Тег: Society

Stop fighting with Russia, it is time to fight with Ukraine

To mark the third anniversary of the start of the SMO, I want to reflect on whether it is ultimately beneficial for libertarians for the hostilities between Ukrainian and Russian troops to end immediately, even on terms that are quite unfavorable for the Ukrainian state. From the phrasing used, the reader can already guess that I will be arguing that this is indeed beneficial for libertarians.

Ukraine has always had an abysmal state (confirmed by several Maidans) and a civil society that is developed relative to the RF (confirmed by those same Maidans, as well as the fact that the front is held largely through the efforts of volunteers—both among those fighting and those providing supplies). Civil society has neither piety nor illusions regarding the state. And over these years, Ukrainian civil society has learned to fight very well. But right now it is terribly preoccupied: fighting another state, Russia, in a situational alliance with a treacherous but slightly less dangerous enemy—the state of Ukraine.

What happens if no one on the Ukrainian side concludes peace with Putin? The flow of resources for conducting military operations in favor of the Ukrainian side will weaken, and the tension of the conflict will gradually fade on its own as the warring parties exhaust themselves. When both armies are completely bled dry, peace will happen eventually, and there will not be much benefit in this peace for Ukraine’s civil society, even if the terms for the Ukrainian state are better than those currently offered.

What happens if a ceasefire with the Russian side is reached and turns out to be relatively stable? A huge number of very angry and highly skilled military representatives of Ukrainian civil society will return from the Russian front to within drone-flight distance of Ukrainian officials. How soon will these gluttonous grabbers (I mean the officials, of course, not the veterans) begin to die en masse, playing with grenades or some other stupid way? How soon will the current Ukrainian president join the ranks of the clumsy idiots who ignore safety protocols? Does he really want that? Therefore, Zelensky will do everything possible to delay the moment of concluding peace. He should not be helped in this. One can even support the pressure on him to finally conclude any deal with Putin. One can even support Mikhail Svetov: I do not know his true motivations, his public argumentation is poor, but he pushes for peace—and good for him.

Just as Milei’s victory in Argentina gave libertarians arguments in favor of political methods of shrinking the state, a potential military coup in Ukraine after concluding an agreement with Putin will give libertarians arguments in favor of armed methods of shrinking the state, and my bloodthirsty heart rejoices in anticipation.

A request to readers. If anyone knows of a specific Ukrainian unit conducting its own crowdfunding for modern, high-efficiency tools of warfare applicable also for combat operations against its own state—please provide links to their materials. I want to read, form an opinion, and donate.

Internal dynamics of libertarian communities

This will be a long-form text in three parts. It was written by request of Soz, for a donation of 50 EURMTL. The work took nearly a full month. For ordinary questions with attached donations, this is indecently long, but I recall that back when Bitarch didn’t yet publish on my channel himself but commissioned me to write long-reads, the pace was comparable. Unfortunately, I struggle to keep large concepts in my head, so as the volume of the task increases, the working time increases in a clearly non-linear proportion: a couple of days for a Telegram-format post, a month for a long-read, a year and a half for an 84-page book…

The task from the client was formulated not very clearly, but it amounted to creating and presenting a conciliatory narrative for the Montelibero community, which is currently experiencing internal friction due to differences in approaches to achieving the movement’s goals.

It seemed appropriate to me to expand the topic slightly, but not so much that the final recipes would be inapplicable to the specific community.

Part 1. Why don’t libertarians like contracts?

There is an opinion that libertarians adore contracts and almost pray to them. This is not true. Libertarians, for the most part, have a fairly ordinary system of values, and therefore they do not like contracts. What they love, like all normal people, is an atmosphere of openness and mutual trust. Anyone who claims otherwise most likely loved it once too, but their trust was betrayed.

What is trust? It is the conviction that the counterparty will sincerely defend your interests, and if they conflict with his own, he will still try to take yours into account as much as possible, and if necessary, occasionally compromise his own. Openness, on the other hand, means that the counterparties provide full and reliable information about their interests and other facts related to the subject of interaction. How could one not love this?

