анонимный вопрос

I think no one doubts that they have the technical capability for such actions, which means they cannot be ruled out. Of course, such excesses will occur; the only question is what they will lead to.

First, let’s consider an example of a monopoly security structure like the “police.” If a competitor emerges, wishing to provide security services to someone other than the police, the police will, of course, enter into a physical struggle with them. This might look boring: initiating a case, conducting an inspection, arrest, investigation, trial, fines, and imprisonment. It might look exciting: chases, shootouts, a coffin, a cemetery. One way or another, the competitor is eliminated, simply because most citizens are convinced of the benefit of a state monopoly on violence, as Hobbes himself proclaimed and Shulman herself confirmed. Will the police torture those who do not use their services? Worse. They will torture those who pay for their services, simply because they can, and there is nothing to oppose them with. More precisely, it is proposed to oppose this lawlessness with the activities of specialized alternative security enterprises: the prosecutor’s office, the internal security department, and so on. In other words, even in current reality, no one is ready to agree to a full and comprehensive monopoly on violence by a single actor. It is proposed that the watchmen be watched.

Now let’s consider a gangster “protection racket” like those that, according to legend, flooded the streets in the nineties. If a city is large enough, there may be several competing rackets. In what cases do rackets enter into physical clashes with competitors? First, the clashes must be inexpensive (plenty of cheap fighters). Second, the disputed business must be quite lucrative. But if a certain business is potentially capable of bringing good money to a racket, it can afford to choose the racket that works better and cheaper, because otherwise, one can always turn to competitors. Thus, competition between rackets will inevitably lead to a reduction in extortion, meaning that physical clashes with competitors will become increasingly unjustifiable. Again, the faster fighters are spent, the more expensive they become. And so, bloody clashes become a rarity, and instead, the bosses settle everything “according to the code.”

And what about torturing those who are not clients? Of course, it is profitable for a racket to spread rumors about punishments for the stubborn. In reality, however, conducting such activities will become completely redundant over time, especially since just a couple or three well-publicized precedents—and few will risk being completely without protection, and bothering someone else’s client is already against the code and fraught with danger. Again, if someone is without protection, it does not mean they are completely harmless, or that there is no one to stand up for them. Simply put, in general, the people standing up for them will be amateurs, but amateurs can also be rare psychos. So why risk it?