Тег: Crisis

Telegram as an indicator

Sperry UNIVAC

Итак, российские власти наконец-то решились заблокировать святое – Telegram, на котором стоит не только большая часть русскоязычного комьюнити, но на него также завязаны и практически все процессы в самой стране – от пересылки депутатами мемов друг другу во время заседания, до координации действий подразделений на фронте. Естественно, это вызвало пожар, подобный Чикагскому и все наперебой (и слева и справа) умоляют товарища Сталина РКН отменить это дикое решение.

Однако, важно здесь немного иное. Блокировка Telegram – лишь следствие, а не причина. И нет, дело вовсе не в цензуре ради цензуры — например, российская цифровая инфраструктура совершенно не готова к массовому использованию населением «национального мессенджера» по причине банального отсутствия серверов, которые, кстати, Москва безуспешно пыталась арендовать в странах Центральной Азии и Китае.

Причина лежит в другой плоскости: Российская Федерация находится на пороге кризиса, причем кризиса открытого, и он, очевидно, должен открыто проявить себя в текущем году. Экономические санкции, силовое давление на инфраструктуру экспорта, отсутствие устойчивых союзнических отношений (что также связано с экономикой) уже прямо демонстрируют своё влияние на функционирование государства. Российские же экономические отчеты показывают нехватку бюджетных средств, урезание экспортных доходов, растущую инфляцию и все прочие издержки «мобилизационной трансформации».

До определенной поры Москва умело маскировала нарастающий ком проблем в глазах населения. Полагаю, что скором времени подобная политика уже не будет оправдывать себя в полной мере – и потому требуется превентивная, ещё более жесткая зачистка информационного пространства. Никаких даже условно «независимых» (не секрет, что фактически все российские каналы более 100 тыс. читателей финансируются и де-факто принадлежат тому или иному ведомству и подконтрольны чиновникам куда в большей степени, чем могло бы казаться) информационных ресурсов и средств коммуникации, доступных широким массам, существовать не должно.

Секретом Полишенеля является и то, что инициатором закручивания всех гаек являются чекисты (просто по принципу – торчит гайка? крутим!), даже если это не только не оправдано логически, но и катастрофично экономически и социально. КГБ – сама по себе организация не из приятных, но когда КГБ радостно бежит в сторону КСИР – это заставляет задуматься о том, что же их так подгоняет.

И, на мой субъективный взгляд, в действительности населению РФ нужно больше размышлять именно над этой непростой темой, а не сокрушаться и сетовать на следствия в виде ужесточающейся цензуры. Правильные вопросы находятся в области первопричин этой цензуры, а не её природы – и ответы на них куда более злободневны и оттого чудовищно неприятны для многих.

RKN is rolling out a fresh update for Telegram

Corporate Psychopathy – the Cause of the Global Economic Crisis

There is a theory developed by researcher Clive Boddy, according to which psychopaths working in corporations, particularly financial ones, played a significant role in the emergence of the 2008 global economic crisis. As is well known, not all managers are inclined to work for the benefit of the company that hired them. Some of them are dysfunctional leaders who literally destroy the company with their actions. One important type of such leaders are psychopathic personalities, which we will now discuss in more detail.

As we know, psychopaths in literature are defined as personalities who have problems manifesting empathy and sympathy toward other people, behave coldly and ruthlessly toward them, lack a conscience, and feel no guilt for causing harm to anyone. In turn, corporate psychopaths are individuals with similar characteristics who engage in organizational activities. They usually present themselves as pleasant, attractive, and successful individuals, but in reality, they merely manipulate everyone around them, usually to their detriment, to achieve purely personal goals.

Such individuals often receive rapid promotions and become leaders due to their charm and confidence, while they are prone to ignoring the needs of others, deceiving them, or even engaging in bullying. Furthermore, there is evidence that in some companies, including international financial corporations, psychopaths were even specifically selected for leadership positions due to the belief that such personalities are best suited for such work.

Usually, such individuals brought short-term success to companies through mass cost-cutting and employee layoffs. However, they were in no way concerned about the potential long-term harm of the strategies they chose, and in general pursued exclusively their own benefits, discarding their obligations and responsibility, striving to obtain as many personal “bonuses” as possible while everyone else was in the midst of financial litigation. From the actions of such “effective managers,” one can well expect that they will ultimately receive a large check for their efforts to “save” the company, after which it will simply go bankrupt.

