Тег: Judgments

“Citizen-Avenger”: Not a Libertarian, but a State in One Person

After the release of the movie “Citizen Vigilante,” some viewers saw the main character as almost a libertarian avenger: the state is failing, the courts release criminals, and an armed citizen takes the protection of society into his own hands.
 
It sounds impressive. But this character has about as much in common with libertarian philosophy as a sea pirate does with the protection of private property. The external attributes are similar: distrust of the state, weapons, independence, and contempt for bureaucracy. But inside, there is a completely opposite system of values.
 
Libertarianism begins not with a pistol, but with the recognition of every person’s right to life, liberty, and property. From this follows the non-aggression principle: violence cannot be used against someone who has not initiated it themselves. And this is where the image of the “people’s avenger” falls apart. The vigilante kills not only criminals. He executes the relatives of a rapist—people who did not participate in the rape. Yes, they say disgusting things, justify the crime, and blame the victim. Their words are loathsome. But libertarianism does not presume the death penalty for vile views.
 
A person is responsible for their own actions, not for the crimes of a son, brother, father, or neighbor. Collective responsibility is a favorite practice of authoritarianism. Today, a family is shot for the act of a relative; tomorrow, property is seized from the “wrong” class; and the day after tomorrow, people are sent to camps for having an unfortunate last name. The path is well-trodden, and the signs have long been in place.
 
Even more terrifying is the scene with the oncoming car. The hero intentionally drives into the opposite lane, forcing an innocent driver off the road. The car falls into a ditch and explodes. People die simply because the vigilante needed a vivid illustration for another monologue. This is no longer “private justice,” but the murder of innocents for the sake of a political spectacle.
 
At the same time, the film tries to endow the hero with a moral code. On the bus, he pays the fare for teenagers and gives them a lecture: if some do not pay, the costs are shifted to others. Everyone must follow the rules! The thought itself is clear. Only it is preached by a man who entered the country illegally, did not legalize his status, hides the real owners of real estate behind a network of holdings, and raises questions with tax authorities. The result is a surprising moral compass: if you don’t pay for a public transport ticket, you undermine society. If you hide your business, money, and legal status—well, that’s something else, that’s an “extended vacation.”
 
Of course, a libertarian is by no means obligated to consider state law just. Immigration restrictions violate natural human rights, taxes are theft, and financial regulation is a violation of property rights. Breaking any law that punishes “crimes” without a victim does not make a person a villain and is entirely permissible.
 
But then one must be consistent. You cannot declare yourself an opponent of the system when the rules hinder you, and become a stern defender of order when a teenager doesn’t buy a ticket. This is no longer a philosophy of freedom, but the good old “everything for friends, the law for everyone else.”
 
“Citizen Vigilante” could have raised an interesting question: what should society do when the state justice system truly fails to protect victims? Where is the line between self-defense, civil resistance, and vigilantism? But instead of a complex conversation, the film presents the viewer with a man who has appointed himself investigator, judge, and executioner. Moreover, evidence, proportionality of punishment, and the rights of the innocent interest him about as much as a cash receipt interests a bank robber.
 
The film’s protagonist does not protect individual freedom. Instead, he creates his own pocket state: he writes the laws himself, determines the guilty himself, passes sentences himself, and exempts himself from the rules. This is not libertarianism, but the dictatorship of one man—just without a coat of arms, a parliament, and boring meetings.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

How ancap courts work in territories occupied by states

The misconception that the state’s power is insurmountable for non-governmental communities in the sphere of court decision enforcement is extremely deeply rooted, despite regular practical refutations.

Nothing and no one can be strong in everything, and the state has plenty of weak points. On one hand, the state is a fairly centralized organization. On the other, it is a completely decentralized mental parasite. The weakness of centralization lies in the long transit of orders through the chain of hierarchy, multiplied by the distortion of the order at each stage. The weakness of decentralization lies in the possibility of a covert independent attack on any node.

The state is a tool of institutionalized violence. However, it is not the only possible one. Any bounty hunter, blood avenger, or duelist is exactly the same tool of institutionalized violence, just from a different lore. But if humanity has learned anything from postmodernism, it is the construction of lores and switching between them.

Now, imagine a clash of two lores: etatism, with its laws written by bureaucrats, adopted by politicians, and enforced by low-paid employees under the command of bureaucrats venturing into politics — and ancap, with its decentralized pluralistic legal system based on the right to restitution and enforced by any interested parties. In a well-functioning etatist system, the second lore resides somewhere in the back of the mind, where adventure novel characters dwell. But what about an etatist system at the stage of collapse?