This is precisely why libertarians prefer to gather in communities. In a circle of people sharing common values, trust is usually higher, and if these values are libertarian, then—especially in business matters—mutual trust may, to an outsider, even border on naivety.

A contract, however, is a product of mutual distrust. Please state exactly what you will demand from me and what you are ready to give me in return, and what tools we have to compel each other to comply with what is written. And further clarify the meaning of the terms, so that it doesn’t emerge in court that you meant something completely different from what you hinted to me…

It’s not that libertarians completely neglect contracts when making deals among themselves, but usually it is just a brief summary of a chat conversation, purely so as not to forget: I borrow so much, for such a term, at such a rate, payments in equal monthly installments on the first of the month. The higher the trust, the more nuances are left out.

Trust in deals and the ability to rely on people to defend your interests is a huge treasure, as it reduces transaction costs to a negligible minimum, and thus ensures maximum market efficiency. But this treasure, unfortunately, is very fragile.

Trust can be destroyed by a fraudster. This is a very banal risk, and it is partially mitigated by simple tenure in the community. The longer a fraudster is forced to maintain an impeccable reputation to gain trust, the larger the deal he needs to scam the counterparty and ultimately still end up in profit.

But trust can also be destroyed by a pedant. Someone who, in a libertarian community, will demand as detailed a contract as possible, and then start insisting that it be followed to the letter—is a repulsive counterparty. He literally positions himself as an outsider, saying that you are all suspicious types ready to scam anyone at the first opportunity. Therefore, here are ten pages of fine print in tooth-grinding legal jargon, now let’s go get it notarized, and here we have a state court specified, and here is the penalty for delay, and so on and so forth.

Therefore, libertarian communities tend to reject both fraudsters and nitpickers, striving to preserve the innocent simplicity of trust-based relationships. But consistent rejection also requires conscious and unpleasant effort. A fraudster can be charming, and if he hasn’t personally scammed you, there is a temptation to continue being friendly with him. A pedant can be a strong professional, and this provides an incentive to tolerate him despite all the discomfort of communication.

Therefore, in real libertarian communities, complete ostracism is rare. Usually, a community member who causes repulsion is simply pushed to the periphery. There, he can either reshape his behavior and over time return closer to the core, or remain in the vague status of a partial outcast, or leave the community of his own volition. So, libertarian communities are quite resilient to problems with individual people, and these do not have a noticeable impact on the atmosphere of trust. However, another phenomenon is far more dangerous. A split.

Part 2. Why don’t libertarians like corporations?

There is an opinion that the world of victorious libertarianism is a war of corporations. Having read the first part, it is easy to conclude that this is also not true. But it is not that simple.

Communities whose members share libertarian values are capable of having a very high level of internal trust. However, libertarian communities usually have not only values but also goals. Their members do not like the outside world, where freedom is quite poor, and they strive to somehow combine the efforts of community members to influence the outside world and make it freer. This noble aspiration, alas, is capable of leading to rather sad results.

In order to turn a community into a movement—that is, to prompt community members to achieve a certain goal—this goal must be either quickly and verifiably achievable, even at the cost of serious effort (for example, a movement to abolish some repressive law), or easily broken down into stages that obviously bring one closer to the final goal (for example, a movement for EU accession, for which there is a checklist of requirements).

However, it may turn out that the goal looks tempting but suffers from a lack of specificity in implementation (for example, making Montenegro a free country). In this case, several movements may arise around the goal, differing in their ideas of exactly how this goal is achieved. For example, part of the community decides to focus on political transformations in Montenegro, and another part on building an economy independent of the state. And another part declares that it does not wish to adhere to the proposed goal and is satisfied simply living in accordance with its values (that is, remaining just a community).

The situation is exacerbated if certain activities of the movement appear from the outside not only as not bringing it closer to the declared goal, but as completely contradicting it. For example, if the goal is a free society, then any regulations of communications and business relations can easily be declared as contradicting the final goal, even if they perform an important tactical task of lowering the heat of conflict in a dispute or improving coordination in a working group.

Add to this the natural isolation of participants of one movement from participants of another movement—and soon we will inevitably see that the level of trust between several movements within one community has decreased, despite the continuing unity of basic values.

