Moral nativism is a theory that, in response to the question of where moral intuition, moral judgment, and other important elements of moral psychology come from, provides the answer that they are to some extent innate and emerged as a result of human biological evolution. Moral nativism relies on a two-stage argument. The first argument is that the mind contains a moral grammar: a complex system of principles, rules, and conceptual building blocks that generate and connect various mental representations upon which moral intuition depends. The second argument is that at least some of the fundamental attributes of this moral grammar are innate and are not based exclusively on experience, but rather come “from nature’s hand.” Cultural factors certainly influence the development of morality; nevertheless, a significant amount of evidence suggests that at least some aspects of moral cognition are innate.
How can we confirm the position of moral nativism? Darwin, de Waal, Kropotkin, and other biologists have emphasized that empathetic and altruistic behavior seems to have deep evolutionary roots. Rats experience stress when they hear the cries of other rats and perform altruistic acts to protect them from harm. Great apes experience evident grief over the death or disappearance of those to whom they were attached, and often comfort victims of attacks. Human infants cry more intensely in response to the crying of other infants than to comparable computer-generated sounds or even to a recording of their own crying; this means that “they react to the awareness of another’s pain, rather than simply to a specific pitch of sound.” Human children are also biologically predisposed to recognize and comfort those experiencing emotional distress. In a broader sense, young children are predisposed to help others achieve their goals, share valuable resources with them, and provide them with useful information. Furthermore, clinical and experimental studies have confirmed that specific areas of the brain underlie moral cognition, and that damage to these areas can lead to impaired moral judgments while leaving other cognitive functions intact.
We can also refer to norms that are universal across all societies. Research across hundreds of jurisdictions shows that the prohibition of murder appears to be universal and highly invariant. All known justifications and excusable reasons for committing murder consist of a relatively short list of defensive arguments familiar to everyone. Moreover, the attitude toward intentional killings specifically is even stricter. And a study conducted among ten cultures from different parts of the world, including residents of villages, cities, and even representatives of nomadic peoples, shows that battery, rape, theft, slander, and perjury are assessed as unlawful (i.e., “bad” or “extremely bad”) acts by about 95% of people.
Finally, one cannot fail to mention the theory of the violence inhibition mechanism, according to which many animal species and humans possess strong deterrents against causing harm to members of their own species. In animals, these deterrents are most often expressed through the ritualization of combat. In humans, they consist of unconditioned (innate) and conditioned (acquired during socialization) reflexes, primarily causing a reaction of rejection and internal resistance to witnessing the suffering of other people and performing aggressive actions toward them. Many studies, including anthropological and military ones, confirm that the average healthy individual possesses strong internal resistance to committing violence. And only a few, completely dysfunctional individuals, experience no resistance at all, even to committing murder—these are also called psychopaths.
