“At Summerhill school, students choose for themselves which lessons to attend. Furthermore, there is no grading system of any kind. No punishment is incurred for skipping classes” (Wikipedia). Can this school be called a kind of libertarian project?
2R
Recently, the left-anarchist channel Prometheus posted an article about anarchism and education, which is, in turn, a summary of an article by Ekaterina Tolkacheva titled A Little Anarchism for the Education System. It discusses Summerhill and many other similar projects specifically as examples of the implementation of a libertarian approach.
From what I quickly googled about Summerhill, it is clear that it is one of the most consistently libertarian educational projects, where a child’s freedom is limited only by the fact that they are physically in a boarding school, but otherwise engage in whatever they please. As far as can be judged from the excerpts I found from the book “Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing” by the school’s founder A.S. Neill, the earlier a child entered the school, the more eagerness they showed for activities: children infected by compulsory education needed time to regain their taste for learning.
Graduates of the school usually turned out to be people with an entrepreneurial streak, or geeks whom no one hindered from pursuing only what they enjoyed, and they continued to specialize in this in their adult lives. At the same time, no absolute geniuses graduated from the school: whether this is a characteristic of the educational methodology, or whether the modest number of students—no more than a hundred children of all ages—played a role.
Thus, I can suggest that this school was far ahead of its time: in the industrial era, a different type of graduate was in demand, but now it is precisely such people who are mainly needed. Ekaterina Schulmann discusses this, for example, in an interview with the publication “Takie Dela”. She describes the problems of the modern Russian school in light of changing trends in society—but does not provide recipes, because she does not know them. However, one of the recipes is boarding schools like Summerhill. Perhaps this is even better than homeschooling, because parents’ pedagogical abilities can be modest.
The main drawback of Summerhill is that such education cannot be mass-market. Therefore, the only real alternative to modern compulsory secondary education is simply the total abolition of its compulsory nature. In modern society, a person has an incredibly long childhood. During this time, the minimally necessary skills for further adult life are acquired even from aimless surfing on the internet, simple housework, and communicating with friends. Those who desire more will find extremely motivated teachers in various “Summerhills.” And for those who cannot afford such things, online courses will remain. The experience of Summerhill shows that when a child is left to their own devices, they eagerly absorb new information; it is enough for them to know that they will obtain their knowledge at the moment they seek it.
Of course, there are many professions for which compliance with strict standards is necessary. In a system of free education, it is sufficient that these standards be known. Those children interested in a profession will know exactly what to achieve, and once they master the required amount of knowledge, they will simply take an open exam. No state regulations are needed for this; professional standards are ultimately dictated by employers.
Today is a day of serious upheavals: the Russian government has resigned, the US Congress has sent impeachment documents for the president to the Senate, and I have completely rewritten the donations page.
Since the project is anonymous, collecting donations for it has its specifics: money mostly arrives in bitcoins, but I have been repeatedly asked to provide the possibility of payments in fiat as well. Rejoice, a method has been found, and the description is provided.
Topping up a Lightning wallet has now become very simple, fast, and cheap, managed by a new concise Telegram bot.
Previously, various ways of acquiring and using crypto were described across as many as four different pages; now all key things are grouped directly on the “Donations” page, and only the purchase of bitcoins has been left as separate text just in case as an optional supplement.
Pollution. This section discusses what measures to reduce government regulation of harmful emissions could lead to an improved environmental situation and certainly to a fairer system of responsibility for pollution.
Fending off the friends of socialism. In this final chapter of the book’s second part, Friedman fires off several arguments demonstrating the fairer nature of capitalism as opposed to socialism. None of them are extensive enough for a separate chapter, which is likely why they were collected this way. The text examines arguments regarding which distribution mechanism ensures greater equality, which society is less prone to corruption, where working conditions are better, and which system is less critically dependent on ideal people.
Holon Synergetic has published an article criticizing the deterrence doctrine, which we write about periodically. Let’s clarify some points.
1) One should not confuse the deterrence doctrine with terrorism. DD is a strategy for increasing the costs of initiating aggression. Methods for increasing costs may not involve the use of physical violence at all. Perhaps Holon has not read all of our articles on DD and missed this one. If DD is non-violent, it is harder for the state to slap a terrorist label on libertarians.
2) No wunderwaffen (robo-bees, genetically modified viruses, and especially doomsday weapons) are required for DD. Relying on wunderwaffen is by no means a libertarian strategy, as they are extremely complex, expensive, and will be available to few (meaning these people will be able to coerce others, ultimately recreating the status quo). For a stable free society according to Hirschleifer, a balance of violence potential (BVP) is needed; that is, weapons and deterrence strategies must be extremely simple and accessible to the maximum number of people.