Let’s leave the theorizing here and turn to a practical example.

There is the state of the RF, which is at war with the state of Ukraine. War is a deeply anti-legal endeavor. To wage it, the state crudely tramples upon the rights of its own subjects that it established itself. Subjects who, in a normal situation, obey simply out of habit (and this is the most energy-efficient way to command), in conditions where extraordinary demands are placed upon them, obey thanks to stronger incentives, for example, serious reward and/or strong fear. Both money and fear lose their value as an incentive with every dose, so to maintain controllability, the doses must be increased. People to whom such powerful incentives for obedience are applied master the skill of serial murder of people unknown to them.

Let’s consider a couple more factors. First, the accounting of weapons in war conditions inevitably becomes extremely negligent, and they flood the black market. Second, the opponent, a citizen of Ukraine, is culturally close, possesses perfect command of the Russian language, and communicates without problems with any subject of the RF. These factors lead to the fact that various military objects or high-ranking officials are constantly exploding on the territory of the RF. The perpetrator could be a Ukrainian saboteur, an ideological Russian dissident, or a simple Russian mercenary for whom this is a less dangerous and more reliable earning than rotting in a dugout waiting for a drone strike.

And it is against this background that ancap gets a serious chance to establish itself in minds not just as a theory detached from reality, but as a fully working practice.

A native of Chuvashia, Mishshi Oreshnikov, moves to Ukraine and arms himself with a lore according to which Chuvashia never voluntarily joined the RF but is an occupied territory; he states that until the state legal institutions of a future free Chuvashia are formed, the use of norms of customary law is quite appropriate — and simply begins to offer court services. Primarily — over those with whom it is most pointless to litigate in state courts, namely, state officials. Middle-management officials find themselves in the highest risk zone here — those who make some responsible decisions, but of whom there are too many for the state to provide each with even a moderately reliable protection.

In an interview with Sota, Mishshi reveals the mechanisms of the court’s operation and his motivations in more detail, while the host demonstrates certain facets of his understanding of the phenomenon.

What other features of the anarcho-capitalist legal mechanism on state-occupied territory can be noted?

  1. There are several courts; entry into the market is formally open, but the mechanisms for admission into the association are informal. At the same time, the exact number of courts in the system is fundamentally unknown, and some of the publicly designated organizations participating in the movement are placeholders, false targets. The possibility of appealing a decision of one court of the association in another court of the association is declared. In fact, in the case of trials of state officials, this is unlikely to become a necessity.
  2. Fundraising for the execution of court decisions is carried out by non-public organizations via cryptocurrencies. Technically, the lion’s share of the budget could consist of funds from the state of Ukraine, but that is completely irrelevant.
  3. The executors of sentences are non-public organizations that formally have no connection to the courts. Technically, the executors could be professional Ukrainian saboteurs, but that is completely irrelevant.
  4. The initiator of the movement is out of reach of direct threats from the army and police of the RF, since the Ukrainian army stands between him and the RF security forces. Thus, he can be destroyed only accidentally during a raid or as a result of sabotage. It is unknown how many people are capable of picking up the banner in the event of his elimination. Technically, this could be handled by some professional Ukrainian officer, but that is completely irrelevant.
  5. Sentences against state officials and, more importantly, the execution of these sentences are primarily advertising. An official commits a crime as part of their job, and therefore is unlikely to seriously consider the possibility of paying compensation to victims from their own personal funds. Therefore, it is convenient to demonstrate on them what happens to those who refuse to pay compensation. After several such demonstrations, the court can be rolled out into production to resolve conflicts between private individuals. There, it is far more likely that the defendant will appear at the court hearing and provide a full defense, and therefore acquittals, court refusals regarding claims, actual compensation payments, and other riches of law enforcement are probable.
  6. However, even if this specific model of courts does not progress beyond ritualized retribution against members of the “State” organized crime group, it is still a significant step in bringing ancap ideas to life.

In several places, I state that for us it is completely irrelevant to what extent we have a confrontation between ancap and the state, and to what extent it is a confrontation between states. Since we are talking about a struggle of ideas regarding the world order, a state imitating ancap mechanisms works for ancap.

Law and legality in the transition to ancap

Another question about the subject was asked in the comments, and I don’t really want to answer from purely theoretical positions, because for a little over three years now, I’ve had the opportunity to try to implement something. So, I want to reflect on the problems of law and legislation in the ancap community using Montelibero as an example.