Now imagine what would happen if, due to certain global changes in the corporate environment—such as increasingly frequent company mergers, the tendency of employees to change jobs more often and move to companies previously completely unknown to them, changes in the technological environment and others, which became common practice on the eve of the global crisis—psychopathic personalities received far more opportunities to occupy high positions, using not their actual work skills, but manipulation and political skills? In such a situation of growing corporate psychopathy, a corporate and social catastrophe can be expected, which is precisely what authors studying this problem warned about in their materials as early as 2005.

Such a problem has still not been given proper attention, which puts the very future of capitalism at risk. Of course, this problem is far from the only one in economic matters, but it deserves more detailed study and the application of appropriate measures.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The 2008 Crisis: Now a Direct Answer to Yesterday’s Question

Yesterday, responding to a question about the libertarian interpretation of the 2008 crisis, I used the question more as an opportunity to talk about my own topic. This left some commenters bewildered, especially given that the corresponding disclaimer did not fit within the limits of the Telegram post and is only found in the full version of the post on the website.

Fortunately, in the Facebook comments, Valery Kizilov provided a link to his own article from 2008, written in the immediate aftermath of that crisis, where he explains the Austrian theory of the business cycle very clearly and concisely. He also recommends a book for a more extensive study of the topic, where everything is explained in much more detail: Jeffrey Friedman, Vladimir Kraus. Man-Made Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. M., IRISEN, 2012.

I haven’t found a detailed libertarian analysis of the origin of the 2008 crisis. The answer that state regulation is to blame for everything is clear, but insufficient.

Anonymous question

I will use this question to reflect on something abstract.

Humans have a natural abyss of empathy. Not surprisingly, since we are social animals. Thus, a person usually enjoys doing what they consider to be good, especially if others also agree that it is good. But it is usually sporadic acts of kindness that are pleasant. Out of generosity, a person performs a one-time good deed and departs, pleased with themselves—after all, it is wonderful when it costs you absolutely nothing to make someone else feel good. If the recipient expresses gratitude, it may increase their chances of receiving another good deed in the future, but one should not rely on this too heavily. Once good deeds become a routine, they begin to be perceived as work. And for work, one wants payment.

So, we pulled a person out of a destitute anarcho-commune and were quite satisfied with how wonderfully we organized the expedition. But then it turned out that the person is completely lacking in independence, very capricious, doesn’t know how to work, and dreams only of living on a generous social benefit. We fell into a trap, because we have no desire to continue carrying this burden, yet we can’t exactly throw them out onto the street. They live like a pet, yearning and whining. It’s unpleasant.

Now let’s imagine that we have a large external source of funding for charity. In this case, of course, it would be no problem for us to rent an apartment for the person that satisfies their demanding tastes, give them an undemanding job that they can actually perform—and if they can’t, who cares—or simply provide them with an annuity, and let them live for their own pleasure; why not? And why should we personally bother? We’ll hire a separate social worker to sit on a salary and wipe their nose, while we will only rejoice in how kind we are and how much benefit we have brought. It’s pleasant.

That is how the social state works: you take money from the budget and do good at someone else’s expense, because you are a kind person. And taxpayers are kind people, so why would they refuse to pay social taxes, since they go toward good deeds! And if taxpayers’ money is not enough for all our ambitious social programs, it’s no problem—we can issue government debt bonds, or simply print new money; this is far more humane toward taxpayers than taking more from them than they are used to paying.

Kind government men desperately wanted even a poor person to be able to afford a good home. Therefore, special organizations were created to finance these expenses. And banks were ordered to generously issue mortgage loans to poor people so they could afford a house. The trouble with the social state, however, is that someone else’s money eventually runs out.

How did it happen that the mortgage crisis turned into a global financial one? What can you do, humans are social animals. Papers that were considered ultra-reliable turned out to be junk, and everyone collectively began to look suspiciously at their own portfolios of securities, wondering if it was time to dump the junk before others did it first. The global financial market deflated significantly, meaning those who lost their capital outnumbered those who profited from the crisis.

But who is even interested in that ancient crisis when we are living in the heat of a new one? And this one, too, was caused by kind people who terribly did not want miserable people to die right on the streets from the terrible coronavirus. People were put under house arrest, forcibly stuffed with experimental medicines, had tests shoved in every orifice, streets were sprayed with chemicals, beautiful fluffy minks were destroyed—what wouldn’t one do out of love for humanity at someone else’s expense!

