Автор: Анкап-тян

Elections, elections!

I have finally received the recommendations from the State Department Smart Voting regarding which specific single-mandate candidate I should vote for in District 96 in the north of the Irkutsk region: that is where our little warm western Montenegro is located. It turned out to be a certain Andreev Andrey Anatolyevich, from the CPRF. For Navalny’s pawns, this information is quite sufficient, but those who enjoy thoughtfully analyzing the varieties of shit can visit the shit directory kindly created by Khodorkovsky and check the details of all candidates there.

As for the voting by party lists, I intend to balance my vote for the communist single-mandate candidate by voting for the LDPR list—especially since, as far as I can tell, Smart Voting mainly recommends communists for the single-mandate districts, and I don’t really want to give them an overly populous faction.

One should not take elections in modern Russia with animal seriousness; it is nothing more than a way to piss in their slippers. It won’t make them feed us better or bully us less, but we know that when we piss in their slippers, it infuriates them. Is that not enough?

A couple more chapters for the book about ancap

I have put together the first two chapters of the third section of the book about ancap. The section is called “The Market” and, of course, the first chapters are dedicated to anything but the market. In the first one, I ramble on about labor productivity, and then suddenly switch to inequality, and I’m currently pondering whether to remove the final passages. The second chapter is dedicated to planning, and this is the first place in the book where I appeal to specific named authorities, Mises and Hayek, which also creates a certain dissonance, as it might overcomplicate the text.

Overall, I am dissatisfied with the writing pace; I thought I would announce three chapters at once, but the chapter about the market isn’t coming along yet, so I have to report on only two.

How do the courts and police work—no, not under ancap—under FPKYU?

I absolutely do not understand how, in a polarized society, the Ural Federal District and the Southern Federal District would agree on, say, the criticism of oatmeal cookies, because some have a liberal attitude toward oatmeal cookies, while for others, insulting oatmeal cookies is haram. It is obvious that judgments applicable to classical panarchy cannot be applied to FOCJs, since the conditional Ural Federal District is driven not by a desire for profit, but by other forces—the political goals of the elites of this Ural Federal District, for example. What should be done if a federal district continues to play at isolationism (which is impossible in classical panarchy); how should federal authorities react in this situation?

Old friend

The question refers to a translation I published quite a long time ago of a work on functional overlapping competing jurisdictions. However, it demonstrates a lack of understanding, quite traditional for a modern person, of how functional jurisdictions differ from territorial ones. A conditional Ural Federal District is a territorial jurisdiction. A conditional Ural University is a functional jurisdiction: although it has a certain territory, the university’s jurisdiction is defined not by territory, but by the function it performs. Its jurisdiction includes the process of its students obtaining higher education and certain related issues. Universities can play at isolationism, up to the extraterritoriality of campuses and their own security services, or they can remain dull agencies under the subordination of the Ministry of Education.

The FOCJ model was proposed by the authors primarily for the EU, as a development of the idea of federalism, in order to take away some powers from the states comprising the EU, but transfer them not to the level of the European Union, but to functional jurisdictions. A rather flexible model is proposed, with the possibility of forming FOCJs from the bottom up, and exactly in the sphere that covers the scale of the problem being solved.

Relationships between FOCJs can be competitive if they perform related functions; they can be reduced to relationships between a customer and a client, as, for example, between an FOCJ serving nuclear power plants and an FOCJ serving the power grid; they can be conditionally neighborly, like the police and the fire department in one city; or they may be completely absent, as between a consortium for the certification of boiled sausage production and an association of kosher food producers.

Since the interests of different FOCJs can indeed come into conflict, legal proceedings between them are possible. Within the original model, it was not intended to shift the judicial system onto FOCJ rails, so most likely one arbitration or another, such as the Stockholm Arbitration, will be used. Police interference in FOCJ activities is also possible if some higher jurisdiction, such as a relevant ministry, sees abuses or simply errors in reporting.