I will outline the conceptual framework I am using. Law is the order for resolving conflicts accepted within the community. Statute is a legal norm that the community considers permissible to impose by force. Court is a procedure for resolving conflicts by a third party not involved in the conflict. Jurisdiction is the venue, that is, the circle of conflicts that the community customarily resolves through a specific court.

Montelibero, like any other ancap community in the era of state dominance, cannot claim full jurisdiction over its members. Yes, any issue can be resolved within Montelibero’s jurisdiction—but only if the state is unaware of it. Otherwise, the state may impose its own requirements on what the parties to the conflict are obliged to do.

The Montelibero community is small. It does not provide the opportunity for full market competition between many diverse courts. However, this is no reason to bow before the state. After all, we have implemented tokenomics and now have our own very cheap and efficient financial system. On a single blockchain, without competition between them (we tried adding others, but they didn’t take hold). Although, privately, nothing prevents the exchange of any values: whether commodities, fiat, or various types of crypto. The same applies to courts: by mutual agreement, disputes can be resolved by a coin toss, mediation by a pre-agreed authority, or a duel—but if there is no agreement, one must rely on some unified default judicial mechanism.

Every jurisdiction is subject to a strong positive scale effect: the more conflicts it resolves, the more potential conflicts will specify this particular jurisdiction in advance. This is understandable: people save mental effort and will not keep many different legal mechanisms in mind without particular need, eventually leaning toward a single option, even if it is not the most optimal for a specific case. There are also negative scale effects: even the most efficient judge is unlikely to be able to significantly increase their productivity and will more likely raise the price as demand increases. Therefore, to scale this type of service, it is convenient to use a franchising mechanism: judges may differ, but they will use a single procedure and uniform legal norms.

Where would these come from? The Schelling point here is the procedures adopted in the hosting jurisdiction, that is, in the Montenegrin courts. Why? At least because that is where those dissatisfied with a Montelibero court decision will theoretically turn. But since the local legislation is full of various statist rubbish, it must, of course, be discarded and replaced with our own home-grown concepts. There are few basic principles in libertarianism, but specific legal norms that do not contradict them can vary. And here, precedents will become the Schelling points. It will be easier for each subsequent court to apply a previously used norm than to invent a new one for every new case. Moreover, it will be easier for all members of the Montelibero community to proceed from established legal practice, as predictability in affairs is the foundation for trust.

But, as is known, it is not enough to understand if the laws are good; one must ask if they are enforced.

While judicial practice is limited, one must rely mainly on the conscientiousness of the parties and the informal authority of the judge. The potential ability to turn to the state for enforcement of court decisions is relevant only for the largest cases, where the amount at stake justifies the accompanying costs. In the smallest cases, the losing party will pay without question because the amount is trivial. The problem lies in medium-sized cases, where invoking state enforcement is still too expensive and disgraceful, but the losing party is reluctant to pay.

The most civilized way to achieve the enforcement of court decisions is the widespread use of collateral. I envision a gradual evolution here from one-time deposits to secure a specific claim, to permanent deposits confirming a willingness to comply with the decisions of a specific jurisdiction.

Initially, it might work roughly like this. A community member wishes to enter into a legal relationship with another member. For example, rent a car or an apartment, borrow money, or enter into an employment contract. In addition to the direct contract between the counterparties, they also notify the court and transfer collateral amounts to a court-controlled account, the size of which depends on the amount of liability imposed by the concluded contract. Then, from this collateral, a penalty can be recovered—for example, from an employee for damaging equipment, or from an employer for an industrial injury caused by their fault.

But gradually, as the court builds its own reputation, deposits will become permanent: you recognize the jurisdiction of the MTL court and place a certain deposit on its controlled account—a sort of “price of honor,” in ancient Irish terms. Now anyone can be sure that within the limits of the price of honor, you can be trusted unconditionally. Want to increase your reputation—simply increase the deposit. Leaving the country, or, say, the last court decision caused your distrust—decrease the deposit. Leaving the jurisdiction—withdraw the deposit entirely (with some lag to ensure you have no debts from old contracts).

Moreover, based on this solution, an institute of suretyship could develop, where a guarantor increases trust in the person they vouch for by risking their own judicial deposit.