3) For deterrence weapons, unlike weapons for classical wars, the “shell and armor” competition is practically inapplicable. Unacceptable damage can be inflicted in a million different ways, and new ones are constantly appearing. It is not for nothing that after the appearance of nuclear weapons, people began to talk about nuclear deterrence, rather than the development of a nuclear bomb neutralizer.
To protect against each type of deterrence weapon, separate “armor” is needed. For example, if the deterring party has ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and micro-drones, to intercept a retaliatory strike, one must have air defense/missile defense for each type, and with a large margin. So many ways to cause pain can be devised that even the nearly boundless US military budget would not be enough for defense.
4) An excursion into the history of medieval proto-panarchies shows that the demand for such institutions has existed for a long time, and now the theory is better developed and the technological level is higher. Furthermore, it is not necessary to involve the entire society in DD. Even a few will create a positive externality for others, as the example of the Femgericht perfectly demonstrates.
5) Regarding universal transparency, a standalone deterrence strategy can also be created on its basis. A libertarian jurisdiction might have no weapons for a retaliatory strike against state facilities at all, only many cameras and streaming to the network (to a server that is not subject to censorship and via a channel that cannot be suppressed—for example, Elon Musk’s Starlink, which uses a narrow beam). If a stationary bandit attempts to attack this jurisdiction, the broadcast of the attack to the network with all its juicy moments will deal a blow to the legitimacy of the government (tolerance for violence is currently extremely low, and various human rights activists will begin to undermine the careers of those who ordered the attack). Residents of such a libertarian jurisdiction would not need weapons more complex than household items—only to make the picture more colorful, otherwise the brief “they flew in and rounded them up” show will not gain a critical mass of views.
A similar strategy was successfully used by American black civil rights activists in the 1950s. Black activists sat in seats for whites on buses, refused to give them up at the request of the conductor, and the police arrested them. Public organizations often paid their fines to multiply the number of participants in such actions. Such cases were actively covered in the media, and irritation toward officials supporting segregation began to grow in society. Eventually, the supporters of segregation had to give in.
Rosa Parks, pioneer of trolling bus companies and segregation laws
I commented on Bitark’s column about promoting libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit to the effect that this is largely knocking on an open door: the bandit nature of the state is quickly recognized by any interlocutor, and from there, discussions begin about the lesser of two evils. In particular, in Russia, there is a popular theme of appealing to the experience of the nineties of the last century, when there was a dominance of nomadic bandits.
All three conditions for the stability of anarchy according to Hirshleifer were not met in Russia in the nineties, meaning there was no libertarianism in the nineties.
To this, I am forced to state that Bitark is again knocking on an open door, and there is no question that there was libertarianism in the nineties, unless, of course, you are arguing with a troll. The point is that to promote libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit, one needs to present arguments on how to prevent the dominance of nomadic bandits after abolishing the stationary one.
Also interesting is the criticism from Vladimir Zolotorev, who quite rightly points out that a stationary bandit is more dangerous than a nomadic one, because he is capable of inflicting far greater damage on society, and at the same time ensures that society is left with no strength to fight any bandits whatsoever. He does not write it explicitly, but it follows from this premise that returning to the era of nomadic bandits is an acceptable price for society to pay for the destruction of the stationary bandit, although, ideally, the choice should be not between stationary and nomadic bandits, but between the presence of a bandit and their absence.
So, we seem to have agreed: the bandit is not needed, let’s get rid of him, we need to ensure a balance of violence potential in society, and we will have stable anarchy. But then, from a reader with the nickname Holon Synergetic, came criticism of the proposed mechanisms of the deterrence doctrine (the text arrived via private channels, and I am publishing it on Telegraph, which serves as a neutral platform).
