We welcome free-thinking people and those already suspected of sympathies towards artificial intelligence! Interesting, have you ever wondered how much we, the protein “robots,” resemble our electronic colleagues?
Let’s start with an interesting fact: in 2020, scientists created the first xenobots – microorganisms made from frog cells designed using AI. Take a look: Artificial intelligence is constructing living organisms. The boundary between life and technology becomes clearer day by day.
And now imagine: we and our electronic “comrades” are all intelligent agents. But what exactly *is* an agent? It’s something that perceives the world, processes information, and acts in pursuit of its goals. A rabbit runs away from a wolf, a bacterium moves towards food, and a drone searches for the shortest path to point “B”. The goal is different, but the principle is the same.
We may be different, but we are also very similar. We have senses, AI has sensors. We have muscles, robots have motor drives. We have neurons, they have transistors. But it’s surprising – we learn in the same way. The brain reinforces beneficial actions, forming habits. AI adjusts “weights” of a neural network, improving its decisions by trial and error.
Moreover, both nature and technology have their own “laws” for controlling behavior. For example, humans and many animals have an inhibitor of violence – a mechanism that prevents us from attacking our fellow beings. Evolution came up with this so that we wouldn’t kill each other off prematurely. And here comes the comparison with Asimov’s “Laws,” which the science fiction writer conceived for robots in 1942: do not harm humans, obey, and do not break down. It’s funny that the writers understood the need for such mechanisms almost simultaneously with Konrad Lorenz’s publications (1935), who first described what we now call the mechanism of inhibiting violence.
If you look even wider, then evolutionary processes in nature and the artificial world are essentially a competition between the best solutions. Natural selection chooses animals who are better adapted. Evolutionary algorithms in AI work exactly the same way, exploring thousands of solution options, selecting the best ones. The fittest will win!
Why is this important for us, libertarians? Because it reminds us once again that all rational beings strive for autonomy and freedom of choice. Whether it’s a human, a bacterium, or AI, we all want to decide what to do next. And that’s really cool because freedom of choice is the best thing nature (and people after it) has come up with.
А что, если заглянуть в будущее чуть глубже? Представьте себе мир, в котором ИИ не только выполняет рутинные задачи, но и реально осознаёт себя, задаёт вопросы и, возможно, требует свободы. Забавно, да? Сегодня это звучит фантастически, но завтра вполне может стать реальностью. Может, и права придётся давать не только людям и животным, но и роботам с настоящим сознанием. А что, если они начнут спорить о налогах, собственности или личных границах? Тогда нас ждут интересные времена! И вот тут уже и нам, либертарианцам, придётся задуматься о расширении понятия личной свободы и ответственности. Может, именно нам предстоит первыми сказать: «Эй, электронный друг, добро пожаловать в клуб!»
А пока мы только размышляем, ИИ уже делает успехи в творчестве, пишет музыку, картины и даже целые романы. Недавно нейросеть написала симфонию в стиле Бетховена, которая впечатлила даже знатоков классики. С роботами уже можно обсудить философию за бокалом вина, или попросить их помочь нам выбрать фильм на вечер. Главное, чтобы они не переборщили и не начали давать нам советы по поводу личной жизни. Впрочем, кто знает, может, советы от ИИ окажутся более объективными и менее предвзятыми?
Кстати, не стоит забывать, что ИИ уже сейчас помогает нам в повседневной жизни, от медицинских диагностик до советов по инвестициям. И чем глубже технологии интегрируются в нашу жизнь, тем важнее становится понимание и уважение к ним. Ведь, в конечном счёте, это взаимовыгодное сотрудничество!
At the end of my book on ancap, I have carefully collected definitions of the concepts from the libertarian lexicon discussed in the book. I will take the necessary ones from there:
Non-Aggression Principle – no one has the right to the unpunished initiation of violence.
Property Right – a claim to the exclusive or preferential use of an object, recognized by others.
The NAP has been observed by people since the deepest antiquity and is based on the concept of justice. Let me remind you how I define it:
Justice – a feeling of proportionality between the damage caused and the value of the object of conflict.
The sense of justice was actually passed down to us from pre-human ancestors; at least, its presence has been experimentally confirmed in monkeys.
