Yet another monstrous piracy

Not long ago, the audience of my Telegram chat watched in real time as I tried to crack an audio file in Amazon’s proprietary aaxc format and convert it into a human-readable mp3. Thanks to the help of readers and a bit of luck, I managed to do it in one evening.

Now, each chapter of the original text of David Friedman’s book The Machinery of Freedom is accompanied by audio where the author himself reads the corresponding chapter. Actually, I was cracking the audiobook for slightly different reasons, but I’ll get to that later; for now, I’ve put the intermediate result to use.

A translation of the first of three appendices to the book has also been published, but that’s a minor detail, needed only to change the number on the progress bar. For the most part, I am currently occupied with the final editing and layout of the translation into epub format.

By the way, regarding the audio. If anyone is interested in voicing the translation of the book, let’s collaborate. Record the poems from the epigraphs of all parts of the book and send the recording to me in a private message. Then, if the selection is representative enough, we will hold a vote on whose version to post on my site and, accordingly, suggest it to Friedman himself for his site. He has already prepared a section for his poems in Russian, but it’s empty for now, and this injustice should be corrected. And if the contest winner has the strength to voice the entire book (which is over twelve hours), that would be simply mega-cool, and it will almost certainly be rewarded by a grateful public.

Navalny’s Actions, Betting on the Rise

Last night, I thought about sharing my own impressions of the recent street protests while they were still fresh, but a more interesting news item came up. Alexei Nefedov, a former author of this channel, was detained on the street, so I decided to ask him how it all happened. And since I’m not very good at interviewing, the conversation quickly drifted into a more abstract discussion, which turned out to be quite interesting.

– I found out about your detention when I was already on my way home, because I rarely took my phone out on the street and only checked the coordination channel. This is the first time a close acquaintance of mine has been detained. In general, detentions have become the norm, so I wasn’t particularly worried; instead, I immediately decided to take the opportunity to ask how it looks from the other side—sorry for being so callous. To start with, how on earth did you get caught?

– When the report was being drawn up, I took Article 51, and I haven’t discussed the defense strategy with my lawyer yet, so I’ll refrain from commenting for now. I can only say that the recommendations you posted in the channel on Friday—it’s not that they are bad, they just work for different conditions. You talk about what a large mass of people should do, but they won’t be able to do it without a team. And you can only command anonymously via Telegram. That signal will be severely delayed. Fantasies about some kind of flag signals are for people who have had at least some coordination training. Not our case, in short. Therefore, people walked in scattered columns; they were easily split up, and movement was blocked. Detentions were also effortless. You can form a chain on the square, but it’s impossible in a column. The security forces control the entire roadway, so they can pop out from the side or behind and unexpectedly attack anyone. That’s exactly what happened to me.

– Strange, most of my recommendations concerned individual tactics, or small groups of acquaintances staying in clusters. But I was still hoping that the level of coordination would be higher. What happened after the detention?

– For starters, for some reason, instead of a classic police van, they used an ordinary Gazelle, without bars, with regular civilian plates. If not for the low ceiling, you might have thought it was taken off a shuttle route. Eight people were shoved in there, two “cosmonauts” [riot police] climbed in, and off we went to the police station. We arrived quickly, but then we sat in front of the doors for half an hour, so there was time to chat with the cosmonauts. Completely apolitical, good-natured guys. If we have to detain—we detain. If we have to kill—we kill. An order is an order. To the attacks of their fellow passengers, they replied that they simply didn’t understand life and invited them to go work for the National Guard to get their act together. In general, in the entire assembly line for stamping out administrative charges, a well-oiled routine is evident. They brought us in, waited for the signal that we could be brought inside, led us in pairs, and took us to the basement. There was more waiting, then the drawing up of the delivery and search report. Then to the duty office, where they have orders to do photography and fingerprinting. This is illegal, but it is demanded of them. So they try to push through purely psychologically, and they do it very well. I refused to roll my fingers and was sure that I would now be charged with violating the legal requirements of the police under Article 19.3. I even reset my phone to factory settings just in case. But none of that really matters, in the end. Generally, this feeling of the pointlessness of any fuss is very strong in the police station. Quotes from the Strugatsky brothers immediately come to mind, where an old revolutionary said: it’s not scary now, but when they were sawing off my arm and complaining about low wages—that’s when it was scary.