In some ways, FOCJs look like an under-panarchy, since they may imply not only contractual relations with those people whose lives they regulate within their function, but may even collect targeted taxes from them if the state delegates these powers to them. In other ways, they are ahead of the panarchy model, because under panarchy we have something like contractual extraterritorial states regulating a more or less arbitrary set of life areas, while the powers of FOCJs are strictly limited by their function, which makes them similar to Friedman’s ancap model.

Functional overlapping oatmeal cookies

Digital gold of El Salvador

El Salvador now has a second national currency alongside the US dollar — bitcoin. Thus, since the autumn of 2008, in just under 13 years, bitcoin has grown from a project posted by an anonymous person for open discussion into a currency equal to the dollar. Although, so far, only in one country.

Now the world should wait for El Salvador to implement something like Estonian e-residency: then anyone wishing to do so will be able to remotely open a business in El Salvador and conduct completely official settlements in Salvadoran currency, because Salvadoran laws will mandate it.

To mark this giant step in bitcoin adoption, discounts have been announced: some lucky individuals managed to buy in today at a price of around 43 thousand US dollars per bitcoin. But it is still not too late: at the time of this post’s publication, bitcoin costs only 47 thousand dollars.

Vladimir Milov is preparing to make the first bitcoin transaction of his life: a hairdresser is telling him how to install a Lightning wallet

Stefan Molinieu. Practical Anarchy. Chapter 7

After an indecently long break, I am returning to the translation of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinari. I have already begun to miss his style, so I decided to ignore the lack of donations and translated another chapter just because; you’ll have plenty of time to chip in later.

Chapter Seven continues the first part of the book dedicated to methodology — the author approaches the explanation of his subject quite thoroughly, yet quite vividly. In particular, here he shows where the main strength of the existing world order, in which everything is divided among states, lies — in the fact that we cannot imagine it being any other way, although if we were to start designing the best possible world order from scratch right now, it wouldn’t occur to anyone to voluntarily build all this crap. On the contrary, the solution we devised would likely resemble something anarchic — simply because these recipes work perfectly in private life. In short, give it a read; it is presented quite well and convincingly.

Next, I am switching back to the translation of Libertarianism by Eric Mack, because a donation of sufficient size has arrived for the translation of another chapter, from which we will learn what Hayek thought about economic justice.

Watched Milov’s video, letting my inner libertarian out for a walk

Yesterday, I put on a video by Milov to listen to before sleep, but I fell asleep before reaching the scandalous phrase about the inner libertarian. I had to start it over in the morning.

In short, Vladimir’s thesis boils down to the idea that it is not always appropriate to take the side of big business when it is in conflict with a state defending certain political interests, especially when big business is lobbying for its own interests. And if your inner libertarian only knows how to say “everything private is good, everything state-owned is bad,” then kill it and grow another, more adequate one. Because values are subjective, and nothing is “good” or “bad” in a vacuum; these terms are always attached to a specific interested party—specifically, who exactly benefits and who exactly suffers.

Is it good for the German gas consumer that their country will receive cheap fuel supplies with massive excess transport capacity? Obviously, it’s good, and from Montenegro, I can only be happy for them. Is it good for a Pomeranian worker that a new employer comes to their land and creates many high-paying jobs? Yes, it’s wonderful for them! Is it good for a Ukrainian worker that their local job maintaining the pipeline is under threat of abolition or at least salary cuts? Nothing good about that. But is it good for them that they can travel to Germany without a visa to maintain the pipeline being built there, already earning a German salary? You bet! True, they will have to compete with Germans, and here, if the German tries to use state protectionism, the Ukrainian will suffer.

Is it good that gas is extracted in Russia and a transport network is built allowing its delivery to various corners of the world? This is an incorrect question. The question does not specify the subject for whom we are making assumptions—whether it is good or bad for them. For Putin, it’s good—the geopolitical club is long, heavy, and shiny. For the rotational workers laying the pipes—it’s great. For Gazprom shareholders—it’s questionable, because the commercial profit from the project is unclear; it’s less about money and more about geopolitics. For Russian citizens counting on some taxes from this Gazprom—don’t count on other people’s money and you’ll sleep sounder; and what are you even doing in Russia? Get out of there, following me and Vladimir Milov. The inner libertarian sticks its head out and gives the budget workers the finger.