This does not mean that covid does not exist. Poverty also exists. And homeless people exist. But when you try to solve other people’s problems by paying for it out of your own pocket rather than someone else’s, you will have much more balanced priorities regarding how much to spend and on what exactly. And that means that your kindness, at least, will not cause global crises.

The possibility of transitioning from a failed state to ancap

There is a fragile states index that takes into account many factors, including the state’s provision of public services, the stability of power, and other elements. Is it reasonable to assume that states with a high rating (coincidentally or not, it is easiest in these states to evade taxes, own weapons, and host information without a “censor”) will develop (or degrade) in the foreseeable future into full or nearly full “ancapistans,” after which an era of prosperity will begin?

Katsist

I have already written on a similar topic regarding the possibility of building an ancap state in fourth-world countries. In short: the pros and cons are listed, and some may believe the former outweigh the latter, while others believe the opposite. It is worth trying.

The same applies to forecasts regarding the developmental prospects of one ineffective state or another into an ancapistan. An anarchic regime—that is, the decentralization of law—is established there relatively easily. But it is far more difficult to understand how to preserve or, worse yet, grow capitalism from scratch in an anarchic society that either denies private property (the dream of the an-coms) or is based on clan interests and collective responsibility (the example of Somalia or Libya).

Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how to eliminate the influence factor of surrounding states. These are surprisingly jealous entities that are willing to deal only with other states, demand that their neighbors be as similar to themselves as possible, and if someone dares to start getting by without a state, they inevitably send their peacekeepers. However, the global trend is clearly changing now, and after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it seems that violent attempts to reformat other societies in their own image will gradually go out of fashion.

It seems to me that if we are to talk about the prospects of transitioning to an ancap regime for certain states, the prospects for countries with parliamentary democracies look slightly more realistic—where, for example, a political layout has emerged that precludes the possibility of forming a government coalition, and if one can be assembled, it must be done by yoking together parties of swans, crayfish, and pikes in one wagon, as a result of which their ability for effective lawmaking and even budget adoption becomes blocked.

And so: unable to pay civil servants because the budget has not been passed, the government sends most officials home. People live almost entirely without government services, but they retain civilized traditions of respect for private property and the market; after some time, they begin to spontaneously use market substitutes for former government services, and at some point realize that they actually like it. The idea that we should fundamentally stop trying to choose a single government for everyone and each individual begins to find understanding among the people.

It is from such state incapacity that something might actually grow. To neighbors, it is still the same state, just experiencing a temporary parliamentary crisis, but that’s fine—someday the politicians will agree, and we will continue to settle matters with them. This is what politicians from surrounding countries think, so they don’t force their recipes for state organization on them. How many years it will take for a temporary crisis to finally solidify into a stable status quo—I cannot say.

In short, it seems to me that to build an ancap society, it is far more important to have a mature, rational society rather than a gathering of supporters of simple and effective solutions that are just as bandit-like as those of the state.

Nothing special, pay no attention, just a small crisis, it will definitely pass, like May thunderstorms, so to speak

Could you criticize Stasik Ay Kak Prosto in this video?

https://youtu.be/ymVOQpFkQSY

The video contains several assertions.

  1. From the perspective of world-systems theory, civilization constantly goes through the same cycles: a new center of global business activity rises, money flows to money, a huge bubble inflates, and soon any production at the center of the bubble becomes unprofitable, and money begins to be made directly from money, through the turnover of various securities. Eventually, the bubble bursts, and soon a new one begins to inflate around a new center. The US will burst as the global hegemon, and China will take the stage.
  2. Any attempts to imitate the global hegemon can no longer be successful: it is pointless to try to increase one’s investment attractiveness, open markets, reduce tariffs, and build institutions—it is impossible to break out of the status of the periphery during the inflation stage of a financial bubble.
  3. Cryptocurrencies have become exactly the same overvalued financial asset, and when the bubble bursts, they will similarly lose the lion’s share of their value.
  4. The shortage of graphics cards caused by increased demand from miners cannot be covered by expanding production because the era of globalization is ending, trade wars are beginning, and the local Chinese market does not need that many graphics cards; fear, honest gamers, you will be stuck with five-year-old junk.

I will answer briefly by points.