– What is expected next?

– They have three days to transfer the case to court, then they’ll call me and tell me the date. In court, I get a fine and file an appeal with the regional court. The appeal is denied, and I apply to the ECHR. In about three years, the ECHR awards me compensation. The fine is paid after the appeal is denied. I can pay it myself or ask the FBK for help. FBK lawyers also help prepare the ECHR application. In short, on our side, it’s also a completely routine conveyor belt, where not only the deadlines but also the court results are known in advance. There is also an unpleasant moment. For six months, protests are contraindicated for me until the administrative charge expires. As you correctly noted, two administrative charges mean the loss of the right to own a weapon. So now I’m sitting still, suing the state, not stirring things up. Or I’ll have to transfer the gun to acquaintances if I want to continue my activism.

– Svetov has a stream going on literally right now. In it, like me, he says that Navalny overestimated his influence, and in this situation, no peaceful protest will yield results. It can only provide a picture for diplomatic pressure on the regime from the outside. A week ago, it seemed to me that there were chances that the protest would soon stop being peaceful. Now it seems that the chance is lost. What do you think?

– Everyone is forced to judge by the part of the picture they see directly. Then they compare data and get a more comprehensive understanding. I only had time to return, wash up, and have dinner; I haven’t even read the feed yet. In the section where I was today, the wall is strong; it can’t be broken by forehead. There are so many security forces that they will disperse protests of this scale and intensity without breaking a sweat. The damage to the economy from blocking the city center for three hours on a weekend is minimal. Moreover, we are the province; everyone understands that the decision about Navalny is made in Moscow, and we are just there for the crowd. When selfish interests are touched, as was the case during the protests over utility tariffs, people are angrier and more active. No one here will seriously stand up for Navalny. Just compare how they shouted “freedom for Navalny” today versus “freedom for Boyko.” Boyko is closer, more popular; they will shout louder for him. But he will be released in mid-February, so people will limit themselves to shouting and won’t get into a fight.

– So you think everything is useless?

– Street politics is a very necessary training in self-organization, in the self-awareness of civil society. In this sphere, we have already streamlined a lot. All I did during the detention was press the red button. Then invisible wheels started turning, and that’s it—LPR writes about the detention on Twitter, OVD-Info calls me, a lawyer arrives, a care package arrives, all further litigation is put on stream. People are learning to peacefully defend their interests through voluntary cooperation. These are the skills that are relevant under ancap. These examples make it easy to show how ancap works. With these people, we will eventually build it. Or not ancap, but panarchy. Because systemic communists have their own mutual aid network, left-wing anarchists have theirs, nationalists have theirs. We are already streamlining society with ECU. It’s just that the streamlining is happening against the backdrop of opposing a single external threat.

– These are all very long terms, but young people have a short planning horizon. Don’t you think people might simply burn out?

– It’s important to switch. I’m temporarily finishing with street activity now and will find myself another occupation. Maybe it will be helping those who will still be detained. Maybe I’ll go give lectures on Bitcoin. Rest is switching to other types of activity. Parties are good in that they are large organizations with several different directions of work; burnout happens much slower than if you, for example, only participate in open-ended protests or only volunteer at elections.

– Parties seem to me a way to unproductively spend a huge amount of time. In my own channel, I also have the most diverse activities and answer questions on a wide variety of topics. But once I switched to street protest, I became close to burnout because there is no immediate result. It’s not like writing a post, discussing the publication, and then writing a new one tomorrow.

– Imagine that you’re just going to a fitness center. You also give yourself a regular load and change imperceptibly. In the process, it may be boring or unpleasant, but you see people around you doing the same thing, which also helps to motivate yourself.