This isolation is further strengthened if a movement is formalized into a corporation. What was simply the coordination of people united by a goal has become management procedures, delegation of authority, setting tasks for working groups, accounting and control—in short, the methods familiar to all of us for making an activity more efficient.

Against the backdrop of such complication of the primary community, those who try to return to the happy past, criticizing the present, are perceived as gloomy retrogrades denying any movement toward the goal.

Thus, a relatively homogeneous community cannot move in a coordinated way toward any complex goal. But with the appearance of structures for achieving complex goals, it, firstly, still cannot move anywhere entirely in a coordinated manner, and secondly, it also loses the atmosphere of trust. What is to be done?

Part 3. How can libertarians maintain a balance of trust and efficiency?

It is quite easy to determine from the outside how great the internal unity of aspirations is in a community. If they argue about fundamental questions, then there is no unity. It is simply a discussion platform, a community united by the value of discussion as such, not its subject. If, however, disputes are over trifles, it means that agreement on basic things was reached long ago; it isn’t even discussed. This does not, however, make disputes over minor details less ridiculous and potentially less destructive.

The devil begins with the foam on the lips of an angel who has entered the fight for a holy right cause. The best path to a community split is animal seriousness in trifles (recall the pedant from the first part). Subconsciously understanding the certain comicality of their position, the disputant in a polemical frenzy begins to accuse opponents of violating basic value principles. Thereby making it clear that they perceive opponents as strangers who somehow ended up in the community.

Therefore, the first rule for a libertarian community that does not want splits is: everyone here is a libertarian. That is, they agree among themselves regarding the basic principles of their ideology.

The second rule develops the first: do not demand ideological purity from others. One can call oneself not just a libertarian, but an agorist. One can gather a bunch of agorists around oneself. But claiming to other libertarians that, for instance, you are not agorists and therefore are latent etatists is a bad idea.

The third rule generalizes the second: excessive detailing is harmful. The more detailed some description, some contract, some charter, or some rules are worked out, the more likely it is that reality will not fit the description, rules will be violated, and the charter will be interpreted based on immediate benefit. A good document is brief, evocative, and strives to capture precisely the spirit of what one wanted to express.

The fourth rule develops the third: an alliance is better than a merger. If a certain group can exist autonomously—let it exist. If it faces a task that it cannot handle on its own, let it enter into an alliance with other groups. If, instead of solving the task, the groups start merging into a single organization to solve the task, all the momentum will be spent on arranging the merger process.

The fifth rule is an antithesis to the fourth: do not judge what is better for others. If, for example, some groups have already merged into something that seems unnaturally large, there is no need to panic and declare war on them. Either they are fine with it, or they will eventually split up on their own. It is better to contact individual members of that group, applying the fourth rule.

One could continue to fantasize, but five rules are already a lot, see the third rule. Therefore, I will limit myself to what has been stated, and in conclusion, I will briefly summarize all three parts of the text.

  1. Trust is what libertarians unite for in communities. Trust must not be destroyed, otherwise the community loses its meaning.
  2. Organization is what without which a community will not move toward a goal. But organization devours trust, and thus destroys the community.
  3. A balance between trust and efficiency is possible, but it is not achieved automatically. One can formulate several rules, the observance of which will help maintain the balance.

Do not be your own enemies; we already have enough enemies from the outside.

Discussing the magic stimulant

So, readers have discussed across several platforms the fantastic assumption laid out in the previous post, its consequences, and their own personal lines of behavior.

Here are the main ideas.

  1. Humanity already consists of both fanatical overachievers and those living “half-heartedly.” If the contrast becomes slightly stronger—well, that’s great. Overachievers will achieve even greater success, burning with their ideas, while others will enjoy the results in a comfortable mode for themselves (as a separate opinion, some believe that those dabbling in the stimulant will be spatially separated from those who don’t, or conversely, communities of advocates for naturalness will appear).
  2. The first thing people under the stimulant will do is develop a second version of the stimulant, devoid of the side effects of the first version, and then we’ll all live well.

Many also noted that the value of a conditional Harvard lies not in knowledge, but in networking; this is a long-term task, and the stimulant does not solve it. Nor does it solve many other tasks, such as finding a long-term marriage partner, raising children, selecting new varieties of baobab, and so on.