  1. As strange as it may sound, stocks are not just numbers in brokerage accounts. These are investments that go to the companies that issued the shares, and they, in turn, by no means spend everything on management bonuses and buybacks—some is indeed invested in production, specifically in the periphery, where it is cheaper. At this moment, it is important for peripheral countries to be attractive for these very investments.
  2. If it is pointless to imitate the hegemon, then how will a new hegemon emerge? If world-systems theory reflects real processes adequately enough, then someone must launch a new cycle with themselves at the center. This means there is a mechanism for leaving the periphery. And it is logical to assume that for this purpose, one really should not simply imitate the hegemon. One should not imitate the hegemon in its current dying state, but rather look back to the time when it was young and healthy—while, of course, adapting to current technological realities.
  3. What does a burst bubble mean? Many companies suddenly lose value and find themselves unable to find a buyer for their goods. Demand is mainly for consumer goods, which become more expensive relative to capital goods. The proud owner of crypto, who previously invested in mining, begins to invest in potatoes, selling first the miners (and they become cheaper), and then the crypto itself (its price also falls). The market becomes saturated with cheap used graphics cards, demand for new ones decreases, it becomes unprofitable to invest in their production, and no trade wars are even needed—gamers are stuck with five-year-old junk. I will only note that miners and crypto will get cheaper relative to conventional potatoes during the deflation stage of the bubble, but relative to a conventional dollar—that is far from certain; it might enter a tailspin of hyperinflation.
  4. Will globalization end as a result? For adherents of world-systems theory, it is somewhat strange to discuss this. Where will a new global hegemon come from if there is no globalization? Without it, hegemons will be local. So, since everything goes in circles for you, global trade turnover will not disappear anywhere.

I am not attempting to judge here how correct the theory itself is. The theory is relatively young, more or less explains the observed facts, and makes verifiable predictions. As it becomes clear which predictions turned out to be false, they will either be patched, or this line of thought will be considered a dead end, and a theory based on completely different premises will be used—why not.

Strategies in a crisis

Vladimir Milov has started a “on quarantine” section in his video blog and has released two videos in it so far. In the first, he gives a rough outline for employees, and in the second, he offers some tips for small businesses. It is better, of course, to watch them in full, but I will point out the moments that I consider important.

  1. This is for the long haul. If you are already suffering losses right now, you should not expect to simply wait out the absolute clusterfuck; you need to work on reducing them immediately.
  2. The state will not help. You should demand as much as possible from it and as loudly as possible, but you should not seriously base your plans on state support.
  3. Being assholes is unprofitable. The state has not declared force majeure, it does not compensate for losses, and it does not curb its appetites. If we start eating each other now, it is a path to nowhere. It is important to reach amicable agreements among yourselves, since this has hit everyone. As for the assholes, they can be shown the full power of the institution of reputation.

I will stop separately at the third point. Milov advises adjusting your consumption model so as to buy only from those who meet ethical criteria: feeding doctors free lunches, caring for animals, paying employees’ salaries instead of sending them on unpaid leave – and so on.

Indeed, the role of every consumer has significantly increased now, and it largely depends on them which business survives and which does not. But I would recommend adding one more, and very important, selection criterion to all the others: how much this business kicks back to the state. Feeding the state with one’s taxes has always been a burdensome moral compromise, but now it is becoming almost a crime. Previously, one could work under the table and be indifferent to the fact that the state takes VAT from your purchases. Now it is important. In conditions of people’s impoverishment, the growing tax collections of the Russian government are a demonstration of sheer madness on the part of the citizens.

Therefore, when choosing whom to buy, say, food from, orient yourself primarily on this. Pickles or potatoes at the bazaar are an excellent placement of money. Buying from a farm kiosk is great, but it’s even better if it’s from a car and without a cash register. Buying at a local store – only if it is not a chain and is on a simplified tax system (the absence of VAT can be seen on the receipt).

The best moral choice for any small business today is to go underground. Closing officially and continuing to serve clients by personal agreement is a measure that will allow not only to plug the hole through which your money leaks to the state, but also to accelerate the development of horizontal ties. It is time to expand contact lists, acquire personal plumbers, hairdressers, doctors – and clients, of course.

In order to refuse service to the security forces, the atmosphere in society has not yet heated up enough, but it already makes sense to have soul-saving conversations with them. Like, you are state employees, you’ll survive on your salary, it’s harder for the private sector. So don’t get in the way, don’t interfere with work – don’t tempt fate.

