Subscribe to the main channel of the Montelibero project and wait there for a post announcing the next MTL-breakfast. They always take place on Wednesdays, but in different establishments, which is why you need to keep an eye on the announcements. MTL-breakfasts are designed specifically so that anyone from the outside can come, see the project participants in person, get acquainted, chat, and perhaps even join in. We already have vegans; maybe radical feminists will fit in too.
Such regular meetings are not yet held in other cities, so it’s a good thing that you are in Bar.
However, Montelibero is not the only Russian-speaking community in Montenegro, nor even the only one in Bar. There is, for example, a quite independent beer club, there is a club for board game lovers, and there are certainly many other centers of activity that I have no clue about. In any case, one would have to be an exceptionally unsociable person to experience loneliness in this country. At least, to experience it for long.
Many proponents of liberal views often consider the sole source of all problems in social and economic management to be the insufficient involvement of the population in the political process. They believe that the state, and especially its coercive function, is absolutely necessary for existence, but that it should be managed by all people simultaneously and without the mediation of any political elites. This can lead to the concept of direct democracy, where a referendum is held on every political issue and the decision chosen by the majority is adopted. It should be noted that the creation of a direct democracy state is often implied, albeit not always explicitly, even by proponents of anarchic views.
Let us ask ourselves: does the decision-making process itself truly play a key role in how social management works? Of course not, because the most critical role is assigned not to the making, but to the execution of decisions. But are the majority of people capable of taking a direct part specifically in their execution? Let us examine this question in more detail.
If we are talking about decisions of a violent nature—for example, the use of force to compel people to comply with certain norms—then the obvious answer to the previous question is no! The majority of people are unable and will never personally execute violent decisions. When it is said that someone must be forced into something by power, it means the execution of this decision by certain separate security agents, who constitute a specific minority in society. This means that even if a violent decision was made by the majority, it will still be executed by the minority, and it cannot be any other way.
The right to commit violence, even in a state of direct democracy and majority choice, is still completely transferred into the hands of a minority. Moreover, the security apparatus must be capable of ensuring the realization of this right. Thus, a direct democracy state also presupposes that the ability of individuals and private communities for self-defense must be lower than the security forces’ ability to attack. This may mean the introduction of gun laws, if not a complete ban on civilian weaponry.
And why would anyone suddenly decide that this minority with the right to commit violence will not use such a position for its own benefit? Will it really execute decisions made by the majority, while effectively having the power to compel that majority to do anything? In practice, in the best case, it will simply pretend to execute the majority’s decisions, but the process of their execution will be organized to maximize its own interests.
In comparison, a free non-violent society, in which the primary tools for implementing punishments for the violation of certain norms are reputational and financial sanctions, can be organized according to the model of direct democracy. Imagine that as a punitive measure for a certain violation, a decision was made by majority vote to ostracize a person in certain types of relationships, including limiting or refusing them the ability to conduct some purchase and sale transactions. Furthermore, it was decided to subject those who continue full cooperation with the violator regardless of everything to this punishment. In such a case, the majority that made these decisions will also be their direct executor. It is the majority that will, in practice, refuse or limit cooperation with the violators.
If someone really likes the idea of society being managed according to the principles of direct democracy, they should first think about how violence can be eradicated from human relationships and how to completely get rid of it as a tool for implementing decisions. Otherwise, the choice of the majority will simply have no practical meaning if the decisions are still executed by a minority of people.
If this occurs under one state system or another, the answer is simple: responsibility lies with whoever is legally required to bear it. Usually, this turns out to be the judge and the taxpayers, or only the taxpayers. Additionally, false witnesses and other individuals involved in fabricating the sentence may also be caught in the gears.
But the question, I presume, concerns ancap, that is, a social order in which law enforcement is decentralized, and developed commodity-money relations are in effect.
Are courts possible under ancap? Yes, because conflicts are possible, and the service of resolving them through a verdict by a third party not involved in the conflict may be in demand on the free market. Are courts that issue death sentences possible under ancap? As a procedure implying the voluntary participation of each party—it is quite doubtful, since the party who may be threatened with the death penalty by a court verdict has a strong incentive to simply refuse to participate in the court.
