Автор: Анкап-тян

Passport of a Montenegrin Russian woman

The topic of a “good Russian passport” is being actively chewed over online, mostly, of course, with criticism of the idea. The arguments are usually roughly as follows:

  1. This kind of ausweis reinforces the presumption of guilt for all Russians: by default, they are all under sanctions, but you can prove to the “kind uncles” that you are a good Russian, and then they will give you a piece of paper stating that you are allowed roughly the same things as other ordinary people; if you behave badly, the paper will be taken away in a heartbeat.
  2. Instead of trying to beg for concessions only for political emigrants, we should strive for sanctions to be lifted from everyone, leaving only personal ones for the direct perpetrators of the war.
  3. Such a division of Russians into grades will drive a wedge between them.
  4. The very name “good Russian passport” is disgusting.

I will approach this from a different angle.

Today’s norm is the serf-like dependence of a subject on the country to which they belong. If you are lucky enough to be a subject of a kind master—rejoice. If not—suffer. If you want to renounce your subjecthood—only with the master’s permission, and he might not allow you to leave. If you want to switch to another subjecthood—only with the master’s permission, and he might not allow you to arrive.

And here we are offered to acquire a document that literally states: the holder of this document publicly tells their master to fuck off and demands that other masters recognize the holder’s human dignity, and whoever does not recognize it does not belong to the family of civilized nations and is in the service of the enemy of the human race. In other words, Russian emigrants opposing Putin’s aggression in Ukraine are literally creating their own extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction. This not only solves the local problems of specific individuals, allowing them to enter into market relations with other people and organizations without restrictions. It also undermines the very idea of state sovereignty over people.

I don’t know exactly which of the anti-war forum participants came up with this, but the idea is definitely a bright one. However, I will readily agree with the argument that “good Russian passport” sounds disgusting. Firstly, it is not a passport, but a declaration, similar to the “declaration on signing the NAP” that Mikhail Svetov tried to push on everyone at one time, but then apparently lost interest in the idea. Secondly, the expression “good Russian” should refer to a dead Russian occupier, not a living Russian emigrant.

Personally, I define myself now as a crnogorska Ruskinja, and if this status of mine is certified by a lična kartica of some special format—why not, it’s just a token.

Europski Rusi

Libertarianism and Social Experiments

In a recent Montelibero news post, I mentioned that among the project participants, there are surprisingly few—not to mention active members—of either of the two Libertarian parties of Russia, or even people somehow connected to them. Perhaps this thought is worth expanding upon.

Of course, at the start of the project, no one could say exactly what it would turn into over time. One founder saw it as a center for agorism. Another as a platform for the future transformation of Montenegro along libertarian lines. For me, it was a platform for the evacuation of Russian political activists from the Putin regime. As a result, we do indeed have a center for agorism, and the strategic goal of transforming Montenegro is written in our project description, although we haven’t made much progress in that direction. As for the evacuation platform—we indeed became one, but more and more people joining us are not political activists, but ordinary libertarians who aren’t interested in any such politics.

And, you know, it seems that this is actually a good thing. Judging by what reached me during the period when I was still relatively close with political libertarians, the bulk of their party activity boiled down to bickering over the charter and dividing power within the party (which happened to be splitting in two at the time). Here, frictions occasionally arise regarding the coordination of joint activities, but there is none of this endless expelling of people from the movement. You approve of the market, you don’t approve of state intervention, you don’t practice coercion—well, great, we are on the same path, and you can get acquainted with the smart books in your spare time, if you get around to it.

I was recently asked what, exactly, distinguishes our community from any other hangout, since here in Montenegro, there are several other emigrant groups that likewise do not practice violence and fully approve of freedom. I had to think about it, and as a result of my reflections, I found the only fundamental difference: we have tokenomics. That is, essentially, we simply actively practice the formalization of our market relations and obligations in an explicit form, and it is precisely this that gives us the opportunity to develop very actively.

The question arises: what if some other community manages to implement tokenomics for themselves, how will they differ from us? And here I note with surprise that, in essence, they won’t. Tokenomics (unlike cryptocurrencies) operates on trust, because linking tokens to real-world objects is impossible without trust. And trust among community members is possible only because they share a common value, such as a love for the market—specifically, for voluntary transactions. Any inclinations toward ideas that it’s useful to deceive “suckers” will be immediately rejected by the community (along with the carriers of such ideas), because our mutual obligations are not secured by any state violence, and deploying the tools of private violence is expensive and troublesome, and just not worth it. If some other community manages to reproduce similar relations within itself, we can boldly recognize them as our equals, and at the same time recognize their tokens. Thus, a completely seemingly auxiliary tool unnoticedly turns out to be a unique feature and almost the basis of identity.

