended fingers equals the number of free spaces.
1.2. Via social networks, the Briar app.
1.3. On their own (together with friends at the rally)
1.4. Preferably, groups should be homogeneous – groups of women, groups of tall people, groups of cyclists, etc.
2. Commanders are chosen within the groups:
2.1. The commander must use hand gestures (described in point 1.1.1) to identify themselves to other commanders.
2.2. Commanders must have a phone with the Briar app.
3. Commanders with “fists” gather in one place. The groups themselves are free to either stay or follow the commander.
4. Commanders are added to a private group in Briar.
5. Commanders discuss the course of the rally. Specifically, the following are established:
5.1. A “commander-in-chief” is chosen (if necessary)
5.2. Destination point
5.3. Group roles:
5.3.1. Vanguard/Tank-group/Main-Group – positioned at the front. Their tasks include:
5.3.1.1. Ensuring the formation is impenetrable to police
5.3.1.2. Breaking through blockades (if any exist)
5.3.1.3. Other tasks (to be supplemented)
5.3.2. Recon-group. Its tasks include:
5.3.3.1. Detecting cordons, barriers, paddy wagons, patrol groups, rapid response groups, police officers, and other agencies
5.3.3.2. Detecting bypass routes, as well as methods to facilitate the crowd’s passage through cordons and barriers
5.3.3.3. Maintaining direct contact with the “commander-in-chief” (if any), otherwise everything is decided via chat
5.3.3. Midgard-group. Its tasks include:
5.3.3.1. Pushing law enforcement officers back into the crowd
5.3.3.2. Suppressing law enforcement groups that have broken into the crowd
5.3.3.3. Providing medical aid to the main group
5.3.3.4. Supplies of equipment taken from law enforcement forces
5.3.4. Support/Spirit/Passive group. Its tasks include:
5.3.4.1. Delivering equipment
5.3.4.2. Delivering messages
5.3.4.3. Chants/extras/initiative
5.3.5. Communications group (possibly unnecessary). Its tasks include:
5.3.5.1. Delivering messages in the absence of Briar
5.3.5.2. Coordinating groups
6. The march begins

At the meeting point, a new goal and the paths to reach it are chosen.

Ancap-chan’s Answer

The action on July 27, of course, looked quite inspiring. Even if nothing more remarkable happens until the elections, and opposition candidates are still not allowed to run, the pro-government candidates still have little to look forward to in these elections. Moreover, it is quite likely that this will lead to changes in the election law: signatures may be allowed via government services, election deposits may be brought back, the collection threshold may be significantly lowered, or graphological expertise may be abolished — in short, the authorities will have to take measures to curb such scandals in the future, as it is too costly for them otherwise.

So, the Muscovites did well; it is only fitting that, as residents of the capital of a highly centralized state, they show increased opposition — and they did, while simultaneously demonstrating civilized behavior.

Now let’s talk a bit about tactics. Honestly, the provided snippet of the manual reminded me of War and Peace: Die erste Kolonne marschiert… die zweite Kolonne marschiert — the battle plan for Austerlitz. It is impossible to ensure a clear, disciplined behavior of large masses of people without full-scale combat coordination. A conditional National Guard can train for a long time to form their little boxes, run in lines, and so on. For people who have not trained in advance, only the simplest tactics work, such as “let’s go there and block the road,” “link arms,” “move through alleys to such-and-such a square,” and so on.

A person who comes to an unauthorized action can be quite inventive in terms of external representation; they came to create a picture and get impressions, which is what they are doing. They understand the overall goal of the action quite well, are able to identify provocateurs, and are generally very motivated — it is important not to waste their enthusiasm on meaningless nonsense. Using July 27 as an example, it is clear that without leaders, people stirred up the entire city center for several hours, but as soon as the police released the “guests of honor” and the latter began giving orders, everyone ended up localized in one square, surrounded and arrested.

Of course, if the protest becomes multi-day, people will allow themselves increasingly complex coordination and division of labor. Relatively disciplined groups of more or less constant composition and similar things will appear.

If you look at the protests in Yerevan, there was a headquarters, but it doesn’t seem like they dealt closely with tactical issues like “who leads people to which street to block traffic”; rather, they issued general appeals within some kind of campaign plan. In Russia, one cannot rely on the existence of a headquarters, because anyone who sticks their head out will be immediately imprisoned. Therefore, a much more decentralized tactic without hard clashes is forced here, until the security forces are exhausted. Only then can conditional protest leaders be used in that capacity to conduct negotiations.