In short, a huge thank you to Vladimir Milov for promoting libertarianism. Navalny is in prison and can no longer, as before, send us to forced labor, so Milov has to take the heat. It’s okay, he’ll manage.

A new serving of propaganda from Libertarian Band

Out of habit, I continue to watch new videos from my former team, but I’ve somehow forgotten to promote them on my own page; that’s untidy, so I’m correcting it.

In the video, which this time is dedicated to propaganda, as usual, there is an extensive historical introduction, and, as usual, it hangs in the air somewhat, because no thoughts are derived from it that the main part of the video could rely on. Next, there is an equally extensive analysis of how it works and what methods it employs, and in conclusion, it is stated that propaganda is not bad in itself, since it can be used for benevolent purposes. For example, promoting vaccination against a fashionable disease and other beneficial methods of state care for the population—what else could libertarians bring up as a positive example? Certainly not Svetov with his propaganda for lustration!

Legal systems that differ greatly from ours. Law of the Chinese Empire.

I continue translating Friedman’s latest book. This time, I’ve gone in order. I translated the introduction and the first chapter, regarding law in the Chinese Empire. An attentive reader may notice that I haven’t fully completed the work, and about half of the footnotes are missing from the text. That is the case; I got exhausted. Tomorrow, I plan to quietly upgrade the text—both for online reading and in the ebook. I also still hope that someone will take on creating a Russian-language cover for the book.

What I like in the book are the constant comparisons: look, here’s how it was for the Chinese, exactly like in modern America. And this—just like in 18th-century England. And then there are attempts to show for what purpose the legislation was made exactly this way, what worked, and what didn’t quite.

The Doomed City

Long ago, I was commissioned and paid to review three books by the Strugatsky brothers. Roadside Picnic I looked at in April, Snail in May, but I only got around to The City in August. Traditionally, I am not going to recount the plot; you can check the wiki, or better yet, read the book itself.

It is clear that after reading, many want to immediately start figuring out the physics of the strange place described. Here, space is rolled into a tube, there are folds here, some potent grass is packed here, and it’s scorching over there. But if you view the book at such a level, it’s no longer the Strugatskys, but Pelevin.

The book was written for the drawer, so it cannot complain that its content is the product of compromises with Soviet censorship—there was no attempt to publish it as long as censorship existed. Boris Strugatsky asserted that this was their favorite book, and its main character, accordingly, their favorite character. However, for some reason, I am not particularly interested in the characters of the Strugatskys; it is far more intriguing to see what is going on regarding society.

And the society there is quite modern; you wouldn’t say it was described in 1972. Globalism, with a single language and the collision of atomized representatives of various cultures. The triumph of equality and inclusivity (but for all the inclusivity, women in the City, as everywhere with the Strugatskys, are completely flat characters serving a purely decorative purpose—except, perhaps, for the entirely episodic Madame Matilda Gusakova—she is not flat, but also rather decorative). Constant sudden calamities—global warming, the sun switching off, COVID, water turning into bile, BLM, an invasion of baboons. The reaction of the people and the reaction of the authorities to these calamities.

And, you know, for some reason I get the feeling that the Strugatskys are convinced: humanity cannot be handled any other way. It must absolutely be put into a state of artificial stress and deficiency; otherwise, some people turn into Doctors Opirov, and others begin to organize some mysterious “sated riots.” The Strugatskys like to frighten people with sated riots. The idea is that when a person is gastrically satisfied, they aren’t very concerned about further self-development, and they unite with others like them for the sake of self-destruction (Fight Club was probably also inspired by the Strugatskys).

Unlike the Strugatskys, I have been fortunate enough to live in a relatively sated time, and I have seen sated riots in practice, not just in theory. Well-dressed, polite people go out to get hit on the head with batons, and then sigh that it seems they won’t be able to obtain political rights here, and emigrate to peaceful Montenegro, which is practically the model for the city from The Predatory Things of the Century (only this morning returned from a drozhka, that was a strong touch). In short, sated riots are quite inspiring for a very short time, and then, of course, there are abysses of frustration. The Strugatskys clearly imagined something far more disgusting.