Are courts that issue verdicts in conditions where one of the parties does not recognize the jurisdiction of that court over them possible under ancap? They are. When I speak of possibility, I mean potential market demand under ancap conditions.
Such a court can function in two ways.
First, it can examine evidence of a crime in a situation where the criminal is in hiding, and give the go-ahead for their pursuit and retribution by any means convenient to the plaintiff. Why does the plaintiff need this? So that other people can familiarize themselves with the verdict and not obstruct this pursuit.
Second, the plaintiff can independently detain the defendant and forcibly bring them before the court. Why? So that the execution they intend to carry out is favorably accepted by those around them and not viewed as some kind of lawlessness.
Can a verdict of guilt be appealed? Yes, of course. The pursued party can present evidence of their innocence to another court, or even to the same one, and after reviewing it, the court may issue a verdict of innocence in light of newly discovered circumstances. If the plaintiff is not satisfied with this new verdict, they will have to act further without the support that the court decision provided, which could be critical for the ability to carry out the execution.
And what if the plaintiff has already executed the defendant using a court verdict, and then evidence of their innocence surfaces? That is, for example, some third party obtains the evidence and deems it important to make it public, after which one or several courts review it and issue an acquittal. By the way, will they do this if they aren’t paid? Actually, they have a market motive: if they can show that the court which issued the verdict of guilt was biased and conducted the procedure incorrectly, they will bury their competitor.
Thus, under ancap, the judge, the plaintiff, and those who execute the court’s decision (if the plaintiff does not carry out the death sentence personally) act at their own peril and risk, and bear responsibility to the extent that other interested parties are willing to spend effort to hold them accountable. Vague? There’s nothing to be done; decentralized systems rely on market incentives, not direct mandates. Just look at Bitcoin—that’s all it relies on, and, you must agree, it’s working out quite well.
How much are you willing to pay for the enforcement of a verdict under ancap?
My book about ancap has been supplemented with a new chapter on secessionism. This is the term I’ve conventionally used for a family of approaches to building Ancapistan—a territorial libertarian community populated almost entirely by libertarians from the start, in contrast to the minarchist approach discussed earlier, where the state as a whole, with all its hereditary ailments, idiotic practices, and dominant statist majority, undergoes libertarian transformation.
The fact that there is still a certain percentage of individuals in the human population capable of committing violence, up to and including murder, easily and without any internal resistance, may lead some to think that this is quite normal and natural. Since such people exist, and humanity has existed for a long time, could violence simply be an evolutionary adaptation that for some reason proved necessary for the human population?
To answer this question, we turn to the works of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, who first discovered the presence of innate inhibitors of intraspecific aggression in many animal species. He also described the conditions under which these inhibitors arise. The most important of these are the presence of strong innate weaponry and the inability to avoid violence through flight. According to Lorenz’s observations, ravens possess a strong inhibitor against striking their conspecifics in the eyes with their sharp beaks. Such inhibitors are often observed in wolves as well—when one of them assumes a submissive posture or demonstrates vulnerable parts of the body, such as the throat or belly, it leads to the cessation of aggressive actions by the conspecific. At the same time, collared doves, whose beaks are not as sharp as those of ravens, although they usually do not kill each other in natural conditions, are capable of doing so during a conflict if they are deprived of the possibility of escape by being locked in a cage.
Speaking of humans, Lorenz did not believe that they possessed aggression inhibitors, as they lack strong innate weaponry. Furthermore, humans were not prepared for the emergence of artificial weapons, as scientific and technical progress acquired rapid momentum that biological evolution simply could not keep up with. In view of this, Lorenz expressed concerns about the possible destruction of humanity:
“The day will come when two hostile camps will find themselves face to face, facing the danger of mutual destruction. A day may come when all of humanity is split into two such camps. How will we behave in this case—like doves or like wolves? The fate of humanity will depend on how people answer this question. We must be vigilant!”
Of course, as other researchers later found, humans do possess a mechanism similar to the one Lorenz wrote about. Its emergence can be explained by gene-culture coevolution, where factors of culture and society influence selection in the human population even over short periods of time. And it is worth remembering that primitive artificial weaponry in the form of clubs, spears, and stones appeared in early hominids presumably as far back as 5 million years ago.
