Тег: Zolotorev

What are the different variants of anarcho-capitalism? I only know about the Rothbardian and Friedmanite variants (I am not including Hoppe, as it is essentially a development of Rothbard’s ideas in one specific direction).

Dmitry

I don’t think there is a clear typology anywhere, but the question is interesting; let’s reason through it.

The Rothbardian version: it is derived from natural rights, and therefore presupposes a certain unified ethical-legal system described in “The Ethics of Liberty,” or derived in some other way on the same methodological basis (for example, Molliqneux expresses his views in this same vein in his Practical Anarchy). Consequently, questions arise regarding it: who will force everyone to be guided by a single legal system?

The Friedmanite version is based on the economic analysis of law, specifically on the basis of the Chicago School of Economics, which implies the possibility of engaging in interpersonal utility comparisons to a certain extent. Accordingly, in the Friedmanite version of anarcho-capitalism, different legal systems are traded on the market, capturing those segments where they prove to be the most efficient.

Nevertheless, both versions of social organization imply, as a kind of successor to the key state function of enforcing its own decisions, certain law enforcement agencies, as in the case of Friedman and the Tannahills, or strictly non-violent dispute resolution agencies, as with Molliqneux, which nevertheless possess truly totalitarian regulatory power—in short, some “larvae” of the state, about which one must somehow explain what reasons will prevent these larvae from growing into full-fledged states.

Following Vladimir Zolotorev, I adhere to a praxeological approach to the analysis of law and, quite independently of him, predict that in an anarchic society with developed market relations, the effect of the division of labor will push cumbersome monsters—those attempting to gather completely diverse functions, which are currently appropriated by the state, under one roof—out of the market. There are no grounds to believe that the services of detectives, forensic experts, or blockchain analysts must necessarily be provided by the same firms that offer security services, debt collection, resolve economic disputes, maintain cadasters, insure life and property, or issue certificates stating that a person knows how to drive a car or, for instance, shoot a pistol.

The practice of living in the libertarian community of MonteLibero further strengthens me in my originally purely theoretical views that people do not need detailed, written-out legal institutions all that much. On the contrary, in an anarchic society, people tend to resolve conflicts on the spot, forming situational coalitions if necessary. The need for complex specialized services in the field of legal protection arises quite rarely; therefore, in a free market, this need will likely be met by relatively small companies that nevertheless have a wide geographical reach—otherwise, a sufficient client base cannot be gathered.

Returning to the question, we see that different descriptions of ancap mainly boil down to how conflicts will be resolved in such a society—because regarding issues such as the functioning of a free market, libertarian theorists have no particular disagreements. Accordingly, if some previously undeveloped idea occurs to you about how law could otherwise function—congratulations, you will add another version of ancap to the collection of existing ones.

Legal systems that differ greatly from ours. I am taking over the translation relay and presenting the chapter on Ancient Athens.

I hope you didn’t miss me too much while the channel was on pause for a while — I have been very busy.

More than a year ago, as part of his Liberty Education Project, Vladimir Zolotorev began posting a translation of David Friedman’s 2019 book Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own — an extremely detailed answer to the question of how courts could operate not only under ancap, but in any conceivable conditions. For my part, I posted the original and published the translated chapters on my page. In November 2020, however, the translation stalled after the publication of four chapters.

And recently, Dima Kovalenko, who translated those four chapters, contacted me and suggested that I continue the work in his place. I gladly agreed. To get started, I took a relatively short chapter on the legal system of my favorite Athens during the time of classical democracy, and now I am happy to present to you the translation of this chapter. I have also formatted all five chapters into an epub and posted it on my page as well. Footnotes for the four old chapters are currently missing — apparently, they were not translated. I will add them in time. Please test whether the book reads normally for you — I tried formatting it in the newer epub3 format, but if it turns out that it is not sufficiently supported by your e-readers, then there is no point in overcomplicating things and it would be better to return to epub2; the book does not contain complex layout for which the new format would be absolutely necessary.

