I have repeatedly defined law as a complex of approaches to conflict resolution. Zolotorev goes further and describes it as a language of human interaction, meaning all spontaneously emerging rules that people follow when interacting with one another.
Within both my definition and Zolotorev’s, there is no such thing as gender equality. It simply does not emerge spontaneously, due to clear differences in approaches to human interaction, or even at least to conflict resolution, if we narrow the topic to my definition of law.
A sufficiently obvious reason why representatives of different biological sexes tend to use different approaches to interaction is that human behavior is largely hormonally determined, and hormone levels differ between the sexes. However, the higher the level of abstraction of the rules, the smaller the role these differences play, and that is normal. Therefore, demanding gender equality at the family level is damn strange, while at the level of large communities, it is damn natural. There is no contradiction here; one simply should not force absolutes everywhere and engage in Procrusteanism (damn, I’m starting to self-cite and invent my own language; soon I’ll become completely incomprehensible to the reader).
I’ll start from a distance and first recommend a recent video by Grigory Bazhenov, where he opposes authoritarian urbanists and, in particular, explains the main purpose of a city — the opportunity to earn money.
Of course, historically, the city often served as a fortress as well. But the ability to protect wealth from an external plunderer largely echoes the ability to become wealthy in the first place. If people didn’t gather in one place and accumulate assets, they wouldn’t be able to afford the construction of such convenient urban infrastructure as protective structures, nor would there be a great need for it — individual caches in the forest or migrating with herds to secluded areas would have prevailed. So, the ability to accumulate wealth by gathering in a compact, large crowd is primary.
All the conveniences that the city provides for people adapt to its main function. And if this is done poorly (for example, if the city is managed centrally and hinders people from earning), the city withers, losing the competitive race to alternatives. This also applies to the organization of urban transport.
The more mobile a city resident is, the more choices of workplaces they have, the better the place they find on average, and the wealthier they become. As a result, they gain the ability to create solvent demand for various conveniences, including even greater mobility. For the most part, it doesn’t matter what the ownership structure is in different companies providing transport services, as long as they don’t have the power to forcibly dictate their rules to competitors or consumers. In other words, properly organized transport can belong to anyone, except for the institution that creates the rules.
So in the Moscow metro, each line could have its own owner, or each station, or separate owners for stations, tunnels, and depots, and separate owners for the trains. In principle, the metro as a whole could have a single owner, and even in this case, it would continue to operate in a competitive market; its competition consists of all alternative ways to get from point to point within the city. But even if the entire city with all its streets, houses, and transport belongs to a single owner, the alternative to using urban transport becomes video communication or moving elsewhere. After all, a city is first and foremost a place where one can earn more money than outside the city, and only then is there all sorts of infrastructure for spending leisure time together in large crowds. If you can earn enough money for your needs elsewhere, the city no longer holds you as strongly.
I am quite concerned about the emerging tacit consensus among the diverse unrecognized opposition in Russia, which suggests that the top leadership (yes, the very top) of the current Russian authorities and their friends from the “Ozero” cooperative, etc., cannot be publicly condemned, dekulakized, stripped of everything, left to rot in mines, or at least given a public, brutal death. Why should these “people” remain unpunished and even continue to live after what they have done to our country? I am concerned.
armchair hater
I have already had to answer a similar question, explaining the impracticality of terror against the security forces. In general, all these arguments, and even to a greater extent, apply to the state leadership as well. There is a well-known political observation that the less blood is shed during a transition of power, the more democratic and “herbivorous” the new government will be.
So, revenge is indeed best served cold. First, a peaceful transition of power instead of a bloody revolution. Then, a peaceful reduction in staff instead of lustration. And only after the deregulation of law has been carried out and confidence in the possibility of a fair trial has been restored, will the citizens themselves gradually begin to file lawsuits against the elderly former tyrants and their elderly former henchmen. Their dirty laundry will be aired in public, their crimes will be impartially and publicly examined, and billions will vanish to settle claims. The remainder of their lives will be spent in continuous, exhausting litigation. But at the moment of transition, nothing will foreshadow anything of the sort. They will even receive guarantees from a transitional government of public trust that it, the government, will not persecute them. And indeed, such important matters should not be entrusted to a government; this is a matter for private, legally equal individuals.
This book is a structured collection of the most significant articles from the LiveJournal blog of the well-known libertarian philosopher Oleg Tarakanov (“Laxy Catal”). The articles are presented in full and unaltered, without edits from the compiler.