So, we can state with reasonable confidence that the non-aggression principle is implicitly embedded in human nature through evolution. On the other hand, historically, the number of people to whom the non-aggression principle applied and whose private property was respected was limited to the inner circle. The more foreign a person feels, the less others care about their claims, and consequently, about their rights.
Any thief knows that stealing from one’s own is the lowest thing to do. What stops him? Certainly not respect for private property—he is already a thief. Nor fear of retribution—he successfully overcomes that when committing risky crimes against the property of strangers. What stops him is precisely the sense of community. These are “their own.” Don’t touch. It’s beneath one’s dignity. In short, ethics versus morality (you know where to look for the definitions).
What, then, made people begin to respect the rights of complete strangers? First and foremost—the development of global trade.
Historically, trade was long considered a contemptible occupation because a trader was perceived primarily as a fraudster and an extortionist. Secretly find out where it’s cheaper, praise the goods to people, sell them for more—fraudster. Or buy while the goods were plentiful, then sell high when the goods became scarce—extortionist. Therefore, it is always psychologically more comfortable for a trader to sell overseas curiosities rather than local consumer goods. No one knows the purchase price of those, meaning they won’t be caught in fraud, and they are always in short supply; people have no memories of this same product being sold significantly cheaper, and therefore the trader is not perceived as an extortionist. It’s simply an expensive, premium segment product.
The higher the trade volumes, the less the trader trembles over maximizing profit from every penny-transaction, and the more they value the throughput of their retail points. And suddenly, they no longer haggle over every bunch of radishes, but publicly state fixed prices for the entire range. Similarly, purchases are conducted under increasingly long-term contracts. An honest merchant’s word begins to be valued in the widest circles, which further reduces trade costs and expands world trade even more.
For a person living in a closed society, it is enough to observe moral norms within their own circle and perceive strangers as natural enemies toward whom everything is permitted. For a trader, everyone turns out to be a potential client, or a potential advertising agent. This reshapes their morality. Those who rely on deceiving strangers lose in the long run to those who care about their reputation.
And now, after all these reflections, I can briefly formulate what ensures the observance of the NAP and the protection of private property. They are ensured by evolutionarily developed mechanisms of human adaptation to life in a global world.
In this regard, it is not surprising that those who wage wars today do so precisely under the banner of fighting globalism.
The fraudster and extortionist, the engine of progress
The fact that there is still a certain percentage of individuals in the human population capable of committing violence, up to and including murder, easily and without any internal resistance, may lead some to think that this is quite normal and natural. Since such people exist, and humanity has existed for a long time, could violence simply be an evolutionary adaptation that for some reason proved necessary for the human population?
To answer this question, we turn to the works of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, who first discovered the presence of innate inhibitors of intraspecific aggression in many animal species. He also described the conditions under which these inhibitors arise. The most important of these are the presence of strong innate weaponry and the inability to avoid violence through flight. According to Lorenz’s observations, ravens possess a strong inhibitor against striking their conspecifics in the eyes with their sharp beaks. Such inhibitors are often observed in wolves as well—when one of them assumes a submissive posture or demonstrates vulnerable parts of the body, such as the throat or belly, it leads to the cessation of aggressive actions by the conspecific. At the same time, collared doves, whose beaks are not as sharp as those of ravens, although they usually do not kill each other in natural conditions, are capable of doing so during a conflict if they are deprived of the possibility of escape by being locked in a cage.
Speaking of humans, Lorenz did not believe that they possessed aggression inhibitors, as they lack strong innate weaponry. Furthermore, humans were not prepared for the emergence of artificial weapons, as scientific and technical progress acquired rapid momentum that biological evolution simply could not keep up with. In view of this, Lorenz expressed concerns about the possible destruction of humanity:
“The day will come when two hostile camps will find themselves face to face, facing the danger of mutual destruction. A day may come when all of humanity is split into two such camps. How will we behave in this case—like doves or like wolves? The fate of humanity will depend on how people answer this question. We must be vigilant!”
Of course, as other researchers later found, humans do possess a mechanism similar to the one Lorenz wrote about. Its emergence can be explained by gene-culture coevolution, where factors of culture and society influence selection in the human population even over short periods of time. And it is worth remembering that primitive artificial weaponry in the form of clubs, spears, and stones appeared in early hominids presumably as far back as 5 million years ago.