I would also be glad if someone would take on creating a cover for the book — for now, I am using the original English one, but the final edition will clearly require something else.

An intriguing find

I accidentally stumbled upon a collection of videos featuring Vladimir Zolotorev on YouTube. It is some sort of tiny channel called Libertarian Site, but since 2019, a fairly large number of videos have been posted there, presumably quite useful ones, though so far I have only watched Vladimir’s most recent lecture, where he discusses the nature of the state and other related matters—not very structured, but fascinating. I suspect that other videos with him are constructed in a similar vein, so their main value, it seems to me, is the demonstration of exactly how a person’s thinking style changes when they begin to share a libertarian worldview. A worldview is a contagious thing, so even without being presented systematically, it will still influence you. Watch and be indoctrinated)

As for my book, which is currently being written, I would still like to save the reader’s time and provide an understanding of libertarianism as briefly and consistently as possible. Maybe it will work…

David Friedman. Legal Systems Strongly Differing from Ours. The Amish.

After a long break, Vladimir Zolotorev has published another chapter of the translation of David Friedman’s book Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own. In total, four chapters have been translated out of order as of today. Today’s is dedicated to the legal system of the Amish, who are beloved by Mikhail Svetov.

From the text, it is evident that these downshifters are sympathetic not only to many Americans, but also to Friedman himself. I wonder if they are currently facing problems because of their support for Trump…

The English original was posted on my website around the end of August. The same fate awaits the translation as it is published on mises.in.ua. Usually, corrections of minor flaws are made to the translation, but overall there is not much difference whether to read it on my site or Vladimir’s.

Can you fix what wasn’t broken?

I read Vladimir Zolotorev’s book Can something that wasn’t broken be fixed? In it, Vladimir develops his cycle of previously published articles on the nature of the state, shows that it works perfectly in its normal mode, performing exactly what it was created for, and reflects on realistic options for its reduction or abolition.

In effect, he has created something like Rothbard’s For a New Liberty, but using a different conceptual apparatus: Rothbard analyzed the state primarily from legal positions, while Zolotorev does so from the perspective of praxeology, spontaneous orders, and social evolution.

A fairly large section of the book is devoted to explaining how society works (one might not even need to add the adjective “stateless” to it, because that is its natural state; rather, for the current state of affairs, it would be more appropriate to speak of “society with a state”).

The last part of the book presents considerations on the abolition of the state. The key to this is to stop viewing the state as an organization. From this, it becomes clear why political methods of fighting the state do not yield results under normal conditions; rather, they strengthen it, making it more efficient. Ridance of the state in its modern form lies more in the sphere of losing social consent for legalized robbery. At this moment, power is lost, and the state disappears de facto.

Next, a small window of opportunity opens for political methods that allow for the reformatting of the political process itself. This can be done in two directions.

First, the subject of political bargaining can be shifted from budget expenditures to budget collections, that is, turning taxes into fees. Alexander Rozov writes extensively about this in a colorful fictional form in his Meganesian cycle.

Second, the state can be turned into a joint-stock company, not in a figurative, but in a literal sense. Subsequently, the management of this newly formed JSC will optimize the company’s structure within a market paradigm and will join the ranks of all other existing corporations in the world.

All the material and specific recipes are given using the example of Ukraine, so the book should not be perceived as a completely literal manual for action in Russian realities, but it is still more relevant material than recipes based on American material.

Zolotorev’s work was released as part of a collection of works by three different authors. I am posting it in full, but if someone extracts only Zolotorev’s part from the general PDF and translates it, for example, into epub, I would be very grateful, as it would be more convenient to read.

Mechanics of Freedom, Chapter 63

Another, very tiny, chapter of Mechanics of Freedom is being published, The Conservative Error. In it, Friedman lumps together immigration, global warming, fracking, GMOs, and various other same-sex marriages, asserting that the rejection of human development in these respective directions is rooted in one simple cognitive bias. Moreover, this bias is characteristic of both those who call themselves conservatives and those who call themselves liberals (referring to the US coordinate system, of course). The bias consists of the assumption that one can stop a beautiful moment. No, you cannot.