In the opinion of the compiler, Tarakanov’s work examines the most realistic model of social organization in terms of current implementation possibilities. It is designed to solve the ever-multiplying problems of people in nearly all modern states based on territorial monopoly and the “tyranny of the majority.”
Oleg Tarakanov himself uses the term he coined, “insurance roofs,” instead of the word “panarchy,” but the compiler found it possible to use the more commonly accepted concept. Panarchy does not aim for the complete destruction of the state, but advocates for the abolition of its territorial monopoly and for voluntary participation in it. It is a system of extraterritorial contractual (and/or competing) jurisdictions (ECJs), in which different people can choose their own “virtual state” while residing in the same territory.
Such an approach ensures competition between jurisdictions, forcing them to spend budgets more efficiently and not infringe upon the personal and economic freedoms of citizens. But more importantly, people gain the opportunity to live by the rules that are closest to them personally, rather than those that were imposed by the will of the majority living in a particular territory. After all, in an ordinary territorial state, only a small portion are actually able to emigrate, while others are forced to endure anything, which is precisely what governments exploit, ignoring their interests.
I can assume that some convinced followers of Rothbard will not consider panarchy to be true libertarianism. Nevertheless, compared to unstable minarchism and difficult-to-implement anarcho-capitalism (ancap), panarchy is the most realistic and easily “sellable to people” option for moving away from the current sad state of affairs. In a mode of panarchy, diplomats already live according to international agreements, so we are talking merely about the large-scale implementation of a ready-made mechanism that has already proven itself.
If you did not like the potestatic (“force-based”) approach to bringing under jurisdiction and the enforcement of court decisions in Oleg Tarakanov’s model, do not turn away from the idea of panarchy entirely. Consider the Bitnation project, where all of this is carried out absolutely without any coercion based on a blockchain reputation system.
You can ask your question regarding panarchy and libertarianism on the Ancap-tyan website, in the VK public “Anti-state”, and on my page.
A small introduction for the readers. Effective altruism is a family of approaches to the task of changing the world for the better. Within this doctrine, it is considered how to achieve maximum effect with minimum means, what considerations to follow when setting goals, and how to motivate oneself toward altruism. Howard Roark is a character from Ayn Rand’s novel “The Fountainhead,” who advocates egoism as the highest moral value.
Of course, both of these concepts coexist quite well, and I won’t have to write tons of text about it, because Mikhail Pozharsky was recently so altruistic that he released a video about it. The engine of altruistic behavior is egoism. And the effective altruism movement is a pretty good confirmation of this. First, a person finds it insufficient to show off with luxury yachts and begins to spend on charity. Then it becomes crowded in this area, and he begins to show off that he spends on charity more effectively than others. You, allegedly, throw in mega-bucks without much point—you might as well have used them to light cigarettes—but I, spending ten times less, have actually helped a bunch of people with real problems; here is the proof, here is the methodological analysis, and here is where to send donations.
What else links effective altruism and Ayn Rand’s egoism is the conviction of many effective altruism adepts that for a successful person, for example, it is more effective not to volunteer personally, but to pay for the work of professionals, because he is more useful in his own position, where he earns the money to pay those very professionals. From here, it is literally one step to the idea that the best way to help people overall is the construction of a maximally free society, where everyone engages in what brings maximum benefit to others—simply because such behavior is best rewarded in a free market.
As I understand it, it is the hitman, not the client, who exits the non-aggression pact, and therefore the perpetrator should be the one to face punishment. But in the murder of Nemtsov (and other political murders), should the clients really be exempt from responsibility?
анонимный вопрос
In order to exit a contract, one must first enter into a contract, so the very concept of a non-aggression pact is as dubious as, say, the concept of a social contract for the establishment of a government. One can only state that people are generally not inclined to kill each other without reason, as if they had agreed upon it, or that people generally behave toward the government as if this institution acts on their behalf. In reality, people are simply inclined to adhere to the status quo and view its violation with suspicion.
States are organizations that systematically exercise aggressive violence, so in the current worldview, political murders are precisely part of the status quo for many people, which means it is an ancient and venerable tradition: a state representative has the right to order a killing, and the perpetrator must follow orders, and for this, the court will treat them with understanding. Therefore, of course, in a deeply etatist society, where it is not difficult but quite easy to find a perpetrator of a political murder on behalf of the state, placing all responsibility on the perpetrator signifies a lack of understanding of the foundations of the world order by the person doing so.
So it is more correct, until proven otherwise, to view murders in the interests of political groups as a common division of labor, where there is a client, a manager, and hired workers; all of them are to some extent involved in performing the work, and all of them to some extent bear responsibility for the result, whether it be the success of the operation or a trial of its participants.