It would be great if increasing the price of honor contributed to respect within the community, but such an attitude will not form on its own—first, a tradition of involving people with a high price of honor in responsible legal relationships must be grown, for example, as witnesses to large transactions or plaintiffs in socially important cases. Also, a mechanism for increasing another’s price of honor through the payment of judicial deposits into another’s account could certainly appear—if a person’s personal integrity far exceeds their financial capabilities. The result would be something like a Hoppean natural aristocracy.

And, of course, this entire mechanism will work much worse if it turns out that there are a large number of community members who completely ignore it, yet enter into legal relationships with each other in the same way. They may be too poor to freeze money for the sake of reputation. They may not trust a specific court. And finally, they may not trust the mechanism itself.

The poverty factor is handled to a certain extent through suretyship mechanisms. The factor of distrust in a specific court—through competing courts. The factor of distrust in the mechanism—simply a matter of habit. Trust is built; one just must not try to impose it.

Court under ancap. Practice.

I have repeatedly had to answer questions about how courts would work under ancap, and we even once made a video on the subject. Nevertheless, questions continue to come in. This is understandable; the future is always in question. I believe the best way to resolve this issue is to demonstrate it in practice. Therefore, I am opening my own ancap court.

The main principles I intend to adhere to:

  1. The goal of the court is to resolve the conflict. Not to match a transgression with a registry of punishments, but to ensure that the decision helps the parties reconcile.
  2. All parties participate in the process voluntarily, agreeing in advance to execute the court’s decision.
  3. I reserve the right to refuse to conduct the proceedings and issue a decision at any moment, consequently refusing payment.
  4. The amount of my remuneration is announced in advance; the judicial process cannot begin before the parties agree to its payment.
  5. Judicial remuneration, deposits, and similar payments will be transferred to a separate Stellar account with a “2 out of 3” multi-signature. Thus, (a) parties will be able to withdraw their money in any proportion at any time by mutual agreement, thereby ending the court amicably; (b) I will be able to receive remuneration if at least one of the parties is satisfied with the decision; (c) the transfer of the claimed amount to the plaintiff or the return of the deposit to the defendant will not require the goodwill of the opposing party.
  6. If the parties agree for the process to be public, its progress will be covered by me in my channel.

I do not like it when those who call themselves libertarians simply mechanically replace the word “state” with the word “jurisdiction” and, in essence, try to simply cosplay the state. Jurisdiction is not a territory, not vassalage, and not an office with a sign. It is simply jurisdiction. For libertarians, it is voluntary jurisdiction that follows a request for help in resolving a conflict.

A court is far from the only tool for conflict resolution, and the need for it arises quite rarely. But, at the very least, I want to restore the good name of this institution, so that a court is not used as a threat, but that appealing to a court is perceived as appealing to a doctor or an accountant: yes, one can manage without it, but if the task is entrusted to someone with experience in it, the result will be faster and more reliable.

My main target audience is the participants of the Montellibero movement, but there are no problems with resolving conflicts among the external audience; they may simply need to put in effort to master the basics of tokenomics.

For now, I am accepting requests simply via Telegram DM (@ancapsan), but over time, I may add some additional interface.

If a judge handed down an unjust death sentence, and it was later overturned, then who should bear the punishment? The judge, the executioner, or who?

Vagabund

If this occurs under one state system or another, the answer is simple: responsibility lies with whoever is legally required to bear it. Usually, this turns out to be the judge and the taxpayers, or only the taxpayers. Additionally, false witnesses and other individuals involved in fabricating the sentence may also be caught in the gears.

But the question, I presume, concerns ancap, that is, a social order in which law enforcement is decentralized, and developed commodity-money relations are in effect.

Are courts possible under ancap? Yes, because conflicts are possible, and the service of resolving them through a verdict by a third party not involved in the conflict may be in demand on the free market. Are courts that issue death sentences possible under ancap? As a procedure implying the voluntary participation of each party—it is quite doubtful, since the party who may be threatened with the death penalty by a court verdict has a strong incentive to simply refuse to participate in the court.

Are courts that issue verdicts in conditions where one of the parties does not recognize the jurisdiction of that court over them possible under ancap? They are. When I speak of possibility, I mean potential market demand under ancap conditions.

Such a court can function in two ways.

First, it can examine evidence of a crime in a situation where the criminal is in hiding, and give the go-ahead for their pursuit and retribution by any means convenient to the plaintiff. Why does the plaintiff need this? So that other people can familiarize themselves with the verdict and not obstruct this pursuit.

