Тег: Coercion

Anarchism versus anarchy, an explication

I read an article by Konstantin Morozov with the beautiful title Anarchism vs. Anarchy.

Briefly, it states that: 1) there is philosophical anarchism, meaning the belief that the state has no moral right to coerce people, and there is political anarchism, meaning the belief that the state should be abolished; 2) political anarchism does not necessarily follow from philosophical anarchism, and one can deny the state the right to coercion without seeking to eliminate the state.

Konstantin claims: principled anarchism requires moral realism—the belief that objectively true moral judgments exist… because otherwise, anarchism itself would be nothing more than a set of someone’s personal desires. Meanwhile, anarchists do not deny the legitimacy of all coercion; they allow it to prevent more terrible coercion. But if coercion is permissible, for example, to prevent even more terrible coercion, then why cannot the state handle this? In other words, if the state behaves well, why should we demand its abolition? And any examples of bad states can always be dismissed as private cases subject to targeted correction.

The article would be incomplete if the author had not taken the trouble to address the obvious question: why does the state suppress its competitors in the matter of legitimate coercion? As a justification, it is argued that a proper state, to which philosophical anarchists should have no complaints, limits competitors for the sake of adhering to uniform, transparent procedural rules—in other words, to exclude vigilantism. That is, self-defense is fine, but dismembering a neutralized offender is not fine (shout out to Alexander Tatarkov and his constant leitmotif “we don’t need state prisons, give me the person who molested my daughter, I’ll sell him for organs”).

In the second part of the article, the author analyzes the question of how one might try to bypass the holes he found in the justification of political anarchism through moral subjectivism. It will not be possible to justify the state’s claim to exercise justified coercion if there is no single and universal standard for the justifiability of coercion. Next, he gallops through Stirner, Svetov, Belkovich, and Hoppe. Konstantin’s objections to the ideas of the aforementioned individuals boil down to the following:

If the individual himself is the final authority in determining good and bad, then why would coercing someone into moral orders to which they did not consent be wrong? Their subjective judgment on this matter cannot carry more weight than the equally subjective judgment of the person exercising the coercion that this coercion is justified.

In other words, in Konstantin’s opinion, if we take the position of moral subjectivism, we leave ideas about the necessity of abolishing the state even more without any support. For some, the state is evil; for others, it is good; everyone is right, let’s move on.

In conclusion, the author states that the most promising direction of work for anarchists is the search for strong practical arguments in favor of the idea that a stateless society will be effective, while any militant rhetoric directed at the state would be better tempered, looking instead at plans for various useful reforms.

I have already summarized Morozov’s previous article on moral realism once, but I never commented on it, and in the meantime, he has written more. In the next post, I do intend to speak out on the interesting questions he has raised.

Non-forceful measures and the logic of proponents of violent coercion

Voluntarist

As you know, proponents of voluntarism and ideas of non-violence actively advocate for non-violent measures for damage compensation, as well as punishments for those who violate agreements and criminals, such as ostracism, financial sanctions, deposits, transaction insurance, etc. The use of force is permissible only for the purpose of self-defense against a direct attack; in other cases, violence is absolutely unacceptable. There are many reasons why such a behavioral model is most optimal, which I have already discussed extensively in my previous materials. Now, we will examine one very common argument aimed at discrediting non-violent measures.

So, I am talking about reputational institutions and ostracism, about how a person who violates agreements or has committed an act of violence in the past can be blacklisted and denied future transactions. And do you know what argument often follows? “This looks like the social credit system in China, you are actually inhuman totalitarians! This is the ‘cancel culture’ currently practiced in the West; you just want to cruelly torture people and deprive them of the right to a normal life!”

Now I want to ask a question to those who express such criticism. What alternative do you propose? Let me guess: should everyone who has erred be beaten with clubs, dragged through courts in handcuffs, or perhaps locked behind bars for many years? Nothing else can be proposed; there is only one alternative to our non-violent measures—violent measures. So, how does it work: we, with our ostracism and financial sanctions, are inhuman totalitarians, but your clubs and prisons are humane and extremely civil tools? If anyone believes this, they are simply a complete idiot!

And, by the way, we do not propose a lifelong “cancellation” of the offending person, which some also mention. In fact, it can be avoided entirely: if a person immediately admits their guilt and willingness to compensate for the damage, no ostracism or blacklists threaten them. In the end, everyone benefits if the perpetrator works off the damage they caused at their own pace and in conditions where they can work with maximum productivity. Also, to put a person behind bars, you will need to forcibly take a portion of peaceful people’s funds (i.e., forcibly tax them) to maintain the prison infrastructure and the prisoner himself. Of course, if someone doesn’t mind paying for this—let them pay, and let them offer criminals their own measure for lifting ostracism in the form of voluntary imprisonment. But I do not want to pay for this. What will you do, beat me with a club too? Then you are a violent aggressor, absolutely no better than any other!

Furthermore, one should not say that non-violent measures won’t work because a criminal can bypass them simply by committing further acts of violence and stealing for their own sustenance. Even in such a case, their life would be extremely unpleasant, since a whole range of goods and services cannot simply be taken and stolen, and if a criminal decides to attack, they can be stopped by means of self-defense. Do not forget that we advocate for general armament and have nothing against self-defense during a direct attack!