It’s funny how the question of a life-accelerating stimulant echoes another question I answered not so long ago—about the consequences of the appearance of immortality technology for the chosen few. Let me introduce additional constraints here as well. Let the production of the stimulant be a cheap and easily replicable technology that is practically impossible to ban. Also, let this technology provide no shortcuts allowing it to be tweaked in a relatively short time to remove the key unpleasant side effect. Otherwise, it’s not interesting.

How could this stimulant appear? Most likely—during developments in the field of traumatology or something of that sort. They struggled for a long time with animals, could not overcome the effect of premature aging, and finally released it for use in first-aid kits as a last resort, initially for the military. If you don’t use it—you die in half an hour; if you do—you live some number of years less. Then, a recovering person, out of boredom, picks up a higher mathematics textbook, or, say, a manual on repairing HIMARS in field conditions—and discovers with surprise that the material is absorbed perfectly. That’s it, the genie is out of the bottle.

It is also quite obvious that cancer patients of any age will use the stimulant. Additionally, it is a more than justified remedy for Alzheimer’s. In short, there will be a significant number of people for whom the use of the stimulant will provide a double plus—both the extension (or serious alleviation) of life and the enhancement of abilities. Instead of living for twenty years as a demented person, a paralytic, or undergoing surgery every six months, a person would quite easily prefer ten years of more comfortable aging coupled with a flowering of cognitive functions.

It is more than likely that the stimulant will be used in poor, large families. Why send a daughter into prostitution or a son to a hazardous production site if there is a way to lift the whole family out of poverty with far lower costs, even regarding the reduction of expected life expectancy. In other words, the stimulant will accelerate social elevators. For those who have acceptable starting conditions, there are fewer incentives to use the drug. Thus, the stimulant will contribute to increasing equality, which leftists love to prattle on about.

As for a truly mass transition to the stimulant—this seems unlikely to me. After all—so we know that methamphetamine is actively used in North Korea to increase labor productivity—and so what? Perhaps students before exams sometimes follow this example, but it is not the case that consumers of this stimulant are directly displacing those who shun it from the labor market. Again, modern left-wing governments are far more concerned with unemployment than with labor productivity. If some maniacs are ready to replace entire creative teams—then for those who have dropped out of the competitive race, even more bullshit jobs will simply be invented.

And under ancap? I see no serious difference; this technology is not key to the formation of society. Except that bullshit jobs under ancap would be substantially fewer, which means those not using the stimulant would have a less stable income, but would be able to enjoy lower prices. However, those using the stimulant wouldn’t become models of stability either, since the stimulant is more about extreme effort than about a constant increase in efficiency. So, the niche for the workhorses will remain wide enough for a long time.

What do you mean “I don’t want the stimulant”? The clock is ticking!

Birthday – not only once a year

I was sent a text describing a fantastic hypothesis and a question about what should be changed in human relationships so that the consequences wouldn’t frighten us too much. So…

Imagine that a certain cellular stimulator had been developed and became available, which, by accelerating biological processes in your body, could cure you of a disease or injury very quickly—literally in an hour—allow you to prepare for entrance exams to a prestigious university in a week, or perform huge volumes of work in the shortest possible time. The price for this is an accelerated “wearing out” of the body, visually and physiologically indistinguishable from natural aging over a longer period of time under natural conditions and, let’s say, without any other side effects. Would you use such a technology?

At first, you’re unlikely to like the idea, but afterwards, you might wonder if it’s worth sacrificing a piece of your life just once and literally celebrate several birthdays in one year for the sake of some significant achievement—for example, getting into Harvard, which should ensure you a good profession, a brilliant career, and high income for the rest of your slightly diminished life. But you’re unlikely to be the only “smart one,” and you’ll soon realize that with such a means existing, many people might start using it in the pursuit of efficiency and quick gains—first in one particular situation, and then again and again. This means that remaining competitive in studies or work without resorting to this means will simply become impossible. And employers, of course, all other things being equal, will prefer to deal with people who never catch a cold, don’t get tired, and can perform a month’s worth of work in a week. And you suddenly find yourself in the position of a professional athlete who understands that it’s impossible to win without doping, but doping will most likely lead him to the grave or make him disabled about five years sooner.