And, of course, it is important for the protesters to maintain the loyalty of the passive part of Muscovites, because constant street protests in a large city inevitably create inconvenience. A war between the authorities and society is one thing, but an intra-civil conflict is something entirely different, and it is not worth letting it get to that.

looks impressive, but please don’t do it this way

Deterrence is not war

Bitarch, Ancap-tyan

Every time we mention the deterrence doctrine, it sparks a discussion. The first time, we spoke with the host of the Antistate channel, and now it has caught the attention of Alexander Elesev, the host of the Dobroum channel. Thus, the idea is controversial, and it is worth continuing to provide clarity, but not for too long, so that the reader does not get bored.

Alexander is far from the first person to voice this reproach: “You intend to fight the state; it’s useless, you will be declared terrorists and destroyed like the militants in Chechnya.”

However, the deterrence doctrine has nothing to do with war. If it can be used with the word “war” at all, then only as “cold.” The confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the 20th century, often called the “Cold War,” was in fact a manifestation of DD.

War is a conflict between several parties, the goal of which is to impose one’s will on the opponent. War is generally conducted by violent means (even if it is a cyberwar, there is an infringement on property). War can be waged until a peace treaty is concluded or until one of the parties completely loses its agency.

Deterrence is also a situation of conflict, but the main goal of deterrence is to make the use of aggressive violence disadvantageous for the opponent. Deterrence in itself is not violence, but only the threat of some damage, which may not be associated with violence at all, if we are talking, for example, about reputational damage. For example, you may not like that a gay couple is walking hand in hand, and you may want to throw filth at them. If they are unarmed, you will easily do so and receive moral satisfaction. But if they are armed, besides moral satisfaction, you have a non-illusory chance of catching a bullet. Weighing the benefits and costs, you will likely prefer not to interfere in other people’s affairs and send the filth you carefully prepared where it belongs: down the drain. Also, you might decide not to stand in the way of even unarmed gays if the name of the previous attacker is currently being dragged through the mud on every corner in the most unpleasant way. In this case, the fear of non-violent punishment will work as a deterrence mechanism.

Another important difference between DD and war: as long as deterrence takes place, there are winners, but no losers. Everyone continues to live their life, without violence and coercion to act, because deterrence is coercion to inaction. In the case we are discussing, when a person carries out secession and unilaterally exits the jurisdiction of the state, he does not overthrow the government and does not call for its overthrow. He does not interact with the state at all and suggests that state representatives reciprocate.

Let’s imagine this situation as a game and draw a simple matrix that describes this game:

If the official does not hinder the secession, his loss is minimal: from slight irritation to dismissal. If he successfully hinders it, the gain is also minimal: from slight moral satisfaction to a professional reward. If a person does not care about deterring the state but encounters no opposition, his gain is maximal. If he has to take deterrence measures and no opposition occurs, the gain decreases. Finally, if the person suffered from state opposition, or the official suffered as a result of the realization of the threat stated by the person, they lose to the maximum, and roughly to the same extent.

What can we see from this matrix?

If the game is a one-time event, then the person, wishing to maximize gain, relies on luck and applies no measures to deter the state. The official, however, wishing to maximize gain, hinders the secession and receives a reward from superiors.

If the game is repeated time and again with the same or new players, then the person more and more often incurs additional costs and chooses the deterrence doctrine, and the official, fearing this circumstance more and more, more and more often closes their eyes to the secession, preferring a small loss to a large one.

Nevertheless, there will still be free riders in society who prefer not to take any measures. If the officials are sufficiently frightened, the bluff will work.

An example of a similar game is the interaction between citizens who have the possibility of concealed carry and criminals. A weapon works as a tool of deterrence, and in a society where a citizen has the right to armed self-defense, violent crimes decrease. At the same time, unarmed free riders benefit from such a positive externality as increased safety, without spending on weapons themselves — but only as long as there are not too many of them.

A gun is a very compact and convenient deterrence tool against a person or a small group of people, but not against the state. That is exactly why we propose various more or less successful options for protection from the state, available both to organizations like ECU and to individuals.

Based on theoretical calculations that do not contradict historical examples, we indicate that the optimal deterrence doctrine against the state is the threat to specific functionaries who make decisions or execute them.