– In short, we’ll keep pumping the invisible butt of the market. Alright, thanks for the story, good night)))

Aesthetics and Propriety as Applied to Book Piracy

Rodion Belkovich has for the first time publicly responded to the appearance of the electronic version of his “Blood of Patriots”. It is clearly evident from this: Rodion Belkovich and I could live within the framework of one republic, since we agree on legal issues (authorship is unconditional; copyright is doubtful, however, restrictions on copying can be introduced by contract; and, of course, appealing to gangsters for help in resolving conflicts that did not arise from the use of violence is unacceptable) and share common interests (we want as many people as possible to read the smart books we like).

Where Rodion and I diverge is in our perceptions of aesthetics and propriety. For Belkovich, paper books possess aesthetic value; they represent respectability and respect for tradition. For me, paper is dust and mustiness, a synonym for stagnation and one of the inherent attributes of Putin, with his famous folders. For Rodion, it is improper, while providing a free service to an indefinitely wide circle of people, to remind the public of the possibility of expressing their gratitude in monetary form. For me, the ancient Soviet tradition of selling a product as a bundle is improper, requiring those who wish to buy the market-demanded Belkovich to also pay for the publication of an unsellable Ficino (though it is quite proper to advertise Ficino’s book right on the paper pages of one’s own bestseller).

That is exactly why I meticulously listed: pay here to support the author, here to support the paper publisher, and here to support the electronic publisher. For me, this is a truly important ethical issue—to ensure maximum transparency of conditions for the consumer. For these same reasons, I, for example, will not place “джинса” (sponsored content) in the channel, I will indicate which donations I received for answers to certain questions, how much the contract for content placement with Bitarch costs, and even how much referral commission I will receive from your transactions in the btc_banker bot. Speaking more broadly, the spheres of what is permitted and appropriate for me, as a fairly typical libertarian, are of course very different.

So, although Rodion Belkovich and I can live within one res publica, it will be more comfortable for us to live further apart and clearly define the boundaries of our res privata. Perhaps then we won’t fight.

Books are lying on the floor. Just imagine if they tried to do that in a mosque!

Why you should not count on the creation of new jurisdictions in the ocean or space

Bitarch, Voluntarist

The idea of seasteading—creating contractual jurisdictions on floating platforms or artificial islands in international waters—seems like a quite interesting solution to the problem of having to submit to monopolistic and violent stationary bandits in the form of states. And the colonization of celestial bodies beyond Earth is a necessity without which humanity cannot survive in the long term. However, these options cannot be relied upon as a real possibility to escape the stationary bandit as long as they still exist and are capable and willing to use violence.

Remember: if you can get somewhere, then the stationary bandit can get there too. This has already been demonstrated by the examples of the Republic of Minerva, Liberland, and a floating platform near the shores of Thailand. In all these cases, the attempt to escape the state ended in its invasion. Additionally, various remote weapons can be used against you, such as missile strikes. This is the easiest way for authorities to get rid of a remote, disobedient jurisdiction without exposing themselves to any risks.

One should also not forget another fact. Creating jurisdictions remote from the rest of the world entails enormous costs; such jurisdictions are difficult to develop and are unattractive to many people due to the unavailability or high cost of many goods.

In order to protect themselves from the encroachments of stationary bandits, people who decide to leave their jurisdiction need certain means of deterrence and self-defense. Free people must be armed; furthermore, they must have the ability to threaten any potential aggressors with unacceptable damage. In modern conditions, the most accessible means of deterrence of this type could be samples of dangerous viruses—by threatening to release them, one could force state leaders to leave you alone. But regardless of which means of deterrence and self-defense is chosen, it is easiest to apply if one does not try to run as far as possible from the stationary bandit; otherwise, they will, again, be able to destroy you with remote weaponry without any risks to themselves. Let us also not forget the ethical point—viruses are indiscriminate WMDs capable of affecting the entire population of the planet, including those not involved in the government’s aggressive actions. The use of such weapons completely contradicts libertarian ethics, and without such weapons of deterrence, the stationary bandit will sooner or later reach your CJ, even if it is located on Mars. Such is realpolitik.