The next stage of rejecting the regime after going underground is usually sabotage, diversion, and guerrilla warfare: destroying surveillance cameras, smashing FNS offices, setting fire to police cars and other cute trifles, but one should not bother with nonsense. If it is possible to achieve total non-compliance with state orders without violent excesses – then all the better for all of us.

And when Putin leaves, and some Navalny takes his place, then it is important to immediately put him before the fact: things will not be as they were. An efficient state is a cheap state. The cheaper it is for the citizens, the more grounds it has to expect that its polite requests will be fulfilled. As for any demands from the state in the beautiful Russia of the future, citizens should have a simple and quick answer: fuck off – that way. And point in the direction where today’s dictator was sent.

What do you think about the recent drops in bitcoin and gold? The most interesting thing is that right now all investors are rushing to buy US government bonds as the most reliable in the world in the event of a crisis. How do you comment on this?

Sea King

Bitcoin is a digital asset designed to perform the function of money, and it indeed possesses a number of properties inherent to good hard money. It is not surprising that among those who actively use Bitcoin, there has been a supposition that it is an excellent safe-haven asset, and that in the event of a financial crisis, money would flow specifically into it. As for gold, it is a safe-haven asset with a centuries-old history, and the fact that it would rise during a crisis was not subject to any doubt whatsoever.

Nevertheless, let us recall how gold behaved during the previous crisis. From March to November 2008, while the mortgage crisis was gradually turning into a financial one, the price of gold fell: everyone needed dollars specifically to plug the holes. And only when central banks began to compete in who could lower interest rates faster and buy up more junk papers did the resulting excess of dollars lead to a two-year rally in the gold market, during which its price reached an all-time high.

Gold in the last crisis: first down, then up

Currently, we are at the very beginning of the crisis. Just like last time, everyone is first running to the dollar. But, unlike in 2008, when quantitative easing was far from immediate, there was no delay in pumping the economy with fiat this time. On the other hand, it must be noted that immediately before the start of the crisis, the price of gold was close to all-time highs, as central banks had been actively buying it for several preceding years. It is possible that a number of countries will now feel the need to sell part of their reserves, and this will put pressure on the price. Thus, on one hand, many new dollars suitable for buying gold will appear in the market, and on the other, there will be a lot of gold sold from reserves. It is impossible to predict with certainty which of these opposing factors will be more significant over a horizon of up to a year. Further on, of course, the factor of the growth of the dollar mass will outweigh it, and gold will begin a new rally.

Today, Bitcoin is gold for geeks. Institutional investors have not yet had a chance to properly enter, and by their standards, the liquidity of this asset is completely negligible: the daily trading volume of Bitcoin is some measly thirty billion dollars, which is essentially nothing by the standards of stock and currency exchanges. Therefore, even a very modest sell-off of Bitcoin is capable of seriously dropping its price. But conversely, even very modest investments from the “big players” are capable of seriously heating it up.

In addition to the fact that the global economy will soon be flooded with dollars and other fiat, the reduction in supply will inevitably influence the price of Bitcoin: there are less than two months left until the halving. Therefore, if you have free fiat, now is a great time to enter Bitcoin. If there is an opportunity to take a fiat loan for about three years, investing that money in Bitcoin could also prove to be an excellent decision. Of course, one should not take microloans for this purpose.

In conclusion, I will comment on why buying US government debt may be more attractive than buying dollars. Purchased dollars sit in a bank, and a bank is an unreliable thing during a crisis. Bonds, however, are registered directly to the investor, and therefore the risk of their loss is incomparably lower. The liquidity of US government bonds is quite comparable to the liquidity of the dollar. So, there will be people willing to hold them even at a negative interest rate, although this seems counterintuitive.

Big Changes

Sorry, I’m focusing on current events again, which is actually not very characteristic of my channel about theory.

The year has been quite rich in events. So much so that some of them, which seemed very important when they occurred, are now almost forgotten. Who remembers that at the very beginning of the year, a war between the USA and Iran almost broke out? It didn’t happen, so that’s fine. Nevertheless, each such surprise, even if it was managed quickly, rocked the boat. Perhaps the global economy would have digested another fallout between the USA and Iran, but then the coronavirus happened. Perhaps it too would not have caused a global recession, but then the cartel agreement between OPEC and the RF collapsed. If the global economy miraculously digests this as well, tomorrow some new horror will surely happen that will break the camel’s back.