As for political methods of solving problems, it’s truly better to leave them to the parties. And for them, we are apparently doomed to remain a completely non-political project, whether for selling land or some other politically meaningless activity. Let’s wish these guys luck in their mission, but if any party member wants to move from politics to economics—our doors are open.

Do you accept EURMTL?

Montelibero project news, issue 11

The previous issue was mainly about how the start of the war affected the project (in short: the influx of people accelerated, and bringing in money became harder). Since then, the war has become routine, it no longer attracts as much painful attention, and people have switched back to peaceful life.

Construction of the settlement is progressing actively; the first two foundations were poured the other day.

The media coverage of the project has also grown significantly. I am no longer the main mouthpiece of Montelibero, but just an old information channel, but the main content is now provided by entirely different people. For example, you can check out a short drone video on Soz’s channel, which clearly shows where the settlement is located relative to the nearest town and what the activity on site looks like. Soz has taken over my role as the main construction inspector; I can breathe a sigh of relief. Or, for instance, Viktor gave an interview to a friendly project creating a decentralized legal platform, where he explained who we are and why we gathered here.

There are currently fifty Montelibero activists who have directly relocated to Montenegro (the strangest thing for me is that there are very few members of the Libertarian Party of Russia among them—it’s completely unclear where they all went; some remained in the RF and are active, but most seem to have vanished without a trace). Additionally, a core of supporters from the diaspora is being formed; they haven’t fully integrated yet but are gradually participating in various activities. Here, of course, the club mentioned in the previous issue turned out to be an important center of attraction. The premises are still being tidied up, but in parallel, they regularly host various events: English and poker clubs, D&D and more modern board games, birthdays, and simple gatherings to celebrate the arrival of various guests.

Tokenomics continues to strengthen. The MTL Fund and individual private investors have invested their capital into a car rental organization project. The first convertible has already been purchased and rented out; now simpler cars are being bought. Our Euro-pegged stablecoins are already accepted by a fairly large number of businesses. By the way, if you followed the previous link, you might have seen that the project has acquired its own directory on a wiki engine; there is hope that this will slightly reduce the flow of identical questions in the chats.

I hope you are subscribed to the main project telegram channel, and for you, my news selection is just a very modest summary of what you’ve already read, as you’ve long been aware of all our inner workings.

It will soon be a year since my arrival in Montenegro, and that decision so far seems like the most successful one in my life. I have never had so many active, free people around me with whom I am on the same wavelength. I hope that similar decisions become the most successful in your lives as well.

Book about ancap – started the section on the imperfection of society

Since my recent posts have featured translations of smart books, it is high time to squeeze out another fragment of my own smart book. In the second part of the book, as the reader may recall, I first briefly described an ideal ancap, and then began to show the difficulties on the path to its implementation, dividing them into three categories: the imperfection of the world, the human, and society. Well, now I have slowly crawled my way to society.

Firstly, in a real society, the construction of ancap is hindered by communication difficulties — it is difficult, you know, to establish voluntary relations if you are unaware of what the counterparty’s good will consists of because you cannot understand them. Secondly, opportunism turns out to be a very harmful thing — when people may verbally acknowledge the appropriateness of observing the non-aggression principle, but find it hard to refrain from violating it in conditions where it leads to obvious personal gain (and sometimes to obvious gain for many people).

Every time I write another pair of chapters about the difficulties of ancap, I try to do it conscientiously enough that, in the process of writing, I begin to suspect that this is a disaster and there is truly nothing that can be done about it. So, I need some time to restore my emotional balance and counter my gloom with text about how the aforementioned difficulties are overcome. Fortunately, the second part of the book is nearing completion, and the third part will be about the tools for building ancap, which is a much more positive topic.

As usual, if you find it more convenient to read the book in e-reader format, you can download it; I try to maintain the current version on the website. And, as usual, if you have a desire to donate, do not delay the fulfillment of that desire.

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Finishing the translation of the book’s bonus section.

Alex Dvoretsky cheered me up with another donation, so I am releasing the translation of the final chapter of the bonus section of Eric Mack’s book on libertarianism. The chapter is devoted to a problem faced by all indirect consequentialist approaches to creating a pleasant society to live in. For people in a society to limit themselves to voluntary interaction, voluntary self-restraint and widespread adherence to the rules of fair behavior are required. But for every specific person, there will always be a justification for deviating slightly from these rules for a bit more gain. And they know that others have similar justifications. Where would the confidence come from that everyone will follow the rules? And without this confidence, who will follow them?

