You all know that old story about the little mice whom anyone could bully and devour as they pleased. So the mice went to the wise eagle owl and asked him what they should do so that they would no longer be bullied.
– Mice, – said the wise eagle owl, – become hedgehogs. Hedgehogs have needles; no one bullies them.
The mice were overjoyed, but then they thought it over and asked:
– How exactly do we become hedgehogs?
– Leave me alone, that’s tactics, and I deal with strategy, – the wise eagle owl answered them.
But no one has told you until now what happened next. Well, listen up.
So the owl told them about strategy, hooted mockingly, swallowed one mouse whole, and flew off to his hollow, while the mice rushed home in terror. Later they calmed down a bit and reasoned: after all, it’s true, hedgehogs have needles, and no one bullies them. Let’s go to the hedgehog.
The mice came to the hedgehog and said:
– Hedgehog, we are little mice, everyone bullies us. But you are something else, with your needles, no one touches you; take us as your wives.
The hedgehog snorted and replied:
– I’m a hedgehog, a proud bird. You can’t screw a hedgehog for shit. I have no need for this social burden of yours. I don’t touch you, and you don’t touch me! Am I making myself clear?
The mice waved their paws, twitched their whiskers and squeaked:
– Hedgehog, don’t think we’re freeloaders, we’ll keep things honest. Maybe you need something too? We can bring you seeds.
– Pffft to you and your carbohydrate diet, – the hedgehog grumbled, – now a worm, I could really devour a worm.
Then the mice huddled together, whispered, rustled their tails, and then turned around and solemnly announced:
– Hedgehog! You’ll have your worms! And grasshoppers, and all sorts of other flies. We don’t eat those, but we’ll get them for you. And in return, don’t let anyone bully us. Deal?
The hedgehog wasn’t a fool himself and would have liked to snack on a mouse if the occasion arose, but then he thought: that’s it, no more tedious night hunting, food delivered to the door—just imagine how much leisure time will open up!
– Deal, – he said.
And so, one day a fox came out to scavenge. He found a burrow, smelled mice, got excited, and thought he’d dig it up right now. But from inside, the hedgehog sharpened his needles and gave him a real wallop!
The fox started yapping: his nose hurt, his paws hurt, and there was nothing he could do. He yapped and yapped, and then limped away to find himself easier, more defenseless prey. And the mice remained to live and prosper with the hedgehog.
And that is the end of the fairy tale, but that’s where the history begins. Word spread through the forest, and other animals also began to help each other protect themselves from predators. Before, they used to hide or scatter, a predator would catch one for dinner, and be satisfied with that. But now they stopped letting such robbery slide.
Some predators fled the forest forever, others adapted somehow and switched to a more modest diet. One thing led to another: private property, division of labor, freedom of trade, and the doctrine of deterrence. Living together became convenient, profitable, and safe. That is how we gradually built our Zootopia.
In the past (150-200 years ago and earlier), laws were much more primitive than they are now. Many aspects of life were not regulated at all, many definitions of terms were missing (for example, “everyone must pray loudly in the mornings” — how loud is loud, and where is the boundary of the morning?), and many points were left to the discretion of the subjects of law and the enforcers. Additionally, everyone had the right to carry weapons, and the tax burden was quite primitive. Can it be considered that the society of that time was much closer to ancap than the current one? And if so, why did we take the wrong turn?
анонимный вопрос
On this topic, it is worth first revisiting one of our videos about the stationary bandit, where we explain this simple theory and show how the natural state turned into the strange absurdity we have now.
Specifically, the video indicates where we took the wrong turn. We took the wrong turn every time we traded freedom for security. In the case of the proto-ancap of Ireland or Iceland, we are talking about the external conquest of quite blatant backwaters, so one could say it didn’t matter what the natives chose; they effectively had no choice, and brute force decided. But in the USA, you cannot rely on the factor of external conquest, as they managed to win the War of Independence in a mode of anarchy. But after that, there was indeed a turn in the wrong direction. In a free market, competition among producers is beneficial to the consumer. But to the producer, of course, a monopoly is beneficial. There are more consumers, but they are worse organized. A cohesive minority is capable of securing a disproportionately large amount of influence. Thus, in the USA, the federal government began to swell, introducing economic regulations, and the state of affairs in the states began to look less and less like ancap. They put a finger in the state’s mouth, and it bit off the whole arm.
