This chapter, Stateless Society and Violent Crime, had already been roughly translated by a volunteer, and I have now simply proofread the translation.

Here Molynieux, sparing no colors, continues to paint that totalitarian hell he is trying to sell us instead of ancap—with a global network of “dispute resolution organizations” (DROs) to which, however, he grants powers of total control over the smallest aspects of life. According to the author’s design, this should make it impossible for a person to exist without “cover,” as the intimidated DRO businesses would not dare sell even a damn hot dog to someone who finds themselves struck from the lists.

No bitcoins, total KYC, and other wonders of totalitarianism—this is what happens to otherwise decent people when they get fascinated by moral philosophy. Children, do not be like Molynieux. Moral philosophy corrupts, as does any pursuit of absolutes. If you feel an attraction to it—keep your hands above the blanket.

What guarantees against abuses by DROs does Molynieux offer? Here you go, this is everything he writes on the matter:

Ah yes, but what if an “outcast” has been treated unfairly and is being blackmailed by a DRO or a PCR?

Well, remember that anarchism is always a two-way negotiation. To attract people to sign a contract with your DRO or PCR, what checks and balances would you include in it to soothe their fears on this issue?

In other words, he believes that DROs will figure out for themselves what guarantees of their own integrity they could provide to attract clients—and this is in a situation where not being a DRO client means becoming a total marginal. Quite hypocritical, much like expecting states, with their monopoly on violence, to compete in the attractiveness of their laws to attract potential citizens—rather than striving to extract maximum money from citizens while providing minimum services.

Fortunately, the proposed model simply will not work as described. For example, here is the simplest way to bypass it. A person simply declares that they have created their own DRO, which provides insurance services personally to them—and to everyone else, they honestly offer contracts with prices so exorbitant that no one would ever insure with them. That’s it; we have a “non-outcast” with a zero-value contract, which they concluded with a zero-value firm, and which they honestly observe, since they indeed pay themselves for all insurance cases.

If Molynieux believes that such a system bypass should be suppressed by the large, venerable DROs—otherwise, various outlaws will exploit this bug, and they could not be distinguished from honest individuals by the formal criterion of having a DRO contract—then we arrive at the idea of business licensing, which is already state regulation. Well, fine, let’s call this regulation “guild-based”—does that make life any easier for people? Today the DRO guild decides who to let into its market and who not, and tomorrow every random person will start regulating entry into their own business plot.

If Molynieux agrees that self-service in the sphere of dispute resolution is legitimate, then this kills all his totalitarian pathos. A person who is de facto outside the insurance system would still be able to conduct ordinary economic activity, which means there is no point in the myriad of procedures devised to ensure not even a mouse slips past the system. “All the better,” countless hotels and diners would say. “Our business costs will decrease, and if some snobs want to insure themselves against every sneeze—be their guest; we choose risk and champagne.”

In short, one should not take any static model and give it a total character. People will seek ways to improve their own personal situation. The result at any given moment will be largely determined by the balance of profits and costs of one behavior or another. But it is extremely unlikely that at any point in time the result will resemble the DRO system as Molynieux describes it—it is based on too narrow a conception of who should be considered respectable, and therefore will inevitably be in conflict with numerous more libertine anarchists, to whom this system appears as a totalitarian hell.

As a reminder, posts in the channel will be more frequent and interesting if you encourage the author with donations.

I am posting the edits of three more chapters of The Practical Anarchist by Stephan Molneux.

Anarchy, Violence, and the State – this section analyzes the economic incentives for violence (which in some ways echoes a chapter from Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom about the economics of vice and virtue) and shows that the best way to exponentially increase the amount of violence is to establish a state, because it is precisely the state that most successfully combats the economic factors that prevent the widespread use of violence in private life.

War, Profit, and the State – here the thesis is further sharpened, and explanations are provided as to why involving the state is the only way to make modern warfare profitable; a private individual has no chance of waging war effectively and remaining in the black.

Successful Operation (Dead Patient) – here the author discusses the tragedy of the commons and how, in most cases, it is perfectly resolved through privatization rather than the regulation of public goods. But even if one assumes that in some cases the tragedy of the commons cannot be cured by privatization, the state in any event cannot be the remedy, since it is itself the clearest example of that very tragedy.

Last time I promised to announce the final editing of six chapters at once, but for some reason the process dragged on (maybe due to insufficient motivation?), so for now, here are three.

In the second part of Practical Anarchy, Molynneux proceeds to argue why anarchy is better than the state. In the introduction, he lists six main questions that make sense to ask when analyzing any critique of anarchic solutions from the perspective of statism. Next, in a fairly extensive FAQ on anarchism, he answers the most typical objections (roads, national security, and all that). And in the chapter on four arguments against the state, he actually provides not four arguments, but four possible ratios between “bad” and “good” people in society, showing why, regardless of the ratio, the emergence of the state only makes things worse. I am not fond of the idea of dividing people into good and bad, and it is entirely possible to put forward a coherent system of objections against the state based, for example, on the analysis of economic incentives—but preachers of moral systems have their own audience, and Molynneux knows best how to work with them.

Chapter 9 concludes the first part of Stephan Molneux’s Practical Anarchy, which is dedicated to methodology; following this will be the second part on argumentation, a considerable portion of which has already been translated and published in draft form by volunteers. Therefore, in my spare time, I will refine the next six chapters slightly and will report back once they are done, to avoid making too many small updates.

While in the eighth chapter Molneux explains why collective defense against external invasion is more effective under anarchy than under a state, in the ninth he uses several historical examples to show what is wrong with the state’s so-called defense.

Unlike the translation of Eric Mack, which is funded by Alex Dvoretsky, and David Friedman, which is funded by Dima Kovalenko, a permanent sponsor for the translation of this particular book has not materialized. Bitarch was involved here, but he seems to have lost interest; I would be glad if someone else takes the initiative.

Alex Dvoretsky kindly sponsored the translation of another chapter by Eric Mack, but the donation caught me in the process of translating another chapter by Stephan Molinari, which I was crafting according to the dictates of my own soul (and in the hope that donations would follow post factum). So, I finished with Molinari first, and now I will switch to Mack.

In the chapter Collective Defense: An Example of Methodology, Molinari analyzes the third most popular question about ancap, after courts and roads: how ancaps will defend themselves against an attack by an evil neighboring state. The book was written before Putin loudly enough declared his claim to be the world’s number one villain, so Germany is used as the model villain instead of Russia, and the dictator there faces a difficult choice: whether to conquer statist Poland or ancap France. I would say that in his fantasies about how the defense problem is resolved, Molinari appears more overconfident than Friedman, who, at least, considers the problem serious, and even admits that for this specific need he would, grimacing and wincing, agree to feed the state.