Free Navalny Project

Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s deputy for political technology, has announced something unprecedented that he is preparing to save his boss many times, and now, he has published it. In effect, he has invented a Free State Project. There, a roll call of those wishing to join the project was conducted first, and only after twenty thousand people wishing to move to the promised land were gathered did the relocation begin. It is the same in our case. Everyone who intends to join the prayer ritual for Navalny’s release from captivity is suggested to first sign up on the website, and only when half a million such people are gathered will the date of the ritual and other details be set.

They say the site crashed almost immediately from the influx of interested people, but by the time I reached it, the only thing indicating the high load was a non-functioning counter. So, the order of magnitude could only be estimated by the circles on the map (however, a report arrived—the 200,000 application mark has been passed). To register, you need to specify your address (you can simply click a point on the map) and a valid email. After the email is verified, the voice of the applicant is counted—at least, the number next to my house on the map increased by one.

There are no options to withdraw a vote, so if the date for taking to the streets turns out to be later than the date of my departure to Montenegro, I will not be able to inform the organizers that I cannot attend.

What can I say about the prospects of the campaign? If the goal were specifically the release of Navalny, one would have to take some Katerina Tikhonova hostage and demand Alexei’s immediate release, threatening this woman with death. As for the chosen toolkit, it is primarily suitable for rocking the boat. Well, okay, let’s rock it, even though it’s already become tiring. This will not help Navalny in any way, but he is a grown boy and knew what he was getting into.

Everything is fine, the protest is drained

I will reflect a bit on the topic of the protest’s collapse and hope that after this, I can move on from the Navalny theme for a long time.

What did Volkov tell us on the February 4 stream? That they, of course, anticipated the possibility of imprisonment, and for this occasion they have a plan: to seize the assets of Putin’s circle abroad, thereby causing a split among the elites and bringing about the “tabaquero” scenario (or the final transformation of the RF into Belarus, where the dictator’s circle doesn’t show their noses abroad, but instead enjoys themselves fully at home).

Svetov reacted to this, stating that stopping the street actions was a good idea, but it would have been even better not to start them at all: simply come to Russia and silently go to jail.

And here I cannot help but be outraged. Why go to jail at all? What, was the task of seizing the property of Putin’s circle unsolvable without the imprisonment of one Navalny and sixteen thousand people outraged by Navalny’s imprisonment? Is it impossible to speak before the European Parliament or the US Congress without this? Actually, it seems the opposite: imprisonment only hinders this, as colleagues have to speak instead. Can’t you release new exposés without being in jail? No, videos with Alexei are clearly more lively than without him. Or would fewer people have watched the video about the palace if he hadn’t arranged a promo tour from Berlin to the Kremlin Central prison? Yes, perhaps fewer. Maybe by ten million. Is that so critical?

In short, Volkov did not convince me, and I continue to believe that Navalny was completely mistaken to fear that he would fade away abroad and become uninteresting as a politician. By going to prison, he created many difficulties for many good people, and yes, this is pure victim-blaming on my part: you shouldn’t fly to such a dangerous country wearing such a short skirt.

Of course, there is a certain probability that foreign elites didn’t fully believe Bellingcat’s investigation into Navalny’s poisoning, and the self-sacrifice became simply a final demonstration: yes, look, they have truly lost their minds over there, now live with this and fight, if you can. If this is the case, it certainly casts a shadow on the impeccable moral qualities of Grandpa Biden and Grandma Merkel, and portrays them as cannibals.

But anyway. Putin successfully survived another crisis involving tens of thousands of protesters taking to the streets; the security forces stretched their legs after Covid, and are now cheerful, spirited, and ready to arrest everyone on weekends even without any mass actions. Detainees are fined, they bill the FBK, and then they win these cases in Strasbourg, but that is a slow process. And people have only just felt the drive, and now they are talking about a “drain” precisely because all activity ended so abruptly, while they had only just woken up from a year-long Covid slumber.