How would you solve this problem? A blunt government ban on the drug won’t help. Government agents themselves would be happy to use its effect, primarily for military purposes if talking about others, and to increase efficiency in political struggles if talking about themselves. How, in your opinion, should human relationships be influenced so that situations do not arise where some people absolutely do not care about others and are only glad if they completely exhaust their life resource for their own benefit?

In the next post, I will share my reflections on the proposed situation, but for now, I would like to read your ideas in the comments.

Why does the forest burn every year in Russia and particularly in the Republic of Karelia? The number of fires per day amounts to several dozen, and this year it is already over 250, while in neighboring Finland, Sweden, or Switzerland, these are isolated cases.

OpenKoder

Taking this opportunity, I want to say thank you for the regular reposts of my materials on Twitter)))

As for the question, I believe the reason is roughly the same as why far fewer people die in earthquakes in California than in Haiti. It is because of poverty, which in turn stems from the poor organization of society.

And I am not even talking about the size of the state, because it is difficult to say offhand in which country the state interferes more in people’s lives—Sweden or Russia, California or Haiti. Any society has as much state as it resisted poorly, and mainly in those areas where the resistance was particularly ineffective.

In Russia, the main strategy for resisting the state has always been flight; therefore, people here are effective at gathering something and using it quickly—be it mushrooms from a state forest or machinery from a state factory for scrap metal—while owning real estate is always a zone of vulnerability, so they don’t get attached to it and don’t take care of it. Who would take care of state forests, and why? Who would put out the fires, and why?

In Sweden, for example, you cannot flee from the state, and people had to cling to the land. As a result, the state there is more effective at collecting taxes, since everyone sits neatly in their places, everyone is counted, and everyone is accounted for. Life costs a pretty penny and is entirely scheduled, but the forests do not burn.

I have now moved to a country where, on the one hand, private property is reasonably well protected—and this is not so much because of the state as because those are the interests of society; it is profitable for people to sell it dearly to foreigners. On the other hand, state intervention is tolerated quite reluctantly, and quite often it puts on a brave face while playing a bad game, simply legalizing over time what people did for themselves at their own risk. Forests here still burn from time to time, but gradually there is less and less ownerless junk.

If we reason specifically about the forest, then to reduce the number of fires, it is very important that it is not just private, but also belongs to owners who are not too large. A large owner, at best, will make quarterly clearings, and if lucky, will also plow firebreaks. If very lucky, they will perform selective logging and remove deadwood. But generally, for them, the concentration of production and square-nest thinking is effective. But a small owner will live in the forest themselves and will build a paved road to their farmstead. Such a road will not only serve as a firebreak but will also allow all necessary equipment to be delivered almost instantaneously anywhere to put out a blaze. And since putting out the fire will be economically effective, it will be put out.

Navalny’s Actions, Betting on the Rise

Last night, I thought about sharing my own impressions of the recent street protests while they were still fresh, but a more interesting news item came up. Alexei Nefedov, a former author of this channel, was detained on the street, so I decided to ask him how it all happened. And since I’m not very good at interviewing, the conversation quickly drifted into a more abstract discussion, which turned out to be quite interesting.

– I found out about your detention when I was already on my way home, because I rarely took my phone out on the street and only checked the coordination channel. This is the first time a close acquaintance of mine has been detained. In general, detentions have become the norm, so I wasn’t particularly worried; instead, I immediately decided to take the opportunity to ask how it looks from the other side—sorry for being so callous. To start with, how on earth did you get caught?

– When the report was being drawn up, I took Article 51, and I haven’t discussed the defense strategy with my lawyer yet, so I’ll refrain from commenting for now. I can only say that the recommendations you posted in the channel on Friday—it’s not that they are bad, they just work for different conditions. You talk about what a large mass of people should do, but they won’t be able to do it without a team. And you can only command anonymously via Telegram. That signal will be severely delayed. Fantasies about some kind of flag signals are for people who have had at least some coordination training. Not our case, in short. Therefore, people walked in scattered columns; they were easily split up, and movement was blocked. Detentions were also effortless. You can form a chain on the square, but it’s impossible in a column. The security forces control the entire roadway, so they can pop out from the side or behind and unexpectedly attack anyone. That’s exactly what happened to me.