The text is very long and difficult to perceive, so I will provide a brief explication:
1. As follows from Mazarra’s article on the deterrence doctrine, the translation of which I recently posted, the perception factor is very important for successful deterrence. The opponent must understand that when a potential victim shouts, “I’ll pull your eye over your ass if you take one more step,” the victim is actually ready to carry out their threats because they are backed into a corner and have no way out other than to unleash their arsenals for pulling eyes over asses. At the same time, the potential aggressor must by no means be put in an equally desperate position where they have no choice but to risk an eye and take a step forward. However, the more successfully such a doctrine is implemented, the more often threats will be a bluff—simply for reasons of economy. 2. The state also implements a deterrence doctrine regarding members of society who wish to destroy it. One of the most reliable ways for it is to take society hostage. Every member of society must understand that any threats or, God forbid, real actions against state representatives will only make things worse for a conditional city like Voronezh. Thus, the state invented the concept of extremism, and now extremists are to blame for any tightening of the screws; all these security measures are undertaken precisely to protect society from them. Rare successful actions against the state only confirm that extremism is not a fiction and state security measures are justified. 3. Attempts to propose increasingly technological weapons for fighting state representatives, such as micro-drones and the uberization of violence, will lead to the state starting to protect citizens from micro-drones and uber-violence with great pleasure, and for this, completely totalitarian methods of control over all aspects of life will be required. In the limit, this arms race leads to a situation where doomsday weapons become available to everyone, and then it’s just coffin, coffin, cemetery, game over. 4. As a dessert, there is a historical excursion into medieval Saxony, where something very close to my described concept of uber-retribution was successfully practiced. Nevertheless, the system did not survive its time, like all other medieval elements of panarchy, and gave way to the state monopoly on judgment and punishment. The author suggests thinking about whether such an outcome was inevitable.
The main conclusion I would draw from this tangle of arguments is the following consideration. No single doctrine is a panacea. The state is in the minds. This means that although in some cases the problem of the state can be successfully simplified by cutting off particularly obstructive heads or the threat of such decapitation, the decisive importance still lies with the means of indoctrination in freedom. These, in turn, must be selected individually.
In honor of the US-Iran war that never actually started, which for some reason was predicted to have the status of a world war, I am publishing an extraordinary translation of two chapters from David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom, dedicated to the problem of the army and defense in a stateless society.
National Defense: A Serious Problem. In this chapter, written shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops, national defense is considered from the perspective of the economics of public goods; much attention is paid to why the free-rider effect is so pronounced in this sector, and the conclusion is drawn that although there are some prerequisites for a stateless society to be able to defend itself, if it turns out in practice that this is impossible without some minimal state concerned exclusively with defense issues, the “witcher” is ready to accept this lesser evil.
A Serious Problem, Part II. Forty years later, Friedman returned to this topic, and this time he is far more optimistic. The chapter advocates for the “haven’t served, aren’t a man” approach (which girls should also exhibit) and other totalitarian trinkets, because totalitarianism is when everything is done voluntarily, for free, and with songs. At the curtain, the author also skeptically smirked regarding Iran’s military potential, which formally aligns the topic with the agenda of early 2020.
I listened to Grigory Bazhenov’s conversation on Vadim Politikov’s channel. The conversation is boringly titled “Why Left-wing Economies are Doomed,” so I didn’t immediately decide to spend two hours on the interview, assuming that it would indeed be a banal explanation of why left-wing economies are doomed. Fortunately, Grigory, fueled by good whiskey, discussed many other things, and in particular, towards the end, modernization.
Main points: 1. In a state that is already leading, authoritarian modernization from above is impossible, because a plan works only when you know where to go; the leader, however, will have to pave the way through the operation of spontaneous orders. 2. Forced modernization from an agrarian to an industrial society within the framework of catch-up development is possible. Universal education, a transport network, a banking system—and that’s enough; after that, just don’t interfere with the work of institutions. Those states that limited themselves to this gentleman’s set, and then allowed society to develop independently, were able to successfully cut the corner, catch up with the leader, and many even surpassed the unfortunate Great Britain, once the world’s first economy. Those that played at dirigisme, crawled forward in bursts, with great costs—in short, it didn’t turn out very well. 3. Forced modernization from above from an industrial to a post-industrial society is theoretically possible, but the recipe consists precisely of the dismantling of authoritarian mechanisms, and this is not a recipe that most leaders are willing to hear. However, Grigory does not believe in dismantling from below through agorism, and this is the point on which I would discuss with him, provided, of course, that he doesn’t find a conversation partner in his own weight class.
In connection with this, I recalled a book I recently read by Dmitry Travin and Otar Margania, “Modernization: from Elizabeth Tudor to Egor Gaidar”. It is an excellent selection of historical anecdotes about who and how tried to spur the nag of history in their countries. It mainly describes a long line of kings, prime ministers, and other ministers, while only two inseparable partners of the twentieth century—Keynes and Hayek—stand apart, who personally conducted no reforms, but exerted a powerful influence on minds.
Historical anecdotes are pleasing because they are not dry theory, but a multitude of yarns, from which each is entitled to derive their own moral. In general, these stories do not contradict Grigory Bazhenov’s points, and instead complement them well, so I recommend checking them out, especially since it is a fairly light, entertaining genre.
And finally, I will give you a song by Timur Shaov, “From where modernization in Rus’ began,” to create a proper stereo effect.