The translation of Mechanics of Freedom is nearing completion. Parallel to this, I have finished organizing by chapters and posted on my website the English text of Friedman’s 2019 book about legal systems that are very different from ours. Vladimir Zolotorev has so far released translations of three chapters, all of which are duplicated on my site, and I intend to continue in the same vein. If you want to encourage the translation, send donations to Vladimir. But if he gets stuck for long, I will take the initiative.

For the attention of connoisseurs of David Friedman

As I promised, I am moving over the two chapters of David Friedman’s new book, Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own, which have already been translated under the editorship of Vladimir Zolotorev. At the same time, I am gradually typesetting the English original by chapters; I will complete this meditative process in a while.

The section on my site where the translation will be posted

Already translated chapters:

https://ancapchan.info/friedman2019/russian/f2019-7/
https://ancapchan.info/friedman2019/russian/f2019-8/

Fall of the Black Hawk

Yesterday, after I finished editing the article on the inefficiency of violence, I sat down to watch the movie “Black Hawk Down,” which I came across while following links related to the article. The film focuses on the episode mentioned in the article: how the US was forced to leave Somalia after the failure of what they considered a peacekeeping operation—losing nearly two dozen special forces operators in a single day and killing around a thousand locals in a dense urban environment, without much regard for who was a combatant and who was not.

In 2001, when Black Hawk Down was released, I was more interested in things like The Lord of the Rings or Harry Potter, which came out around the same time, but I’m glad I finally got to it; the movie is excellent. However, I want to talk not about the plot in general or the visual quality, but about literally two moments that were key for me personally, and to which all other narrative serves, in my view, merely as illustration.

The first moment is around the eighteenth minute. The Rangers are discussing a fact from a thin brochure they were given titled “All About Somalia”: if one local kills another, his clan must pay the clan of the deceased a hundred camels. To this, one of the soldiers notes that he couldn’t even afford one camel, and the locals must all be in debt now. And now, let’s listen to a lecture by Vladimir Zolotorev:

I am providing a link exactly to the moment where he explains how the civil war in Somalia was effectively stopped by a court decision: the combatants were quieted by their own clans because the relatives of the killers were tired of paying giant sums for other people’s debts.

Thus, the film brilliantly shows how expensive and pointlessly cruel the UN intervention was, and how little importance the self-proclaimed peacekeepers attached to the mechanism that actually stopped the war.

The second important moment is closer to the end of the movie, around 1:45. A Somali man is talking to a captured American pilot and explains: you took our hostages, we took you. The pilot replies: my government will not negotiate. OK, the Somali replies, then let’s negotiate between you and me, soldier to soldier. To this, the American replies that he has no decision-making power. The Somali huffs in response: you, apparently, are granted the right to kill, but not to negotiate, while for us, war is just another form of negotiation. Therefore, you have nothing to gain here.

Many thanks to Ridley Scott, who didn’t film a propaganda piece, but truly managed to show the difference between a dull and meaningless state military machine and an anarchic society. I especially recommend the film to those who repeatedly ask the same questions about how “Ancapistan” would defend itself from a state invasion.

Of course, Somalia is not Ancapistan—things are doing well with anarchy there, but significantly worse with capitalism, especially at the time shown in the movie. Nevertheless, even a pre-capitalist stateless society managed to teach a good lesson to the strongest superpower on the planet. States risk a lot when they try to impose their rules on anarchic orders, and if these orders are backed by a truly strong economy, then the outcome of a direct military confrontation between a state and Ancapistan can be considered predetermined.

The best scene in the movie

Discussion on the stationary bandit and the doctrine of deterrence

I commented on Bitark’s column about promoting libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit to the effect that this is largely knocking on an open door: the bandit nature of the state is quickly recognized by any interlocutor, and from there, discussions begin about the lesser of two evils. In particular, in Russia, there is a popular theme of appealing to the experience of the nineties of the last century, when there was a dominance of nomadic bandits.