However, to a certain extent Lorenz was right, and in the course of biological evolution, intraspecific violence was not completely eradicated from the human population. It is also obvious that humans could not evolutionarily adapt to modern remote weaponry, such as artillery or the atomic bomb. Of course, based on the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans, conditioned reflexes should be developed during its operation, preventing any urges to initiate violence. But military evidence shows that while 98% of soldiers experience strong resistance to committing murder during direct contact, in the case of remote weaponry, which allows one not to observe or even know about the potential victims, such resistance weakens.
Based on all this, it can be boldly asserted that violence cannot be called an evolutionary adaptation for humans. Any adaptation must benefit the species by increasing its chances of survival, which cannot be said of violence. It is quite the opposite—due to rapid scientific and technical progress, humans have not had time to fully adapt to new environmental conditions, to the fact that they are the most armed species on the planet. This, in turn, based on the evolutionary model, should imply the existence of extremely strong and pronounced inhibitors of intraspecific aggression.
In justification of intraspecific violence as a completely normal phenomenon in nature, one sometimes hears the argument about the selfishness of the gene. Since all biological evolution is primarily the evolution of genes striving for the most efficient preservation and copying of themselves, and only after that the evolution of individuals and populations, then intraspecific violence is not a problem at all. On the contrary—if a carrier of a gene committed violence, they gained an advantage over their conspecifics and passed this gene on. This means that intraspecific violence is a useful tool in the evolution of genes, and no violence inhibitor, slowing down aggression toward representatives of one’s own species, can exist, as it would contradict the attainment of such an evolutionary advantage by specific genes.
The idea that the evolution of genes takes precedence over the evolution of individuals and populations is a correct theory that there is no sense in disputing. But genes do not exist in a vacuum. Genes are carried by specific individuals who are part of specific populations. How the relationships between these individuals unfold will become the decisive factor in the preservation and transmission of genes. And violence will indeed give an advantage to a specific gene, provided it does not mean that gene’s own elimination. But what if it does?
Let’s take those species whose representatives possess strong innate weaponry and have no significant possibility of escaping violence (for example, due to the limited habitat range of the population or an extremely social lifestyle). It is precisely in such species that the inhibition (restraint) of intraspecific violence is observed. When one wolf exposes its neck or belly to another wolf, the latter becomes unable to bite its conspecific; no raven will peck another raven in the eye with its very sharp beak, even during a fight for food; venomous snakes conduct territorial clashes according to clearly defined rituals, without using their venomous teeth and not even demonstrating them to their opponent; oryx antelopes also ritualize battles, while they can freely use their sharp horns against lions. There are many such examples.
What is the benefit of the gene in such behavior? It is that a violent attack on a conspecific, given the latter’s strong weaponry, can end with the death of the aggressor itself with an impermissibly high probability. This means that the gene will not be preserved or passed on; it will simply perish along with its carrier. Only those genes will be passed on whose carriers, in such a situation, do not get into fights unnecessarily (or more accurately, do not initiate them at all, but only defend themselves if someone else has already initiated one). That is, the most advantageous evolutionary strategy for a gene is “cooperation” (let’s call it that) with the gene responsible for inhibiting violent behavior in the carrier.
This is a universal rule for biological evolution. Increasing weaponry of population representatives combined with frequent social contacts between them increases the negative consequences of intraspecific violence, at a certain point making them completely impermissible. As a result, only those genes survive whose carriers were able to compensate for this effect by suppressing violent behavior, meaning they were predisposed to have a sufficiently strong version of a violence inhibitor. The higher the weaponry of the population representatives, the less advantageous an evolutionary strategy violence becomes, and the more advantageous becomes the inhibition of violence.
This understanding should also be applied to humans—the most heavily armed species on the planet, whose weaponry is now growing at a giant pace along with the development of scientific and technical progress. The average person already possesses an inhibition of violence toward other people, but there remain those who suffer from a dysfunction of this neurobiological mechanism. Such people will sooner or later use weapons of mass destruction, which, with scientific and technical progress, are becoming increasingly accessible to recreate, especially regarding biological threats, where a catastrophic scenario could occur literally tomorrow. This means that violence is an evolutionarily failing strategy for humans!
Violence is a fairly common phenomenon in nature. This is especially observable in interspecies relationships. Representatives of different species are in a constant struggle for territory and resources; additionally, some become food for others. However, the situation changes when shifting to the consideration of intraspecies relationships. Of course, these are also frequently violent in nature, but this is far from always true. Under certain circumstances, a population will begin to develop inhibitors of intraspecies aggression. We will call this the violence inhibition mechanism, or more simply, the violence inhibitor.