After the Russian state banned Jehovah’s Witnesses, the niche of street preachers has remained vacant. So, if you feel an urge to borrow five minutes from passersby to convey some bright idea to them, why not make it about panarchy? And what is a preacher without glossy brochures featuring a lion lying with a lamb?
But seriously, for a libertarian, it can be quite useful to have printed handouts on hand at rallies, public lectures, debates, round tables, and other gatherings of social activists. Put on a bright t-shirt, a badge, a scarf, or a cap in any combination; people will notice you in the crowd, approach you, and wonder who you are. If you don’t have time to explain in detail to everyone what you are campaigning for, or if you simply aren’t very silver-tongued, you can always hand a handout to someone who is interested.
I would like to organize a section on my website with various useful templates (I would welcome help from designers, as I don’t know much about it myself) for free download and self-printing. To start things off, I am posting a template for a brochure about panarchy. The text is mine; the design is by Aegis Mirijam.
Don’t know where to start promoting libertarian ideas to your mother or a friend? I’ll be blunt, because I’ve tried it myself more than once: don’t talk about the advantages of the free market, the absence of taxes, and regulations. Firstly, your interlocutor is unlikely to understand anything. Secondly, you must know the theory perfectly and avoid mistakes, as everyone has Google in their pocket now. You shouldn’t talk about personal freedom right away either, because a person’s views on drugs and gambling may not be libertarian at all.
What should you talk about then? The Stationary Bandit Theory (SBT). Your story should begin with the phrase “The state is a stationary bandit.” You need to instill in your interlocutor a sense of guilt for supporting the stationary bandit, as if they themselves are an accomplice to state violence and therefore a “complete maniac.” Turn them into a modern German, who feels guilt not just for themselves, but for ancestors who died long ago. The “state” structure exists only in the head; it is a quasi-religion (meaning the belief that people belonging to this structure have a “legitimate” right to initiate violence, while others are not allowed to). If a person feels guilt for supporting aggression, they will change their behavior, the state will begin to weaken and eventually lose its territorial monopoly, which is exactly what we are striving for.
If you haven’t read our article on SBT, I advise you to do so and give it to everyone to whom you are promoting ideas of freedom.
Although, it is quite possible that a slightly simplified but emotionally charged explanation of SBT will be more effective:
“States are organizations that unjustifiably appropriated supreme power over a certain territory through conquest, placing its population in direct subordination to themselves. The state arose not from freedom of association, but through a violation of the non-aggression principle.
You do not question the state’s right to kill, carry out confiscations, or arrest. Yet, if private individuals do this—you would call them murderers, thieves, and bandits. Don’t you find this hypocritical?
States are highly organized criminal organizations, like gangs that “racketeer” a particular territory, imposing their rules on its residents, collecting tribute (protection money) from them, and occasionally fighting other gangs for spheres of influence. The state has the same basis as any organized crime group—the violent imposition of its rules on captured territory. And today, there is nowhere to run from these gangs. They have divided the entire Earth among themselves.
How does the “Islamic State” group fundamentally differ from the states of “Saudi Arabia” and “Iran”? After all, their laws are roughly the same. The only difference is that IS is not recognized by other states. International recognition—that is the difference between a “legitimate” gang and an “illegitimate” one.
The main grievance against bandits is that they are bandits and take land or other goods from their victims through aggressive violence. These same bandits then write laws to create the feeling among others that what was looted belongs to them by right.
If people came to a wild land and began to develop it—they are colonists.
If they came to a land where other people lived and took it from them by force—they are bandits.
If they hold other people on their land by force—they are bandits, even if they refer to a “law” that they wrote themselves.
When you tell people that the state is a stationary bandit, it is quite possible that you will be asked one of the following questions. Be ready to answer them.
1) There is a “social contract” between citizens and the state. How can it be a bandit if it happens with the consent of the citizens?
If such a contract exists, show me the text! The Constitution is not a “social contract,” but one of the “laws” (which are actually orders, i.e., the arbitrary will of the stationary bandit); it’s not for nothing that it’s often called the “basic law.” Even if just one person in the country did not agree to this constitution, it cannot be considered a contract (which, by definition, requires the voluntary consent of all parties).
2) People are not protesting, which means they are satisfied with the status quo. Can’t the “social contract” be implicit?
Suppose a girl is raped by a maniac, and she is unable to put up a proper fight. Will you say that everything between them happened “by mutual consent” too?!
3) The state is not necessarily a “stationary bandit,” since there are examples in history of the emergence of proto-states—entities with a territorial monopoly not through violence (conquest), for example, like some poleis in Ancient Greece?