Forgive me, but the FBK is not your helper here. It is a machine for conducting and promoting anti-corruption investigations. The FBK will continue to act using FBK methods. And Navalny’s headquarters will not help you. That is an electoral machine. They will continue to use the doctrine of smart voting. If you desire something more—not just going to the street when asked, and donating and liking the rest of the time—you will have to organize yourselves. The main thing here is not to chase glory or mass appeal. You simply spend pleasant time in the company of reliable friends you managed to make in some other setting. And then you read in the news: “unknown persons decorated the mayor’s office building with fresh graffiti” or “unknown persons slashed the tires of a judge’s car.” “How strange,” you send the news to your friends, “what a weird story, what did the car do to offend them?”

Navalny’s Actions, Betting on the Rise

Last night, I thought about sharing my own impressions of the recent street protests while they were still fresh, but a more interesting news item came up. Alexei Nefedov, a former author of this channel, was detained on the street, so I decided to ask him how it all happened. And since I’m not very good at interviewing, the conversation quickly drifted into a more abstract discussion, which turned out to be quite interesting.

– I found out about your detention when I was already on my way home, because I rarely took my phone out on the street and only checked the coordination channel. This is the first time a close acquaintance of mine has been detained. In general, detentions have become the norm, so I wasn’t particularly worried; instead, I immediately decided to take the opportunity to ask how it looks from the other side—sorry for being so callous. To start with, how on earth did you get caught?

– When the report was being drawn up, I took Article 51, and I haven’t discussed the defense strategy with my lawyer yet, so I’ll refrain from commenting for now. I can only say that the recommendations you posted in the channel on Friday—it’s not that they are bad, they just work for different conditions. You talk about what a large mass of people should do, but they won’t be able to do it without a team. And you can only command anonymously via Telegram. That signal will be severely delayed. Fantasies about some kind of flag signals are for people who have had at least some coordination training. Not our case, in short. Therefore, people walked in scattered columns; they were easily split up, and movement was blocked. Detentions were also effortless. You can form a chain on the square, but it’s impossible in a column. The security forces control the entire roadway, so they can pop out from the side or behind and unexpectedly attack anyone. That’s exactly what happened to me.

– Strange, most of my recommendations concerned individual tactics, or small groups of acquaintances staying in clusters. But I was still hoping that the level of coordination would be higher. What happened after the detention?

– For starters, for some reason, instead of a classic police van, they used an ordinary Gazelle, without bars, with regular civilian plates. If not for the low ceiling, you might have thought it was taken off a shuttle route. Eight people were shoved in there, two “cosmonauts” [riot police] climbed in, and off we went to the police station. We arrived quickly, but then we sat in front of the doors for half an hour, so there was time to chat with the cosmonauts. Completely apolitical, good-natured guys. If we have to detain—we detain. If we have to kill—we kill. An order is an order. To the attacks of their fellow passengers, they replied that they simply didn’t understand life and invited them to go work for the National Guard to get their act together. In general, in the entire assembly line for stamping out administrative charges, a well-oiled routine is evident. They brought us in, waited for the signal that we could be brought inside, led us in pairs, and took us to the basement. There was more waiting, then the drawing up of the delivery and search report. Then to the duty office, where they have orders to do photography and fingerprinting. This is illegal, but it is demanded of them. So they try to push through purely psychologically, and they do it very well. I refused to roll my fingers and was sure that I would now be charged with violating the legal requirements of the police under Article 19.3. I even reset my phone to factory settings just in case. But none of that really matters, in the end. Generally, this feeling of the pointlessness of any fuss is very strong in the police station. Quotes from the Strugatsky brothers immediately come to mind, where an old revolutionary said: it’s not scary now, but when they were sawing off my arm and complaining about low wages—that’s when it was scary.

– What is expected next?

– They have three days to transfer the case to court, then they’ll call me and tell me the date. In court, I get a fine and file an appeal with the regional court. The appeal is denied, and I apply to the ECHR. In about three years, the ECHR awards me compensation. The fine is paid after the appeal is denied. I can pay it myself or ask the FBK for help. FBK lawyers also help prepare the ECHR application. In short, on our side, it’s also a completely routine conveyor belt, where not only the deadlines but also the court results are known in advance. There is also an unpleasant moment. For six months, protests are contraindicated for me until the administrative charge expires. As you correctly noted, two administrative charges mean the loss of the right to own a weapon. So now I’m sitting still, suing the state, not stirring things up. Or I’ll have to transfer the gun to acquaintances if I want to continue my activism.