In the end, we have the following: a remote jurisdiction can certainly be reached for the purpose of subjugation, it can be quite easily destroyed remotely, and life in it is unattractive to most people. Considering all this, the most profitable strategy is to strive for the achievement of a free society where you are right now, or, if you still like the idea of settling previously unoccupied lands, you should choose among the most accessible, comfortable, and economically advantageous territorial plots, rather than among islands in the ocean or space objects. To secure your intentions, you need to use various means of deterrence and self-defense—then no one will be able to continue imposing their violent power on you. The creation of remote jurisdictions, for example in the oceans or space, is a task that can be undertaken after the possibility of current stationary bandits applying violence has been eliminated, so as not to fear invasion or remote destruction on their part.

Comment by Alexander Tatarkov:

If you blackmail the state with a viral attack in case of aggression, then it is logical to organize your stateless territory precisely in the capitals!

For example, declare a specific micro-district to be free.

The logic is this: they definitely will not bomb their own capital. Meanwhile, in case of aggression against the free territory by the state, it is much easier to poison their reservoirs.

As for the idea of moving to the end of the world, as Svetov propagated—the story of the “Order of the Solar Temple” is a typical example. It would seem that they didn’t harm the state, moved to a remote wilderness that you can’t find on maps, didn’t even refuse to pay taxes, and made no demands…

For the state, the very fact of their existence was grounds for a punitive operation. They need no other reasons!

P.S. We are not calling for the use of a virus; this is an idea by Alexander Rozov, which at least looks realistic compared to the naive dreams of seasteaders, even if it is extremely inhumane. We always advocate for the option of eradicating aggressive violence as such, then there will be no problem of creating a CJ!

Street processions. Recommendations.

Tomorrow, January 31, we take to the streets again. After January 23, we see a fairly clear tactic from the regime: to make coordination as difficult as possible and to knock out all organizers, as well as those who theoretically could be organizers, even if they aren’t currently exposed but were noticed in something similar in the past. In the locations where the protests are held, communication will be jammed, public transport movement will be restricted, sidewalks and roads will be blocked, and establishments will be closed.

Navalny’s headquarters continues to insist that the upcoming action be peaceful. That is, it is suggested not to kick the security forces in the stomach, even if their visors fog up.

How is it proposed to behave within the restrictions imposed on us by the enemy, and those imposed on us by our own command?

  1. This is not the final decisive battle, but simply one of the episodes of a very long confrontation to come.
  2. But tomorrow we must perform more vividly than a week ago.
  3. Most likely, slightly more people will come out, but that is not of particular importance.
  4. We need to demonstrate determination, but at the same time sustain minimal losses.
  5. Therefore, the main emphasis is placed precisely on safety.
  6. Anonymity. Unobtrusive clothing that hides identifying features; definitely wear masks, no badges or other accessories that make identification easier.
  7. Come in groups. If you don’t have your own company, try to attach yourself to someone. You must not remain alone and unsupervised.
  8. Do not stand in squares; move continuously as a dense mass, do not let yourselves be surrounded or split; if the cops try to break into the ranks—link arms.
  9. During detention attempts, grab those being detained, surround the resulting scuffle, and demand that the cops leave without their prize.
  10. Film only the cops on camera. Under no circumstances film your own. Demand that journalists only film wide shots, and only from behind. No interviews—tell them to fuck off. And use profanity specifically, so there is no temptation to broadcast it. The best thing you can do with a pro-government channel journalist is to secretly push them toward the cops and immediately vanish into the crowd.
  11. Do not bring posters. Unless that poster is on plywood, and the plywood is on a sturdy stake. You never know, it might come in handy.
  12. Regarding weapons. Use them only to prevent detention, and only when it is not being recorded by cameras. Stream and gel sprays are good. Aerosols are bad (your own people may suffer).
  13. Banners are needed only for orientation, to understand where the head and tail of the column are. The banner-bearer should not walk on the edge—they are a primary target for detention. If the banner-bearer is detained anyway, take the flag from them, if they don’t think to throw it far into the crowd themselves. Let someone else carry the flag. It is stupid to take the flag with you into the police van.
  14. Chants—keep them to a minimum; it is better to loudly greet friendly motorists who are honking. Chants can also be used to notify the rear ranks of important details of the situation. “Putin is a dick!” is a bad chant. “Cops on the right!” is a good one.
  15. When the end point of the march is reached, you must immediately and very quickly disperse in different directions, but not individually, but in several columns, according to the number of possible directions of movement at the finish point. This is the most dangerous stage of the action; it would be a pity to complete the entire route only to end up in a police van at the very end.
  16. If the cops are waiting at the finish point, do not go there at all—it is better to turn off beforehand and go far to the side, and only end the action at a safe distance from the enemy.