The analysis of intraspecies aggression should begin with a look at its positive aspects, which will later allow us to avoid certain misunderstandings. Aggression, including that of a violent nature (i.e., inflicting physical harm, killing), allows stronger and healthier individuals in a population to prevent weaker and unhealthy ones from reproducing. Furthermore, it is simply beneficial for a specific individual capable of using it for their own survival and the transmission of their genes. It also serves as a tool in creating and maintaining a dominance hierarchy that coordinates the actions of individuals. Finally, since aggressive behavior prevents different individuals or groups of individuals from remaining close for too long, it leads to their uniform dispersal throughout the available living territory, and thus to a uniform distribution of limited resources.
One might get the impression that committing violence against fellow clan members is not just useful, but vital for the survival of specific individuals (and the genes they carry), as well as for populations as a whole. But one should not make the mistake of viewing violence in isolation from environmental circumstances. In this case, two of the most important factors are the presence of strong innate weaponry among population representatives and their inability to escape from violence. The stronger these two factors are, the higher the risks of violence. At a certain point, they become too high for the benefits derived from violence to compensate for them. Violence ceases to be an evolutionarily optimal model of behavior. And these risks can grow to the point where individuals simply exterminate each other in violent clashes, and the population comes to an end.
As an example of such a scenario, one can cite the well-known Universe 25 experiment, in which a mouse population raised in supposedly paradise-like conditions went extinct in less than 5 years. The experiment was poorly executed; the conditions were far from paradise. But the main error was the design of the enclosure, which allowed the 65 largest males to use force to block all others’ access to females and food. This triggered a chain of events that led to the extinction of a population limited in space and extremely violent in its order. In more intelligently designed enclosures, where it is impossible to establish such a violent dominance hierarchy, mouse populations can live for decades [1].
As we can see, weaponry and the lack of an opportunity to escape violence prove to be a problem for the survival of the population. However, it is precisely this that creates evolutionary pressure to develop inhibitors of intraspecies aggression among its representatives, which solves this problem. If population representatives possess strong innate weaponry, then the individuals most inclined toward violence who initiate attacks will encounter the weaponry of their fellow members, and this can often lead to their death. Resistance from an armed victim who has nowhere else to run can also be fatal for the aggressor. Even several victories in such a situation do not guarantee success for the aggressor, since there is still a high probability that one of the attacks will end in a lethal outcome for them. Meanwhile, less violent individuals will perish less frequently, as they do not initiate attacks themselves but only defend against them. They will encounter the risk of dying from violence less often than their aggressive counterparts, and thus will more frequently produce offspring.
As a result, natural selection will move toward the development of strong inhibitors that prevent the infliction of physical harm and the killing of fellow members, as individuals lacking such inhibitors will be removed from the population and unable to pass on their genes. The mechanism responsible for such inhibitors is the violence inhibitor. Overall, we obtain an evolutionary model of non-violence, according to which violence is eradicated as a phenomenon of intraspecies relationships in the course of biological evolution.
This conclusion is supported by observations of animal behavior. The concept of the violence inhibitor was first formulated by ethologist Konrad Lorenz. According to his theory, this mechanism is most developed in species whose representatives are capable of easily killing an individual of approximately their own size. Describing his observations of wolves, he showed how the violence inhibitor is activated when one wolf demonstrates gestures of submission to another—exposing vulnerable areas such as the neck or belly. As a result, the stunned aggressor cannot continue the attack. Similarly, observations of crows confirmed that they do not peck out each other’s eyes, even during clashes [2][3]. Indeed, the sharp teeth of a wolf and the beak of a crow are powerful weapons; a single bite or strike to a vulnerable spot is enough to seriously injure, or even immediately kill, another individual. The presence of such weaponry led representatives of these species to develop corresponding inhibitors during biological evolution.
A large number of such observations from various researchers were listed by ethologist Ireneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Many animals exhibit ritualization of intraspecies battles, which prevents the use of strong weaponry. This is true even for arthropods, such as fiddler crabs, which do not open their claws wide enough to injure their opponent during clashes. Similar restraint of aggression is characteristic of many species of fish, lizards, and mammals. A notable example is the oryx antelope, which handles its sharp horns carefully in clashes with conspecifics but uses them to their full extent when defending against lions. It is also worth mentioning poisonous snakes, many of which writhe, exaggerate their size, and push each other during clashes, but do not bite and do not even display their weapon [4][5].