– Svetov has a stream going on literally right now. In it, like me, he says that Navalny overestimated his influence, and in this situation, no peaceful protest will yield results. It can only provide a picture for diplomatic pressure on the regime from the outside. A week ago, it seemed to me that there were chances that the protest would soon stop being peaceful. Now it seems that the chance is lost. What do you think?

– Everyone is forced to judge by the part of the picture they see directly. Then they compare data and get a more comprehensive understanding. I only had time to return, wash up, and have dinner; I haven’t even read the feed yet. In the section where I was today, the wall is strong; it can’t be broken by forehead. There are so many security forces that they will disperse protests of this scale and intensity without breaking a sweat. The damage to the economy from blocking the city center for three hours on a weekend is minimal. Moreover, we are the province; everyone understands that the decision about Navalny is made in Moscow, and we are just there for the crowd. When selfish interests are touched, as was the case during the protests over utility tariffs, people are angrier and more active. No one here will seriously stand up for Navalny. Just compare how they shouted “freedom for Navalny” today versus “freedom for Boyko.” Boyko is closer, more popular; they will shout louder for him. But he will be released in mid-February, so people will limit themselves to shouting and won’t get into a fight.

– So you think everything is useless?

– Street politics is a very necessary training in self-organization, in the self-awareness of civil society. In this sphere, we have already streamlined a lot. All I did during the detention was press the red button. Then invisible wheels started turning, and that’s it—LPR writes about the detention on Twitter, OVD-Info calls me, a lawyer arrives, a care package arrives, all further litigation is put on stream. People are learning to peacefully defend their interests through voluntary cooperation. These are the skills that are relevant under ancap. These examples make it easy to show how ancap works. With these people, we will eventually build it. Or not ancap, but panarchy. Because systemic communists have their own mutual aid network, left-wing anarchists have theirs, nationalists have theirs. We are already streamlining society with ECU. It’s just that the streamlining is happening against the backdrop of opposing a single external threat.

– These are all very long terms, but young people have a short planning horizon. Don’t you think people might simply burn out?

– It’s important to switch. I’m temporarily finishing with street activity now and will find myself another occupation. Maybe it will be helping those who will still be detained. Maybe I’ll go give lectures on Bitcoin. Rest is switching to other types of activity. Parties are good in that they are large organizations with several different directions of work; burnout happens much slower than if you, for example, only participate in open-ended protests or only volunteer at elections.

– Parties seem to me a way to unproductively spend a huge amount of time. In my own channel, I also have the most diverse activities and answer questions on a wide variety of topics. But once I switched to street protest, I became close to burnout because there is no immediate result. It’s not like writing a post, discussing the publication, and then writing a new one tomorrow.

– Imagine that you’re just going to a fitness center. You also give yourself a regular load and change imperceptibly. In the process, it may be boring or unpleasant, but you see people around you doing the same thing, which also helps to motivate yourself.

– In short, we’ll keep pumping the invisible butt of the market. Alright, thanks for the story, good night)))

Street processions. Recommendations.

Tomorrow, January 31, we take to the streets again. After January 23, we see a fairly clear tactic from the regime: to make coordination as difficult as possible and to knock out all organizers, as well as those who theoretically could be organizers, even if they aren’t currently exposed but were noticed in something similar in the past. In the locations where the protests are held, communication will be jammed, public transport movement will be restricted, sidewalks and roads will be blocked, and establishments will be closed.

Navalny’s headquarters continues to insist that the upcoming action be peaceful. That is, it is suggested not to kick the security forces in the stomach, even if their visors fog up.

How is it proposed to behave within the restrictions imposed on us by the enemy, and those imposed on us by our own command?