From a slightly different perspective, but in much greater detail, this process is examined in the book by Rodion Belkovich, Blood of Patriots, which I recently pirated (don’t forget to donate to the CRI after reading, as the author dislikes pirates and needs to be re-educated). In Europe, the same processes took place with even greater permissiveness from society because they never even got a whiff of real anarchy, so they tried to invent an unreal one based on the denial of private property.
Next, check out our second video on the conditions for the stability of anarchy.
There, we talk about the main condition without which nothing will work. Looking at the macro level, it is a matter of prevailing values. The value of freedom must be higher than the value of security; otherwise, it will be impossible to turn toward ancap, and even if one manages to get there, without the personal protection of one’s rights, it is easy to return to slavery.
But how can freedom remain more valuable than security if the value of human life is growing? The thing is, there are living people on the aggressor’s side too, and they also value security. The willingness to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker during defense is the basis of the deterrence doctrine, about which we also made a video, and I suggest finishing today’s topic with it.
Bitarch’s Column (with editorial edits by Ancap-chan)
When you want to achieve a certain goal, you choose one of many available tools. Suppose a hostel has opened in your house, which constantly creates noise and a criminogenic environment near your home. What can you do? The simplest option at first glance is to force the owner to close their business by using physical violence.
But what if they have at least a pepper spray? Now, in the event of your attack, your potential costs have increased. Violence as a tool no longer looks as profitable as it seemed initially. So, willy-nilly, you have to look for other ways to influence them—persuading, explaining the situation to the property owner so they terminate the lease, giving the hostel a one-star review on online resources, and calling on other residents of the building to do the same. In short, you have a incentive to act civilly.
Initially, the simplest tool of coercion, physical violence, quickly loses its effectiveness when the potential victim is capable of applying counter-violence, even in the smallest amount. The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, once praised violence as a tool of extremely high efficiency. But for this to be the case, he had to introduce some of the strictest rules for purchasing and owning weapons in Singapore, even for self-defense—because even a slight leveling of the balance of violence potential in society leads to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of violence as a tool of coercion.
I can propose a hypothesis well-supported by facts: the costs of aggressive violence increase exponentially as the possibilities for counter-violence by the victim increase.
Suppose a stationary bandit (the state) wants to use violence to force someone to comply with its demands. If the victim of state aggression has no lethal weapon, a small operational group is sufficient for the arrest. But what if the victim has a pistol? Police special forces must be sent. For a minor reason, such as unpaid fines or the retail sale of psychoactive substances, no one will send special forces. In Alexander Rozov’s blog, there is a post with confirmation of this fact using the example of Sweden.
Suppose the potential victim of state aggression is not some tax delinquent, but a more significant target—for example, a clan leader in Somalia. He doesn’t just have a pistol, but a thousand fighters with Kalashnikov rifles, albeit poorly trained. As history has shown, the damage even from such “bandits” proved unacceptable for the US government.
Imagine that the followers of the Branch Davidians sect, who took refuge at the Waco ranch in 1993, had anti-tank grenade launchers in addition to shotguns and rifles. As we know, the FBI decided to use tanks at the time to ram the walls and release tear gas. If the defenders had anti-tank weapons, such an option would have had to be rejected as excessively risky.
In such a situation, the state could either turn the assault on the ranch from a police operation into an army operation, using mortars or other lethal indiscriminate weapons, or starve the ranch out, with the prospect that these fanatics would indeed all die of hunger. Both options in a democratic state are fraught with significant political damage, which for politicians is even more important than economic damage to the state. For more details on such factors, I recommend reading Martin van Creveld’s book The Rise and Decline of the State.
