I read my first saga by mistake when I was about twelve. I was sure that this plump volume would contain tales of gods and heroes, something like the legends and myths of Ancient Greece. Everything turned out to be completely different and far more interesting, and it clearly influenced why ancap seems like a perfectly natural and reasonable system to me. David Friedman also relied heavily on the material of the sagas when constructing his proposals for a stateless system of law under capitalism. And finally, in his book about legal systems that differ from those we are used to, he also began specifically with the section on Iceland.
Therefore, when it became clear that simply translating this book as a commissioned work at a fixed rate didn’t work out, I decided to continue the translation using my traditional donation scheme, and to perk myself up, I grabbed a chapter out of order, and the most delicious one right away.
I will finish the chapter notes later; that’s already a bit tedious. In the meantime, I will be very glad for your money, by the volume of which I can judge how interested you are in this specific translation and how briskly I should tackle the next chapter.
On Boosty, I created a separate goal for this translation, but you are, of course, free to use all the other tools listed on the donations page. By the way, there is another innovation there: since we have developed all sorts of local tokenomics here in Montelibero, I will gladly accept donations in our own internal tokens.
Do you need to ask them for permission before flying? Is it necessary to somehow amortize the risk of the aircraft falling on the property of people located beneath it, and how to compensate for the noise of the engines/propellers? What is your personal/Montelibero/Montenegrin position on this issue?
L29Ah (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.012345678901 Monero)
I like how David Friedman analyzes this and many other questions (sorry for buzzing your ears with him so much). He analyzes the topic in great detail in the book The Machinery of Freedom. I have managed to get through about a third of it so far. Much more concisely—in one of the chapters of The Machinery of Freedom. There, economic analysis of law is also used as a basis for reasoning. This often allows for a fairly clear generalization of those specific answers that I have to give from time to time.
To put it very briefly, the lower the transaction costs for proposed deals to purchase rights to actions that violate others’ interests, the more convenient it is to recognize the owners’ right to prohibit such actions. If necessary, the potential trespasser will buy the right of passage. And the higher the transaction costs, the more convenient the procedure of judicial settlement of such cases becomes through claims for damages. No one defines a specific threshold altitude at which one can fly over someone else’s property, but if the flight caused damage, it will have to be compensated in court. Flights over someone else’s territory at a sufficiently high altitude (so as to at least not crash into terrain irregularities in normal mode and not frighten people with the wild roar of engines) are clearly the second case; obtaining permission to fly from all owners over whose territory it may occur is an unrealistic task.
Specifically in Montenegro, there is state licensing for the import of drones into the country, certain weight restrictions, a ban on flying above a certain altitude, and other highly sophisticated restrictions, some of which can be bypassed, while in others it proves too expensive, and it is simpler to accept that a certain application of drones is too troublesome to engage in systematically. Naturally, we in Montelibero find the complete repeal of all these regulations desirable, because drones can at least be used to take beautiful photos, which is useful for promoting the project. But, of course, the drone owner must be prepared for the fact that if their expensive toy falls on someone else’s plot, they may well lose it. The plot owner is not responsible if a cow steps on the fallen drone, or if his underage son decides to break something off this unexpected gift. He is not even obliged to let the drone owner onto his territory—here, the right of prohibition applies, because the transaction costs for purchasing the right of passage are small.
Here we filmed our plot with a drone, but this required flying over the neighbors as well
To the question of whether a person has the right to commit violence, we have only one answer — they do not! No single person in the world should possess the right to initiate an act of violence against another person. But some people (most often supporters of authoritarian-conservative views and force-based methods of solving problems) may say that this is a restriction of freedom. Freedom to commit violence is a freedom like any other, which means we are contradicting ourselves and are authoritarians ourselves, wanting to forcibly impose a single life scenario on everyone.
This is a rather inadequate manipulation in essence, which ignores the fact that violence leads to people being deprived of their freedom. That is, when one person initiates an act of violence against another person, they thereby deprive them of their freedom. Accordingly, violence is non-freedom. The right to violence is the right to deprive people of their freedom. However, the elimination of violence, the striving for its complete eradication as a phenomenon as a whole, is the elimination of the factor that leads people to non-freedom. And no verbal manipulations will change the essence of the phenomenon of violence!