This is not the final decisive battle, but simply one of the episodes of a very long confrontation to come.
But tomorrow we must perform more vividly than a week ago.
Most likely, slightly more people will come out, but that is not of particular importance.
We need to demonstrate determination, but at the same time sustain minimal losses.
Therefore, the main emphasis is placed precisely on safety.
Anonymity. Unobtrusive clothing that hides identifying features; definitely wear masks, no badges or other accessories that make identification easier.
Come in groups. If you don’t have your own company, try to attach yourself to someone. You must not remain alone and unsupervised.
Do not stand in squares; move continuously as a dense mass, do not let yourselves be surrounded or split; if the cops try to break into the ranks—link arms.
During detention attempts, grab those being detained, surround the resulting scuffle, and demand that the cops leave without their prize.
Film only the cops on camera. Under no circumstances film your own. Demand that journalists only film wide shots, and only from behind. No interviews—tell them to fuck off. And use profanity specifically, so there is no temptation to broadcast it. The best thing you can do with a pro-government channel journalist is to secretly push them toward the cops and immediately vanish into the crowd.
Do not bring posters. Unless that poster is on plywood, and the plywood is on a sturdy stake. You never know, it might come in handy.
Regarding weapons. Use them only to prevent detention, and only when it is not being recorded by cameras. Stream and gel sprays are good. Aerosols are bad (your own people may suffer).
Banners are needed only for orientation, to understand where the head and tail of the column are. The banner-bearer should not walk on the edge—they are a primary target for detention. If the banner-bearer is detained anyway, take the flag from them, if they don’t think to throw it far into the crowd themselves. Let someone else carry the flag. It is stupid to take the flag with you into the police van.
Chants—keep them to a minimum; it is better to loudly greet friendly motorists who are honking. Chants can also be used to notify the rear ranks of important details of the situation. “Putin is a dick!” is a bad chant. “Cops on the right!” is a good one.
When the end point of the march is reached, you must immediately and very quickly disperse in different directions, but not individually, but in several columns, according to the number of possible directions of movement at the finish point. This is the most dangerous stage of the action; it would be a pity to complete the entire route only to end up in a police van at the very end.
If the cops are waiting at the finish point, do not go there at all—it is better to turn off beforehand and go far to the side, and only end the action at a safe distance from the enemy.

All these recommendations are for the regions. The two capitals have their own specifics, huge experience with such actions, plus a completely different scale; they will figure it out themselves.

As for banal things, like how to behave in the police department, I’ll leave that to the lawyers. First of all, try not to end up there.

Yes, this is all preparation for a past war. If tomorrow we are met not with batons but with water cannons, gas, and rubber bullets, little of these recommendations will be useful. If the situation proves to be that abnormal, you should simply get as far away from the action site as possible, because it will mean that next time you will need to bring completely different equipment.

It is better to repost this text from anonymous accounts.

*I’m not calling for this yet, although I really want to, of course*

Claims against Navalny

Supporters of political stability have many grievances against Alexei Navalny. If you ignore the anecdotal stuff, like “State Department agent” and “he would have stolen even more in their place,” and start asking in more detail, something curious emerges. If Navalny had overthrown Putin back in 2012, simply by preventing him from taking a third term, kicked both him and Medvedev out of the Kremlin, sat on the throne himself, befriended Europe, refrained from lending to Yanukovych, refrained from seizing Crimea, stopped inflating spending on the security forces and directed it toward social welfare instead—then in 2018, they would have voted for his second term and been champions of stability, asking “who, if not Navalny?” And they would have grumbled about gay parades in hushed tones, because there would be no reason to rock the boat.

In short, the main grievance “vatniks” have with Navalny is that he is weak and indecisive, and therefore unworthy of sitting on the tsarist throne. Instead of allowing himself to be beaten in the squares, he should have smashed the Kremlin with tanks; then he would be a respected man, not some lowlife. It is easy to see that this position is very close to the position of the well-known liberal extremist Arkady Babchenko, who still reminisces about the warm December of 2011 and expresses readiness to return to Russia only in an Abrams tank as part of a NATO peacekeeping contingent.

Alexei Navalny returned to Russia not at the head of a loyal guard, but on a shitty low-cost carrier; he was immediately punished for this stupidity, and rightly so. And if our leader is so dear to us, why the hell haven’t we freed him yet, and instead boast that on January 23rd the police seized a record number of people? Are we masochists? Is this why we went out? What do we actually plan to do to free Alexei? Where is the storming of Matrosskaya Tishina? Or do we think that they, the supporters of political stability, will defend Putin? No way! If Akela cannot protect himself, he has no business leading the pack.