All these recommendations are for the regions. The two capitals have their own specifics, huge experience with such actions, plus a completely different scale; they will figure it out themselves.

As for banal things, like how to behave in the police department, I’ll leave that to the lawyers. First of all, try not to end up there.

Yes, this is all preparation for a past war. If tomorrow we are met not with batons but with water cannons, gas, and rubber bullets, little of these recommendations will be useful. If the situation proves to be that abnormal, you should simply get as far away from the action site as possible, because it will mean that next time you will need to bring completely different equipment.

It is better to repost this text from anonymous accounts.

I’m not calling for this yet, although I really want to, of course

Blood of Patriots, New Edition

In the channel Scipio’s Dream, a post has appeared providing donation details for the Center for Republican Research. Rodion Belkovich claims that supporting the Center serves as a donation in exchange for reading the book Blood of Patriots. Therefore, I have added a link to the post in the publisher’s preface and also noted that those wishing to support the Vladimir Dal publishing house can purchase a paper copy—Belkovich himself, according to him, receives no money from this, so you will be sponsoring the publishing house itself.

Download the new version of the book; several scanning errors have been fixed there as well. There is still a lot left to do, but it was important to add the CRI details as quickly as possible, so I will leave the final polishing for later. By the way, if anyone takes it upon themselves to proofread this book and sends a corrected file, I would be very grateful.

Our goal is the elimination of the violence of pawns

Voluntarist

There is an argument that fighting a phenomenon such as violence will in no way help eliminate our current hierarchy of dominance and the monopoly on power. Firstly, many doubt that methods against violence can be applied to the leaders of the dominance hierarchy—they work in closed office buildings, travel in armored cars, and their homes are cordoned off by security, meaning there is no way to approach or reach them. Secondly, they may be people who are not themselves prone to committing acts of violence. Perhaps some of them are intellectuals, incapable of even hitting someone lightly, and they have no need for it anyway, since an entire army of pawns, already prone to violence, does all the dirty work for them. Sometimes the second argument is even considered alleged proof that the problem of the dominance hierarchy and monopoly power does not stem from violence.

To refute this argument, we must always remember exactly this army of pawns. Behind political leaders stand the security structures in which many agents work. And it is these agents who enter into direct contact with us; it is through them that all orders given from above are carried out. The cause of our problems and the goal of our activity is the elimination of their violent nature. Looking at it realistically, we cannot stop the leader of the dominance hierarchy, liquidate him during self-defense during a direct attack, or even in the future, with the development of technology, inject him with a gene therapy needle. But this may be completely unnecessary and even useless given that he himself may be a person not prone to committing acts of violence. However, we will always be able to apply all these measures to his servants, since they, again, enter into direct contact with us when applying aggressive violence against us.

As soon as all the pawns are stopped or liquidated in the process of self-defense against their attack, their leader will simply lose his power; he will no longer be able to realize any aspirations toward us. That is precisely why it is sufficient to work only with the violence of the pawns who enter into direct contact with us; without them, the leader of the dominance hierarchy is absolutely worthless!

Claims against Navalny

Supporters of political stability have many grievances against Alexei Navalny. If you ignore the anecdotal stuff, like “State Department agent” and “he would have stolen even more in their place,” and start asking in more detail, something curious emerges. If Navalny had overthrown Putin back in 2012, simply by preventing him from taking a third term, kicked both him and Medvedev out of the Kremlin, sat on the throne himself, befriended Europe, refrained from lending to Yanukovych, refrained from seizing Crimea, stopped inflating spending on the security forces and directed it toward social welfare instead—then in 2018, they would have voted for his second term and been champions of stability, asking “who, if not Navalny?” And they would have grumbled about gay parades in hushed tones, because there would be no reason to rock the boat.