Second, the plaintiff can independently detain the defendant and forcibly bring them before the court. Why? So that the execution they intend to carry out is favorably accepted by those around them and not viewed as some kind of lawlessness.

Can a verdict of guilt be appealed? Yes, of course. The pursued party can present evidence of their innocence to another court, or even to the same one, and after reviewing it, the court may issue a verdict of innocence in light of newly discovered circumstances. If the plaintiff is not satisfied with this new verdict, they will have to act further without the support that the court decision provided, which could be critical for the ability to carry out the execution.

And what if the plaintiff has already executed the defendant using a court verdict, and then evidence of their innocence surfaces? That is, for example, some third party obtains the evidence and deems it important to make it public, after which one or several courts review it and issue an acquittal. By the way, will they do this if they aren’t paid? Actually, they have a market motive: if they can show that the court which issued the verdict of guilt was biased and conducted the procedure incorrectly, they will bury their competitor.

Thus, under ancap, the judge, the plaintiff, and those who execute the court’s decision (if the plaintiff does not carry out the death sentence personally) act at their own peril and risk, and bear responsibility to the extent that other interested parties are willing to spend effort to hold them accountable. Vague? There’s nothing to be done; decentralized systems rely on market incentives, not direct mandates. Just look at Bitcoin—that’s all it relies on, and, you must agree, it’s working out quite well.

How much are you willing to pay for the enforcement of a verdict under ancap?

The Limits of the Competence of a Libertarian Court

You described a situation where, to resolve a conflict between a rapist and a victim, the court takes measures that physically isolate only the former from the latter, but not the former from society as a whole. But what about the fact that a rapist, who has demonstrated in practice a readiness for violence, continues to pose a potential danger to others while remaining free, even if in another city?

In other words, how should one deal with pathological personalities like Alexander Pichushkin, who, due to their mental characteristics, will continue to commit crimes as long as it is physically possible?

What are the general limits of deterrent measures for a court following libertarian principles? Does this mean that forced deportation to another city is permissible, but, for example, life-long house arrest or placement in a psychiatric clinic is not?

Anonymous question

The court can offer any recommendation to resolve a conflict. For example, “since the defendant’s actions are primarily caused by his mental state, the court believes that the conflict will be resolved after the defendant pays the plaintiff such-and-such compensation, as well as undergoes psychological rehabilitation until complete recovery, confirmed by a medical board including a representative of the plaintiff, a representative of the rehabilitation institution, and a representative of such-and-such independent medical non-profit organization.” The problem is that within its decision, the court can only operate with the funds available to the parties of the process, including those voluntarily provided by third parties. If the defendant is not wealthy enough for his assets to pay for his rehabilitation, and the plaintiff or third-party benefactors are not generous enough to make such a broad gesture, then the court’s recommendations will in no way resolve the conflict; there will be no means to execute them.

In such cases, cheaper solutions will inevitably come into play. The simplest is a banal declaration of outlawry, in the Old Icelandic spirit. The first person they meet has the right to kill the defendant, and the court, by its authority, guarantees that other means of resolving the conflict in this case do not work or are prohibitively expensive. And that’s it—then the defendant searches for a stump to hide under themselves, to live there and keep a low profile.

The poorer and harsher a society is, the larger the proportion of court decisions of the “outlawry” type will be, and the fewer hesitations individuals will experience when encountering such an outlaw before exterminating them. If memory serves me correctly, the longest term an outlaw managed to survive in Iceland was sixteen years, and this remarkable epic was honored with a separate saga.

Accordingly, the wealthier and more benevolent a society is, the larger the proportion of court decisions of the “hand over to the guardianship of such-and-such charitable foundation for rehabilitation” type will be. Again, nothing prevents such foundations from picking up those who have already been declared outlaws. What will compel people to donate money to such foundations? An unwillingness to personally shoot outlaws who wander onto the lawn in front of their house. And so—you donate some money to good people and be happy.

Admit it, an unpleasant sight. Why would you want that in your yard?

Animal cruelty under ancap. A question for Alexander Tatarkov.

Do you believe that child pornography and animal cruelty (torture and abuse of animals) would be fully legalized under libertarianism and anarcho-individualism in particular?

Semyon Persunov (question accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00011718 BTC)

Answered by Alexander Tatarkov (original publication on Yandex.Zen and on Bastion):

Well, it seemed interesting to me not so much the question itself, but the fact that it is apparently asked by a libertarian, or even an anarchist.