Finally, we have already analyzed a potential situation where a potential victim of state violence threatens the use of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, this is perceived as something extremely unlikely—not because the state effectively prevents the creation of WMDs by private individuals, but because people who have enough skills to create WMDs also have strong internal moral convictions that preclude the use of indiscriminate mass violence, including against innocent people. If a democratic state sets an example by being the first to use WMDs against its own citizens, this moral prohibition will be weakened, and over time will disappear altogether. No official in a relatively civilized state is ready to allow such consequences.
Conclusions can be drawn:
1) The costs of coercion by the state or any other aggressor increase exponentially as the means of counter-violence by the victim are strengthened. Minimal self-defense weapons, therefore, sharply raise the price of an attack, and against a cheap dirty bomb made from nuclear waste, even the nuclear arsenal of a superpower will be ineffective.
2) In order for a free society (a territorial or extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction) to protect itself from conquest by the state, it is more profitable for it not to invest in a single “wonder weapon,” but to provide incentives for clients to acquire personal weapons, skills for their use, and the readiness to use them for defense. This will also help society protect itself from its own coordinating bodies, should they decide to become a state, since it will ensure an even distribution of the potential for violence. This is discussed, in particular, in the previously translated work by Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Dissolution.
Finally, I will provide a good quote from the book The Liberal Archipelago by Chandran Kukathas.
Take gamblers and casino owners. Their activities may be alien or even repulsive to us. However, would the fact that gambling takes place in another country be sufficient grounds for invading it?
Take “monopolists.” They may set prices for their products that we consider unfair. However, would we consider the fact that a country supplies its goods too expensively a sufficient ground for declaring war on that country?
But why are we ready in similar cases to send armed men (police) to our fellow citizens, take them captive (prison), and take tribute from them (fine)? Probably because, unlike a neighboring state, they cannot defend themselves.
Holon Synergetic has published an article criticizing the deterrence doctrine, which we write about periodically. Let’s clarify some points.
1) One should not confuse the deterrence doctrine with terrorism. DD is a strategy for increasing the costs of initiating aggression. Methods for increasing costs may not involve the use of physical violence at all. Perhaps Holon has not read all of our articles on DD and missed this one. If DD is non-violent, it is harder for the state to slap a terrorist label on libertarians.
2) No wunderwaffen (robo-bees, genetically modified viruses, and especially doomsday weapons) are required for DD. Relying on wunderwaffen is by no means a libertarian strategy, as they are extremely complex, expensive, and will be available to few (meaning these people will be able to coerce others, ultimately recreating the status quo). For a stable free society according to Hirschleifer, a balance of violence potential (BVP) is needed; that is, weapons and deterrence strategies must be extremely simple and accessible to the maximum number of people.
3) For deterrence weapons, unlike weapons for classical wars, the “shell and armor” competition is practically inapplicable. Unacceptable damage can be inflicted in a million different ways, and new ones are constantly appearing. It is not for nothing that after the appearance of nuclear weapons, people began to talk about nuclear deterrence, rather than the development of a nuclear bomb neutralizer.
To protect against each type of deterrence weapon, separate “armor” is needed. For example, if the deterring party has ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and micro-drones, to intercept a retaliatory strike, one must have air defense/missile defense for each type, and with a large margin. So many ways to cause pain can be devised that even the nearly boundless US military budget would not be enough for defense.
4) An excursion into the history of medieval proto-panarchies shows that the demand for such institutions has existed for a long time, and now the theory is better developed and the technological level is higher. Furthermore, it is not necessary to involve the entire society in DD. Even a few will create a positive externality for others, as the example of the Femgericht perfectly demonstrates.
5) Regarding universal transparency, a standalone deterrence strategy can also be created on its basis. A libertarian jurisdiction might have no weapons for a retaliatory strike against state facilities at all, only many cameras and streaming to the network (to a server that is not subject to censorship and via a channel that cannot be suppressed—for example, Elon Musk’s Starlink, which uses a narrow beam). If a stationary bandit attempts to attack this jurisdiction, the broadcast of the attack to the network with all its juicy moments will deal a blow to the legitimacy of the government (tolerance for violence is currently extremely low, and various human rights activists will begin to undermine the careers of those who ordered the attack). Residents of such a libertarian jurisdiction would not need weapons more complex than household items—only to make the picture more colorful, otherwise the brief “they flew in and rounded them up” show will not gain a critical mass of views.