Now, under ancap, should a contract killing occur, it is conversely more appropriate by default to assume, until proven otherwise, that the perpetrator bears full responsibility, since it is he who makes the decision based on his own personal moral convictions. If, during the investigation, a serious economic dependence on the client emerges, or hostages, or some other crap where not only the reward for successful work but also serious sanctions in case of refusal to execute the order depend on the client—then it would be appropriate to hold the client responsible, as if it were the ancient wild era of total etatism.
I understand that this can be settled within contract jurisdictions, but how should one act in general? For example, if I see someone drawing a weapon in a public place, can I shoot first before they have harmed anyone?
Han Solo
I understand your desire to remove the responsibility for choosing the best course of action in an extreme situation. Unfortunately, it doesn’t work that way.
You see someone drawing a weapon in a public place. You can also draw a weapon and shoot first, or you can choose not to. You don’t know which decision will be correct because you do not have full information about the situation. There are real-life examples where a person drew a weapon to defend themselves from an attack, but bystanders decided that he was the attacker and shot him. What if that person is drawing a weapon to protect themselves from someone outside your field of vision?
Therefore, a safer practice is considered to be shouting the sacramental “Stop, or I’ll shoot!” before shooting anyone—this is done primarily to inform witnesses that you did not start the attack and that you are hoping for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. By the way, this is taught in firearm safety courses, so I’m not reinventing the wheel here.
Yes, any delay before firing carries the risk that you will not be the first to shoot. But no one in that specific situation will decide better than you which risk is preferable: shooting without warning and answering for having attacked, or giving a warning and taking a bullet.
The world is becoming increasingly transparent. Even now, no one can be sure that a particular action of theirs won’t surface in the public space shortly. Surveillance technologies are constantly improving. One needs a decent knowledge of computer technology to avoid leaving a vivid digital footprint while surfing the internet or traveling in the real world. In the future, the required qualification for maintaining privacy will only increase, and eventually, even such a foolproof method as diving headfirst under a blanket will stop saving you: they will see you under the blanket too.
It is becoming increasingly difficult with the privacy of monetary transactions. One can argue for a long time about whether a quantum computer will crack the asymmetric encryption used by Bitcoin, but what is the point of even the most reliable encryption if advanced surveillance technologies allow anyone to peek at your private key—you have to store it somewhere, after all.
So, it would be entirely appropriate to think in advance about how to live in this brave new world, where no one is able to hide anything from anyone.
I believe that in such a world, the most reliable way of ensuring one’s identity will be continuity. Let me explain. For instance, I have Bitcoin, and theoretically, anyone can transfer this Bitcoin from my wallet to their own. And I could, at any moment, transfer someone else’s to myself. For money to be preserved as a concept under these conditions, I myself would need to be completely digitized and entered into the blockchain. On what basis do I claim the Bitcoin? On the basis that I sold an apartment. And where is the proof that I sold my apartment and not someone else’s? Well, I can present a continuous chain of events of my life back in time, from the sale of the apartment to its acquisition, during which the apartment did not change owners. And if, during this period, a third party generated my signature on a fictitious sales contract, anyone can trace the chain of events back in time from the signature on the contract to the criminal intent, and it will turn out that at no point during this time interval did I give instructions to sell my apartment, meaning the transaction will not take place.
If everything and everyone is recorded, then everything is fine; one can live in this world, and even quite well—specifically, a bunch of stupid prejudices will die out. What one should fear is information asymmetry, where some can monitor everyone, while others are limited in such means. This is exactly what would mean total lawlessness: when according to all documents and video recordings you are living a happy life, but in fact, you were killed long ago.
This post turned out to be atypical. Thanks to Karambe from the cozy chat for prompting these strange thoughts.
Three main types of system organization can be identified: centralized, decentralized, and distributed. This applies to all complex systems with multiple nodes, both technological and social. In a centralized system, there is a single point of control (a server) through which all interaction of regular nodes (clients) occurs, both with the server itself and with each other. In a decentralized system, there is no single server; instead, there is a certain number of super-nodes connected to other super-nodes as well as to clients (client-to-client interaction occurs with the participation of super-nodes). In a distributed system, the network is entirely peer-to-peer, and clients interact with each other directly, without any intermediary.