It would be one thing if an apologist for the state had voiced it. We are used to that. Standard scare tactics like: “without the state everyone will shoot each other,” “without the state everyone will rape each other,” “without the state everyone will die because there will be no hospitals,” “without the state there will be no education or science,” and even “without the state women won’t give birth to children(!!!)” should gradually be squeezed out of the consciousness of the unaware through consistent and reasoned propaganda. Much like I do in the video “Why Do We Need a State?”. An anarchist and libertarian should sow the rational, the kind, the eternal, rather than inventing additional apocalypse scenarios that supposedly await us if we are left without the sovereign’s supervision.

After such questions, not only the average person, but even well-prepared individuals should get the impression that anarchy is a paradise for pedophiles, animal abusers, perverts, thugs, robbers, rapists, and murderers. And sane, adequate people in a stateless society will lead a miserable existence under siege, continuously escaping from all this zombie apocalypse.

Answering the question.

My favorite example. Very illustrative. I used it in the video about the right to self-defense:

If tomorrow at 06:00 Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder) were abolished and everyone were given an automatic rifle, the percentage of murders would not increase by even 1%. Because I cannot imagine who I would want to kill right now. In other words, a person doesn’t go around gunning everyone down not because the state forbids it, but for a million other reasons (morality, ethics, religion, laziness, impracticality). Well, simply put, I have absolutely no reason to kill anyone. And I don’t have much of a desire either… I mean, I have a gun in my safe. I’d have to get up, open the safe, load it, put on a coat, go outside, chase someone, shoot… And they might shoot back for all I know… Why on earth would I do all that???

At the same time, if a drugged-out, wide-eyed junkie were to break into my house with the clear intention of killing, raping, robbing, and dismembering everyone, I would, of course, kill him. And Article 105 of the Criminal Code would definitely be the last thing on my mind in such a situation. That is, if a murder does not happen, it does not happen not because a law exists. And if it does happen, the existence of a law has no effect on it.

Now, to the animal abusers. I’m not entirely sure if there is currently an article in the law providing punishment for animal cruelty, but I have no desire to abuse animals. Nor does the vast majority of people. That is, I don’t gouge out the eyes of puppies not because I’m afraid I’ll be fined 500 rubles, but simply because I don’t want to gouge out the eyes of puppies! And for what reason would I want to do that once the state is gone?

It should be understood here that in a stateless society, the state, its institutions, control, and repressive apparatus will disappear. But morality, ethics, empathy, reason, compassion, and mercy will not go anywhere. The first is not connected to the second at all. Consequently, there will certainly not be more thugs with the abolition of the state. There will be fewer.

And here is why:

Currently, if a person sees someone abusing an animal, they cannot punch the abuser in the face (well, okay, I, for example, might), because the abuser will snitch to the cops, and that kind person will be imprisoned. For the same reason, everyone walks past when a grandmother is being robbed, a resisting girl is being dragged into a car, or children are being raped. Because the state court stands guard over the interests of every thug. And the one who steps in faces jail time in 100% of cases if they so much as touch them with a finger. Therefore, right now they feel completely untouchable and safe, and they not only abuse animals, old women, girls, and children, but also post it all on social networks.

What would happen in a similar situation in a stateless society?

As I described in the video “Lynch Law, Agora Court, or State Court? The Right to Judicial Protection under Anarchy”, seeing such filth, I would boldly punch the animal abuser in the face, shoot the grandmother’s robber, the girl’s rapist, and carve up the pedophile-maniac-dismemberer. Next. I am invited to a Lynch Court. They ask why I punched the face, shot the rapist, and carved up the maniacs. Well, I say: “Just because… they were raping, robbing, torturing defenseless animals…” The judge asks the crowd if I am guilty and if I deserve punishment or leniency. The crowd says: “Good job, man! That’s how it should be! Let’s chip in for his bullets. The man spent his own for the common good! Now bring those thugs here! To the stake with them (on a pole, on an aspen… underline as needed).” Well, that’s basically it. Everyone is satisfied. Everyone is smiling. Except for the maniac and the thug.

Thus, Lynch Law (Agora court) is a guarantee that a stateless society will be not a paradise, but a hell for every thug. They will find themselves in the most disadvantageous position. Everyone will beat them, and there will be no one to stand up for them.

Consequently, the existence of some written law prohibiting animal cruelty or the rape of minors will simply not be necessary.