– Strange, most of my recommendations concerned individual tactics, or small groups of acquaintances staying in clusters. But I was still hoping that the level of coordination would be higher. What happened after the detention?

– For starters, for some reason, instead of a classic police van, they used an ordinary Gazelle, without bars, with regular civilian plates. If not for the low ceiling, you might have thought it was taken off a shuttle route. Eight people were shoved in there, two “cosmonauts” [riot police] climbed in, and off we went to the police station. We arrived quickly, but then we sat in front of the doors for half an hour, so there was time to chat with the cosmonauts. Completely apolitical, good-natured guys. If we have to detain—we detain. If we have to kill—we kill. An order is an order. To the attacks of their fellow passengers, they replied that they simply didn’t understand life and invited them to go work for the National Guard to get their act together. In general, in the entire assembly line for stamping out administrative charges, a well-oiled routine is evident. They brought us in, waited for the signal that we could be brought inside, led us in pairs, and took us to the basement. There was more waiting, then the drawing up of the delivery and search report. Then to the duty office, where they have orders to do photography and fingerprinting. This is illegal, but it is demanded of them. So they try to push through purely psychologically, and they do it very well. I refused to roll my fingers and was sure that I would now be charged with violating the legal requirements of the police under Article 19.3. I even reset my phone to factory settings just in case. But none of that really matters, in the end. Generally, this feeling of the pointlessness of any fuss is very strong in the police station. Quotes from the Strugatsky brothers immediately come to mind, where an old revolutionary said: it’s not scary now, but when they were sawing off my arm and complaining about low wages—that’s when it was scary.

– What is expected next?

– They have three days to transfer the case to court, then they’ll call me and tell me the date. In court, I get a fine and file an appeal with the regional court. The appeal is denied, and I apply to the ECHR. In about three years, the ECHR awards me compensation. The fine is paid after the appeal is denied. I can pay it myself or ask the FBK for help. FBK lawyers also help prepare the ECHR application. In short, on our side, it’s also a completely routine conveyor belt, where not only the deadlines but also the court results are known in advance. There is also an unpleasant moment. For six months, protests are contraindicated for me until the administrative charge expires. As you correctly noted, two administrative charges mean the loss of the right to own a weapon. So now I’m sitting still, suing the state, not stirring things up. Or I’ll have to transfer the gun to acquaintances if I want to continue my activism.

– Svetov has a stream going on literally right now. In it, like me, he says that Navalny overestimated his influence, and in this situation, no peaceful protest will yield results. It can only provide a picture for diplomatic pressure on the regime from the outside. A week ago, it seemed to me that there were chances that the protest would soon stop being peaceful. Now it seems that the chance is lost. What do you think?

– Everyone is forced to judge by the part of the picture they see directly. Then they compare data and get a more comprehensive understanding. I only had time to return, wash up, and have dinner; I haven’t even read the feed yet. In the section where I was today, the wall is strong; it can’t be broken by forehead. There are so many security forces that they will disperse protests of this scale and intensity without breaking a sweat. The damage to the economy from blocking the city center for three hours on a weekend is minimal. Moreover, we are the province; everyone understands that the decision about Navalny is made in Moscow, and we are just there for the crowd. When selfish interests are touched, as was the case during the protests over utility tariffs, people are angrier and more active. No one here will seriously stand up for Navalny. Just compare how they shouted “freedom for Navalny” today versus “freedom for Boyko.” Boyko is closer, more popular; they will shout louder for him. But he will be released in mid-February, so people will limit themselves to shouting and won’t get into a fight.

– So you think everything is useless?