I continue translating Friedman’s latest book. This time, I’ve gone in order. I translated the introduction and the first chapter, regarding law in the Chinese Empire. An attentive reader may notice that I haven’t fully completed the work, and about half of the footnotes are missing from the text. That is the case; I got exhausted. Tomorrow, I plan to quietly upgrade the text—both for online reading and in the ebook. I also still hope that someone will take on creating a Russian-language cover for the book.
What I like in the book are the constant comparisons: look, here’s how it was for the Chinese, exactly like in modern America. And this—just like in 18th-century England. And then there are attempts to show for what purpose the legislation was made exactly this way, what worked, and what didn’t quite.
I hope you didn’t miss me too much while the channel was on pause for a while — I have been very busy.
More than a year ago, as part of his Liberty Education Project, Vladimir Zolotorev began posting a translation of David Friedman’s 2019 book Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own — an extremely detailed answer to the question of how courts could operate not only under ancap, but in any conceivable conditions. For my part, I posted the original and published the translated chapters on my page. In November 2020, however, the translation stalled after the publication of four chapters.
And recently, Dima Kovalenko, who translated those four chapters, contacted me and suggested that I continue the work in his place. I gladly agreed. To get started, I took a relatively short chapter on the legal system of my favorite Athens during the time of classical democracy, and now I am happy to present to you the translation of this chapter. I have also formatted all five chapters into an epub and posted it on my page as well. Footnotes for the four old chapters are currently missing — apparently, they were not translated. I will add them in time. Please test whether the book reads normally for you — I tried formatting it in the newer epub3 format, but if it turns out that it is not sufficiently supported by your e-readers, then there is no point in overcomplicating things and it would be better to return to epub2; the book does not contain complex layout for which the new format would be absolutely necessary.
I would also be glad if someone would take on creating a cover for the book — for now, I am using the original English one, but the final edition will clearly require something else.
If there is no state, and my wife cheats on me, would it be lawful to throw her out the window if I live on the second floor of a building owned by a homeowners’ association that has opted out of insurance services, but has an oral contract for territory security with a private security company (PSC) registered in a territory where a state exists, of which our joint daughter is a citizen, and who, under their law, is obliged to look after disabled parents—a category that includes stateless persons, which my wife is, having applied for a residence permit that was formally accepted due to the difference in time zones?
Topotushka
This question, if I recall correctly, was cited by Alexei “Komendant” Tereshchuk as an example of how even non-trolls—but quite enthusiastic ancaps—can be intensely interested in the most minute details of a completely hypothetical stateless society of the future, falling into the deductive heresy of deriving any, no matter how subtle, specifics from a few general principles.
But no. In order to derive specific consequences from general principles, one must add additional information to the general principles regarding the conditions to which we are deriving those specific consequences. The more assumptions the initial data rely on, the more unstable the result of such reflections becomes.
Does this mean that the deductive method is useless? Of course not. It simply means that to obtain reliable results, you need to take the general principles and bring them as close as possible to the local environment to which you will be applying them.
Now, let us return to the joking question and provide a serious answer to it.
The question of the lawfulness of throwing a cheating wife out the window can only have a positive resolution under conditions where cheating is considered a legal offense. Can cheating be considered a legal offense in the absence of a state? It can. Let us note that in our hypothetical society, marriage is officially considered a property relationship—at least, Topotushka’s “ownership” over his wife.
Moving forward. The homeowners’ association’s refusal of insurance services means that causing harm to the health of one of the association’s residents does not constitute a tort against the association.
The fact that the PSC is fulfilling an oral contract for territory security means that oral contracts are recognized in our hypothetical stateless society.