And in general, “legalization” without a state—what does that even mean!?!?!?! Well, yes. There will be no law issued by a parliament… But that is no guarantee that there will be happiness for animal abusers, pedophiles, and maniacs.

And it’s not as if I’ve just imagined these constructions in my head. Not at all. I had the chance to observe something similar personally in the early 90s, when I had the honor and pleasure of living and working actively in a private plot farm (LPH) in the Irkutsk region. So, there was 1 district police officer for every 4 LPHs (staff shortage). From us to the nearest LPH was 40 km. Everyone was armed (it’s the taiga). The vast majority of residents of the LPHs were former inmates, many of whom had served sentences such as that after which no one expects you and there is nowhere to return. And when, in my youth and ignorance, I mentioned a license (for weapons and hunting), they looked at me as if I were mentally ill. Either to pity me or to punch me in the face—I was speaking in incomprehensible words, but seemingly not using profanity…

Gunshots in the taiga are not rare at all. And whether a bear was shot or a cop—who was going to run around and find out about every single shot? Therefore, the cop tried not to step on anyone’s toes. He came once every 3 months, nobody had been killed, thank god, crossed himself and left. And if he started asking about licenses—well, again, gunshots… And, most importantly, hardly anyone would look for him. At the time, by law, searches stopped after 3 days. Because in 3 days, if not the wolves, the ants would eat the corpse. And if the corpse fell into a river, it was simply impossible to find.

And in this society, there were neither murders, nor rapes, nor thefts.

My favorite example with the pigs. Pigs there weren’t even locked up, let alone just wandered freely around the village. I asked a local why they didn’t lock them up. And the answer was a masterpiece: “And where would they go? They’re afraid to go into the taiga. They’ll be eaten there.” I didn’t specify that they’d also be eaten here. But the very question was clearly incomprehensible to him. I explained that someone could steal them… And again, they looked at me as if I were mentally ill. Pigs are all marked. And if all my pigs are intact, but there’s a smell of shashlik from a yard—then they’ll burn down my house and me inside it if I don’t manage to jump out. And if I do, it doesn’t mean my situation improves. Because no one will allow “ratting” (stealing from one’s own)!

So why on earth do we need laws and cops in such a scenario? Perhaps it was exactly there, at age 16, that I became an anarchist. Convinced. Because where there’s a cop on every corner—pigs were locked up with 3 locks and dogs were kept on wires. And where there are none at all, and the word “law” has a meaning not quite familiar to us, as well as the expression “settle it by the law”—there, locks on doors are unnecessary.

So, nothing bad will definitely happen to us with the disappearance of the state. All these wild delusions about the rampage of animal abusers, maniacs, pedophiles, murderers, and thugs—just wild delusions. To the one who asked the question, I recommend watching less state TV and reading less zombie-apocalypse literature.

How did the courts work during anarchy?

Right now I am living in Albania in the village of Theth, 50m from a majestic historical monument – Kulla e Nguemit – the tower of conflict resolution.

This unique structure was used by locals to handle legal matters. If a dispute arises – go to the tower, sit there on a rug, and discuss your issue over rakia, in the presence of mediators if necessary.

If you cannot reach an agreement within a reasonable timeframe – they will lock you in there, and you can negotiate as much as you like. Food will be brought to you.

Finally, if someone plotted something evil against you – run to the tower, lock yourself in, and fire back from the top floor, while simultaneously negotiating the terms of reconciliation. Thus, we have an elegant combination of a courthouse and a prison in one package, which is quite economically justified for a small village. Prisons in the ancap sense – that is, a refuge from retribution.

In short, most smart things were already thought of before us. Our task is to comprehend them, provide a theoretical basis, generalize, and then implement them on a new level of understanding.

Tyan, but what about the physical restriction of liberty for dangerous criminals under ancap?

If, for example, we take ancap according to Molynieu, is it really possible that a few rich kids who caused a car accident while drunk or high, even without fatalities, or raped a girl, will be able to pay compensation, even tenfold, and continue to roam free? Money is money, but the danger to society hasn’t disappeared. Would you yourself, God forbid, if the above happened to you, turn to a state or private court, assuming we have minarchism with ancap tendencies and a choice between them? Yes, a state court would shake out a tiny compensation, as usually happens, but would isolate rapists in a colony for 5-10 years, with a small chance that they won’t return, or will return as broken and sick people. A private court, however, would shake out compensation exceeding the damage dozens of times over, but would release the rapists, as we know that the goal of punishment under ancap is not correction or retribution, but restitution for damages. What do you say to that?