Let’s consider the history of the Internet. In its early days, if you wanted to distribute a file to other people, you had to upload it to your own server (Web, FTP), from where anyone interested could then download it. As the flow of visitors increased, your server might fail to handle the load, or the bandwidth of the communication channel could be exhausted, which ultimately made downloading the file impossible. I don’t think it’s necessary to mention the extreme vulnerability of such a system to a “forceful” server shutdown—that should be obvious.
Later, decentralized file-sharing systems appeared, such as Kazaa, eDonkey, and BitTorrent. These no longer had a central server that could easily fail. User interaction occurred through many independent super-nodes (for example, torrent trackers), which provided file search and coordination of data regarding the availability of files on regular users’ computers. For greater resilience and improved quality of service, fully peer-to-peer (distributed) networks later emerged, such as BitTorrent with DHT, which can operate without a torrent tracker at all, or the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) on the blockchain, which is fully resistant to censorship and individual node failure.
Decided to create your own internet resource? You’re in luck! Today there is a sea of options for hosting it. A quarter of a century ago, it would have been significantly more difficult. Back then, you needed to possess a huge sum of money to buy a physical server, place it in a room with a high-speed Internet connection, powerful power supply, cooling, etc. It is not surprising that there were practically no individual online projects at that time.
The boom of the Internet coincided with the appearance of virtualization technology, which allowed several virtual machines (VMs) to run on one physical server simultaneously. For example, there are the well-known VirtualBox and VMware. Each virtual machine allowed it to be treated as a physical server, solving the problem of running several applications simultaneously (each may require its own versions of system libraries and OS settings, so running them simultaneously under one OS could create a conflict).
The number of applications grew, but the ability of a physical server to run VMs is limited by memory and disk space. A solution emerged—containerization—virtualization at the operating system level (e.g., Docker). It uses the shared kernel of the physical server’s operating system, and each container encapsulates only the application itself, the required versions of libraries, and specific OS settings (rather than a full OS, as in a VM). This allows for a significant reduction in the size of the container image compared to a VM (which makes it easier to move from server to server), and also reduces the load on the physical server (meaning more applications can be run on it, lowering the price for end users).
How does all of this relate to social organization? Currently, we live in a fully centralized state with a territorial monopoly (the so-called Westphalian state) and constantly encounter it. As in the previous example with different versions of system libraries for different applications, different people have different values, religions, and ideas about life. It is complete absurdity to believe that, for example, Turks and Kurds can live by the same laws! And, as we see, any attempts by the Turkish authorities to impose uniform rules are met with resistance, up to armed struggle.
The simplest solution in this situation seems to be a transition to a decentralized system in the form of panarchy (a system of contractual jurisdictions – CJ), where each group with shared views has its own government, not tied to a territory. Some libertarians may not like this option, as they want to choose “components” on the market entirely according to their own tastes and not depend on a CJ. This results in a fully distributed model, which we call anarcho-capitalism (ancap).
History has many examples of transitioning from a centralized system to a decentralized one, and then to a distributed one. Here is another example—electronic media. First, there was fully centralized radio and television, then came the decentralized Internet with websites, and only now are the sprouts of fully distributed applications appearing (such as Bitcoin, or Ethereum with smart contracts). I cannot even provide examples of a transition from a centralized system directly to a distributed one (bypassing the decentralized), so I consider such a thing extremely unlikely. This also applies to social organization, and it is naive to believe that we can move directly from a centralized state (even a minarchist one) to ancap. I provided practical arguments in my article “Realistic Libertarianism”.
There is one, but rather significant, incorrect assumption in the text. In both of the social models being considered, there is some kind of absolute impersonal external enforcer who imposes this model. In the Federation, it is forbidden to help without being asked, and some external force suppresses all such attempts; in the Union, it is forbidden to restrict another’s freedom even in the smallest way, and some external force, again, suppresses all such attempts.
But in reality, there is no external impersonal force; all rules are established and enforced by the people themselves. In the Federation of Freedom, a person can intrude upon someone else’s territory and free slaves there, and to those who want to challenge him for violating others’ borders, he can present what he discovered within those borders. In the Union of Freedom, a person can tie up an epileptic, and to the person who demands they be untied, demonstrate a video recording of the previous seizure.
Of course, common sense does not have to triumph in absolutely all cases; it is enough that there is no “external stupid lex” who doesn’t care about common sense, but only wants the law to prevail.
It is clear that Kukatas, speaking of hypothetical libertarian orders, effectively reduced everything to an analogy with the US Civil War, where one side defended the rights of states to establish their own laws, and the other defended the need for everyone to adhere to a single standard of freedom. Kukatas himself took the position of the conditional South in this conflict, which is, in fact, the main provocative message of the lecture.