In short, the main grievance “vatniks” have with Navalny is that he is weak and indecisive, and therefore unworthy of sitting on the tsarist throne. Instead of allowing himself to be beaten in the squares, he should have smashed the Kremlin with tanks; then he would be a respected man, not some lowlife. It is easy to see that this position is very close to the position of the well-known liberal extremist Arkady Babchenko, who still reminisces about the warm December of 2011 and expresses readiness to return to Russia only in an Abrams tank as part of a NATO peacekeeping contingent.

Alexei Navalny returned to Russia not at the head of a loyal guard, but on a shitty low-cost carrier; he was immediately punished for this stupidity, and rightly so. And if our leader is so dear to us, why the hell haven’t we freed him yet, and instead boast that on January 23rd the police seized a record number of people? Are we masochists? Is this why we went out? What do we actually plan to do to free Alexei? Where is the storming of Matrosskaya Tishina? Or do we think that they, the supporters of political stability, will defend Putin? No way! If Akela cannot protect himself, he has no business leading the pack.

That is the kind of interesting conversation I had recently, and I was unable to give my interlocutor satisfactory answers. Not only because I am not great at oral debates, but because essentially I have nothing to object with. Navalny and his team behave as if they haven’t even considered overthrowing the regime; Navalny seems perfectly content to spend another ten years playing Mandela and wait until Putin either dies on his own or becomes completely decrepit, hands over the throne, and his successor engages in national reconciliation by releasing Navalny and allowing him to run in the elections. Because even if they are looking at the Belarusian scenario, there was no need to return to Russia for that—hang out with Tikhanovskaya, meet with world leaders, push for sanctions, push for the freezing of the accounts of Putin’s cronies, rather than sitting in a cell. The cell is for Putin, not for you.

When Navalny and his associates try to explain why the hell Alexei rushed back to Russia, they bleat about moral duty. It is roughly like riding out on a white horse into machine-gun fire just to wave a papakha hat and send the army into a psychological attack because “the truth is on our side,” meaning we’ll overwhelm them by throwing hats at them.

So, I’ve suddenly found this touching unity with the supporters of the “strong hand.” As for tomorrow, I will try to post my thoughts on what I would like to see at the upcoming Sunday action.

Us. Here. Power!
Putin. Resign!
Give us. A Constituent. Assembly!

Freedom of speech — in respect of everything, but not physical violence

Voluntarist

Against the backdrop of recent blockings of conservative groups and resources by Western corporations, as well as in view of longer-standing claims against me regarding my calls to participate in the blocking of propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s YouTube channel, I would like to express my, and in general the libertarian/voluntarist, position regarding freedom of speech.

As we know, the idea of voluntarism is to eradicate any manifestation of violence and coercive force in relationships between people, that is, to achieve a state of maximum freedom of activity, agreement, and association. It can be said immediately that the blocking of content of any kind by any platform is not a violent act, and therefore it is not something that a voluntarist can oppose. However, in the modern world, a situation has arisen where large social platforms are heavily dependent on states; they are in close cooperation with them (especially with police and intelligence services), and also frequently receive monopoly privileges and subsidies from them. Effectively, they operate to some extent using tax funds taken from people, and as long as this remains true, many believe they can be nothing other than public services to which freedom of speech should apply in an absolute (or nearly absolute, with minor caveats) degree. I also frequently encounter the opinion that even in a free society, pressure must be exerted on any large social platforms so that they also support full freedom of speech.

However, let us not forget that the main problem for us is violence. It must be fought. And in the course of this struggle, the dissemination and popularization of violent ideas must under no circumstances be allowed, as this will only provoke new acts of violence, which will lead to many negative externalities (about which I have spoken a lot in the materials of my channel and public page) and may eventually turn into a total catastrophe for us all (someone, wishing to solve their problems through violence, might even use weapons of mass destruction, for example, by releasing a very dangerous virus).