This is exactly why raw consequentialism is unable to create a stable libertarian society — a catalyst in the form of a belief in the necessity of following the rules is required; that is, their observance must be seen as inherently valuable, and not just as a means to achieve general well-being. Only then will general well-being follow.

I have left to translate the last part of the book, dedicated to the critique of libertarianism. There is an introduction and four chapters; perhaps I will finish within a reasonable timeframe, before Mikhail Pozharsky, who inspired me to translate, dies of boredom.

Stefan Molyneux. Practical Anarchy. Editing of chapters 10-12.

Last time I promised to announce the final editing of six chapters at once, but for some reason the process dragged on (maybe due to insufficient motivation?), so for now, here are three.

In the second part of Practical Anarchy, Molynneux proceeds to argue why anarchy is better than the state. In the introduction, he lists six main questions that make sense to ask when analyzing any critique of anarchic solutions from the perspective of statism. Next, in a fairly extensive FAQ on anarchism, he answers the most typical objections (roads, national security, and all that). And in the chapter on four arguments against the state, he actually provides not four arguments, but four possible ratios between “bad” and “good” people in society, showing why, regardless of the ratio, the emergence of the state only makes things worse. I am not fond of the idea of dividing people into good and bad, and it is entirely possible to put forward a coherent system of objections against the state based, for example, on the analysis of economic incentives—but preachers of moral systems have their own audience, and Molynneux knows best how to work with them.

Reparations

It is quite funny that the RF is still fully attempting to go on the offensive, still holds a substantial advantage in the air, and continues to throw new goals of the war into the information space—while on social media, discussions are already in full swing about how Russia will pay reparations to Ukraine, whether one should push for them, and whether those who were initially against the war should have to pay them.

I’ll throw in my two cents as well. It seems to me that the absence of reparations is primarily in the interests of Ukrainian libertarians, but also Russian ones. Meanwhile, statists on both sides should heartily approve of reparations.

The thing is, reparations are money that a state pays to a state. But the state always collects this money from its subjects. How did the rise of the Moscow Principality begin? It began when the Moscow Prince Ivan received the privilege from the Horde Khan to pay reparations on behalf of all Russian principalities. In the process of collection, much stuck to his hands, and Moscow grew strong. When a conditional Leonid Volkov begins collecting reparations for Ukraine, Moscow will also only grow stronger from this, because what on earth is federalization and the transfer of powers to regions when you need to squeeze money out of people and pay the Ukrainian president?

But let’s assume that the international anti-corruption fund, led by the valiant Ivan Zhdanov, manages to find and lobby for the seizure of such a quantity of property from major Russian corrupt officials that it will be enough to pay reparations, and no extraordinary taxes will need to be levied from other Russian citizens. What will the kind Ukrainian president do upon receiving reparations from the kind Russian president? He will begin, on behalf of the state, to commission various works to restore what was destroyed during the war, strengthen the Ukrainian state army, police, customs, tax authorities, provide additional funding to the national bank, and so on. In short, he will strengthen the social state. Is this a good thing? “Of course, it is,” the government officials who will distribute all this money will answer the Ukrainian libertarians, as well as their relatives who, by a happy coincidence, receive government contracts.

Naturally, any caring person has many moral grounds to help Ukrainians in the war, in life in emigration, and in the restoration of the ruined economy after returning home. But for this, they do not need state coercion; it is more likely to get in the way. For instance, states block the bank cards of RF citizens (making it harder to donate), create a mass of restrictions for emigrants, which complicates their settlement in a new place and hinders providing them with help, and at the stage of post-war assistance, they will surely surround private initiative with a bunch of hurdles. Therefore, partisan activity against all states proves to be in demand: against the state of Ukraine, which prevents some refugees from leaving it freely; against the state of the RF, to sabotage military conscription, the work of state institutions, disrupt military supplies, and demotivate private individuals from supporting the war; against other states that hinder emigrants from finding employment, settling in, and conducting monetary transactions. But all of this is not reparations—do not whitewash this cringe-worthy word.

P.S. I forgot to add one more important point. The best outcome of this war is the complete destruction of the Russian state. But in that case, there will certainly be no reparations: the subject from whom they can be taken will vanish. And this is another very important reason why Ukrainian libertarians should dream not of reparations, but of a far more pleasant outcome.

Of course, the absence of reparations does not cancel the possibility of prosecuting private individuals and bringing claims against them for specific damages.

Where do reparations come from? Allah gives!