That is the kind of interesting conversation I had recently, and I was unable to give my interlocutor satisfactory answers. Not only because I am not great at oral debates, but because essentially I have nothing to object with. Navalny and his team behave as if they haven’t even considered overthrowing the regime; Navalny seems perfectly content to spend another ten years playing Mandela and wait until Putin either dies on his own or becomes completely decrepit, hands over the throne, and his successor engages in national reconciliation by releasing Navalny and allowing him to run in the elections. Because even if they are looking at the Belarusian scenario, there was no need to return to Russia for that—hang out with Tikhanovskaya, meet with world leaders, push for sanctions, push for the freezing of the accounts of Putin’s cronies, rather than sitting in a cell. The cell is for Putin, not for you.

When Navalny and his associates try to explain why the hell Alexei rushed back to Russia, they bleat about moral duty. It is roughly like riding out on a white horse into machine-gun fire just to wave a papakha hat and send the army into a psychological attack because “the truth is on our side,” meaning we’ll overwhelm them by throwing hats at them.

So, I’ve suddenly found this touching unity with the supporters of the “strong hand.” As for tomorrow, I will try to post my thoughts on what I would like to see at the upcoming Sunday action.

*Us. Here. Power*!
Putin. Resign!
Give us. A Constituent. Assembly!

Has it really begun?

Today’s rallies dispelled my melancholy. Many people came out; the crowd was angry and cheerful. There were far more cops than in previous years. They worked without brutality, but with enough determination. People were learning how to link arms on the fly, trying to beat back their own. There were few posters and flags; they didn’t come out to show off, but to push with their mass.

Videos where cops are sprayed with pepper, pelted with snowballs, or simply punched in the face are particularly motivating. I cowardly took the spray out of my pocket before leaving, but next time I will definitely bring it. And perhaps I will even look for an occasion to use it. It feels that this time, if criminal cases are filed, they won’t be fabricated or based on plastic cups, but for real. And I have a strange feeling that such cases will likely fuel the people rather than intimidate them. Yes, of course, I am recording this now while the trail is hot and the adrenaline-fueled memories are fresh. But people are already mentally preparing to come out in a week, if not sooner, and their adrenaline-fueled memories are also fresh. So, an escalation on the part of the protesters is quite likely, and that is exactly what is needed for a chance of success.

Special thanks to that young man, who remains unknown to me, who prevented my detention by grabbing me and shouting, “Hands off, she’s my girlfriend!” And the cop, characteristically, took his hands off. That’s how the homstead works)))

This is Moscow, I think. Unfortunately, we didn’t have such inspiring footage.

I wanted to make an extremist post, but something didn’t work out

In 2017, Navalny released a film about Medvedev that unexpectedly took off and brought a huge number of new faces onto the streets. Back then, many expected that the most important film—about Putin—was about to be released. We had to wait almost four years, but now we have a double blow: one about Putin’s palace, which is very effective and capable of igniting a new audience, and one about the FSB poisoners, which had a serious effect even on long-time observers.

On January 23, like most of my Russian readers, I will go out into the street to demonstrate my disagreement with Navalny being held in prison. This is a simple warning that the boundary between the extremely undesirable and the completely unacceptable today lies somewhere around “imprisoning a public politician of international standing through lawlessness on a live broadcast.” The use of violence against people in uniform or state property is not endorsed. But there is also an emphasis on the unwillingness to coordinate the protest itself in any form with representatives of the regime.

For its part, the regime is predictably demonstrating that it does not recognize our right to such a demonstration and will most likely not listen. This manifests in preemptive arrests of everyone who is presumed not only to intend to go out but is also capable of participating in the coordination of protest actions. Those who are administratively dependent are being assigned various chores for Saturday on a mass scale, students are warned of expulsion, loyalists invent horror stories about police shooting to kill, and Roskomnadzor-chan is scrubbing communities from VKontakte and videos from TikTok—in general, the direction of work is more or less clear.