A similar strategy was successfully used by American black civil rights activists in the 1950s. Black activists sat in seats for whites on buses, refused to give them up at the request of the conductor, and the police arrested them. Public organizations often paid their fines to multiply the number of participants in such actions. Such cases were actively covered in the media, and irritation toward officials supporting segregation began to grow in society. Eventually, the supporters of segregation had to give in.
Rosa Parks, pioneer of trolling bus companies and segregation laws
I commented on Bitark’s column about promoting libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit to the effect that this is largely knocking on an open door: the bandit nature of the state is quickly recognized by any interlocutor, and from there, discussions begin about the lesser of two evils. In particular, in Russia, there is a popular theme of appealing to the experience of the nineties of the last century, when there was a dominance of nomadic bandits.
All three conditions for the stability of anarchy according to Hirshleifer were not met in Russia in the nineties, meaning there was no libertarianism in the nineties.
To this, I am forced to state that Bitark is again knocking on an open door, and there is no question that there was libertarianism in the nineties, unless, of course, you are arguing with a troll. The point is that to promote libertarianism through the theory of the stationary bandit, one needs to present arguments on how to prevent the dominance of nomadic bandits after abolishing the stationary one.
Also interesting is the criticism from Vladimir Zolotorev, who quite rightly points out that a stationary bandit is more dangerous than a nomadic one, because he is capable of inflicting far greater damage on society, and at the same time ensures that society is left with no strength to fight any bandits whatsoever. He does not write it explicitly, but it follows from this premise that returning to the era of nomadic bandits is an acceptable price for society to pay for the destruction of the stationary bandit, although, ideally, the choice should be not between stationary and nomadic bandits, but between the presence of a bandit and their absence.
So, we seem to have agreed: the bandit is not needed, let’s get rid of him, we need to ensure a balance of violence potential in society, and we will have stable anarchy. But then, from a reader with the nickname Holon Synergetic, came criticism of the proposed mechanisms of the deterrence doctrine (the text arrived via private channels, and I am publishing it on Telegraph, which serves as a neutral platform).
The text is very long and difficult to perceive, so I will provide a brief explication:
1. As follows from Mazarra’s article on the deterrence doctrine, the translation of which I recently posted, the perception factor is very important for successful deterrence. The opponent must understand that when a potential victim shouts, “I’ll pull your eye over your ass if you take one more step,” the victim is actually ready to carry out their threats because they are backed into a corner and have no way out other than to unleash their arsenals for pulling eyes over asses. At the same time, the potential aggressor must by no means be put in an equally desperate position where they have no choice but to risk an eye and take a step forward. However, the more successfully such a doctrine is implemented, the more often threats will be a bluff—simply for reasons of economy. 2. The state also implements a deterrence doctrine regarding members of society who wish to destroy it. One of the most reliable ways for it is to take society hostage. Every member of society must understand that any threats or, God forbid, real actions against state representatives will only make things worse for a conditional city like Voronezh. Thus, the state invented the concept of extremism, and now extremists are to blame for any tightening of the screws; all these security measures are undertaken precisely to protect society from them. Rare successful actions against the state only confirm that extremism is not a fiction and state security measures are justified. 3. Attempts to propose increasingly technological weapons for fighting state representatives, such as micro-drones and the uberization of violence, will lead to the state starting to protect citizens from micro-drones and uber-violence with great pleasure, and for this, completely totalitarian methods of control over all aspects of life will be required. In the limit, this arms race leads to a situation where doomsday weapons become available to everyone, and then it’s just coffin, coffin, cemetery, game over. 4. As a dessert, there is a historical excursion into medieval Saxony, where something very close to my described concept of uber-retribution was successfully practiced. Nevertheless, the system did not survive its time, like all other medieval elements of panarchy, and gave way to the state monopoly on judgment and punishment. The author suggests thinking about whether such an outcome was inevitable.