It is quite rightly pointed out to us that if the threat looks too intimidating, the state figures may take the risk of being under attack for a while and begin preventive purges, in other words, start a war. Similarly, harsh opposition to low-level security forces can cause a feeling of solidarity with fallen comrades. To minimize the danger of such an outcome, we suggest, first, to maximize the anonymity of those carrying out the threats, and second, to make threats non-lethal whenever possible, emphasizing ridicule and other types of humiliation, or, in the worst case, property damage. Here, one really wants to refer to the project announced recently by Alexander Litreev with the very telling name Russian Elephant. Alexander regularly deanonymizes various offenders in power, and it seems he now intends to put this on a conveyor belt.

And if we are to delve into philosophical generalizations, then maxims such as “live and let live” and “do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself” are not just good wishes. These are lines from a safety manual, written, as usual, in blood. This is the same kind of life wisdom as “don’t eat yellow snow” (remade by domestic meme-makers into “don’t eat yellow snack,” with an obvious reference to the NAP) — and this wisdom appeared precisely because people have successfully practiced the deterrence doctrine for many centuries.

If you have fresh interesting ideas about what non-violent threats and mechanisms for their implementation could be applied by a citizen against state employees of various ranks, share them in the comments or via DM. Authors of the most successful ideas can expect a reward in bitcoins.

Containment by “Dead Hand”

In May, Bitarch and I on one side, and Ved Neumann on the other, debated the applicability of the deterrence doctrine to ensure the secession of individuals from the state. Here is a description of the doctrine, and here is a summary article, which also briefly recounts the course of the discussion.

A frequent criticism of the described doctrine was that it remains unknown whether the threat against the key functionaries of the aggressor state will actually be carried out, while the death of a citizen seeking secession could be very swift, leaving them no time to organize retribution. Moreover, if they openly insure themselves somewhere, a sad fate might await the insurance company as well, as a warning against fulfilling various anti-state contracts.

Therefore, today we will talk a bit about how a citizen can ensure the implementation of individual deterrence without putting any outsiders at risk.

The dead hand principle is a kind of threat against a potential aggressor that will be executed only if the potential victim perishes. The most vivid embodiment is a grenade with the pin pulled, held in the very much living hand of the potential victim. Their death will lead to the dead hand relaxing and an explosion occurring. Clearly, a threat based on this principle can be scaled quite arbitrarily, up to a system implementing the automatic launch of intercontinental nuclear missiles in the event of an attack by a potential adversary, without waiting for special commands from a potentially already destroyed command post.

One could fantasize about purely engineering solutions in the spirit of the 20th century that would provide such a threat scheme for a person against the state leadership—for example, by pre-mining residences, deploying rocket launchers, or programmed combat drones, but all this looks disproportionately expensive, clumsy, and unreliable. Our information age implies a slightly different style.

For example, with the appearance of bitcoins, decentralized death betting markets became quite feasible, which is a veiled form of a contract killing. The mechanism is roughly as follows.

On a website that accepts bets on certain events that may or may not happen in real life (for instance, implemented on the Augur protocol), a potential victim of state aggression can place a bet on the death of a certain government official. The size of the bet must be large enough to tempt someone to ensure that very death. The money is bet on the fact that this official already died on some day in the past, which is obviously untrue; therefore, when the official actually dies, this bet will lose, and the winner of the wager will receive it. After the bet is placed, a potential hitman only needs to choose a day to execute the order, bet that the target will die on that specific day, then commit the murder, wait for the oracles to notify the system, receive their winnings, and carefully cash them out. This wager is our grenade, but a dead hand mechanism must still be organized.

One could take a more sophisticated route and place another bet on the same market, this time on one’s own death. If this bet wins, it triggers a smart contract that then places the bet on the official’s death. But it could be simpler: a smart contract that places a bet on the official’s death is given a delayed launch and triggers if it does not receive a cancellation code in time. That’s it; now you can notify the official that, unfortunately, if I accidentally die, your precious life is in great danger, so you had better treat me with the utmost care.

Of course, the more complex the predictions the service allows, the more carefully and moderately the impact can be planned. For example, the trigger could be not only death, but also arrest, and the threat not only death, but the burning of a house, or some other non-lethal nuisance (the most elegant thing I’ve come across was an order to spray a powerful odorant in an official’s residence; a house thoroughly stinking of mercaptans is no longer fit for habitation or sale, yet no one dies even accidentally).

Naturally, to undertake these non-trivial measures, a person must be sufficiently wealthy, but this does not require exorbitant riches, so the task is quite manageable.