Why doesn’t any sufficiently strong agent automatically become a state under ancap? How do you abolish the state without becoming a state?

Anonymous question

The state is an order that determines exactly how it is customary to systematically rob people in a given place. Anarchy implies a high degree of decentralization of power in society, where in the worst-case scenario, people unite into situational alliances to restore justice, and once the task is solved, the alliance begins to struggle with goal-setting and tends to dissolve. A certain analogy can be found in modern interstate relations: the NATO defensive alliance almost collapsed from neglect when the threat of the USSR vanished, but immediately revived and is ready to accept new members when the RF began rattling sabers. But for a victim of aggression to receive support under anarchy, they do not even need to formally belong to an alliance, which we can clearly see in the example of Ukraine.

The same applies to ancap: no one will object to a particular market agent becoming stronger: why not, if they satisfy their clients so well. But as soon as they begin to exercise non-market power, clients begin to flee, and competitors begin to consider which side is most convenient to strike from.

A sufficiently strong agent under ancap

Is this mechanism sufficient to ensure that ancap, once established, prospers for all eternity? I cannot guarantee it. Fukuyama deceived us: there is no end of history. The stability of ancap is based on economic incentives that prevent inefficient centralization, but anomalies cannot be ruled out. For example, the proof-of-work mechanism in Bitcoin is a good model of ancap, and we see that over time, the decentralization of mining only increases, yet the history of Bitcoin has by no means been devoid of crises related to miners’ attempts to dictate their will to coin holders. And a poorly balanced PoW, as we see in the example of ether, does not prevent the creator of the currency from ruling it unilaterally at all.

Liberal democracies are precisely an example of such crooked systems, where checks and balances are drawn on paper, but in fact, it still results in a vertical of power or, at best, an oligarchy. Designing a reasonable system of anarchic self-government from scratch and launching it instead of a particular state is a non-trivial task, and it does not occur to me how it could be implemented in the absence of crises. However, since the state is a system of robbery in which positive feedback loops are historically much stronger than negative ones (the more you have robbed, the easier it is to rob more—positive feedback; but the more you are hated—negative feedback), crises in states are inevitable. From time to time, I come up with some story about how, in one place or another, a transition from a rigid state to something like ancap occurs against the backdrop of a crisis. For instance, right here about liberal parliamentary democracy.

Reflections in connection with the special operation

I am not, of course, talking about what is happening in Ukraine—a war is happening there. I am talking about the special operation carried out by Ekaterina Schulmann for evacuation to Germany “for an internship.”

For a long time, Ekaterina Mikhailovna categorically denied the possibility of her own emigration, because she is a political scientist, a specialist in the Russian legislative process, and leaving would mean leaving the field of research. Of course, these are rather laughable excuses, because she herself has repeatedly stated that she always relies solely on open sources rather than some murky insiders; access to open sources from Berlin is no worse than from Moscow. We have a classic cover story so that the enemy suspects nothing until it is too late.

Now she claims that the internship is not indefinite, it is only for a year, and then either the shah will die, or the donkey will, or as a result of the internship, a new interesting research task will come up, for example, in Latin America—but make no mistake, return to Russia is inevitable, so there is no need to repress the relatives remaining in Russia, dear officers of the authorities.

I strongly urge those who find it difficult to decide to leave to adopt the experience of Ekaterina Schulmann. The main thing: if emigration scares you so much, do not call it emigration. As Schulmann has repeatedly stated, people are not leaving for nowhere now. You can relocate to another country while continuing to maintain communication with those remaining in Russia no less closely than before departure. You can continue to work for Russia remotely. You can choose not to sell off your property, but simply mothball your home or rent it out. You can leave powers of attorney with reliable people, allowing them to carry out any transactions on your behalf if necessary. And most importantly—you can immediately outline an approximate timeframe or conditions for return. That’s it; you are simply going for a change of scenery, not throwing yourself into a whirlpool of uncertainty. Admit it, that sounds much less frightening.

Nevertheless, please do not be overly reckless. Study the experience of the pampered Muscovites who rushed out of the country like they were scalded, only to discover with surprise that while it is, of course, pleasant and peaceful abroad, it’s actually damn hard to break through. Many skills diligently acquired in Russia turn out to be useless, employers are not lining up to hire you, and then there are all those annoying domestic trifles, like an unfamiliar cuisine or an insufficiently rich cultural life.