The main conclusion I would draw from this tangle of arguments is the following consideration. No single doctrine is a panacea. The state is in the minds. This means that although in some cases the problem of the state can be successfully simplified by cutting off particularly obstructive heads or the threat of such decapitation, the decisive importance still lies with the means of indoctrination in freedom. These, in turn, must be selected individually.
At the beginning of December, someone anonymously sent me a text for editing; I rewrote it beyond recognition, and now it is posted in the public channel Deterrence Doctrine. I didn’t publish it here, but recently in my cozy chat, a long argument broke out due to some vague disputes at a Moscow New Year’s party for decision-makers, and so, I remembered it, which is why I’m posting the text here.
You are being bullied in the workplace—how do you solve the problem? If you don’t intend to run away or kill everyone secretly, then you need to develop a deterrence doctrine—that is, establish a line of behavior that makes the pleasure the group gets from bullying you less than the potential costs of doing so.
The clearest and most powerful measure that avoids open warfare is to gather compromising material on everyone who bullies you, store it in a secure location that allows for quick publication, and then casually let the bullies see samples of the material. From then on, they will hate you exclusively in secret, but will communicate with you in a pointedly neutral manner. In terms of implementation complexity, this is roughly as if you were a state creating a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying each of your potential adversaries.
Making acquaintances with some tough guys from the outside is also a decent measure; however, this will require some communication skills, not just the ability to work with information. In this scenario, they might still huff in your direction, but they will try to keep your irritation below the radar: after all, you are unlikely to incite your support group to step in for you over trivialities. In terms of complexity, this is as if you were a state joining NATO.
The most reliable way is, of course, to bulk up, get experience in sparring, overcome the natural omega-like inability to strike first, and then, in response to another episode of bullying, address the participant who seems like a manageable opponent: something like, “You’re only brave when you’re in a pack, or are you too chicken to go one-on-one?” Essentially, it doesn’t matter who wins the ensuing fight; what matters is that it happens at all, one-on-one, and that you manage to demonstrate a sufficient level of resilience. If you cause significant damage to your opponent, all the better. In terms of complexity, this is as if you were Finland and the Soviet Union was bullying you. Finland, as a reminder, turned out to be the only country that, despite losing to the USSR as a result of World War II, maintained its relative independence, and was actually reckoned with because dealing with this little psycho was more trouble than it was worth.
And finally, if you’re too scared to fight honestly, but the hatred is building and you don’t want to pursue a career as the Joker, then buy some pepper spray, ambush one of the harassers, spray them in the eyes, knock them down, and kick them. Then inform all the others that they can, of course, kill you, but if they don’t and simply continue their bullying, you will get to every single one of them. This is as if you were a country training terrorists, and there were no USA in the world, only the EU.
The general line of thinking is roughly this: you need to demonstrate that you are prepared to exert significant effort and incur significant costs to rid yourself of the bullying, and that you have no intention of simply enduring it and crying into your pillow.
But the best thing is simply to stop being an omega. You won’t be bullied not only if people fear the consequences, but also if you are simply likable and useful to the members of the collective. This is as if you were Japan, exporting anime and Toyota.
I would like to present to your attention a translation of an article by Mike Mazarr, dedicated to modern approaches to the United States’ deterrence doctrine regarding other states. The author works at the RAND Corporation and previously served in Naval Intelligence.
The article is interesting in that it departs from rather primitive notions of deterrence based on game theory and focuses on methodological subjectivism, which is so valued by proponents of the Austrian school. Therefore, libertarians should find the content of the article easy and pleasant to digest, and for my part, I have tried to make the reading even easier and more pleasant by significantly simplifying the rather ponderous language of the article.
By the way, I have collected all the translations, which were scattered across my site, into a general section; feel free to use it.