However, to a certain extent Lorenz was right, and in the course of biological evolution, intraspecific violence was not completely eradicated from the human population. It is also obvious that humans could not evolutionarily adapt to modern remote weaponry, such as artillery or the atomic bomb. Of course, based on the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans, conditioned reflexes should be developed during its operation, preventing any urges to initiate violence. But military evidence shows that while 98% of soldiers experience strong resistance to committing murder during direct contact, in the case of remote weaponry, which allows one not to observe or even know about the potential victims, such resistance weakens.
Based on all this, it can be boldly asserted that violence cannot be called an evolutionary adaptation for humans. Any adaptation must benefit the species by increasing its chances of survival, which cannot be said of violence. It is quite the opposite—due to rapid scientific and technical progress, humans have not had time to fully adapt to new environmental conditions, to the fact that they are the most armed species on the planet. This, in turn, based on the evolutionary model, should imply the existence of extremely strong and pronounced inhibitors of intraspecific aggression.
The external background today is not very conducive to writing monumental works, so new chapters of the book on ancap are coming out infrequently. Nevertheless, last night another one was born: about minarchism. For those who have forgotten the context, let me clarify that I do not view minarchism as a branch of libertarianism asserting that the state must be preserved while being limited by certain boundaries. No, for me, minarchism is simply a method of implementing libertarian principles into society: through political reforms from above. This is the method, with its obvious advantages and inherent limitations, that I discuss in this new short chapter.
Sometimes violent actions, ranging from their use as a method of resolving interpersonal conflicts to geopolitical relations, may be justified by resorting to the so-called concept of a preemptive strike. In this way, violence is equated with self-defense, since the victim of the attack is allegedly the aggressor themselves, intending to carry out an attack and certainly would have done so if a preemptive strike had not been delivered. In practice, this line of thinking can easily be seen in conflict situations where, for example, violence was used in response to purely verbal threats. It is even more evident in cases where some threat of a future attack was presented as a justified reason for starting wars.
Of course, there are no preemptive strikes as a separate category of aggression, and certainly not as a form of self-defense. A certain “preemptiveness” in this case is exactly the same kind of justification as any other possible justification for violence; it in no way makes a specific instance of its use something else, qualitatively different from other cases. Certainly, if there were immediate threats of violence or a real attempt to attack, then responsive force measures can be called self-defense. But if there was no such thing, then we are dealing precisely with a violent attack, and everything else is simply speculation, invented to justify one’s violence to others.
The Libertarian Band studio released a fairly dense ten-minute video explaining the specifics of mobilization in the RF for those who still believe that it is actually possible to do something according to the law in the RF. By the way, this is actually possible, because “according to the law” in the RF is one of several competing systems of concepts, and where there is competition, there is an opportunity to win that competition. The thing is, the main tool to ensure that things are handled “according to the law” with you is a loud and dirty public scandal or a credible threat of one. The video also speaks quite clearly about this.
At the end of the video, it was also mentioned that a great way to avoid mobilization would be physical relocation to Montenegro and joining the Montelibero project.
Mikhail Svetov held a rather thin six-hour stream with the powerful title “Run,” where at the end he also mentioned that he strongly recommends fleeing, including to Montenegro, where one can join the Montelibero project if desired—despite Mikhail’s own skepticism regarding the project’s goals, as it’s not the time for luxuries.
I regret to state that the suggestions from both respected channels were slightly belated, and now the priority is to flee not specifically to Montenegro, but anywhere abroad at all, as long as you aren’t turned back at the border—then you can figure out how to survive in the new conditions, and perhaps you’ll manage to make it to Montenegro after all, who knows. For example, one of the project participants lived with us for a month in August; he liked it, then he returned to the RF to pack the rest of his things and move for good—and now he’s stuck in Kazakhstan, where he managed to get with considerable difficulty after the mobilization decree. “Packed his things,” my foot…
Nevertheless, we still declare that we will help with settling in those who make it to our remote area, from some Georgia, Armenia, the same Kazakhstan, or, why not, even from Russia. If you can—mobilize all your resources—and come join us.