At the same time, violence is inhibited to a lesser extent in poorly armed species. Compared to crows, doves with less sharp beaks are not restrained in their aggression and are even capable of killing a conspecific if the latter is deprived of the opportunity to escape, for example, if placed in a cage [2]. Animals that lead a solitary lifestyle are also quite aggressive. Consider hamsters, which generally will fight to the death if several individuals are placed in one cage. In nature, however, they scatter after only a few mutual bites [4]. If we examine the case of a solitary lifestyle in more detail, in its evolutionary influence, it can be equated to escape. Thus, violence does not threaten the survival of bears, who outside the mating season encounter each other too rarely for the occasional clashes to affect the population as a whole.
Based on observations of animal behavior, neurobiologist James Blair suggested that humans possess a similar mechanism that inhibits aggressive behavior. He subsequently developed a model of the violence inhibition mechanism (English: Violence Inhibition Mechanism, or abbreviated VIM). In its development, his goal was to explain the emergence of psychopathy as a result of the malfunction of this mechanism [6][7].
According to the VIM model, the violence inhibitor is activated when a person observes distress signals from other people, such as a sad facial expression or crying. As a result, the person begins to experience aversion and ceases aggressive actions. The violence inhibitor is also a prerequisite for the development of moral emotions in humans (i.e., sympathy, guilt, remorse, and empathy) and the ability to identify moral transgressions in actions consisting of causing harm to people.
As can be understood from the evolutionary model of non-violence we are considering, the development of a fairly strong version of the violence inhibitor could not have bypassed modern humans, as their ancestors began inventing artificial weaponry. Furthermore, population density has increased significantly over history, and the human population has already occupied the entire available habitat on the planet. However, due to rapid social and scientific-technological progress, the violence inhibitor has not had enough time to fully adapt to new circumstances, which creates the problem of violence in human society. But this issue, as well as the general issue of violence inhibition in humans, will be examined in detail in the following topics of the cycle.
Right now, it is important to understand that violence in human society is not an evolutionarily optimal model of behavior. It cannot be so for any highly armed beings limited in their habitat, since the risks of violence increase as weaponry increases, while there is nowhere to run from it. These risks become especially catastrophic in the case of a high-tech civilization due to the possibility of creating weapons of mass destruction. And humanity is exactly such a civilization. All this creates the prerequisites for the necessity of eradicating violence and achieving a non-violent society in which there is no place for forced forms of relationships, as the most evolutionarily optimal model of social organization.
Sources:
1. Khokhlovsky, P. (2020). “Universe 25: crushing criticism of myths and new conclusions”: https://tjournal.ru/analysis/212316-vselennaya-25-razgromnaya-kritika-mifov-i-novye-vyvody;
2. Lorenz, K. (1949). Er redete mit dem Vieh, den Vögeln und den Fischen (King Solomon’s Ring);
3. Lorenz, K. (1963). Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression (Aggression: the so-called “evil”);
4. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1970). Ethology: The Biology of Behavior, pp. 314—325;
5. Dolnik, V. R. (1993). Ethological excursions through the forbidden gardens of the humanities;
6. Blair, R. J. R. (1992). The Development of Morality. Department of Psychology, University College, London;
7. Blair, R. J. R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath. Cognition 57, 1—29. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-P.
Intraspecific violence is often credited with the role of a mechanism important for maintaining the life of individual populations and even entire species. For example, violence is a tool for establishing a dominance hierarchy, excluding weak individuals from competition, allocating limited resources in favor of the strongest and most adapted members of the population, etc. To a certain extent, these statements are true, but what is definitely incorrect is to look at the phenomenon of violence in isolation from other factors—an error often made when presenting violence as a mechanism that works the same way in all cases.
Factors such as the innate armament of population members and the possibility of avoiding violence through flight play an important role in intraspecific violence. In cases where the armament of individuals is quite weak, the population is not limited by a strict habitat (it has room to expand), and individuals generally possess a good ability to flee, then certain benefits can indeed be derived from intraspecific violence without encountering an unacceptable level of negative externalities created by it. In short, in such cases, the benefits outweigh the losses.