Ancap-chan, in her post about LPR and security forces, lamented that in a direct confrontation with the state, the libertarian party behaves not in accordance with its public rhetoric about what ought to be, but like ordinary peaceful law-abiding citizens. One can talk as much as they want about the state being a bandit, about the aggressor’s sanction that allows for the removal of government officials without trial or investigation, and so on, but as we see, this does not translate into a real program of action and likely will not.
Why does this happen? Most would probably say that people are “simply intimidated and afraid to push their luck,” “the state is stronger,” and other such nonsense. But the government of the Russian Empire was by no means a cute bunny and far exceeded Putin’s in terms of cruelty. Nevertheless, it was opposed by determined fellows with their own often suicidal doctrine of individual terror. This was an incomparably greater extremism than the behavior of modern Russian oppositionists, who do not even dare to do what is widely practiced in modern Hong Kong—for example, go out into the street in a mask, shine a weak laser in a policeman’s eye, and then flee unidentified.
Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann constantly speaks of a global trend toward the reduction of violence and the strengthening of security values. According to Inglehart’s values map, Russians are particularly characterized by values of individualism and security; therefore, it is not surprising that their behavior is so different from that of the residents of Hong Kong, who embrace values of development. Thus, we will have to build our struggle strategies based on this fact. If we want to create a mass resistance movement against the stationary bandit, the methods it uses must be as non-violent as possible.
As we wrote in previous articles, the meaning of the deterrence doctrine is to increase the costs of initiating violence for the aggressor. In this regard, it does not matter exactly how the costs are increased for officials and security forces. But since we want to create a mass campaign (so that as many people as possible participate), the methods must be maximally non-violent, and the necessary actions for participants (the level of difficulty) must be the simplest.
Such a means, of course, is a service for the de-anonymization of officials and security forces. Alexander Litreev launched a project with similar goals called “Russian Elephant,” but only the first name, last name, and photo of security personnel who showed cruelty are added there. Not even a home address. Litreev positions his project as “absolutely legal” (which should be read as: “obeying all orders of the stationary bandit”), so it will have no serious impact on the state. It is foolish to hope for victory by playing by the rules of the bandits, which they write for themselves.
To truly increase the costs for stationary bandits, I envision a service roughly like this:
1) It is implemented as a website but operates under TOR, like all darknet sites such as Hydra. This provides maximum security while maintaining ease of use. The TOR browser is already installed for many people (enough to download and launch, everything works “out of the box”) on all platforms (Windows/Linux, Android/iOS). Despite known cases of .onion site hacks followed by the installation of malicious scripts for user de-anonymization, all of these were carried out by the FBI, CIA, and NSA. Uncle Sam, of course, is just as much of a stationary bandit as Pynya, but he will never help Pynya crush his opponents. Thus, even a bare TOR browser without additional anonymization tools (VPN, disk encryption, Linux instead of Windows, accessing the network via an anonymous phone and SIM card), TOR provides practically 100% anonymity against local guardians of stability, i.e., against the FSB. A low entry barrier will allow for the attraction of the maximum number of people, even those who are not technically savvy. This also greatly simplifies development (it is created as a regular website and then hosted on .onion).
2) The website collects a database of officials and security forces of all ranks, posting absolutely all information that could be found—first name, last name, residential addresses, phone numbers, social media profiles, the wife’s place of work, connections with mistresses, car license plate. We are deterring bandits, so obeying their own “law”/order “On the Protection of Personal Data” is the height of absurdity!
3) The site is populated by concerned users. The entire database is in open access, and its snapshot is posted daily for offline download (so it is not lost if the FSB manages to seize the server). Data appears on the site after verification by moderators to exclude the intentional entry of people not involved with stationary bandits.
4) Each profile of an official or security officer will have crowdfunding (like on Kickstarter) to conduct a campaign to “increase the costs of aggression” (retribution) against that person. People will contribute bitcoins, suggest options, carry out retribution, and send a report to the moderators. If everything is correct, the executor will receive all the money from the fund of that official/security officer. Similarly, one can motivate the collection of data on a specific official (home address, car number, mobile number, etc.).