One of the business cycle theories, the so-called real business cycle theory, argues that crises occur not because of some internal reasons and accumulating contradictions in the economy, but exclusively due to external shocks that sharply change consumer behavior. I am not ready to fully adhere to this theory (essentially, it is an application of Taleb’s black swan idea to the theory of economic cycles), but it is hard to deny that external factors are quite significant. However, it is also hard to deny that external factors become quite significant precisely when enough internal contradictions have accumulated.

And as if we didn’t have enough external shocks, the Russian leadership is bustling with activity in domestic politics as well. The resignation of the government, the first wave of constitutional amendments, the second wave of amendments, the idea that the constitutional amendments reset presidential terms—all of this is a reflection of active mental churning at the top. No one knows what ideas will surface in public policy tomorrow, but it is perfectly obvious that fish are easily caught in muddy waters. This must be taken advantage of.

The notorious plebiscite on constitutional amendments is an attempt to scoop up at least a drop of legitimacy from the people. And since legitimacy is needed, populism can be expected. This means it is the perfect time to announce a public demand.

Of course, I don’t know exactly which demand will be widely supported, because even sociologists can only provide support percentages for a closed list. As for us, we have yet to toss that list out there.

I already suggested the first proposal in connection with the Litreev case: the repeal of Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the RF, at least regarding the criminalization of possession without intent to sell. The beginning collapse of the Russian economy provides additional support for this idea: by reducing the prison population by a quarter, the FSIN budget can be significantly cut.

It is unlikely that ideas for tax cuts will be pushed through—we now have a former tax official as prime minister. But it is still necessary to complain about the unbearable tax burden, so that they at least don’t try to exacerbate it. On the other hand, there is a chance to simplify regulations—if presented under the guise of budget savings. For example, trying to replace the abolition of fire supervision with mandatory fire insurance. Or pushing for the easing of control over the circulation of hunting weapons. Or canceling the licensing of various types of activities.

It is very possible that it will be possible to selectively expand the rights of local self-government and bring back mayoral elections in some places.

In short, right now, supporters of reducing the state through political methods have a good opportunity to make progress. Even if success cannot be achieved in all areas, at least they can build up competence. As for the fact that Putin intends to rule forever, it’s too early to worry. Maybe tomorrow he’ll catch the coronavirus, and in a month he’ll kick the bucket—there’s no need to predict so far ahead; Putin currently plays no role in our calculations at all.

On Fears

I enjoyed listening to Ekaterina Schulmann’s lecture on Pravokon, dedicated to the fears that influence Russian society. The lecturer calls the most important category of fears the fear of some unexpected meanness on the part of the state. This could be repressions, tax increases, some new regulations, or simply a banal economic collapse, which the state illustrated in Ekaterina Mikhailovna’s lecture literally just a few days ago.

Analyzing the nature of this fear, Schulmann notes that it is not a manifestation of darkness and ignorance—on the contrary, it is a deeply justified distrust of both the motives of those in power and their competencies. Later, admittedly, she focuses on how best to coordinate in order to defend one’s political rights, but I think we should forgive the political scientist for her love of her subject of study, which prevents her, despite all her criticality toward the state, from sharing a libertarian worldview.

In such situations, one can react to the environment in different ways. Those who practice agorism will likely gloomily calculate what profit can be derived from the coming expansion of the black market, and how to facilitate this expansion. Those who put effort into regime change are considering where it is best to apply those efforts now, when the regime may be on the verge of faltering. Those looking for a country to flee to are considering whether it makes sense to try to save a little more, or if doing so here is already counterproductive. Moreover, as Bitarch recently correctly noted, relative freedom of movement between states is by no means the norm, and for Russia, it is an anomaly; it is unclear how much longer it will last, as it is already being gradually curtailed. And, of course, there are those who will run right now to buy dollars or household appliances at the old prices. Although, keeping in mind the coronavirus wandering around, perhaps a much larger percentage will actually start stocking up on canned goods: this is both an investment in a relatively hard currency and an opportunity to survive a quarantine.

This year, the Russian oil industry is unlikely to bring significant sums to the budget, which means they will squeeze money out of citizens to the fullest. This means that to minimize losses, one should not only try to earn money “under the table,” but also avoid showing money to banks whenever possible: banks are completely transparent to the state. So, those who have not yet acquired bitcoins should do so now and start practicing settling accounts with each other in this currency.

This is probably one of my most banal posts recently. I simply needed to voice all these fears, if only for myself.