Effectively, we are now at a fork between the Ukrainian and Belarusian scenarios. And I would, of course, prefer the Ukrainian one, but the Belarusian one seems more likely to me. I don’t know what other cards Navalny’s team has in their hand, but I suspect that the strongest ones have already been played, and the Ukrainian scenario requires the ability to raise the stakes significantly. In short, I am going tomorrow with a heavy heart and without much hope, not even for victory, but for at least some improvement in the situation. If no unpleasant surprises occur, tomorrow I will try to reflect in another post on what it felt like. And so, a channel about theory turns into a chronicle of some petty squabbling…

The stylistics of 2021 differ noticeably from 2020: people look back at the rules less and less

As time goes on, I am more and more surprised that there are still people convinced that the state benefits citizens by creating norms, thereby increasing the predictability of life. But if there is anything one can be sure of, it is that the state constantly violates its own norms, and from time to time changes them to legalize these violations. The game can also be played in reverse: if people massively and consciously violate a norm, it will eventually be softened or abolished—but until then, it will ruin the lives of a vast number of people, and when the norm changes, they won’t even bother to offer a fleeting apology.

You are constantly constrained by absurd, impossible norms handed down from above, and you either tolerate it or fight it (the latter is called “engaging in politics”). If you fight, the norms constrain you even further. It doesn’t matter whether you are a cog in the state machine or a completely private individual: there will be absurd norms for everyone. Simply depending on your weight in the class hierarchy, you will have to exert different efforts to evade the execution of some inconvenient norm with impunity or to get it abolished.

Today, the most convenient way for the state to introduce arbitrary restrictions is, of course, covid. Any business can be closed, any offline activity banned, arbitrary expenses can be imposed on people, or passport control, detention centers, and courts can even be merged into one. Millions bear the costs of covid itself; billions bear the costs of covid-related bans. But the suffering of billions in no way helps to save millions; they simply suffer along for the ride.

You have read three paragraphs of whining, which means that the situation with Navalny has left me stunned. I need to at least outline an answer to the question “what to do.” Navalny claims that taking to the streets works best. And how does it work? You go out. You get beaten. You go out. You are fined. You go out. You are imprisoned. Everyone around discusses the failure of the protest. The country becomes a pariah, the economy crashes, and those who are beaten, fined, and imprisoned become poor even faster. This goes on for about twenty years, then a miracle happens, and the regime becomes loose enough to collapse. By this time, only the most inert and incompetent remain in the country, while the clever ones have long since settled abroad.

Of course, any oppositionist would prefer everything to be resolved more quickly. A peaceful rally suddenly turns unpeaceful, the National Guard is driven from the squares, the order to bring in tanks is sabotaged, and suddenly the Prime Minister announces that the President has passed away suddenly and invites the opposition to jointly form a government of national reconciliation. But for now, it is not customary to call for such a thing aloud: the level of bitterness is insufficient. For us, a refusal to authorize a rally is still considered a valid reason to cancel it.

If you count on changing the situation in the country through rallies, at least expand the circle of protesters. Is the person already a regular? Leave them alone, look for a newcomer. It is pleasant to see familiar faces in the crowd, but it is far more useful to see new ones. If authorization was denied due to covid, that is a reason to rally not only for that but also for the abolition of covid restrictions. But it is better, of course, to fundamentally not notify the authorities of the intention to take to the streets. Let them monitor social networks instead of hoping that everything will be told to them voluntarily.

And, of course, if you intend to become regulars at protest actions, you will have to get rid of real estate, cars, and bank accounts—everything that can be seized for refusing to pay a fine. Or do you intend to pay the fines? Really? Do you want to overthrow the regime or feed it? In a while, they will start trying to fire protesters on a mass scale. This is a reason to get ahead of the game by asking employers to fire you and hire you in the same position under the table.

You can do none of this, of course, and just quietly grumble and keep a low profile. Then the inertial scenario described in the paragraph about twenty years will work.

I make a poor politician; I have never known how to motivate people to perform heroic deeds…

*When the legal is illegal, it’s better to look to the shadows*

Forced Protest

The friendly channel Anarchy+ is publishing a multi-part longread about how the presence of a radical wing, ready for violent action, affects the course of protests. Five parts have been released so far, and more are coming. The series explores various subtleties, such as how the effects differ when the radical wing is friendly with the moderate one, and when there is no coordination between them—and so on. Two or three more episodes are expected, which will then be collected into a single post, but I preferred not to wait for the end because an interesting practical example has come along.

