Chapter 38, The Economics of Theft, or the Absence of a Ruling Class, provides an economic analysis of the theft industry, showing that competition in this sphere leads to the impoverishment of society, and that this industry is essentially unprofitable even for the thieves themselves. A similar system of arguments shows that the state, as a variety of theft, is unprofitable even for top politicians, as their costs turn out to be higher than the profits. Of course, this argument seems paradoxical, since it is easy to oppose it with many counterexamples; however, the main conclusion of the chapter does not relate to the denial of the possibilities of individual profit through the state, but to the indication that no single class interest can be seen behind the actions of the state.

Chapter 39, The Right Side of the Public Goods Trap, tells of a very interesting paradox related to the fact that public goods are always underproduced relative to the demand for them, due to difficulties with their monetization. Under a state, such a public good turns out to be good laws that make life simple, convenient, and unburdened, as opposed to bad ones that distribute costs among all while bringing profit to a few. However, under anarchy, it is exactly the opposite: since laws are, in a sense, purchased on the market, good laws turn out to be a private good and are produced until demand is fully satisfied, while bad laws turn out to be a public evil: few are willing to spend on their production for their own profit, and everyone will be able to sabotage their implementation, and cheaply at that. Thus, if it is possible to transition somehow from the state to an anarcho-capitalist order, it will prove quite stable against attempts to bring back the state.

In Chapter 40, How to Get from Here to There, Friedman tells me that I am doing well and correctly understand the strategy of building ancap, and suggests that Mikhail Svetov tone down his zeal in building a vertical of power in the libertarian party and focus on personal educational projects. Thank you, David!

In the Postscript for Perfectionists, Friedman explains which subjects he did not touch upon in the book and why.

This concludes the first edition of The Machinery of Freedom. Subsequent parts were written for the second and third editions of the book.

Yesterday David Friedman turned 75. Unfortunately, I didn’t have enough time to prepare the entire translation for the anniversary, so I am publishing the next three chapters.

Chapter 35. When Prediction Amounts to Speculation. Here, Friedman admits to us that he described only one of many options for an anarcho-capitalist society—the agoric one, which is equally alien to both communes and corporations, but tends toward self-employment and small agencies of freelancers (cute!). At the same time, it turned out that the word agorism was coined not by Konkin, but by Robert LeFevre, about whom I, unfortunately, know nothing.

Chapter 36. Why Exactly Anarchy? In this chapter, Friedman has to explain why the idea of a limited state is so unsatisfactory to him, and why he so stubbornly defends the idea of anarchy specifically. Unfortunately, the author answers: we have already tried the limited state; it doesn’t fit into any boundaries and stubbornly moves to sit right on your face.

Chapter 37. Revolution is the Worst Choice. Here, Friedman polemicizes not so much with ancaps as with classical anarchists who are convinced that the state can only be abolished through revolutionary means. The argumentation is not brilliant in its originality, but it is clear enough.

Chapter 3.2, Police, Courts, and Laws in a Free Market, was translated a long time ago by Elena Makeeva by order of the LPR. I have finally edited it; in time, the same fate awaits the other four chapters translated for the LPR.

This chapter examines a central piece of Friedman’s picture of society under anarcho-capitalism: the concept of private competing law enforcement agencies, which will take on the role of police and partially insurance companies. It also describes the interaction of such agencies with private arbitration courts.

Chapter 3.3, The Stability Problem, concerns the question of whether this beautiful system of private law enforcement agencies will be stable, or whether they will inevitably form a state. Naturally, Friedman argues that everything is stable—otherwise, there would be no point in building such a complex system—and then provides the justifications for this thesis.

I have also reworked the table of contents in accordance with Friedman’s internal chapter numbering, as he numbers them here, doesn’t number them there, and does something completely random elsewhere…

Usually, when I start working on the translation of another part of David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom, I stall for a long time. He precedes each part with a poetic opus of his own composition, where the wit of the content is compensated for by the clunkiness of the form. Fortunately, this time I managed to deal with the poems relatively quickly. In them, David naively wonders how the world order manages to exist in such harmony despite the government’s disregard for these things, and how government services themselves only provoke a smirk: as if this public good is not very much of a good.

What is anarchy? What is the state? In this chapter, Friedman defines what he intends to rail against throughout the rest of the part, while leaving the clarification of all the philosophical murk to Lysander Spooner.

Finishing the second part of The Machinery of Freedom by David Friedman.

Pollution. This section discusses what measures to reduce government regulation of harmful emissions could lead to an improved environmental situation and certainly to a fairer system of responsibility for pollution.

Fending off the friends of socialism. In this final chapter of the book’s second part, Friedman fires off several arguments demonstrating the fairer nature of capitalism as opposed to socialism. None of them are extensive enough for a separate chapter, which is likely why they were collected this way. The text examines arguments regarding which distribution mechanism ensures greater equality, which society is less prone to corruption, where working conditions are better, and which system is less critically dependent on ideal people.

In honor of the US-Iran war that never actually started, which for some reason was predicted to have the status of a world war, I am publishing an extraordinary translation of two chapters from David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom, dedicated to the problem of the army and defense in a stateless society.

National Defense: A Serious Problem. In this chapter, written shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops, national defense is considered from the perspective of the economics of public goods; much attention is paid to why the free-rider effect is so pronounced in this sector, and the conclusion is drawn that although there are some prerequisites for a stateless society to be able to defend itself, if it turns out in practice that this is impossible without some minimal state concerned exclusively with defense issues, the “witcher” is ready to accept this lesser evil.

A Serious Problem, Part II. Forty years later, Friedman returned to this topic, and this time he is far more optimistic. The chapter advocates for the “haven’t served, aren’t a man” approach (which girls should also exhibit) and other totalitarian trinkets, because totalitarianism is when everything is done voluntarily, for free, and with songs. At the curtain, the author also skeptically smirked regarding Iran’s military potential, which formally aligns the topic with the agenda of early 2020.

I have posted a few more chapters of Mechanics of Freedom.

Creeping Capitalism. The author notes the success of the socialists’ tactic of stealing a well-sounding word, liberalism__, and calling themselves liberals. He then suggests using the same tactic: to stop fighting socialism and start improving it, to the point where it becomes completely indistinguishable from true classical liberalism.

If you need it, just buy it. Here, Friedman provides simple calculations showing that there are no reasons why workers, within the existing order in the USA, could not provide themselves with full socialist worker self-management if they actually needed it—simply by buying their companies using their own salaries. This would require far fewer resources than a bloody socialist revolution.

Scarce means exhaustible. In this chapter, Friedman notes that one should not confuse the economic term “scarce resources” with the everyday understanding of the word “rare.” He examines in detail why, in an era of full automation, the prerequisites for the disappearance of the institution of property will nevertheless not arise, regardless of how much our left-anarchist friends might wish otherwise.