Such entities occupied in total no more than 0.1% of the Earth’s surface; the remaining 99.9% were seized by stationary bandits. Even if we assume that poleis, as voluntary associations, did indeed exist, this does not justify modern states with extensive borders that appeared through violence according to SBT. If we accept a hypothetical situation where stationary bandits never existed, we would now have, for example, 1% of the planet’s territory with voluntary territorial monopoly and 99% without it, with extraterritorial status (like international waters). Agree that this is far better than 100% of the planet under stationary bandits, which we have now. Libertarianism does not forbid the creation of voluntary communities and private cities with territorial monopoly, but this should not happen through violence, and people must retain the right to leave, and owners—to withdraw their land from such jurisdiction. This model is promoted, for example, by Mikhail Svetov.
4) At the moment when the bandits seized a certain territory, there were no laws prohibiting this, so what grievances can there be against them?
At the moment when millions of Jews were sent to gas chambers and burned in the ovens of Auschwitz, there were also no laws prohibiting this—that is exactly what the defendants said at the Nuremberg trials. As a result, they ended their lives with a noose around their necks, as befits any maniac and rapist who rejects the fundamental principles of morality and does not recognize the natural right of every person to life.
5) Yes, I agree, but what do you propose instead? Anarchy?
You can’t just simply abolish the state entirely in one or two steps. This would lead to the creation of a new and more cruel state, which would be an unmasked stationary bandit, as usually happens in a failed state situation. But you can make current states extraterritorial with competition between multiple jurisdictions in one territory. Then the current state will become just one of such jurisdictions (meaning you could choose another jurisdiction for yourself without flying to Alpha Centauri, but while continuing to live in your home in Russia). Such a system is called panarchy.
6) This will cause chaos. Without a monopoly on violence, a war of all against all will begin.
Diplomats for some reason don’t fight, haven’t you noticed? Although they have extraterritorial status (they obey the laws of their own state, not that of the territory they are on). Perhaps people fight among themselves in European cities like Basel and Geneva, where jurisdictional borders run right through houses? I haven’t noticed anything.
7) Personally, I feel more comfortable living in a familiar state with a territorial monopoly; I am a conservative and fear abrupt changes.
Currently, many libertarians would be quite satisfied with the non-interference of state supporters in the creation of new jurisdictions. People would gladly occupy unclaimed lands, experiment there with social orders convenient specifically for them, and not immediately attack capitals. This is a very moderate agenda, from which no one should experience discomfort. Various practices of social organization in these territories could be evolutionarily refined and gradually reach large cities in a mature form, without causing upheavals.
But you must also clearly understand that by opposing such a model, you directly initiate aggression against peaceful people through your support of the stationary bandit. If being a maniac does not cause you remorse, then be prepared for oceans of blood, the destruction of the economy, and the habitual way of life already in the city where you live.
8) Move to another country and build your Ancapistan there.
Why should I move anywhere?! I love my country and I hate the stationary bandit, who forcibly seized the territory and considers it, and everything on it, his property. But can a subject who acquired a thing using violence be considered a legitimate owner of anything? For example, a robber who took your phone on the street? By all principles of law—definitely not!
Comment from Ancap-chan
Everyone has their own experience of offline preaching; some find it more convenient to appeal to the Stationary Bandit Theory, and this text is for them. My practice shows that people usually understand anyway that the state is a stationary bandit, but for them, this means that it is “their own” and already tamed. And if it were removed, nomadic ones would swarm back, like in the nineties, and would act lawlessly. So one should seek an individual approach to the interlocutor, finding out beforehand what they fear.
Hello, give me a minute of your time, and I will tell you how the stationary bandit crucified our Lord Jesus; by the way, happy birthday to him!
Creeping Capitalism. The author notes the success of the socialists’ tactic of stealing a well-sounding word, liberalism__, and calling themselves liberals. He then suggests using the same tactic: to stop fighting socialism and start improving it, to the point where it becomes completely indistinguishable from true classical liberalism.
If you need it, just buy it. Here, Friedman provides simple calculations showing that there are no reasons why workers, within the existing order in the USA, could not provide themselves with full socialist worker self-management if they actually needed it—simply by buying their companies using their own salaries. This would require far fewer resources than a bloody socialist revolution.
Scarce means exhaustible. In this chapter, Friedman notes that one should not confuse the economic term “scarce resources” with the everyday understanding of the word “rare.” He examines in detail why, in an era of full automation, the prerequisites for the disappearance of the institution of property will nevertheless not arise, regardless of how much our left-anarchist friends might wish otherwise.