The most notable protest of last year was, of course, Belarus. In its aftermath, political scientists either gently lamented that a regime relying on a compact, loyal security core remains stable regardless of the dissatisfaction of the rest of the population—as confirmed by two examples, Venezuela and Belarus—or they expressed indignation toward the protesters, arguing that by taking off their slippers before standing on benches, they demonstrate their complete toothlessness to the regime’s dogs and give a carte blanche for repressions, the severity of which is directly proportional to the size of the demonstrations.

And then I am handed a link to an extremely curious channel, which is used to promote specifically violent actions in Belarus, and in an extremely harsh form. Read it carefully; it is quite young, so you can manage its entire content. In short: the channel intends to launch a full-scale guerrilla war against the regime. The tactics proposed make it clear: the authors of the channel, whoever they may be, know very well how courts work under ancap, and they also perfectly understand that very influence of a radical wing on the protest as a whole.

I have attempted to roughly formulate what these anonymous organizers of decentralized violent protest are guided by:

Today, the overwhelming majority of those dissatisfied with the regime are indeed not ready for an open armed rebellion, but many are extremely irritated by the complete lack of concessions from the regime in response to peaceful actions.
The lack of readiness for open rebellion in some is caused by a principled unwillingness to escalate violence, while in others, it is an unwillingness to bear serious costs.
A person is capable of developing habits and skills. Starting small, they get drawn in, and then can gradually train for serious violence.
Violence must not be heroized. Heroes take off their slippers before standing on benches. Terror is carried out by scum. And society has a demand for the appearance of these loathsome characters who will fight the regime out of the lowest motivations.
For a socialist country, the textbook lowest motivation is money. It is best if servants of the regime are killed by other servants of the regime for the sake of money. But any other lumpen will do.
How much to pay for which actions? Who will pay? Let the “market” decide that; the channel’s job is to describe the business model, which anyone wishing to do so can then adopt.

What can we extract from these materials?

Firstly, keeping in mind that Belarus is something of a testing ground for the Russian regime, one can assume that something similar may await us in the RF, so why not keep a closer eye on the underside of the protest as well, trying it on for size in advance.

Secondly, the channel provides a number of practical tips on anonymization that will also be useful for peaceful agorists.

Thirdly, we see vivid confirmation that market relations work perfectly even when fighting the state, which means the market will survive without the state. Not that this is exactly some discovery, but we’ll add this to the pile of evidence.

*Nothing special, just an open registry of targets*

What should Belarusians and Tsikhanouskaya do?

Bogdan Fokin

I’ll say right away that in this instance, I most want to play the Shulman: curl up in a hole and scream from there that I am not an expert, go to the experts. But let me just stipulate that I am not insisting on being right in this matter, and am merely expressing a modest opinion.

I am proceeding from a simple comparison of the tactics of the Ukrainian Maidan and the Armenian revolution. The Armenian tactic ensured victory at the cost of less bitterness between the parties, as a result of which the conflict quickly quieted down, and reforms are now proceeding without as many problems.

So, Tikhanovskaya’s headquarters should formulate the simplest possible decentralized tactic of wearing down the security forces through peaceful urban guerrilla warfare, with coordinated street closures in geographically dispersed districts, strong moral pressure on election commission employees—so that they publish materials showing falsifications—and strong moral pressure on the relatives of security personnel to force their helmet-wearing kin into unobtrusive sabotage, and so on.

After this tactic is announced, there is a high probability that the headquarters will be crushed and its leadership imprisoned in its entirety. But a decentralized tactic will allow things to proceed without a headquarters thereafter.

The diaspora worked well in Armenia. Belarusians have one too; it should be utilized. This means pressure on foreign leaders so that they do not recognize Lukashenko’s victory, but rather recognize Tikhanovskaya’s victory.

Unlike in Venezuela, high-ranking Belarusian security officials do not seem to be as heavily involved in business, but are simple government employees, so it will be easier to win them over to the side of the legitimate lady president.

Ancap-chan

I answer questions on ancap, libertarianism, economics, politics, ethics, law and occasionally on abstract topics.

Тег: protest