About two months have passed since the previous newsletter, which means it’s time for the next one. Last time, there was a lot about the First Montelibero Club, which has become the main center of activity for project participants. So, once again, I’ll start by talking about the club.
Since only those who have explicitly agreed to abide by the NAP become club members, it is much easier to count them than the participants of the Montelibero project; today there are 81 people, half of whom I haven’t even seen once because I don’t visit as often now.
Currently, an English club, a movie club, and a discussion club coexist under its roof; lectures are held from time to time, and a coworking space and bar — with cocktails and the best coffee in Montenegro — are permanently operational.
Additionally, a podcast recording studio has been created there. Those interested can subscribe to the channel where they are posted. For now, the content consists of introductions to various project participants, but over time, I hope other materials will appear.
And I would like to say that this is a photo from a typical MTL breakfast, but no, it’s an ML assembly
The project’s tokenomics is becoming increasingly mature. For instance, for the MTL token — Montelibero’s main investment fund — a public offer has appeared, which finally describes in a dry but accessible manner what it is, what it is used for, and how it works. Previously, the tokens themselves were sold directly by the fund in unlimited quantities at a fixed price, but this sell order has now been liquidated. Issuance at a fixed price is still possible, but only in large portions and by prior request. It is expected that this will have a positive effect on the token price and on the activity of the secondary token market.
For the first time in a very long while, I didn’t start the news summary with the MTL City settlement, but that doesn’t mean construction has failed or even stopped. The concrete frames for a residential building with eight apartments and a non-residential building, which will house various technical services for the future settlement, are completely ready. Wall laying is finishing, then comes the finishing work; the buildings are promised to be completed by the end of the year.
Meanwhile, in Russia, general mobilization and the closing of borders are underway. This means that the main source of new recruits for the project is under threat of exhaustion, and we may soon need to reorient ourselves entirely toward other markets. I doubt we will suddenly start catering to Western European libertarians. Rather, we will work more actively with the already established Russian-speaking diaspora.
After my previous post, I was criticized for inconsistency: on one hand, I claim that the leaders of the Russian opposition acted quite competently, and on the other, I write that the regime’s response was to ban everything in Russia, and that all roads lead to the disposal of the population.
Here I will simply briefly note that when the RF troops attacked Ukraine, the Ukrainian troops also acted quite competently, which did not prevent them from losing a large territory. The actions of the opposition could have been successful if they hadn’t been constantly lagging. But they couldn’t help lagging: you cannot immediately incite people to burn down administrative buildings and engage in individual terror while people, for the most part, believe in legal methods of struggle. Thus, the few extremists from the time when the regime was slightly more herbivorous turned out to be premature, and their impulse went to waste. Now all they have left is to say, “we warned you.”
Similarly, this is all that remains to be said by those who desperately called all their friends and relatives to leave the country, and now they would be glad to leave, but there are traffic jams at all borders, and departure may be banned entirely any moment now.
We do not know what reserves of strength the regime has. Perhaps it will fall like the Soviet one after Afghanistan or the Russian one after the First World War. Or perhaps it will survive, like the Iranian one after the war with Iraq. It is only in our power to nudge it toward collapse through our action or inaction—and, if possible, avoid getting a retaliation from the regime for it. You can flee the country. You can burn down a recruitment office. You can beat up a recruitment officer. You can end up at the front and destroy your tank or commander there, and then successfully surrender into captivity. Or, if you prefer a positive agenda, you can help an immigrant, hide a deserter, persuade a friend not to go to the recruitment office… Ah, yes, that’s some kind of negativity again. Either way, all of these will be competent actions, strategically bringing you closer to the bright goal of the fall of the Russian dictatorship, even if the tactical effect seems negligible.
And what actions would be incompetent? For example, mocking those who have just this moment opened their eyes and demonstrating to them the shimmering whiteness of your own coat. Thoughtlessly approving and trying to justify every single action of regimes hostile to Russia—many of their actions are no less cannibalistic. Paying the regime fines issued to you for participating in peaceful street protests. Wishing the Russian army victory.