Pushistik (question accompanied by a donation of 0.00009809btc)

Fortunately, I have already managed to write the first chapters of a book on libertarianism, so I can immediately send you to read about libertarian law. The task of the court is not to punish the criminal or to squeeze the maximum amount of money out of them. The task of the court is to resolve the conflict. Even if I couldn’t reach an agreement with the rapists regarding which court should consider our conflict, and the court turns out to be imposed on the defendants, this does not cancel the main task of the court. The outcome must be a situation where the conflict between me and the rapists is considered exhausted.

For me, it is extremely important to understand that I will never see these people again in my life. This will allow me not to flinch upon seeing an indistinct figure in my peripheral vision (at least, I hope). So I would insist that they receive an order to live in some specific city known to me, even if it is quite large. Accordingly, I will never set foot in that city, and they must stay out of mine. Of course, monitoring their compliance with this point will cost money—there’s no way around it, let them cough it up, it’s important to me.

I have a very strong psyche, but when I heard in an interview with Shulman that she suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome for a year after an attack on her husband, I am forced to admit the possibility of some psychological traumas needing treatment for myself. So my second requirement, of course, would be the payment for my rehabilitation.

Also, naturally, I would like to receive significant monetary compensation, however, I placed this point third because my priorities fully correspond to safety regulations: first, the dangerous factor is eliminated, and only then is aid provided and compensation paid.

As a fourth point, I would like the rapists to also receive psychological treatment, but if they have no money left for this after the payments for the previous points, I will not insist.

If the rapists were too poor to immediately pay the compensation assigned to me and fund other measures—well, they will have to take out a loan. They’ll pay it back someday; that’s no longer my business, but theirs and the bank’s.

It seems to me that my requests are modest enough: I do not insist on castration or execution, I do not demand that they necessarily languish in a cramped cell and be subjected to rapes by cellmates. I don’t need them to lose their health, nor do I want those who deprive them of health to lose their human form. So I hope the court will grant my claims. And if a victim of violence insists on all the crap described in this paragraph, I hope the court manages to convince her to abandon such requests. If the court appoints some severe punishment in this vein, for me, it will be a clear red flag: the court is not libertarian, I will never voluntarily deal with it, and I will try to dissuade others.

Here is a sufficient physical restriction

Would the police under ancap investigate the case of a person killed on someone’s private property, for example, in a case where the owner gave the killed person permission to move/be on their territory, and then took them out?

Anonymous question

Let us consider the organization of law and order according to David Friedman — in my opinion, his approach is the most developed and yet remains entirely within the framework of ancap, that is, a society with a free market where everything is traded, including law. Various law enforcement agencies and various courts operate in the market, guided by various legal systems. The task of a law enforcement agency is to protect the private property of its clients and assist in resolving conflicts between clients and other entities. The task of a court is to develop decisions that resolve conflicts between the court’s clients. Finally, a legal system is the product of the work of lawyers, representing a certain set of principles and templates for conflict resolution.

When the owner of a certain territory kills a stranger on it, this may cause a conflict with a wide variety of people or organizations. First, these could be companions of the deceased who are convinced that the execution was unjust. Second, his relatives or friends who were not present during the clash but are interested in finding out what happened. Third, the law enforcement agency of which the deceased was a client. Finally, any concerned individual who dislikes it when people are killed for no reason. In short, the killer has no reason to believe that no one will care about this incident.

In medieval Iceland, in the event of such excesses, the killer had to immediately tell the nearest neighbor what happened, taking him as a witness. It can be assumed that such a norm would also take hold under ancap, since the killer is directly interested in this: by telling everything, he can claim that it was an accidental conflict, or even one provoked by the victim, but if the story is hidden, it is unequivocally an intentional murder, for which much more serious sanctions are due.

Thus, after the murder has been announced, all that remains is to conduct an investigation. Much time has passed since the age of the sagas, technology has advanced, and it is possible to establish with slightly greater certainty how truthful the killer’s story is, even if there are no direct witnesses to the incident. Of course, the killer has no reason to obstruct the investigation, because that would predispose the court against him. But he can, of course, try to forge evidence to create a false impression.

Does the fact that the murder took place on the killer’s territory give any preferences in court? Only if it is established that the deceased violated the rules announced by the owner of the territory and refused to leave the other’s property. Therefore, naturally, the killer is interested in claiming exactly that. Whether he succeeds in creating the necessary appearance is a purely technical question.