If the PSC operating legally on the protected territory records damage to the adjacent territory caused by the fall of Topotushka’s wife, I find it difficult to imagine a legal construction within which the responsibility for the damage would be placed by the PSC on the wife rather than on the Topotushka who threw her. Thus, we can state that since throwing a large object out of a window entails a risk of damage to the adjacent territory, it is an unlawful act, and we have obtained an answer to the original question without even delving into the intricacies of time zones. Moreover, according to the oral contract, the PSC may be obliged to prevent even the throwing of cigarette butts on the lawn, which are viewed as litter; therefore, Topotushka’s arguments that his wife is quite compact and did not cause any significant damage are unlikely to hold weight. Littering under the windows is an unlawful act, period.
Property is, as is fashionable to explain nowadays, a bundle of rights. Moreover, an awful lot of these rights can be invented: the more complex the legal relations in society, the more of these rights there are, the harder they are to distinguish, and the more they intertwine. For example, I can visit a friend and sit down to work at a computer that he rents along with the apartment using his parents’ money, where I pay for access to the computer with a kiss. I use a pirated operating system and type the text of an article promised to a client, for which I have received an advance payment. In this regard, can the friend’s parents, the owner of the apartment with the computer, and the employees of the operating system manufacturer also demand a kiss from me, and exactly what share of the kiss? Can I, instead of a kiss, send the guy to my client so that the client can kiss him himself, since he has such an urgency that I have to work anywhere at an odd hour? The answers to these questions seem obvious only if we have some roughly similar notions of what is proper in our minds.
But notions of what is proper depend quite heavily on context. If I kill an opponent in a computer game, and the game implies the possibility of looting the corpse, then the transfer of the deceased’s property to me causes no particular dispute. If the same rules apply in a live-action role-playing game, then my ownership of the killed person’s property can also be quite legal. Finally, if I participate in such an unpleasant variety of role-playing games as a real war, then the appropriation of weapons, ammunition, and various souvenirs from the body of the killed person there also does not cause misunderstanding among those around.
Moreover, military booty may not be limited to things from a corpse. If tomorrow Navalny kills Putin, he could well claim to inherit the presidential post in Russia, and show me that strange person who would dispute this. Prescribe him a triple dose of fantasy.
But as soon as we move into a context where murder is not considered a way of resolving conflict, it ceases to be a legitimate way of acquiring the property of the killed. After that, the entire bundle of rights for the killer will shrink to the factual possession of what he managed to take from the killed, and only for as long as it is not taken away.
Madam President, please choose the dish upon which to place your trophy during the inauguration.
What is the situation with animal rights under ancap? Unlike humans, they have no means of self-defense
Hate-monger against moskalyaks
I have nothing to add to this issue beyond all my earlier texts on the subject, so I will take this opportunity to simply refer to them.
Libertarianism and environmental protection. Here I recommend a video by Svetovsky about how, if we want more animals, let’s eat them and benefit from them in every way. Plus, I mention Ostrom, who shows what to do with the tragedy of the commons as applied to wildlife.
Zoophilia. This discusses the legal status of animals, morality as the main regulator of the relationship with animals, and unexpectedly, a cat named Stubbs pops up.
Animal Rights. Here is one of my first clumsy formulations stating that a right is a claim that is tolerated, and advice is given for fans of ancient Rome.
On the killing of animals in the zoo. I start with mosquitoes, go through the case of one unlucky monkey, and end with a bright prediction of how the Earth will be swallowed by virgin nature.
On the rights of sentient non-humans. I demonstrate approaches to establishing legal relations with non-human intelligence—using a parrot as an example.
Generally, when composing another question, I highly recommend first checking the navigation page and using the search for the likely keywords of your question. It is quite possible that you will get a fairly comprehensive answer to your question from already published materials.
For some, the girl from lofi radio, and for some, an illustration of an animal’s right to lie on the bed
Another, very tiny, chapter of Mechanics of Freedom is being published, The Conservative Error. In it, Friedman lumps together immigration, global warming, fracking, GMOs, and various other same-sex marriages, asserting that the rejection of human development in these respective directions is rooted in one simple cognitive bias. Moreover, this bias is characteristic of both those who call themselves conservatives and those who call themselves liberals (referring to the US coordinate system, of course). The bias consists of the assumption that one can stop a beautiful moment. No, you cannot.