Understanding this will allow us to formulate an answer regarding what policy should be applied now on so-called public social platforms, and what is necessary when exerting pressure (except for forceful pressure, which is obviously unacceptable) on any platforms of this kind in general. And that is: freedom of speech is permissible in all cases except for cases of calls to violence.

Ideas based on coercive imposition should not be allowed for publication on such platforms. People who call for the initiation of violence against anyone should be blocked; general ostracism can also be applied to them until they decide to renounce violent aspirations. Calls for the punishment of people by state authorities are also unacceptable, since such punishments are implemented by forceful methods. Of course, this does not apply to calls for self-defense by any means in the event of the initiation of violence by an aggressor, as this action is aimed at stopping an act of violence already being committed and eliminating the associated negative externalities.

Conclusion: violent people must be subjected to ostracism, and violent ideas must not be allowed for publication and dissemination on social platforms. Pressure (of course, non-violent) must also be exerted on any social platforms to achieve the blocking of people and materials that call for violence. In the case of materials of another nature, everything is settled privately: each platform decides for itself what to publish and what not, and each person decides whether to use a particular platform and whether to introduce personal sanctions against it if they do not like the content published there.

Do we need to actively implement UBI from below?

Should we actively promote actions that contribute to PNBP within the framework of current law? For example, the acquisition of hunting rifles or gas pistols, martial arts training (and which ones?), the creation of voluntary militias to counter criminal violence, etc.? In general, does it mean that every “ideological” libertarian should possess at least some weapon or combat skills?

Continuing regarding self-organized people’s militias. If their goal is to apprehend actors of unorganized violence (hooligans, bandits, etc.) and hand them over to the state, can they be considered a successful example of a first step toward PNBP under statism?

Muscovite

In short, yes, we should, and yes, they can. Now, in more detail.

The key condition for maintaining anarchic social orders is a mass readiness to personally exercise one’s rights and an unwillingness to delegate them to anyone without serious benefit. Therefore, naturally, skills for ensuring both personal and public security through cooperation greatly help to push out of one’s head the idea of the state as something vitally necessary.

Now let’s go through specific activities.

Martial Arts — I am not particularly well-versed in them, but the main benefit is removing the psychological block before inflicting pain on another, and the fear of having pain inflicted on you. So, contact martial arts are preferable; otherwise, it’s just a variety of gymnastics, which, however, is also useful.

Knife. The most effective tool for kitchen disputes, and doubtfully effective on the street in an equal fight. It is intended, essentially, for a surprise attack or improvised self-defense with whatever is at hand. Therefore, specifically training with a knife is unlikely to be very relevant if the readiness to strike can be developed in some other way.

Pepper Spray. In conditions of a ban on rifled short-barreled firearms, it is the primary means of street self-defense; it works, as we saw on January 23, even against a buffed OMON officer. The skills for use are simple. The effect is easily verified even on oneself: the consequences are instant, and there is no long-term harm to health.

Civilian Firearms. They cannot be used on people, and one cannot train on people, so the only thing they are good for is developing skills on targets, assuming these skills might come in handy at the moment when you stop caring about what is “forbidden.” An additional downside to owning legal weapons is that they are seized after two administrative offenses, which can be received for literally anything; thus, the possession of a weapon motivates one to stay quiet and not stir—and this particular skill is rather harmful to train for building an ancap society.

Militias. An excellent legal way to develop skills in team power interaction, without serious risk to health, without a drop in income, while earning real authority among neighbors. If militiamen catch real aggressors rather than violators of public morality, then such associations are certainly worth joining. Again, in far from every case does it make sense to hand detainees over to the state. Judging by certain publications, self-proclaimed law enforcement associations in those remote corners where cops were last seen in the last century are usually inclined to resolve matters on the spot, and legal norms will inevitably emerge from this tradition. Ancap is the decentralization of law, so militias are exactly what the doctor ordered.

The obvious downside of militias is the disgusting smell of officialdom already emanating from the phrase “voluntary people’s militia.” Here, of course, it would be good to organize everything so as to practice doublethink less, but that is difficult to guarantee.

How militiamen would like to see themselves
And how it looks at best