– Street politics is a very necessary training in self-organization, in the self-awareness of civil society. In this sphere, we have already streamlined a lot. All I did during the detention was press the red button. Then invisible wheels started turning, and that’s it—LPR writes about the detention on Twitter, OVD-Info calls me, a lawyer arrives, a care package arrives, all further litigation is put on stream. People are learning to peacefully defend their interests through voluntary cooperation. These are the skills that are relevant under ancap. These examples make it easy to show how ancap works. With these people, we will eventually build it. Or not ancap, but panarchy. Because systemic communists have their own mutual aid network, left-wing anarchists have theirs, nationalists have theirs. We are already streamlining society with ECU. It’s just that the streamlining is happening against the backdrop of opposing a single external threat.

– These are all very long terms, but young people have a short planning horizon. Don’t you think people might simply burn out?

– It’s important to switch. I’m temporarily finishing with street activity now and will find myself another occupation. Maybe it will be helping those who will still be detained. Maybe I’ll go give lectures on Bitcoin. Rest is switching to other types of activity. Parties are good in that they are large organizations with several different directions of work; burnout happens much slower than if you, for example, only participate in open-ended protests or only volunteer at elections.

– Parties seem to me a way to unproductively spend a huge amount of time. In my own channel, I also have the most diverse activities and answer questions on a wide variety of topics. But once I switched to street protest, I became close to burnout because there is no immediate result. It’s not like writing a post, discussing the publication, and then writing a new one tomorrow.

– Imagine that you’re just going to a fitness center. You also give yourself a regular load and change imperceptibly. In the process, it may be boring or unpleasant, but you see people around you doing the same thing, which also helps to motivate yourself.

– In short, we’ll keep pumping the invisible butt of the market. Alright, thanks for the story, good night)))

We will hit the passport, not the face

In connection with the recent publications from Bitarch regarding the construction of a non-violent society, I would like to recommend the anime series Psycho-Pass to everyone. Three seasons have been released, plus some side stories; so far, I have only watched the first.

The main protagonist of the series is a quasi-minarchist society in which an effective method for the prevention of violence has been developed, but not through genetic modification and BPN, as Bitarch suggests, but through the creation of a Big Brother capable of rapid diagnosis of tendencies toward violence. In all other matters, the state does not particularly interfere, although in the area of material production, it is unclear whether it is a market or socialism—under conditions of robotic abundance, it is easy to confuse the two.

The series is intelligent. It quotes Weber, Shakespeare, Pascal, Foucault, and discusses William Gibson and Philip K. Dick—in short, it is the kind of thing that our Ekaterina Schulmann would not be ashamed to recommend, although she prefers Pixar studio productions. It might be a bit difficult to watch at first; I got into it on my second attempt—but it is definitely worth the time spent.

Critique of Absolute Non-aggression

With some delay, I saw an article by Anton Epikhin on the RLN.Today channel, in which he discusses the idea of absolute NAP voiced by Bitarch. These thoughts seemed very interesting to me, as they appear more practical and illustrate that the same goal, if pursued as a tactical one, requires certain methods, whereas if pursued as a strategic one, it sometimes requires the exact opposite.

From the position of prioritizing a radical interpretation of the primacy and absolutization of the NAP, for example, a contract army is clearly better than a conscripted one, and the complete absence of an army is even better than its presence.

However, if the NAP is understood as a project-based direction of movement rather than a religious dogma, it becomes obvious that the existence of a national army ensures collective sovereignty for society. Therefore, it is better that it exists than not, and the presence of mass military conscription, unlike a compact conscript army, distributes power within society by involving broad layers of the population in the defensive function, preventing the repressive apparatus from being concentrated solely in the hands of the government.

Therefore, the optimal defense system for moving toward the NAP would be a ubiquitous, albeit currently compulsory, militia-volunteer force, rather than a purely “professional army,” or even more so, the elimination of the state’s repressive apparatus as such, as this would only guarantee the establishment of someone else’s repressive apparatus that is not subordinate to the local community. Gradually, once they become an accepted norm, the practices of local militias united into a nationwide defense system can become purely voluntary; however, for the NAP, the physical presence of such a militia is more important here than the voluntariness itself.

Read the full article on Dzen

Rules for Success for Libertarian Organizations. An Overview.

The host of the channel Right Argument for 14.88 rubles asked to criticize 12 points published on his channel: Part 1. Part 2.

Point No. 1: An idea needs only 10% convinced supporters to convert the remaining 90% of society to its side.