5) Only non-violent methods of retribution are permitted (killing or causing physical harm to health is forbidden). It is forbidden to list the children of officials and security forces as objects of retribution. In this way, the creators of the service cannot be portrayed to the public as ruthless terrorists, and the bandit’s relatives will not be as enraged as in the case of his death, while those who would like to replace him will be pleased. Here are examples of permissible methods of retribution: posting flyers with photos in the entrance, writing on the door, filling the lock with glue, writing on the car, reporting something to the wife’s workplace, filling the apartment with odorant, splashing with zelyonka. Impermissible: smashing a head, breaking legs, splashing with acid, setting the apartment on fire. Always remember: deterrence is not war!
As you can see, this service does not require the use of violence and is easy to use, which gives good chances of attracting a large number of people.
The libertarian eagle is anonymized and safe; the bandit is deprived of such luxury
In many plays staged in ancient theater, an unusual technique for resolving character conflicts was often used — “Deus ex machina” (“God from the machine”). It consisted of the sudden appearance of a new god-like character on stage at the end of the work, who had not been mentioned previously in the performance and had the ability to quickly resolve the heroes’ problems. Simply put, external forces solved the heroes’ problems without delving into the essence of the conflict. This technique is suitable not only for works of art, but can also be useful for political transformations aimed at the destatization of society.
Let’s look at any libertarian public page on social media, chat, website, stream, podcast, or channel. What will we see? Most likely, an endless discussion of the same topics — how libertarian courts work, who will build roads under ancap, contractual slavery, abortions, the agency of children, nuclear weapons, drugs, the Austrian School of Economics versus Keynesianism and state planning, minarchism versus ancap, ancap versus panarchy, territorial communities versus ECUs. Often, this boils over into an endless holy war, where people spend many days in a row defending their point of view.
But the thing is, if you argue endlessly among yourselves and spend all your resources on it, you won’t achieve much! And is it even necessary? Perhaps there exists a single universal recipe for how to resolve all these problems at once and spend our scarce resources for the benefit of the movement?!
Yes, it exists and is found in the very nature of the state — a stationary bandit can conquer a society only when the balance of violence potential (BVP) is disrupted, while when this balance is maintained, a stateless society exists quite stably, as proven within the methodology of neo-institutionalism. You can hear about this briefly and clearly in the first part of Alexander Auzan’s lecture “Evolution of the Stationary Bandit.” After the formation of centralized coercive structures (the state), movement in the opposite direction toward a decentralized society becomes impossible without applying external effort to the system (this pattern is analogous to the second law of thermodynamics: heat will not spontaneously transfer from a colder body to a warmer one).
If we restore the BVP, the costs of initiating violence become higher than the costs of defense, and the territorial monopoly of the state simply disappears. Beyond that, everything else simply doesn’t matter! Of course, it is better to know the answer in advance as to who will build roads or how to determine the agency of children, but even without that, people will have no choice but to solve this without the state. It simply cannot exist when the BVP is maintained. If you are a programmer or simply know Boolean logic, you understand well: after calculating the value of the first operand in a conjunction (&&), you don’t need to calculate all the other operands if it is FALSE, as the result of the conjunction will be FALSE anyway. Or for a disjunction (||), you can skip calculating the other operands if the first is TRUE, because the result will be TRUE anyway.
It follows that a sufficient condition for the transition to libertarianism is merely bringing the violence potential in society to a more uniform distribution. As you have probably already guessed, this can be achieved by creating and spreading tools for the doctrine of deterrence (DD).
The advantage of this approach is that the development, production, and implementation of DD tools into wide use can be carried out by a much broader circle of people than those currently involved in political campaigning and protest actions. Co-opting techies who can assemble a drone, a blinding laser, or other interesting tools from freely available parts to fight the regime is far more promising in terms of expanding the protest base than limiting recruitment to humanities scholars and economists who are well-versed in the nuances of ideology. Even more useful is the involvement of engineers and managers capable of organizing the mass production of such items, which is also a very numerous category. It should also be noted that semi-cottage production or writing a software product is easily hidden from the state and is therefore safer than attending rallies, which serves as an additional stimulating factor.