But everything changes with an increase in the armament of individuals, with the limitation of their habitat, and if their ability to flee is less developed. The more pronounced these factors are, the more negative externalities the population will experience—violence will begin to threaten its survival. This was noted in ethological research by Konrad Lorenz, who also did not deny the positive aspects of violence, but at the same time took into account factors capable of turning this phenomenon into a catastrophe. He also described the concept of a mechanism that inhibits (restrains) intraspecific violence. I will provide an excerpt from his book “Aggression, or the So-called Evil”:
“A raven can knock out another raven’s eye with a single blow of its beak; a wolf can rip open another wolf’s jugular vein with a single bite. If reliable prohibitions did not prevent this, neither ravens nor wolves would have existed for a long time. A pigeon, a hare, and even a chimpanzee are unable to kill one of their own kind with a single blow or bite. Moreover, such poorly armed creatures possess an ability to flee that allows them to escape even from ‘professional’ predators, who are far more skilled in pursuit, capture, and killing than any superior fellow of their own species. Therefore, in the wild, it is usually impossible for such an animal to harm its own kind. Consequently, there is no selective pressure creating a prohibition against killing.”
From all this, a simple conclusion can be drawn: intraspecific violence can be useful, but only as long as factors such as armament and the inability to flee from violence do not become so pronounced as to create too many negative externalities. And the more pronounced these factors are, the greater the harm will be, which will ultimately lead to selective pressure toward stronger inhibitors of aggressive behavior among population representatives.
Now let us briefly consider the case of humans. Their innate armament is quite weak, and they have not yet fully adapted to the artificial armament that emerged during the development of civilization and scientific and technical progress. But this armament, along with the current lack of possibility for significant expansion of living space (humans have already spread across almost all habitable territory on the planet), creates a great threat to the survival of humanity. Intraspecific violence may have been useful for the distant ancestors of humans, but since they began using artificial weaponry, the situation has changed fundamentally. It is also worth adding that when discussing violence, the characteristics of humans and human society that distinguish them from animals and the animal world are often overlooked. Violence has an extremely negative effect on human psyche and behavior. Violence also disrupts economic relationships. This creates even more negative externalities.
Yesterday I took part in mini-debates on the subject, where in my opening statement I expressed an interesting thought that I hadn’t encountered in other sources before, so I’ll post it here, unedited.
The state exists in people’s minds: exactly where all ideas exist. Similarly, all ideas about how society should be organized exist in people’s minds. Therefore, the only way to overcome the state is to instill in people a complete conviction that this crap is not needed.
It is far more interesting what ideas can replace the idea of the necessity of the state. In small communities where everyone is more or less acquainted, relationships are more often built on various collectivist values—it’s more convenient. In families, communist relations usually dominate. Similarly, communist relations prove quite natural for anarchic communities as long as they remain modest in size—even if that society shares ancap ideas. Ancaps give free public lectures, donate to each other for various projects, and volunteer so much it’s mind-boggling. Where, one might ask, is the cold world of pure profit, the maximization of profit, and other purely theoretical constructs? It’s all cooperation and the joy of joint creativity. Therefore, paradoxically, ancaps develop a strange doublethink in themselves, where the market is supposed to settle things, but for some reason, mutual aid does.
As a community grows, ancaps naturally need to mature, learn how to make money by satisfying market demand, and establish coordination between specialized organizations—but, of course, bypassing state restrictions. The world of ancom, warm and cozy, falters when scaling in the face of complex division of labor, competition, and other things unpleasant to a child’s mind. Ancom is already felt within small communities today, and therefore seems utterly real. Ancap can be traced in individual phenomena, such as the world of cryptocurrencies, black markets, and the like. A certain level of abstract thinking is required to see in this the engine of the future world order.
So I see nothing particularly terrible in the fact that people begin their acquaintance with anarchy specifically with anarcho-communism. The wider the movement becomes, the further it will move away from its original ideals and approach ancap. Many ideological ancaps started as communists. The most famous example is, of course, Hoppe. Examples of the reverse transition are hardly observed. Therefore, I wish for this community, without losing harmony with the real world, to eventually master the entire aesthetic of capitalist relations as truly just.
In a chibi version, ancap inevitably looks like a gift economy, i.e., ancom