It is presumed that through all these endless experiments on humans, some “new man” is being forged, who is the only one capable of building a new world. However, through the example of the novella’s protagonist, we see that the only thing the experiment succeeds in is knocking the ground from under a person’s feet, destroying any ideological supports, and ultimately driving them to suicide, instead of building anything at all. Although, of course, there is hope that after returning to Leningrad in 1951, Voronin will start writing interesting science fiction and become an idol for the entire Soviet intelligentsia.

Imperfect People and the Social Ideal

In your posts, you often state that under ancap, all people (or most of them) will not be prone to violence (and those who are can be “reprogrammed”), which will allow for the construction of a violence-free society. But hold on! With ideal people, one could build an ideal society based on almost any ideology—even communism in its early idealized conceptions. Any modern social structure, however, is built on the fact that people are almost always imperfect—emotional, foolish, aggressive, greedy, cowardly, and so on—and the social order must neutralize human flaws. How can ancap exist in a society of imperfect people, if even now criminals are stupid enough to steal right under cameras, and in the absence of a universally recognized police force, they will become completely brazen, and their capture/shooting by private security companies will become difficult due to the scale of crime and overloaded courts? Will this not lead to a rapid slide of society into a wild state, where even adequate people are forced to be in a permanent state of war against all?

Anonymous question

You are right; many things can be built from ideal people. That is precisely why Bitarch and Voluntarist—the authors of the posts regularly appearing on this channel about building a non-violent society—do not bother with building specifically ancap; for them, the economic model is secondary, and the absence of a central authority is secondary, while the primary value is non-violence, in its narrow sense of the absence of physical coercion.

The doctrine of anarcho-capitalism assumes that the human inclination toward physical coercion will not undergo serious changes. The only thing required for its triumph is the emergence of a critical mass of technologies that make decentralized production and trade more economically viable than centralized ones—this is if we proceed from a materialist position, where being determines consciousness and the base determines the superstructure. If, on the contrary, we assume that consciousness shapes being, then the triumph of ancap requires a critical mass of people for whom libertarian ideas have significant value. To me, it essentially makes no difference which end of the loaf I bite into; it tastes equally good from both ends.

When decentralized technologies dominate everyday life, it means that an uber-police force will arrive faster and provide service more cheaply and with higher quality than a police squad from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; therefore, the Ministry will lose the economic competition for the client and die off. And if people steal right under cameras, decentralized technologies will more likely provide the ability to issue them a fine right under those same cameras. And if they wave at the camera instead and claim that they are, say, renting this car, then instead of a disproportionately large fine, a modest rental fee will be debited from them in favor of the car owner. Or perhaps I am talking nonsense, and the “market” will decide some other way.

When libertarian ideas dominate society, then even under conditions of technologically driven centralization of a large number of industries, people will still value freelancing or freelance-like relationships relatively higher, and the owner of the production facility will have to adapt to this demand if they wish to secure a workforce. People will join the police, but will still view their patrol crew as an autonomous entrepreneurial unit, with its own permanent clients and obligations to them that mean far more than formal subordination within a police department.

The most terrifying thing for libertarianism is an increase in the efficiency of the centralization of violence. In the middle of the 20th century, such efficiency was at its maximum; humanity fought with armies of millions, and there was not the slightest prospect for building a libertarian society. Now, an army of a hundred thousand is considered large, and one hopes that decentralization will continue at an accelerating pace. Cheap and effective decentralized violence, which scales very poorly as the number of involved persons increases or additional capital is invested—this is exactly what is required so that even in the event of armed conflicts, they quickly fade away without further escalation.

As you can see, it is not at all necessary to indulge in empty dreams about how chipping will make everyone “sweethearts and darlings.” Instead, one can indulge in empty dreams about how total armament with handheld weapons—effectively and as painlessly as possible incapacitating a person, but having low lethality—will make everyone “sweethearts and darlings.” As for my time free from empty dreams, I prefer to build a local libertarian community where all necessary skills of interaction between people are acquired through simple habit—and these habits will strongly conflict with the habits of obeying the state or any other centralized force.

No one needs a Leviathan. Hobbes is sad.