The translation of Mechanics of Freedom is nearing completion. Parallel to this, I have finished organizing by chapters and posted on my website the English text of Friedman’s 2019 book about legal systems that are very different from ours. Vladimir Zolotorev has so far released translations of three chapters, all of which are duplicated on my site, and I intend to continue in the same vein. If you want to encourage the translation, send donations to Vladimir. But if he gets stuck for long, I will take the initiative.
While recently answering a series of questions in a blitz format, I touched upon the topic of the responsibility of the person who orders a crime, and this sparked a discussion in the Facebook comments. So, I will try to reason through this in more detail.
Let’s consider a sequence of situations.
1. The client demands that the perpetrator commit a crime, threatening sanctions in case of refusal: causing harm to the perpetrator themselves or to some hostages. The perpetrator does as required, thereby avoiding the threat.
2. The client demands that the perpetrator commit a crime, threatening sanctions for non-compliance and promising a reward for completion. The perpetrator does as required and receives the reward.
3. The client asks the perpetrator to commit a crime, offering a reward in return. The perpetrator carries out the request and receives the promised reward.
4. There is a highly competitive market for crimes where many perpetrators compete to offer their services. The buyer chooses the perpetrator who offers the service that is optimal in terms of price and quality, and purchases it.
5. The perpetrator commits a crime, reports it, after which interested parties pay them donations for it.
I have tried to arrange the situations in descending order of the client’s degree of responsibility and ascending order of the perpetrator’s degree of responsibility—from the full responsibility of the former to the full responsibility of the latter.
In a situation where the perpetrator faces a serious threat for failing to fulfill the order, we can de facto consider them a mere tool. That is why, for example, it is quite logical to completely exempt conscripted soldiers from responsibility for participating in a war if they acted within orders and it is customary in that army to execute for desertion or failure to follow orders.
But in a situation where the perpetrator of a crime has the opportunity to resign, or to stage a work-to-rule strike by demanding written instructions for every unlawful order—but does not do so—they share responsibility with their superiors for all crimes committed. This is the case of the Belarusian OMON, for example. In conditions where those who resign can also count on the support of society, the responsibility of those who did not resign naturally increases.
At what point can we confidently assert that the client should bear no responsibility at all? Clearly, this is only possible in cases where the perpetrator acts entirely voluntarily, but is it so in all such cases?
Any voluntary exchange is based on the division of labor. I do not do everything I need myself; instead, I exchange a part of what I need less for something that is difficult for me to obtain on my own. The purchase of an illegal service is the exact same division of labor. But since the labor is divided, so is the responsibility for the damage that this labor caused to someone. Logical? Logical. And what if we continue to complicate the division of labor?
One studied the target’s daily routine. A second purchased the equipment. A third planted the bomb. A fourth sent a text message at the right moment, and the bomb blew up the victim along with the car and three random passersby. A fifth negotiated with the client and coordinated the group’s work. The sixth is the client himself. The seventh is the primary beneficiary in whose interests the client acted. And let’s add payment schemes. And let’s add explosives suppliers. And someone else bought these guys donuts…
A court in the wonderful Ancapistan of the future will have to assess the level of awareness of each person involved in the offense, the degree of unlawfulness of the actions they were directly involved in, the possibility of backing out, cooperation with the investigation, and so on—everything we already see in our usual boring reality. Except that the idiotic practice of imprisonment for the sake of imprisonment will be mostly replaced by monetary compensation or their in-kind equivalents.
Knowledge of principles will not provide a precise solution for all cases in life. It only allows one to have something to be guided by when evaluating a given situation in all its complexity. Therefore, please do not turn the non-aggression principle into a dogma; it doesn’t work that way.
Here you have the direct perpetrators, the filming of a video for the report to the client, and a whole chain of decision-making behind the scenes. The division of responsibility is the most typical practice in the modern state.