According to Taleb, 4% will be enough; there are studies suggesting even less is needed. If there is an active radical minority, its ideas begin to be taken into account. However, a society may end up with two such radical minorities. This is fraught with civil war. Is this a reason to abandon one’s idea? No, but it is worth considering this point.

Point No. 2: Ideology must intersect with the mainstream.

It is suggested to broadcast simple and clear slogans outwardly, leaving the sophisticated studies for the inner circle; otherwise, agitation will be easily countered by stupid memes about courts under ancap.

Point No. 3: If a movement consists of more intellectuals, then the ideology and culture within the movement will be more developed and attractive.

This is an antithesis to point 2. Without intellectuals, a movement to transform the world degenerates into a gathering of rowdy schoolkids, rejecting anyone remotely adequate. Upon receiving a complex question, an agitator must answer at the appropriate level, or admit that it is better to consult so-and-so.

Point No. 4: Arguments over axioms and cornerstones of theory between libertarians and leftists/etatists are a waste of time.

Unless it is a public dispute to win over the public’s sympathy or training debates to hone rhetorical skills.

Point No. 5: Internal enemies are a thousand times more dangerous than external ones.

When an organization begins to fight internal enemies, it means that the external ones have won without a fight. In general, one should not confuse the competition of ideas with the machinations of enemies.

Point No. 6: Watch your appearance.

One should not fall into the opposite extreme, or it will turn into a Putin-style lineup of technocrat governors.

Point No. 7: Stay away from people who are too old.

The largest audience is forty-year-old women; without their approval, you won’t get far. Thus, you need mature people who have a track record of success, and they are the ones who should be put in the storefront, while the task of the youth is active movement.

Point No. 8: Stay away from Russian social networks, but actively use foreign ones.

Every social network has its own pitfalls. Facebook and YouTube have censorship. VK has arrests. It is important to understand where the target audience is, how to speak with them, and what precautions to take.

Point No. 9: Convince people of other political views and inexperienced newcomers of the consistency and viability of libertarianism.

There is no need to obsess over trying to absolutely convert opponents to your teaching. It is more important to create a reputation for libertarians by your own example as people who are capable of agreement and consistent, with whom one can cooperate on specific issues. Then, an ideological drift in your direction becomes inevitable.

Point No. 10: We do not have good media resources, and those that exist are terrible in terms of effectively promoting ideas to the masses (this applies to this channel as well).

It is unclear what this point is doing in the list; it does not form a positive assertion.

Point No. 11: Track progress.

In the authors’ understanding, this refers to progress in metrics: number of subscribers, views, likes, and so on. I would suggest understanding this point in a more general way.

Point No. 12: We do not have very much time to realize our ambitions.

This is a demonstration of the authors’ high time preference. An ordinary young activist quickly burns out if they do not achieve significant success, after which they switch to what does bring success—usually a business career and family life. But social change is a longer process than the evolution of a specific activist’s priorities. A movement that does not take this into account can only win by chance.

Domestic violence

The artificial isolation of citizens in their apartments has already led to a surge in domestic violence. And while this is happening haphazardly and spontaneously worldwide—one cohabitant beating another—in Russia, the state is taking over the organization of domestic violence; it is seriously intent on defending its monopoly on violence, as it understands it.

For example, it recently organized armed robberies with breaking and entering targeting several members of the “Association of People’s Resistance,” as well as Vladimir Vorontsov, the lead of the Telegram channel Police Ombudsman. The former were released after being robbed and beaten. The latter was kidnapped and is still being held. The criminals chose an opportune time, while the entire country is locked in their homes and people cannot provide serious mutual support—aside from informing each other of danger and providing situational assistance in dealing with the aftermath.

However, classic non-state domestic violence has not disappeared either, and here civil society has slightly more opportunities, provided, of course, that the state does not throw a wrench in the works, as it loves to do. The Civil Society movement announced the launch of the Fortress project, under which it will provide temporary shelter for victims of domestic violence (alas, not from the cops), and the Open Russia movement announced that it would provide Fortress with organizational and legal assistance (which would include protection from the cops).

I very much hope it takes off.