When reliable, mass-produced, and inexpensive tools for deterring aggressors are available even to a grandmother, it won’t be long before the “market decides” the fate of the state. After the deus ex machina does its work, all of today’s theoretical disputes about how to organize under ancap will abruptly move into the practical plane. We observed something similar relatively recently, when economists argued about whether it was possible to return to the gold standard in the era of fiat money, and then Satoshi arrived, and now instead of the gold standard we have the bitcoin standard. That’s it, the subject of the dispute has vanished; the agenda is now the widespread practical implementation of private hard money.
In the LiveJournal blog of science fiction writer Alexander Rozov (known primarily for his Meganesian cycle), an interesting post was published regarding the idea of a “vaccination against violence” applied by the Senoi people in Malaysia. Based on other posts in his blog, it is easy to conclude that Rozov sympathizes with the idea of the deterrence doctrine (DD) — manifestations of it are mentioned with enviable regularity.
Why is the Senoi culture of interest to us? This is an extremely primitive ethnic group in technological terms, where blowguns with poisoned arrows are still used as weapons. Nevertheless, the Malays at the end of the 19th century, according to Miklouho-Maclay, were clearly afraid to touch them. The fact is that from early childhood, every Senoi person learns intolerance toward violence. To any initiation of aggression directed at them, they are obliged to apply counter-violence instead of appealing to an external authority. This idea is instilled throughout their entire lives — every morning at breakfast, Senoi families tell each other about their dreams and how they confronted danger, if there was any in them.
Rozov
highlights the main points of Senoi
society:
1. On one hand, the Senoi are clearly not people prone to tolerating violence against themselves (the Malays would not have feared the weapons of these almost primitive characters otherwise, nor would they have described how quickly a person hit by the combat element of Senoi weaponry dies).
2. On the other hand, internal Senoi tribal customs are clearly not aggressive and are not built on violence.
3. Miklouho-Maclay believed that the Senoi were a dying ethnic group (since they were clearly at a lower level of socio-technical development than the surrounding Malays). But now, 150 years after Miklouho-Maclay’s research, the Senoi population is roughly the same as it was then. In other words, it is a quite stable population.
And he
draws the primary conclusion:
“Active opposition to a threat. As it turns out, this trait does not contradict peaceful, non-aggressive customs at all. On the contrary, it is a complementary element. For someone who knows how and is ready to defend themselves, it is easier to be non-aggressive.”
Friendly natives and their deadly weapons
The described example shows that super-modern bee-sized drones or nuclear missiles are not at all mandatory for the successful implementation of the deterrence doctrine. All that is needed is the willingness of as many people as possible in society to apply counter-violence, thereby increasing the costs of initiating aggression. Specifically how they are increased does not matter much. Even light mockery, spitting, a sidelong glance, ignoring, boycotting, shaming, and other actions without any violence at all, but applied by a large number of people, will make the life of any politician unbearable and force them to stop working for a stationary bandit (in terms of the deterrence doctrine: the costs of counter-violence will exceed the benefit of initiating violence, the conditional salary received from the stationary bandit, who, in turn, obtained these funds by coercing citizens to pay taxes).
One can even derive a dependency: the more people in a particular society are intolerant of violence, the less powerful (and, accordingly, technologically complex) weaponry is necessary for the successful deterrence of an aggressor. If in some country only one (!) person is ready to apply counter-violence against an aggressor on the level of the USA, then the only option for deterrence is nuclear weapons with a “dead hand” auto-launch system (which is extremely complex and insanely expensive), but if 90% of the population are ready to apply counter-violence, blowguns will suffice. The war in Somalia (the invasion and subsequent retreat of the US army) demonstrated this perfectly.
The image is clickable. The power units are conventional; the mathematical apparatus for the deterrence doctrine in this direction has not been developed