Far from the familiar business and linguistic environment, far from familiar daily life and old friends, it can be difficult. You will have to prove to a multitude of people, who didn’t know you until now, that you are needed enough for them to pay you. You may have to engage in completely unskilled labor, at least for some time. You may be visited by thoughts that you are using yourself completely irrationally, since in Russia your labor was far more effective than here, in a new place. Yes, it may be so. But there, your labor benefited primarily those who are killing people in Ukraine. Therefore, your departure is a heroic act. It is your feasible contribution to the defeat of the Putin regime. It is not the only possible path, but it is a completely worthy one.

Instead, you can go to prison in Russia. The regime will feed you, and the recruit will get less food. You can engage in propaganda and sabotage. The regime will feed an army of investigators, whom you will provide with work, and the monetary allowance of Russian contractors will be more modest. You can earn money in Russia and donate to the Ukrainian army or other organizations waging war against Russia. All of these are also worthy choices.

Actually, there are only two unworthy choices. This is retreating into internal emigration, when you live in the RF as if nothing had happened, shutting yourself off from external irritants. And this is supporting the Russian regime. In the first case, you are a legitimate target for economic sanctions. In the second, you are also a legitimate target for security actions.

Perhaps I will expand slightly on the last point. Libertarians, after all, advocate for the protection of private property. But if it occurs to you to mark your private property with the same symbols used to mark Russian military equipment—you are marking yourself as a target for guerrilla warfare. Moreover, an easy, poorly guarded target. You are a combatant, a member of an organization that initiated violence against a wide range of people, and your property is now encumbered by demands for reparations. Be glad if they only slash your tires.

Minarchism in the Russian Protectorate

Suppose young democrats come to power in the RF—they don’t want it to be “like Somalia,” but in principle, they are curious about various forms of organizing a free country. Is it possible to establish an experimental minarchist state in one of the protectorates—for example, South Ossetia (assuming some agreement is reached with Georgia—after all, we are now like Sweden, and she doesn’t fight over Aland, and neither will you)—? We appoint Misha/Yarik/you as the head, abolish taxes, declare freedom of business/substances/weapons/ideas, and welcome visiting global businessmen with open arms; we write the NAP and freedom into the constitution. From the state, we leave only a minimal police force for the first period (protection against “the air of freedom tickled me” and “Somalia”), social medicine, and a business entity in a competitive market (it is free to conduct business however it likes, but is obliged to spend profits on charity, and essentially on social welfare). Then, as success grows, we abolish the rudimenting state bodies, moving toward full ancap. Meanwhile, Ancapistan remains a protectorate for now, so the USA won’t attack it because of a nest of hackers and drug dealers there, and the PRB itself will protect itself from them in a market-based way—by paying for them to refrain from working in our market.

Katsist

Two related questions have been successfully combined, and if for the previous question—about ancap in an enclave against the backdrop of collapsed Putinism—I answered with a fairy tale, then here I am forced to state clearly: no, it is impossible.

What is the difference between the Sakhalin scenario and the one you proposed? The difference is that your scenario assumes that the RF retains the ability to influence its current protectorates after the end of Putin. But at what price can the rise to power of these very young democrats be achieved without the collapse of the RF? A simple change of government to people with pleasant faces is not enough. These young democrats would have to launch a process of denazification and demilitarization of Russia, publicly repent for all the sins of Putinism, pay reparations to at least Georgia and Ukraine, hand over a mass of criminals to them and international bodies for trial, withdraw troops from all annexed territories, from foreign military bases, and from those very protectorates.

There is some chance that they might simultaneously launch serious reforms within the RF itself: make the High Court in London the supreme judicial authority in the RF, and fine their own judges for every instance where their verdict is overturned in this appellate instance; return the lion’s share of taxes to the regions and even slightly reduce the overall tax burden; purge the criminal and administrative codes of a bunch of stupid Putinist articles; privatize a huge number of Putinist state corporations once again; completely abandon conscription, the navy, 80% of nuclear warheads; dissolve the FSB and Rosgvardia; radically rewrite the regulations of the antimonopoly service, and so on and so forth. But all of this would concern Russia directly. Meanwhile, the protectorates would have to somehow negotiate their return to their former metropoles, because without the help of the RF they would be unable to avoid this fate, and the RF would state something like “yes, yes, guys, of course, take it, it’s yours; sorry we are returning it in such a terrible state, here is some compensation.”

On the other hand, after the neutralization of the RF as an exporter of authoritarianism, a return to the trajectory from which it veered under Ivanishvili is quite likely in Georgia; and if so, the aforementioned South Ossetia does indeed have a chance for all these reforms, but not as a Russian protectorate, but as a Georgian one. But here I don’t even need to fantasize much; this is roughly the same course the region followed before 2008.

No bedtime stories today