In response, Bitark suggests in his VKontakte public page turning to Hirshleifer’s 1995 research, which Professor Ausan referenced in his lecture “The Evolution of the Stationary Bandit”

All three conditions for the stability of anarchy according to Hirshleifer were not met in Russia in the nineties, meaning there was no libertarianism in the nineties.

To this, I am forced to state that Bitark is again knocking on an open door, and there is no question that there was libertarianism in the nineties, unless, of course, you are arguing with a troll. The point is that to promote libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit, one needs to present arguments on how to prevent the dominance of nomadic bandits after abolishing the stationary one.

Also interesting is the criticism from Vladimir Zolotorev, who quite rightly points out that a stationary bandit is more dangerous than a nomadic one, because he is capable of inflicting far greater damage on society, and at the same time ensures that society is left with no strength to fight any bandits whatsoever. He does not write it explicitly, but it follows from this premise that returning to the era of nomadic bandits is an acceptable price for society to pay for the destruction of the stationary bandit, although, ideally, the choice should be not between stationary and nomadic bandits, but between the presence of a bandit and their absence.

So, we seem to have agreed: the bandit is not needed, let’s get rid of him, we need to ensure a balance of violence potential in society, and we will have stable anarchy. But then, from a reader with the nickname Holon Synergetic, came criticism of the proposed mechanisms of the deterrence doctrine (the text arrived via private channels, and I am publishing it on Telegraph, which serves as a neutral platform).

The text is very long and difficult to perceive, so I will provide a brief explication:

1. As follows from Mazarra’s article on the deterrence doctrine, the translation of which I recently posted, the perception factor is very important for successful deterrence. The opponent must understand that when a potential victim shouts, “I’ll pull your eye over your ass if you take one more step,” the victim is actually ready to carry out their threats because they are backed into a corner and have no way out other than to unleash their arsenals for pulling eyes over asses. At the same time, the potential aggressor must by no means be put in an equally desperate position where they have no choice but to risk an eye and take a step forward. However, the more successfully such a doctrine is implemented, the more often threats will be a bluff—simply for reasons of economy.
2. The state also implements a deterrence doctrine regarding members of society who wish to destroy it. One of the most reliable ways for it is to take society hostage. Every member of society must understand that any threats or, God forbid, real actions against state representatives will only make things worse for a conditional city like Voronezh. Thus, the state invented the concept of extremism, and now extremists are to blame for any tightening of the screws; all these security measures are undertaken precisely to protect society from them. Rare successful actions against the state only confirm that extremism is not a fiction and state security measures are justified.
3. Attempts to propose increasingly technological weapons for fighting state representatives, such as micro-drones and the uberization of violence, will lead to the state starting to protect citizens from micro-drones and uber-violence with great pleasure, and for this, completely totalitarian methods of control over all aspects of life will be required. In the limit, this arms race leads to a situation where doomsday weapons become available to everyone, and then it’s just coffin, coffin, cemetery, game over.
4. As a dessert, there is a historical excursion into medieval Saxony, where something very close to my described concept of uber-retribution was successfully practiced. Nevertheless, the system did not survive its time, like all other medieval elements of panarchy, and gave way to the state monopoly on judgment and punishment. The author suggests thinking about whether such an outcome was inevitable.

The main conclusion I would draw from this tangle of arguments is the following consideration. No single doctrine is a panacea. The state is in the minds. This means that although in some cases the problem of the state can be successfully simplified by cutting off particularly obstructive heads or the threat of such decapitation, the decisive importance still lies with the means of indoctrination in freedom. These, in turn, must be selected individually.

Shock content!

Well-known Ukrainian ancap Vladimir Zolotorev gave a lecture in which he supported a minarchist program of state transformations, including nationalization. This is something to see!

In general, I am glad that people, having quickly decided on the question of “Who is to blame,” are focusing on the question of “What is to be done,” while remaining within the framework of more or less realistic ideas about the capabilities of society and social organizations.